EFTA00077606

alleged omissions and correcting the alleged errors, the "ultimate inquiry" is whether "there 
remains a residue of independent and lawful information sufficient to support probable cause." 
United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
"[E]ven if the misrepresented or omitted information was material, a motion to suppress is 
to be denied unless the misrepresentations or omissions were intentional or deliberate, or were 
made in reckless disregard for the truth." Lambus, 897 F.3d at 399. The standard to demonstrate 
material false statements and omissions in an agent's affidavit is a "high one." Rivera v. United 
States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir. 1991). The intent prong of Franks is particularly demanding 
with respect to omissions. "Franks protects against omissions that are designed to mislead, or that 
are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead." Awadallah, 349 F.3d at 68 
(emphasis in original). After all, "la]ll storytelling involves an element of selectivity,' and it is 
therefore not necessarily constitutionally significant that an affidavit `omit[s] facts which, in 
retrospect, seem significant.'" United States v. Lahey, 967 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting United States v. Vilar, No. 05 Cr. 621 (KMK), 2007 WL 1075041, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
4, 2007)); see also United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) ("As courts in this Circuit have recognized, it is not shocking that every 
affidavit will omit facts which, in retrospect, seem significant." (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). 
The "substantial preliminary showing" requirement explained above exists to "avoid 
fishing expeditions into affidavits that are otherwise presumed truthful." Falso, 544 F.3d at 125. 
"[C]onclusory allegations cannot support a Franks challenge as a matter of law." United States v. 
Pizarro, No. 17 Cr. 151 (AJN), 2018 WL 1737236, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018); see also 
114 
EFTA00077746

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 ("To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack must be more 
than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine."). Instead, 
to warrant a Franks hearing: 
[t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless 
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied 
by an offer of proof . . . Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable 
statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence 
satisfactorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent 
mistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard 
whose impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, 
not of any nongovernmental informant. 
Id. 
The burden to even obtain a Franks hearing is a heavy one, and such hearings are thus 
exceedingly rare. See United States v. Brown, 744 F. Supp. 558, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("A 
defendant seeking to have the Court hold a Franks hearing bears a substantial burden."); United 
States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 2000) ("These elements are hard to prove, and thus 
Franks hearings are rarely held."). 
b. 
Discussion 
In an alternative effort to suppress the materials obtained pursuant to the subpoena, the 
defendant argues that an evidentiary hearing is warranted to inquire into the Government's 
"misrepresentations" to Chief Judge McMahon. (Def. Mot. 3 at 16). However, as discussed 
extensively above, Maxwell's motion is little more than speculation and innuendo, itself rooted in 
a lone news article that, as described above, is not fully accurate. She otherwise presents no 
admissible evidence, affidavits, or other materials supporting the breathless accusations contained 
in her motion papers. As such, because the defendant does not include "an affidavit of someone 
with personal knowledge of the underlying facts," Shaw, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 570, and because the 
115 
EFTA00077747

Government has responded with reliable information directly rebutting the defendant's allegations, 
there is no material issue of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.4* 
The defendant cites Franks, to suggest that a hearing is somehow warranted, but her motion 
falls far short of the standard required to obtain a hearing. "While the Franks analysis discussed 
above is typically employed to evaluate misstatements and omissions relating to probable cause, 
the Second Circuit has extended the Franks analysis to other Title III requirements for obtaining a 
warrant." United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *18 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). The defendant fails to identify the standard that would govern such a 
hearing. In light of the interests implicated by a Title III wiretap, the USAO-SDNY submits that 
the defendant's depositions in a civil matter, even with a protective order, are no more significant 
than the interests implicated by a Title III wiretap. As such, the exacting standard of Franks should 
apply. On this record, the defendant has not made a threshold showing that the Government acted 
with the intent to mislead or in reckless disregard for the truth. The Franks standard is rightly a 
"high one," Rivera, 928 F.2d at 604, and one the defendant has failed to meet here. 
The defendant's bald assertions alone do not entitle her to a fishing expedition in the form 
of a hearing. 
V. 
The Jury Should Decide Whether the Defendant Committed Perjury 
Counts Five and Six of the Indictment allege that, during the course of two depositions, the 
defendant knowingly made false material declarations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The 
defendant moves to dismiss those Counts, arguing that the Court can determine now—on a pre-
44 For similar reasons, the defendant's request for discovery regarding this matter should be denied. 
The defendant has failed to meet her burden under Rule 16 of making "a prima fade showing of 
materiality and must offer more than the conclusory allegation that the requested evidence is 
material." Urena, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (citations omitted). Because the defendant has offered 
nothing more than her conjecture, based on an inaccurate and hearsay-ridden article, that some 
unspecified evidence might exist, her request for discovery should be denied. 
116 
EFTA00077748

