EFTA00194687

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 14 of 19 
loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, 
separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and 
luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical 
and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and 
psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn 
income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in 
nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the futurc. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, 
attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, 
and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. 
COUNT FIVE 
(Cause of Action for Transport of Child Pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4 2255 
in Violation of 18 U.S.C. G 2252A(a)(1)) 
44. 
Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above. 
45. 
Defendant knowingly mailed, transported, shipped, or sent via computer and/or 
facsimile in or affecting interstate and/or foreign commerce child pornography, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(l). 
46. 
Defendant transported lewd photographs of Plaintiff and other victims elsewhere 
using a facility or means of interstate and/or foreign commerce. 
47. 
Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, 
and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United 
States Code. 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
14 
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800, Miami, FL 33130, Miami 305.358.2200 Fax 305.358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.163.4346 
www.podhurst.com 
EFTA00194787

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 15 of 19 
48. 
As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 
being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, 
and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, 
psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, 
loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, 
separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and 
luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical 
and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and 
psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn 
income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in 
nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, 
attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deems just and proper, 
and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. 
COUNT SIX 
(Cause of Action for Engaging, in a Child Exploitation Enterprise pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2255 in Violation of 18 U.S.C. a 2252A(a)) 
49. 
Plaintiff hereby adopts, repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 26 above and Counts One through Five above. 
50. 
Defendant knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as defined in 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g)(l). As more fully set forth above, 
Defendant engaged in actions that constitute countless violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (sex 
trafficking of children), Chapter 110 (sexual exploitation of children in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
15 
25 West Flatter Street, Suite 880, Miami, FL 33130, Maud 305.358.2800 Fax 305358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 I 
www.podhurst.com 
EFTA00194788

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 16 of 19 
2251, 2252(a)(1), and 2252(A)(a)(I)), and Chapter 117 (transportation for illegal sexual activity 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421. 2422(b), and 2423(b)). As more fully set forth above in 
paragraphs I through 26, Defendant's actions involved countless victims and countless separate 
incidents of sexual abuse, which he committed against minors, including Plaintiff, in concert 
with at least three other persons. 
51. 
Plaintiff was a victim of one or more offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255, 
and, as such, asserts a cause of action against Defendant pursuant to this Section of the United 
States Code. 
52. 
As a direct and proximate result of the offenses enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2255 
being committed against the then minor Plaintiff by Defendant, Plaintiff has in the past suffered, 
and will in the future continue to suffer, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, 
psychological and/or psychiatric trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, confusion, embarrassment, 
loss of educational opportunities, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, 
separation from her family, and other damages associated with Defendant's manipulating and 
luring her into a perverse and unhealthy way of life. The then minor Plaintiff incurred medical 
and psychological expenses, and Plaintiff will in the future incur additional medical and 
psychological expenses. Plaintiff has suffered a loss of income, a loss of the capacity to earn 
income in the future, and a loss of the capacity to enjoy life. These injuries are permanent in 
nature, and Plaintiff will continue to suffer these losses in the future. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for all damages available 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, including, without limitation, actual and compensatory damages, 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
16 
25 West Fiagler Street, Suite 800, MILS, FL 33130, Miami 305.3582800 Fax 305358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.4634316 
www.podhurst.com 
EFTA00194789

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 17 of 19 
attorney's fees, costs of suit, and such other further relief as this Court deans just and proper, 
and hereby demands trial by jury on all issues triable as of right by a jury. 
Date:  C44.ArtatA4-1.2)-3 , 2010. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
By: 
iRreat 
fia—Plef'-b 
W4P/ 
Robert C. Jose 
erg 
Bar No. 040856 
Katherine W. Ezell 
Bar No. 114771 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
25 West Flagler St., Suite 800 
Miami, Florida 33130 
Telephone: (305) 358-2800 
Fax: (305) 358-2382 
rjosefsberu@podhurst.com 
kezell@podhurslcom 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
17 
25 West Plaster Street Suite 800, Miami, Ft. 33130, Miami 305356.2800 Fax 305358.2382 • Fort Lauderdale 954.463.4346 I 
www.podhuntxom 
EFTA00194790

' Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Pag 18 of 19 
036
-
-  
1 D 1
..413 4t, elov. 
CIVIL COVER SHEET 
ros
ThoJS44 civil cover sheet saddle information
 herein neither rotplacenor supplement the filing and 'mice ofyleadin or otherpapers as required bylaw, except asprovided 
by local rules of coon. This fans, approved by theJudkial Cooke:awe of theUnited fies In Septanber 1974,1$ required fort 
o he 'kik ofCourt for the purpose of initiating 
the civil docket Acct. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.) 
NOTICE: Attorneys MUST Indica 
led Cases Below. 
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS 
Jane Doe No. 103 
1 0 - 80 
(b) County of Residency of First Listed Plaintiff West Palm Beach 
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIPP CASES) 
S 
int. 
NTS 
0 it Fey 
stein 
(c) Attorney's (Tina Nam, Address. nod Telephone Hornbill) 
Robert C..losefsbag, Esq./Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. 
Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 
25 W. Flag' er St., Suite 800 
Miami Pf 1111(1 
FILED b
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County of Residence of Drst LiSted Dekria 
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tales Virgin/ Iamb 
(IN U.S. PLAINT (CASES ONLY) 
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION OASES. fEi3. 244019 THE'S ACT 
LAND INVOLVED. 
STIPPE IS ES-LIWIESOETE 
AllOmon Of Kann) 
CLERK U.S. DIST. CT. 
Robert D. Ctitlon, Esq., Burman, 0 — kaat"
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P, 
u 303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400, West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(0 Cheek County Wheso Action Masa co MIAMI. DADS 
0 MONROE 0 DROP/MID 4 
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0 INDIAN RIVER 
0 OKEECHOBEE 
HIGHLANDS 
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
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Judgment 
VI. RELATED/RE-FILED 
CASE(S). 
(See IMIniCliole 
second pale): 
a) Re-filed Case 0 YES 473 NO 
b) Related Cases 01 YES ONO 
JUDGE Kenneth A. Marra 
DOCKET NUMBER See Attached. 
VII. CAUSE OF ACTION 
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and Write a Brief Statement of Cause (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless 
diversity): 
18 U.S.C. 2255 (Predicate Statutes 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), 2423(b), 2423(e), 2251, 2252, 2252A(aK1), 2252A(g)(1) 
LENGTH OF TRIAL via  if  days estimated (for bah sides lo try claim cue) 
VIII. REQUESTED IN 
0 CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION 
DEMANDS 
CHECK YES only if demenckd in complaint: 
r./.1 eytt f. CS OF W 7900.7 JURY DEMANDS 
Aida 
No 
fil 
44.4... (A . 
FOR OEFICE USE ONLY 
DfiTE 
2:3 
SIGNATURE OP ATTORNEY OF RECORD 
AMOUNT 3CG .00 
RECEIPTS /0/ 
COMPLAINT: 
UNDER P.R.C.P. 23 
ABOVE INFORMATION IS TRUE & CORRECT TO 
THE BEST OP MY KNOWLEDGE 
24 
EFTA00194791

Case 9:10-cv-80309-WJZ Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/09/2010 Page 19 of 19 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION 
ATTACIIMENT TO CIVIL COVER SIIEET 
FOR: Jane Doe 1031 Jeffrey Epstein 
VI. 
RELATED PENDING CASES 
08-80119 - KAM 
08-80232 - KAM 
08-80380 - KAM 
08-80381 - KAM 
08-80811 - KAM 
08-80893 - KAM 
08-80993 - KAM 
08-80994 - KAM 
09-80469 - KAM 
09-80802 - KAM 
09-81092 - KAM 
EFTA00194792

, -17 Roy BLACK 
HOWARD M. SREBNICK 
Scan A. KORNSPAN 
LARRY A. STUMPP 
MARIA NEYRA 
JACKIE PERCZEK 
MARK A.J. SHAPIRO 
JARED 
O
M
 
