EFTA00194687

(quoted above), and having an effective date of 1999 through July 26, 2006. Sec 
endnotc 1 hereto. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant's conduct occurred during 
the time period from the age of 17, January 2004 until approximately May 2005. 
Complaint, ¶117, 18. Thus, the version in effect in 2004-2005 of 18 U.S.C. §2255 
applies. 
Under applicable law, the statute in effect at the time of the alleged conduct 
applies. See U.S. 
Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. 1 (E.D.CaI. Jan. 11, 2010); 
U.S.I. Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. 
Fercnci, 2009 
WL 2579102, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. I. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, fn. 1 
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. 
Zane 2009 WL 2567832, fn.l (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18 
2009). In each of these cases, the referenced footnote states — 
Prior to July 27, 2006, the last sentence in Section §2255(a) read "Any 
person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have 
sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value." Under the civil statute, 
the minimum restitution amount for any violation of Section 2252 (the 
predicate act at issue) is $150,000 for violations occurring after July 27, 2006 
and $50,000 for violations occurring prior to $50,000. 
Even with the typo (the extra "$50,000") at the end of the quoted sentence, it is 
clear that the Court applied the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct 
constituting one of the statutorily enumerated predicate acts, which is consistent with 
applicable law discussed more fully below herein. 
It is an axiom of law that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen, 488 
U.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf I. USI Film 
Products 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994): 
... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our 
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. 
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an 
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled 
13 
EFTA00194807

expectations should not be lightly disrupted .This For that reason, the "principle that the 
legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the 
conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser, 494 U.S., at 855, 110 
S.Ct., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both 
commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people 
confidence about the legal consequences of their actions. 
F1418. See General Motors Corp. 
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 
1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of 
unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because 
it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions"); 
[Further citations omitted]. 
It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in 
several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits 
retroactive application of penal legislation.PN19 Article I, § 10, el. 1, prohibits States 
from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws "impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts." The Fifth Amendments Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other 
government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for 
a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation." The prohibitions on "Bills of 
Attainder" in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons 
and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e.g., United States'. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1719-1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The 
Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be 
compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's 
prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive 
application. Usetyl. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 
49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). 
F1419. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, 
cl. 3), the other to the States (§ 10, cl. 1). We have construed the Clauses as 
applicable only to penal legislation. See Calder 
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390-391, 1 
L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The 
Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly 
and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a 
risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution 
against unpopular groups or ilividuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for 
"1498 the Court in Weaver . Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 
(1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have "fair warning" 
• about the effect of criminal statutes, but also "restricts governmental power by 
restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at 
963-964 (citations omitted). "a°
F1420. See Richmond'. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 5.O. 706, 
732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that 
promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against 
the enactment of a post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern 
about. the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of 
14 
EFTA00194808

private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is 
best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create 
the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been committed") 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James!. United 
States, 366 U.S. 213, 247, n. 3, 81 act. 1052, 1052, n. 3, 6 L.Ed.2d 2 6 (1961) 
(retroactive punitive measures may reflect "a purpose not to prevent dangerous 
conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or 
classes of persons"). 
These well entrenched constitutional protections and presumptions against 
retroactive application of legislation establish that 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005) in effect at the 
time of the alleged conduct applies to the instant action, and not the amended version. 
B. Not only is there no clear express intent stating that the statute is to apply 
retroactively, but applying the current version of the statute, as amended in 2006, would 
be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as it 
would be applied to events occurring before its enactment and would increase the penalty 
or punishment for the alleged crime. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. 1. U.S.'. 
Seigel, 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. 
Edwards 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); and 
generally, Calder 
Bull 3 U.S. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798). 
The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex 
post facto Law shall be passed" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it " cappli[es] to events occurring before its 
enactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the 
definit n of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." 
L nce 
Mathis 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting 
Weaver 
Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). 
U.S... Siegel,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998). 
§2255 is contained in Title 18 of the United States Codes - "Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure, Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children." 
18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and imposes a 
presumptive minimum of damages in the amount of $50,000, should Plaintiff prove any 
15 
EFTA00194809