trial record—that the questions were fundamentally ambiguous, and the defendant's answers were 
truthful and immaterial. (Def. Mot. 5). To the contrary, the Government expects to prove at trial 
that the defendant understood the questions and that her answers were both false and materially 
so. This case does not present the narrow circumstances in which a court can and should dismiss 
perjury counts, let alone do so before trial. 
A. 
Factual Background 
On July 7, 2008, following the USAO-SDFL entering into the non-prosecution agreement 
with Epstein, two minors filed a petition under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3771, alleging that the prosecutors violated their rights under that statute. See Doe v. United 
States, 08 Civ. 80736 (S.D.F.L). See generally Doe No. 1. v. United States, 749 F.3d 999, 1002 
(11th Cir. 2014) (describing the background of the suit). On December 30, 2014, Virginia Roberts 
Giuffre moved to join the petition, alleging that the USAO-SDFL had also violated her CVRA 
rights. See Doe, No. 08 Civ. 80736, Dkt. No. 279.45 In her motion for joinder, Giuffre described 
the defendant as "'one of the main women' Epstein used to `procure under-aged girls for sexual 
activities,"' and as a "'primary co-conspirator' with Epstein in his scheme. See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 
No. 18-2868 (2d Cir. 2019), Dkt. No. 287 at 10 (containing the unsealed summary judgment 
opinion from 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP)). Among other allegations, Giuffre alleged that the defendant 
"'persuaded' [her] to go to Epstein's mansion," and, "when Giuffre began giving Epstein a 
massage, [he] and [the defendant] 'turned it into a sexual encounter.'" Id. at 11. Giuffre alleged 
that the defendant also "`participat[ed] in the sexual abuse" of others. Id. A few days later, the 
press reported a statement by a spokesman for the defendant, Ross Gow. Among other things, 
45 Giuffre filed a corrected motion on January 2, 2015. See Doe, No. 08 Civ. 80736, Dkt. No. 280. 
The court later struck the original motion, sealed the corrected motion, and ordered filing of a 
redacted version of the corrected motion. See id., Dkt. No. 325 (Apr. 7, 2015). 
117 
EFTA00077749

Gow stated that Giuffre's claims were "untrue" and "obvious lies." (15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. 
No. 1 at 6). 
As described in the preceding section, in the fall of 2015, Giuffre sued the defendant for 
defamation.46 (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1). Giuffre alleged that Epstein sexually abused 
her, "with the assistance and participation of Maxwell" at "numerous locations" between 1999 and 
2002, and that Epstein abused more than thirty minors between 2001 and 2007 "with the assistance 
of numerous co-conspirators." (Id. at 3). 
During the defendant's first deposition on April 22, 2016, the defendant refused to answer 
questions that she deemed related to consensual adult sexual interactions. (See, e.g., Ex. 10 at 
92:20-93:6). Giuffre moved to compel the defendant to answer, explaining that "[a]t the core of 
[her] allegations is the allegation that [the] Defendant lured her into a sexual situation with the 
offer of a job making money as a massage therapist; that Epstein always habitually tried to turn 
massages into sex . . . and that Maxwell recruited other females for an ostensibly proper position, 
such as therapeutic masseuse, with knowledge that the intent was for that person would be 
pressured to provide sexual gratification to Epstein." (15 Civ. 7443 (LAP), Dkt. No. 1137-1 at 5-
6). Giuffre also explained that the defendant's refusal to answer questions about adult consensual 
sex prevented Giuffre "from seeking legitimate discovery," such as the identity of people the 
defendant presently deemed adults. (id. at 6). 
The Court granted Giuffre's motion. 
the 
of the 
 