Jeff Sloman, Esq. 
United States Attorney 
99 N.E. 4th Street 
Miami, FL 33132 
BLACK 
SREBNICK 
KORNSPAN 
&STUMPF 
March 29, 2010 
Bob Senior, Esq. 
Assistant United States Attorney 
99 N.E. 4al Street 
Miami, FL 33132 
RE: 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Dear Counsel: 
JESSICA FONSECA-NADER 
Woman P. PHILLIPS 
AARON ANThON 
MARCOS BEATON, JR. 
MATTHEW P. O'BRIEN 
JENIPER J. SOULIKIAS 
NOAH Fox 
RalocklaRoyalackeom 
A. Marie Villafana, Esq. 
Assistant United States Attorney 
500 South Australian Avenue 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6223 
Jeffrey Epstein has an April 5, 2010 deadline for the filing of a Motion to 
Dismiss, and thereafter an Answer, to claims brought by Jane Doe 103 pursuant 
to 18 USC P255 that were referenced in our earlier letter to you dated March 5, 
2010, to which there has been no response. We firmly believe that the issues 
raised in the draft motion that is appended to this letter do not conflict with, nor, 
if filed, breach Mr. Epstein's obligations under the NPA. 
Please advise if any of the issues in the draft motion authored by his civil 
counsel Robert Critton are, from your perspective, in conflict with the §2255 
provisions of the NPA so that we may reassess our legal opinion that Mr. Epstein's 
civil counsel can litigate the legal issues contained in the draft motion without fear 
that the litigation will be construed by your office as being in violation of the NPA. 
If the government believes that any of the issues intended to be raised in defense 
of the Jane Doe 103 lawsuit are in breach of Mr. Epstein's obligations under the 
NPA, we request notice so that we could decide before any filing whether to file a 
201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300. Miami. Florida 33131. Phone: 305-371-6421• Fax: 30S-1M-2DM • mw.RoyBlack.coni 
EFTA00194793

Jeff Sloman, Esq. 
Bob Senior, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafana, Esq. 
March 29, 2010 
Page 2 
Declaratory Judgment action asking the Court presiding over the Jane Doe 103 
lawsuit to determine whether the raising of the issue by motion or defense would 
be in conflict with Mr. Epstein's contractual duties under the NPA or to withdraw 
the issue to the extent we become convinced that your position, if in conflict with 
ours, is correct. 
Again, Mr. Epstein's paramount priority, and ours, is that the terms of Mr. 
Epstein's agreement with the government be followed and fulfilled. 
Your truly, 
MARTIN WEINBERG, ESQ. 
ROY 1AACK, ESQ. 
/wg 
By 
Black, Srebnick, Komspan & Stumpf, P.A. 
EFTA00194794

• 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 10-80309-CIV-
JANE DOE No. 103, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS, & FOR MORE 
DEFINITE STATEMENT & STRIKE DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF 
JANE DOE NO. 103'S COMPLAINT !dated 2/23/20101 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned 
counsel, moves to dismiss Counts One through Six of Plaintiff JANE DOE 103's 
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, as specified herein. Rule 12(b)(6), 
Fed.R.Civ.P. (2009); Local Gen. Rule 7.1 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Defendant further moves for 
more definite statement and to strike. Rule I2(e) and (f), In support of his motion, 
Defendant states: 
"Ike Complaint attempts to allege 6 counts, all of which are purportedly brought 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 — Civil Remedies for Personal Injuries. Dismissal is 
required on the following grounds: (1) 18 U.S.C.A. §2255 allows for a single recovery of 
"actual damages." 
(A.) Statutory Considerations: the statute does not allow for the 
Plaintiff to allege multiple counts, six in this case, or multiple predicate act violations or 
incidents, in an effort to multiply or seek duplicate recoveries of her "actual damages" 
EFTA00194795