violation of the specified criminal statutes and that she suffered personal injury and 
sustained actual damages. Thus, the effect of the 2006 amendments, effective July 27, 
2006, would be to triple the amount of the statutory minimum previously in effect during 
the time of the alleged acts. 
The statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application 
is to be retroactive. Thus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply 
retroactively, and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct 
is to apply. Landgraf 
USI Film Products supra, at 1493, ("A statement that a statute 
will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any 
application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date."). 
This statute was enacted as part of the Federal Criminal Statutes targeting sexual 
predators and sex crimes against children. H.R. 3494, "Child Protection and Sexual 
Predator Punishment Act of 1998;" House Report No. 105-557, 11, 1998 U.S.C.A.N. 
678, 679 (1998). Quoting from the "Background and Need For Legislation" portion of 
the House Report No. 105-557, 11-16, N.R. 3494, of which 18 U.S.C. §2255 is included, 
is described as "the most comprehensive package of new crimes and increased penalties 
ever developed in response to crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by 
computers." 
Further showing that §2255 was enacted as a criminal penalty or 
punishment, "Title II — Punishing Sexual Predators," Sec. 206, from House Report No. 
105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an 
additional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and 
punishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation 
of the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against 
16 
EFTA00194810

those who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-
02. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as "penalties." Id. 
The cases of U.S. I. Siegel, supra (11th Cir. 1998), and U.S. . Edwards, supra (3d 
Cir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18 
U.S.C. §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the Mandatory 
Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct 
occurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(f)(1)(A), even though 
the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute. 
On July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 U.S.C. 
§371 and §1956(a)(1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, and 
laundering of money instruments; and money laundering). He was sentenced on March 
7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution 
under the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA required that the district court 
must order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss without consideration of the 
defendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the MVRA and under the former 18 
U.S.C. §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.l. No. 
97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to consider, among other factors, the 
defendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution. 
When the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to the 
VWPA "shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing 
proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment 
17 
EFTA00194811

of this Act [Apr. 24, 1996]." Siegel, supra at 1258. The alleged crimes occurred between 
February, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's position that 1996 
MVRA "should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's restitution order 
because to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution. See U.S. Const. art I, §9, cl. 3." 
The Ex Post Facto analysis made by the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel is applicable to 
this action. In resolving the issue in favor of the defendant, the Court first considered 
whether a restitution order is a punishment. Id, at 1259. In determining that restitution 
was a punishment, the Court noted that §3663A(a)(I) of Title 18 expressly describes 
restitution as a "penalty." In addition, the Court also noted that "[a]lthough not in the 
context of an cx post facto determination, ... restitution is a 'criminal penalty meant to 
have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect.' United States'. Twitty 107 F.3d 1482, 
1493 n. 12 (11th Cir.1997)." Second, the Court considered "whether the imposition of 
restitution under the MVRA is an increased penalty as prohibited by the Ex Post Facto 
Clause." Id, at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVRA would 
indeed run afoul of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the 
majority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty? 
"The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering 
the defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an 
amount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court 
7 The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that "the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose 
criminal conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996," was "persuaded by the majority of 
districts on this issue." "Restitution is a criminal penalty carrying with it characteristics 
of criminal punishment." Siegel, supra at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement 
with the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See U.S. 
Futrell 209 F.3d 
1 
1286, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2000). 
18 
EFTA00194812

must order restitution to each victim in the full amount." Id, at 1260. See also U.S. I. 
Edwards 162 F.2d 87 (3"I Circuit 1998). 
In the instant case, in answering the first question, it is clear that that imposition of 
a minimum amount of damages, regardless of the amount of actual damages suffered by a 
minor victim, is meant to be a penalty or punishment. Sec statutory text and Ilouse Bill 
Reports, cited above herein, consistently referring to the presumptive minimum damages 
amount under §2255 as "punishment" or "penalties." According to the Ex Post Facto 
doctrine, although §2255 is labeled a "civil remedy," such label is not dispositive; "if the 
effect of the statute is to impose punishment that is criminal in nature, the ex post facto 
clause is implicated." See generally, Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland I. Superior 
Court 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, at 360, citing Kansas 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-61 
(1997). The effect of applying the 2006 version of §2255 would be to triple the amount 
of the presumptive minimum damages to a minor who proves the elements of her §2255 
claim. The fact that a plaintiff proceeding under §2255 has to prove a violation of a 
criminal statute and suffer personal injury to recover damages thereunder, further 
supports that the imposition of a minimum amount, regardless of a victim's actual 
damages sustained, is meant and was enacted as additional punishment or penalty for 
violation of criminal sexual exploitation and abuse of minors. 
Accordingly, this Court is required to apply the statute in effect at the time of the 
alleged criminal acts. Not only is there no language in the 2006 statute stating that it is to 
apply retroactively, but further, such application of the 2006 version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 
to acts that occurred prior to its effective date would have a detrimental and punitive 
19 
EFTA00194813