 put 
"ffiraions are 
directed alevant
Th alla
iregaFding Defairs tallegationd 
" The below discussion is provided as context for the Court's consideration of the motion. As 
discussed further in the Government's opposition to the defendant's motion for severance, the 
Government expects to provide a more streamlined presentation regarding the Giuffre suit at trial. 
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EFTA00077750

(Def. Mot. 4, Ex. H at 9). "That knowledge," the Court explained, "goes directly to the truth or 
falsity of the alleged defamation, a key element of Plaintiff's claim." (Id.). The Court therefore 
ordered the defendant to answer the questions related to her sexual activity with or involving (1) 
Epstein, (2) Giuffre, (3) underage girls known to Epstein or who she thought might become known 
to Epstein, or (4) involving massage with individuals the defendant "knew to be, or believed might 
be, I
Epstein." (Id. at 10). The Court further ordered the defendant to answer questions 
about firagedge 
of the sexual activities of others in the same four categories. The Court add
that the "Il.lof Defendant's answers are not bound by time period, though Delarbant need not 
tisin 
that relate to none of these subjects or that is clearly nota 
(hd The 
defendant sat for a second deposition on July 22, 2016, before the case settled. 
As discussed more fully below, the Indictment charges the defendant with two counts of 
perjury, one arising from statements made during the April 2016 deposition and one arising from 
statements made during the July 2016 deposition. Indictment ¶¶ 21, 23. (Ex. 10 at 253:25-254:8, 
384:15-20; Ex. 11 at 88:9-89:13, 91:22-92:16, 113:2-12). The defendant now moves to dismiss 
both counts, arguing that the Court can effectively decide now, as a matter of law, that the questions 
were fundamentally ambiguous, her answers were true, and her answers were immaterial to the 
case. 
B. 
Applicable Law 
Section 1623(a) imposes criminal penalties on anyone who "in any proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court ... knowingly makes any false material declaration." 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). 
In perjury prosecutions, "whether the witness believes that an answer is true or false generally 
turns on the declarant's understanding of the question." United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367,372 
(2d Cir. 1986). Accordingly, and as is true of virtually all factual issues, "[a] jury is best equipped 
119 
EFTA00077751

to determine the meaning that a defendant assigns to a specific question." Id.; see, e.g. United 
States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 (2d Cir. 2018).47
A narrow exception arises when language in a question is so "fundamentally ambiguous" 
that a Court can conclude, as a matter of law, that a perjury count cannot stand. Lighte, 782 F.2d 
at 375. A question is "fundamentally ambiguous" when "it is not a phrase with a meaning about 
which [people] of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual 
understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and 
offered as testimony." Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). In such a case, the "answers 
associated with the questions posed may be insufficient as a matter of law to support the perjury 
conviction." United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 808 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lighte, 782 
F.2d at 375). For instance, in Lighte, a case involving post-conviction appellate review, the Court 
found that a question was fundamentally ambiguous because it used the word "'you' without 
indication that, unlike the prior two questions, the appellant was now being questioned in his role 
as trustee." 782 F.2d at 376. "[F]undamental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the 
rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental 
ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are amenable to multiple meanings, 
or that an answer "might generate a number of different interpretations." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; 
United States v. Strohm, 671 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Simply plumbing a question for 
post hoc ambiguity will not defeat a perjury conviction where the evidence demonstrates the 
defendant understood the question in context and gave a knowingly false answer."). "If, in the 
47 The Second Circuit analyzes general principles of perjury similarly under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 and 
another perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, see Lighte, 782 F.3d at 372, and it has assumed without 
deciding that those standards also apply to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), see United States 
v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 307 n.15 (2d Cir. 2018). 
120 
EFTA00077752