based on the number of predicate act violations or incidents. The statutory minimum is 
just that — a minimum; nothing prevents a plaintiff from proving and recovering "actual 
damages" in excess of the minimum amount. (B.) Constitutional Considerations: in 
the alternative, constitutional principles require that the statute be interpreted as allowing 
for a single recovery of one's damages. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking to 
improperly multiply or seek duplicate recoveries of her actual damages, the action is 
required to be dismissed. (2) The statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct 
applies — the version in effect from 1999 to July 26, 2006, not the statute as amended in 
2006, effective July 27, 2006. 'lb the extent Plaintiff is attempting to rely on the 
amended version of the statute, such reliance is improper and also requires dismissal of 
the entire action. (3) Count VI is also subject to dismissal because the predicate act relied 
upon by Plaintiff did not come into effect until July 27, 2006, well after the conduct 
alleged by Plaintiff occurred. 
Supporting Memorandum of Law 
Principles of Statutory Interpretation 
It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the 
plain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS, Inc.'. Prime Time 24 
Venture, 245 F.3d 1217 (11" Cir. 2001); U.S. 
Castroneves 2009 WL 528251, *3 (S.D. 
Fla. 2009), citing Reeves 
Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and Smith I. 
Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 ("When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry begins 
with the text."). "The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and 
scrutinize the statute's `language, structure, and purpose.' Id. In addition, in construing 
a statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what it 
said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated in 
2 
EFTA00194796

CBS. Inc., supra at 1228 — "Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative 
intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and unambiguous meaning 
are in effect asking courts to alter that language, and `[c]purls have no authority to alter 
statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] provision what Congress left 
out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187." See also Dodd . U.S., 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 
Am Jur.2d Statutes §124 . 
Title 18 of the U.S.C. is entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." §2255 is 
contained in "Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of 
Children." 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2002), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and 
provides: 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 
2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers 
personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United 
States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as 
described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages 
of no less than $50,000 in value. 
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint 
is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a 
person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability. 
See endnote 1 hereto for statutory text as amended in 2006, effective July 27, 
2006. Prior to the 2006 amendments, the version of the statute quoted above was in 
effect beginning in 1999.1
1 The above quoted version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 was the same beginning in 1999 until 
amended in 2006, effective July 27, 2006. 
EFTA00194797

Motion to Dismiss 
The remedy afforded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 82255 allows for a single 
recovery of "actual damages" by a plaintiff against a defendant. The recovery 
afforded is not on a per violation or per incident or per count basis.2
(A.) Statutory Considerations. 18 U.S.C.A. §2255 - Civil Remedy for Personal 
Injuries, creates a federal cause of action or "civil remedy" for a minor victim of sexual, 
abuse, molestation and exploitation, and allows for a single recovery of the "actual 
damages" sustained and proven by a "minor who is a victim of a violation" of an 
enumerated predicated act and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation." 
"18 U.S.C. §2255 gives victims of sexual conduct who are minors a private right of 
action." Martinez'. White, 492 P.Supp.2d 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 18 U.S.C.A. 
§2255 "merely provides a cause of action for damages in `any appropriate United States 
District Court.'" Id, at 1189. 
Under the plain meaning of the statute, §2255 does not allow for the actual 
damages sustained to be duplicated or multiplied on behalf of a plaintiff against a 
defendant on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. No where in the 
2 In other §2255 actions filed against Defendant, Defendant has previously asserted the 
position that 18 U.S.C. §2255's creates a single cause of action on behalf of a plaintiff 
against a defendant, as opposed to multiple causes of action on a per violation basis or as 
opposed to an allowance of a multiplication of the statutory presumptive minimum 
damages or "actual damages." EPSTEIN asserts his position regarding the single 
recovery of damages in order to properly preserve all issues pertaining to the proper 
application of §2255 for appeal. EPSTEIN will fully honor his obligations as set forth 
in the Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United States Attorney's Office; 
principally, as related to the claims made in this case by Jane Doe 103, the 
obligations as set forth in paragraph 8 of that Agreement. In particular, EPSTEIN 
will not contest the allegation that he committed at least one predicate offense as 
alleged by Jane Doe 103, a waiver sufficient to satisfy the 2255 statutory condition 
that Jane Doe 103 was a victim of the commission of one of the enumerated 
predicate violations as required. 
4 
EFTA00194798