effect on Defendant by tripling the presumptive minimum of damages available to a 
plaintiff, regardless of the actual damages suffered.8
C. As discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §2255 was enacted as part of the criminal 
statutory scheme to punish and penalize those who sexually exploit and abuse minors, 
and thus, the Ex Post Fact Clause prohibits a retroactive application of the 2006 amended 
version. Even if one were to argue that the statute is "civil" and the damages thereunder 
are "civil" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in 
Landgraf I. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), pertaining to civil 
statutes, not only is there no express intent by Congress to apply the new statute to past 
conduct, but also, the clear effect of retroactive application of the statute would be to 
increase the potential liability for past conduct from a minimum of $50,000 to $150,000, 
and thus in violation of the constitutional prohibitions against such application. As noted, 
18 U.S.C. §2255 is entitled "Civil remedy for personal injuries." Notwithstanding this 
label, the statute was enacted as part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish those who 
sexually exploit and abuse minors. 
Regardless of the actual damages suffered or proven 
by a minor, as long as a minor proves violation of a specified statutory criminal act under 
§2255 and personal injury, the defendant is held liable for the statutory imposed 
minimum. 
Notwithstanding the above legal analysis, in the recent case of Individual Known 
to Defendant As 08MIST096.JPG and 08mist067.ipg 
Falso, 2009 WL 4807537 (N.D. 
N.Y. Dec. 9, 2009), United States District Court for the Northern District of New York 
s Plaintiff has attempted to allege 6 counts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255. If it is Plaintiff's 
position that she is entitled to the minimum damage amount on each count, regardless of 
her actual damages, the absurdity of a retroactive application is more magnified. Clearly, 
the result is an unconstitutional increase in either a penalty or civil liability. 
20 
EFTA00194814

addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 
The New York Court stated that 
"looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to 
provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by the title ... and the fact that the statute 
aims to provide compensation to individuals who suffered personal injury as a result of 
criminal conduct against them." The New York Court in analyzing whether §2255 
violated the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, concluded that although 
the behavior to which §2255 is criminal, it did not find that the "primary aim" was 
"retribution and deterrence." "The statute serves civil goals." The "primary aim" is "the 
compensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of criminal conduct." 
Therefore, because Jane Doc 103 has invoked the provisions of the criminal Non-
Prosecution Agreement (NPA) between EPSTEIN and USAO (see paragraphs 25 and 26 
of complaint), plaintiff cannot avoid the full protection of the rule of lenity and due 
process to which EPSTEIN is entitled in the context of these unique factual 
circumstances. 
Although there does not exist any definitive ruling of whether the damages 
awarded under §2255 are meant as criminal punishment or a civil damages award, 
Defendant is still entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the statute in effect at 
the time of the alleged criminal conduct applies. 
As explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505,9
9 In Landgraf, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and refused to apply new provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct occurring before 
the effective date of the Act. The Court determined that statutory text in question, §102, was 
subject to the presumption against statutory retroactivity. 
21 
EFTA00194815

When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's 
first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper 
reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default 
rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must 
determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would 
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past 
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the 
statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not 
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. 
Here, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to 
conduct occurring well before its enactment. Clearly, however, as discussed in part B 
herein, the presumptive minimum amount of damages of $150,000 was enacted as a 
punishment or penalty upon those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. See discussion 
of House Bill Reports and Congressional background above herein. The amount triples 
the previous amount for which a defendant might be found liable, regardless of the 
amount of actual damages a plaintiff has suffered and proven. The new statute imposes a 
substantial increase in the monetary liability for past conduct. 
As stated in Landaraf, "the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as 
the criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored." Courts have 
consistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to 
conduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landaraf, supra at 284-85. Even if 
plaintiff were to argue that retroactive application of the new statute "would vindicate its 
purpose more fully," even that consideration is not enough to rebut the presumption 
against retroactivity. Id, at 285-86. "The presumption against statutory retroactivity is 
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long 
held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation." Id. 
Thus, Plaintiff's action should be dismissed and she should be required to plead her 
action under the applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255. 
22 
EFTA00194816

Motion For More Definite Statement and To Strike, Rule 12(e) and (fl, F.R.C.P. 
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that she was 17 year old high school student as 
of January, 2004, and that the alleged conduct involving EPSTEIN. occurred "between 
approximately January 2004 and May 2005. Thus, Plaintiff had to be 18 (no longer a 
minor) by January of 2005. Under the principles of statutory construction, the language 
of §2255(a) is clear — "Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section ...of this title 
and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate 
United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in 
the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
$50,000 in value." 
As Plaintiff's date of birth is significant to her §2255 claim, she should be 
required to more definitely state her date, of birth so that Defendant and this Court are 
able to determine precisely when she reached the age of majority. (The age of majority 
under both federal and state law is 18 years old. Sec 18 U.S.C. §2256(1), defining a 
"minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years;" and §1.01, Definitions, Fla. 
Stat., defining "minor" to include "any person who has not attained the age of 18 years.") 
In addition, when Plaintiff reached the age of majority may impact her ability to even 
assert a §2255 claim. See §2255(b). 
To the extent that Plaintiff is relying on any alleged conduct that occurred after 
her 18 birthday as an clement of her §2255 claim, such allegations should be stricken as 
immaterial and she should be required to more definitely state the dates of the alleged 
conduct. See Rule 12(0. Defendant also seeks to strike ¶¶l0, II, 12, 13, 14, IS, and 16, 
23 
EFTA00194817