natural meaning in the context in which words were used they were materially untrue, perjury was 
established." United States v. Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d 1218, 1221 (2d Cir. 1976). Critically, and as 
noted with respect to Lighte above, courts generally evaluate whether a challenge to a perjury 
count on the basis that a question was fundamentally ambiguous after trial and following the 
development of a full factual record. See, e.g., Strohm, 671 at 1175 (appeal following conviction); 
SanvaH, 669 F.3d at 406 (same); Farmer, 137 F.3d at 1269 (appeal following conviction and 
partial Rule 29 dismissal) Marldewicz, 978 F.2d at 808 (appeal following conviction); cf. United 
States v. Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a perjury 
count). Indeed, the defendant cites no case in which a court has dismissed a perjury count on the 
basis of "fundamental ambiguity" before trial. 
Because perjury requires a knowing false statement, the law does not permit conviction 
based on answers that are literally true. See Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. Nor can a conviction rest on 
answers that are literally true but unresponsive, and therefore "arguably misleading by negative 
implication." Id.; see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973). But when "the answer 
is false, the fact that it is unresponsive is immaterial." United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 
(2d Cir. 1976). Even statements that "could be literally true in isolation" can support a perjury 
conviction if they are "materially untrue" in "the context in which the statements were made." 
United States v. Schaftick, 871 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1989). "[U]nless the questioning is 
fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise, the truthfulness of [the defendant's] answers is an issue 
for the jury." Id. at 304; see United States v. Kaplan, 758 F. App'x 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); 
cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374 (finding the evidence insufficient where some answers "were literally 
true under any conceivable interpretation of the questions"). 
121 
EFTA00077753

Finally, even if a defendant makes a knowing false statement, a perjury conviction requires 
that the statement be material. A false statement is material if it has "a natural tendency to 
influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 
addressed." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (quotation 
marks omitted). A statement made in a civil deposition is also material if "a truthful answer might 
reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the 
underlying suit." United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994)); see United States v. 
Birrell, 470 F.2d 113, 115 n.1 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining, in the context of a motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis and for appointment of counsel, that "it must be shown that a truthful answer would 
have been of sufficient probative importance to the inquiry so that, as a minimum, further fruitful 
investigation would have occurred." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). "The 
testimony need not have actually influenced, misled, or impeded the proceeding." United States 
v. Chan Lo, No. 14 Cr. 491 (VSB), 2016 WL 9076234, at ■8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2016), aff'd 679 F. 
App'x 79 (2d Cir. 2017); see Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 412. Since materiality is an element of the 
offense, it is a question for the jury "except in the most extraordinary circumstances." Forde, 740 
F. Supp. 2d at 412 (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23). 
C. 
Discussion 
The Government expects to prove at trial that the defendant's deposition statements were 
knowingly false. The defendant's strained efforts to inject ambiguity into the questioning and to 
justify her answers as truthful are in significant part, arguments that are properly put to the jury 
and not a basis to dismiss the counts pretrial and without the benefit of a complete record. See 
United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 237 F. App'x 625, 627-28 (2d Cir. 2007) 
("Generally, the meaning and truthfulness of a defendant's statement is a question of fact for the 
122 
EFTA00077754

jury."). At this stage, the defendant must identify defects so fundamental that the charged 
statements cannot, as a matter of law, support a perjury conviction. She has failed to do so, and 
her motion should be denied. 
1. 
April 2016 Deposition 
At the April 2016 deposition, Giuffre's counsel asked the defendant about how Giuffre 
came to Epstein's home (Ex. 10 at 14:9-17:4), whether hired massage therapists engaged in sexual 
activity with Epstein (id. at 51:13-55:16), and the defendant's knowledge of Epstein's Florida 
criminal case (id. at 171:25-173:12, 183:25-186:21), among other topics. The transcript makes 
clear that when the defendant did not understand a question, she said so. (See, e.g., id. at 9:4-9 
("[C]an you please clarify the question. I don't understand what you mean by female, I don't 
understand what you mean by recruit."), 39:23-24 ("I don't understand what your question is 
asking."), 94:18-95:4 ("You don't ask me questions like that. First of all, you are trying to trap 
me, I will not be trapped."), 138:6 ("Define relationship."), 244:22-23 ("You are not asking me a 
good question, sorry."). 
Count Five charges the defendant with perjury arising from two colloquies at this 
deposition. First, Giuffre's counsel asked the defendant a series of questions about whether the 
defendant brought women to Epstein, which the defendant resisted by observing that she hired 
"people across the board" to "work for Jeffrey." (Id. at 245:7-18). Giuffre's counsel asked 
whether any minors worked as exercise instructors or masseuses at Epstein's home, and the 
defendant testified that they were all adults except for Giuffre, who she acknowledged at least 
claimed to have been seventeen. (Id. at 246:18-251:12). Giuffre's counsel then asked questions 
about whether Epstein had a "sexual preference for underage minors," which drew objections from 
123 
EFTA00077755