statutory text is there any reference to the recovery of damages afforded by this statute as 
being on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) 
creates a civil remedy for "a minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 
2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who 
suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... ." The statute speaks in terms of 
the recovery of the "actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of suit, including 
attorney's fees." See 18 U.S.C. §2255(a) (2002). See Smith'. Husband. 428 F.Supp.2d 
432 (ED. Va. 2006); Smith I Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe'. 
Liberatore. 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007); and the recent cases in front of this 
court on Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement — Doe No. 2 
Epstein, 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3'. Epstein, 2009 WL 
383330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 4 1. Epstein 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 
12, 2009); and Doe No. 5'. Epstein, 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); see also 
U.S. 
Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. I (E.D.Cal. Jan. 11, 2010); U.S. 
Reim, 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S.'. Ferenci, 2009 WL 
2579102, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. I. Monk, 2009 WI, 2567831, fn. 1 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. I. Zane, 2009 WL 2567832, fn.1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18 2009). 
As to the meaning of "actual damages," the Eleventh Circuit in McMillian 
F.D.I.C. 81 F.3d 1041, 1055 (11th Cir.1996)3, succinctly explained: 
3 In McMillian the 11th Circuit was faced with the task of the interpretation of the 
statutory term "actual direct compensatory damages" under FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(2)(3)(0. In doing so, the Court began with the plain meaning of the phrase. See 
Perrin I United States, 444 U.S. 37, 4243, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) 
("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words 
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary common meaning."); United 
States I. McLvmont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1077, 115 S.Ct. 
5 
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... "Compensatory damages" are defined as those damages that "will 
compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such 
as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury." 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1991). "Actual damages," roughly 
synonymous with compensatory damages, are defined as "Meal, 
substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant 
in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury as opposed ... to 
'nominal' damages [and] 'punitive' damages." Id.nii Finally, "[d]irect 
damages are such as follow immediately upon the act done." Id. Thus, 
"actual direct compensatory damages" appear to include those damages, 
flowing directly from the repudiation, which make one whole, as opposed 
to those which go farther by including future contingencies such as lost 
profits and opportunities or damages based on speculation. [Citation 
omitted]. ... 
FN15. According to Corpus furls Secundum," 'Compensatory damages' 
and 'actual damages' are synonymous terms ... and include( ] all 
damages other than punitive or exemplary damages." 25 C.J.S. 
Damages § 2 (1966). 
(Emphasis added). 
See also, Fanini. U.S. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 2009 WL 1677233 (11th Cir. June 
17, 2009), citing Fitzpatrick,. IRS 665 F.2d 327, 331 (I Id' Cir. 1982), abrogated on 
other grounds by Poet Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204 (2004\ "Actual damages" 
recoverable under the Privacy Act are "proven pecuniarylosses and not for generalized 
mental injuries, loss of reputation, embarrassment or other non-qualified injuries;" and 
the statutory minimum of $1,000 under the Privacy Act is not available unless the 
plaintiff suffered some amount of "actual damages."). 
Considering the plain meaning of "actual damages" and the purpose of such 
damages is to "make one whole," to allow a duplication or multiplication of the actual 
damages sustained is in direct conflict with the well entrenched legal principle against 
duplicative damages recovery. See generally, E.E.O.C. I. Waffle House. Inc. 534 U.S. 
1723, 131 L.Ed.2d 581 (1995) ("[T]he plain meaning of this statute controls unless the 
language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results."). 
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EFTA00194800

279, 297, 122 S.Q. 754, 766 (2002\"As we have noted, it `goes without saying that the 
courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual."), citing General 
Telephone 446 U.S., at 333, 100 S.Ct. 1698. 
The purpose of damages recovery where a Plaintiff has suffered personal injury 
as a result of Defendant's misconduct is to make the plaintiff whole, not to enrich the 
plaintiff. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §36, stating the settled legal principle that —
The law abhors duplicative recoveries, and a plaintiff who is injured by a 
defendant's misconduct is, for the most part, entitled to be made whole, not 
enriched. Hence, for one injury, there should be one recovery, irrespective of 
the availability of multiple remedies and actions. Stated otherwise, a party 
cannot recover the same damages twice, even if recovery is based on 
different theories. 
, a plaintiff who alleges separate causes of action is not permitted to recover 
more than the amount of damages actually suffered. There cannot be a 
double recovery for the same loss, even though different theories of liability 
are alleged in the complaint. .... 
See also, 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 28 — 
The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in other words, a plaintiff who is 
injured by reason of a defendant's behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be 
made whole, not to be enriched. The sole object of compensatory damages is 
to make the injured party whole for losses actually suffered; the plaintiff 
cannot be made more than whole, make a profit, or receive more than one 
recovery for the same harm. Thus, a plaintiff in a civil action for damages 
cannot, in the absence of punitive or statutory treble damages, recover more 
than the loss actually suffered. The plaintiff is not entitled to a windfall, and 
the law will not put him in a better position than he would be in had the 
wrong not been done or the contract not been broken. 
See also recent case of U.S. 
Baker. 2009 WL 4572, at *8, (ED. 11 Dec. 7, 
2009), wherein the Court was inclined to agree with the defendant's interpretation of 
§2255(a) of allowing for a single recovery of the statutory minimum damages amount as 
opposed to the government's argument that "the minimum amount of damages mandated 
by 18 U.S.C. §2255(a) applies to each of (pornographic) image produced by 
7 
EFTA00194801