of Plaintiff's Complaint as immaterial and impertinent. None of the allegations in those 
paragraphs specifically pertain to the Plaintiff. 
Not until ¶17 does Plaintiff assert 
allegations pertaining to her and the conduct of Defendant directly involving her. What 
EPSTEIN may or may not have allegedly done with respect to other alleged girls does 
not effect Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255. The allegations in ¶¶10-16 are not 
related to the elements of Plaintiff's §2255 claim and, thus, are required to be stricken. 
Conclusion 
Pursuant to the above, Plaintiff entire action is required to be dismissed. 18 
U.S.C. §2255 allows for a single recovery of the actual damages sustained in proven; 
neither the "actual damages" sustained not the statutory minimum is subject to 
duplication or multiplication on a per violation or per count or per incident basis. Also, 
the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct applies, not the version as 
amended, effective July 27, 2006. Count VI is also required to be dismissed as it relies 
on a statutory predicate act that did not take effect until 2006. In addition, Plaintiff 
should be required to more definitely state her date of birth, and any conduct occurring 
after her 18th birthday should be stricken, and ¶¶10 — 16 of the Complaint should also be 
stricken. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court dismiss the entire action 
against him, and further grant his motion for more definite statement and to strike. 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is 
24 
EFTA00194818

being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in 
the manner specified by CM/ECF on this 
day of 
, 2010. 
Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq. 
Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800 
Miami, FL 33130 
305 358-2800 
Fax: 305 58-2382 
josefsberglanodhurst.com 
kezell@podhurst.com 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 
561-659-8300 
Fax: 561-835-8691 
iaxesq®bellsouth.net 
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
ROBERT D. CR1TTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
rerit@bclelaw.com 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
mpike@bcIclaw.com 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTHER & 
COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
561/842-2820 Phone 
561/515-3148 Fax 
(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
18 USCA 62255 (1999-July 264006): 
PART I-CRIMES 
CHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF 
CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242 
2243, 2251, 2251A. 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title 
25 
EFTA00194819

a 
• 
c 
and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in 
any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual 
damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding 
sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
S50,000 in value. 
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the 
complaint is filed within' six years after the right of action first accrues or 
in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years 
after the disability. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added )'ub.L. 99-500. Title I. 6 101(b)  [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 
1986, 100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I, 4 101(b) 
[Title VII, § 703(a)), Oct 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75• Pub.L. 105-314, 
Title VI. 4 605, Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.) 
18 U.S.C. 42255, as amended 2006. Effective July 27, 2006: 
PART 1--CRIMES 
CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF 
CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries 
(a) In general.--Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation 
of section 2241(c), 2242 2243, 2251, 2251A, 7252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 
2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such 
violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a 
minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall 
recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable. attorney's fee. Any person as described in the 
preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less 
than $150,000 in value. 
(b) Statute of limitations.—Any action commenced under this section shall 
be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of 
action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later 
than three years after the disability. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 99-500. Title I.6 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)), Oct. 18, 1986, 
100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591 Title 1.6 101(b) [Title VII, § 
703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314. Title VI. 6 605, 
26 
EFTA00194820

Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984; Pub.L. 109-248. Title VII, 6 707(b). (c), July 
27, 2006, 120 Stat. 650.) 
2 Paragraphs 30, 34, 38, 43, 48, and 52 of Plaintiff's Complaint alleges: 
30. As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §2255 
being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the 
past suffered, and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and 
suffering, emotional distress, psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental 
anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, loss of educational opportunities, 
loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, separation from her 
family, and other damages associated with Defendant manipulating and leading her 
into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical 
and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future suffer additional medical 
and psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the 
capacity to earn income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These 
injuries are permanent in nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in 
the future. 
* 
The "Wherefore" clauses in each of the six counts are also identical — 
WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages 
available under 18 U.S.C. §2255, including, without limitation, actual and 
compensatory damages, attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other relief this Court 
deems just and proper, and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of 
right by a jury. 
27 
EFTA00194821