defense counsel and which the defendant ultimately answered by saying "I cannot tell you what 
Jeffrey's story is. I'm not able to." (Id. at 251:13-253:12). This colloquy followed: 
Q. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls to 
use them for purposes of sexual massages? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. 
A. Can you ask me again, please? 
Q. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls to 
recruit them for sexual massages? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. 
A. Can you ask it a different way? 
Q. Did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls for 
sexual massages? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. 
Q. If you know. 
A. I don't know what you are talking about.48
(Ex. 10 at 253:13-254:8). 
The defendant argues that the question was ambiguous, as shown by her requests for the 
questioner to rephrase the question. (Def. Mot. 4 at 9-10, 18). A properly instructed jury could 
readily conclude otherwise in light of the evidence the Government expects to introduce at trial. 
The defamation case involved allegations that Giuffre was a victim of that scheme: Giuffre had 
alleged that Epstein and the defendant had sexualized a massage that Giuffre gave Epstein. The 
preceding questions focused on (I) whether the defendant brought underage masseuses to work 
for Epstein, and (2) whether Epstein had a sexual preference for underage girls. Moreover, at trial 
and as discussed further below, the Government expects to elicit testimony from one or more of 
48 Underlined sentences are charged as false statements in the Indictment. 
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EFTA00077756

the victims specified in the Indictment about sexualized massages the victims provided to Epstein, 
conduct that obviously predated the deposition. See Indictment ¶ 7(a), (c). In context, and with an 
understanding of the Government's other evidence, a rational juror could readily conclude that the 
question "did Jeffrey Epstein have a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages . . . [i]f 
you know?" had a clear meaning, and more important for purposes of the instant motion, any 
ambiguity was not "fundamental." Cl Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 237 F. App'x at 628 
(concluding that an answer about "this arrangement" was not fundamentally ambiguous). 
Nor is there any basis to dismiss the count now based on the defendant's professed 
confusion or denial of knowledge of the scheme's existence. A defendant may commit perjury by 
falsely denying memory or knowledge of an event. See, e.g., United States v. Alberti, 568 F.2d 
617, 625 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926, 929 (2d Cir. 1973); Forde, 
740 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11. Viewing the question and answer "in the context of the line of 
questioning as a whole," the defendant "consistently denied" knowledge of Epstein's scheme, 
Markiewicz, 978 F.2d at 810, and a jury could conclude that the "question was not fundamentally 
ambiguous—and thus that [the defendant], understanding the question, lied." See Sampson, 898 
F.3d at 307; cf. Indictment ¶¶ 4(e) 11(c)-(d), 17(c)-(d) (discussing use of massage as part of the 
sexual abuse scheme). 
Second, later in the deposition, Giuffre's counsel asked the defendant a series of questions 
in an attempt to identify other underage girls that the defendant met and brought to Epstein. 
Specifically: 
Q. Can you list for me all the girls that you have met and brought to 
Jeffrey Epstein's house that were under the age of 18? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. 
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EFTA00077757