[defendant]." The government attempted to argue that restitution should be equal to the 
statutory minimum amount times the 55 photos produced by defendant. In rejecting the 
government's argument, the Court reiterated that the statutory minimum is a floor for 
damages — in other words, a mandated minimum. Nothing prevents a plaintiff from 
proving that he or she suffered damages in a greater amount. 
In attempting to bring six counts pursuant to §2255, Plaintiff's complaint alleges in 
part that "Plaintiff was merely a seventeen year old high school student when she was 
first lured into Defendant's sexually exploitive world in or about January 2004." 
Complaint, ¶17. According to the allegations, Plaintiff "was recruited while at work by a 
co-worker, one of the minor victims Defendant paid to procure underage females." Id. 
The Complaint further alleges, ¶¶17-26, that Defendant "sexually abused and/or battered 
and/or exploited Plaintiff at least 100 times between January 2004 and May 2005." If 
Plaintiff were 17 in January, 2004, she was at least 18 (the age of majority) in January 
2005, if not sooner.4
Plaintiff alleges identical damages in each of the six counts. Complaint, ¶¶30, 34, 
38, 43, 48, and 52. See endnote 2 hereto for Complaint allegations? In other words, 
Plaintiff is alleging and seeking recovery of duplicative damages in each of the six 
counts. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to duplicate her "actual damages" on a per 
incident or per violation or per count basis, Plaintiff's action is required to be dismissed 
for failure to state a cause of action. 
4 Defendant is moving for more definite statement requiring Plaintiff to specifically state 
her date of birth because her age and when she reached the age of majority may impact 
her ability to even pursue a §2255 claim. 
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Had Congress wanted to write in a multiplier of actual damages recoverable it 
could have easily done so. For an example of a statute wherein the legislature included 
the language "for each violation" in assessing a "civil penalty," see 18 U.S.C. §216, 
entitled "Penalties and injunctions," of Chapter 11 — "Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of 
Interests," also contained in Title 18 "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." Subsection (b) 
of §216 gives the United States Attorney General the power to bring a "civil action ... 
against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under" specified 
sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest statutes. The statute further 
provides in relevant part that "upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the 
evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for 
each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for 
the prohibited conduct, which ever amount is greater." As noted, 18 U.S.C. §2255 does 
not include such language. 
B. 
Constitutional Considerations? 
As set forth above, it is Defendant's 
position that the text of 18 U.S.C. §2255 does not allow a Plaintiff to pursue the recovery 
of actual damages or the minimum afforded under the statute on a "per violation" or "per 
incident" basis by attempting to allege multiple counts thereunder. In the alternative, if 
one were to assume that the language of §2255 were vague or ambiguous, under the 
constitutional based protections of due process, judicial restraint, and the rule of lenity 
applied in construing a statute, Defendant's position as to the meaning of the statute 
would prevail. 
See United States'. Santos 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). 
As 
summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: 
5 
See argument in sections (2) and (3) that follow which represent the predicate for the rule of 
lenity issue discussed in B. 
9 
EFTA00194803

... The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in 
favor of the defendants subjected to them. See United States I . Gradwell, 243 
U.S. 476, 485, 37 5.O. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917); McBoyle . United States, 
283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931); United States'. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 347-349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This venerable 
rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be 
held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, 
or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the 
weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more 
clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead. ... 
In Santos, the Court was faced with the interpretation of the term "proceeds" in 
the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §1956. "The federal money-laundering 
statute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal 'proceeds."' Id, at 2023. 
Noting that the term "proceeds" was not defined in the statute, the Supreme Court stated 
the well settled principle that "when a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary 
meaning." Id, at 2024. Under the ordinary meaning principle, the government's position 
was that proceeds meant "receipts," while the defendant's position was that proceeds 
meant "profits." The Supreme Court recognized that under either of the proffered 
"ordinary meanings," the provisions of the federal money-laundering statute were still 
coherent, not redundant, and the statute was not rendered "utterly absurd." Under such a 
situation, citing to a long line of cases and the established rule of lenity, "the tie must go 
to the defendant." Id, at 2025. See portion of Court's opinion quoted above. "Because 
the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendant friendly that the 'receipts' 
definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted." Id. 
The recent case of United States'. Berdeal, 595 F.Supp.2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009), 
further supports Defendant's argument that the "rule of lenity" requires that the Court 
resolve any statutory interpretation conflict in favor of Defendant. Assuming for the sake 
of argument that Plaintiff's multiple counts, leading to a multiplication of the statutory 
10 
EFTA00194804

damages amount, is a reasonable interpretation, like Defendant's reasonable 
interpretation, under the "rule of lenity," any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the least 
draconian measure. In Berdeal applying the rule of lenity, the Court sided with the 
Defendants' interpretation of the Lacey Act which makes illegal the possession of snook 
caught in specified jurisdictions. The snook had been caught in Nicaraguan waters. The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting the statute did not encompass snook caught 
in foreign waters. 
The United States disagreed. 
Both sides presented reasonable 
interpretations regarding the reach of the statute. In dismissing the indictment, the Court 
determined that the rule of lenity required it to accept defendants' interpretation. 
To allow a duplication or multiplication would subject Defendant EPSTEIN to a 
punishment that is not clearly prescribed — an unwritten multiplier of the "actual 
damages" or the presumptive minimum damages. 
The rule of lenity requires that 
Defendant's interpretation of the remedy afforded under §2255 be adopted. 
In addition, under the Due Process Clause's basic principle of fair warning - 
... a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a 
crime ... . As was said in United States'. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 
S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989, 
'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying 
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct 
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' 
Thus we have struck down a [state] criminal statute under the Due Process 
Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject 
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' 
Connally 
General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 
L.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential of due process of law,' ibid., and that 
11 
EFTA00194805

'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta I. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 
S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888. 
Thus, applying the statutory analysis, in A. and these well-entrenched 
constitutional principles of statutory interpretation and application in B., Plaintiff's cause 
of action — Counts One through Six — to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to multiply 
actual damages or the presumptive amount of damages, is required to be dismissed for 
failure to state a cause of action. 
(2) In addition, if Plaintiff is relying on the amended version of 18 U.S.C. 62255, 
such reliance is improper and requires dismissal of the entire action. It is 
Defendant's position (hat 18 U.S.C. 62255 in effect prior to the 2006 
amendments applies to this action. 
(3) Further, Count Six is also required to be dismissed as it relies on a predicate 
act that was not in effect al the lime of the alleged conduct.' 
Plaintiff does not specifically allege in her Complaint on which version of 18 
U.S.C. §2255 she is relying. However, in the purported Count Six of her Complaint, ¶50, 
she alleges that Defendant "knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. §2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(g)(1)." §2252A is 
one of the specified predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. §2255. However, subsection (g) of 
§2252 was not added to the statute until 2006. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is relying 
on the amended version, such reliance is improper and the entire action is required to be 
dismissed. Further, in the alternative, Count Six is required to be dismissed as it relies on 
a statutory predicate act that did not exist at the time of the alleged conduct. 
The statute in effect during the time the alleged conduct occurred is 18 U.S.C. 
§2255 (2005) — the version in effect prior to the 2006 amendment, eff. Jul. 27, 2006, 
*Points (2) and (3) are addressed together as the legal arguments overlap. 
12 
EFTA00194806