A. I could only recall my family members that were there and I could 
not make a list of anyone else because that list -- it never happened 
that I can think of. 
Q. I'm talking about the time you were working for Jeffrey Epstein, 
can you list all girls that you found for Jeffrey Epstein that were 
under the age of 18 to come work for him in any capacity? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. 
A. I didn't find the girls. 
Q. You choose the word. 
MR. PAGLIUCA: If you have a question ask it, you don't choose 
the word. 
Q. List all of the girls you met and brought to Jeffrey Epstein's home 
for the purposes of employment that were under the age of 18? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to the form and foundation. 
A. I've already characterized my job was to find people, adults, 
professional people to do the jobs I listed before; pool person, 
secretary, house person, chef, pilot, architect. 
Q. Pm asking about individuals under the age of 18, not adult 
persons, people under the age of 18. 
A. I looked for people or tried to find people to fill professional jobs 
in professional situations. 
Q. So Virginia Roberts was under the age of 18, correct? 
A. I think we've established that Virginia was 17. 
Q. Is she the -- sorry, go ahead. Is she the only individual that you 
met for purposes of hiring someone for Jeffrey that was under the 
age of 18? 
MR. 
PAGLIUCA: 
Objection 
to 
form 
and 
foundation. 
Mischaracterizes her testimony. 
A. I didn't hire people. 
Q. I said met. 
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EFTA00077758

A. I interviewed people for jobs for professional things and I am not 
aware of anyone aside from now Virginia who clearly was a 
masseuse aged 17 but that's, at least that's how far we know that I 
can think of that fulfilled any professional capacity for Jeffrey. 
Q. List all the people under the age of 18 that you interacted with at 
any of Jeffrey's properties? 
A. I'm not aware of anybody that I interacted with, other than 
obviously Virginia who was 17 at this point? 
(Ex. 10 at 382:4-384:20). 
The defendant argues that this question was "grossly ambiguous: who was `Jeffrey'; what 
were 'Jeffrey's properties;' to what time frame did the question apply; what was the basis for Ms. 
Maxwell to determine who may or may not have been `under the age of 18'; and what did `interact 
with' mean?" (Def. Mot. 4 at 11). These arguments only underscore the principle that perjury 
prosecutions are an inquiry into "the natural meaning in the context in which words were used," 
Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221, and not an opportunity for defense counsel to "plumb[] a question 
for post hoc ambiguity," Strohm, 671 F.3d at 1178. A reasonable jury, after hearing the evidence, 
could readily conclude that the natural meaning of those words in context is abundantly clear. For 
instance, at the end of trial, a jury could conclude that "Jeffrey" is Jeffrey Epstein; "Jeffrey's 
properties" are Jeffrey Epstein's properties, including his houses in Palm Beach, New York, New 
Mexico, and the United States Virgin Islands (see, e.g., Ex. 10 at 248:17-20 (naming those 
properties)); and "interact" is an expansive word aimed at capturing any encounter, that was used 
after the defendant resisted words like "met," "found," and "hired" in the prior questions, see 
Interact, Oxford English Dictionary Online, https://oed.corniview/Entry/97518 (last visited 
February 25, 2021) ("To act reciprocally, to act on each other."). Such inferences will be 
particularly easy for a jury to reach after hearing multiple victims testify about their own 
127 
EFTA00077759

interactions with the defendant and Epstein at Epstein's various properties. See, e.g., Indictment 
1 7(a) ("MAXWELL subsequently interacted with Minor Victim-1 on multiple occasions at 
Epstein's residences."). Accordingly, a rational juror, after hearing the evidence, could find that 
the question called for the names of minors that the defendant interacted with at any of Jeffrey 
Epstein's properties, that the defendant answered that she was aware of no such minors other than 
Giuffre, and therefore that her answer was false. And even if the defendant identifies some 
plausible ambiguity—and she has not—the terms in this question are ones "with a meaning about 
which [people] of ordinary intellect could agree," and therefore are not fundamentally ambiguous. 
Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The defendant points out that, in response to an earlier question asking her to list the 
underage girls she "met and brought" to Epstein's house, she said that she could not do so. (Del. 
Mot. 4 at 12-13). She argues that the charged question was "improper" because it asked her to 
generate a list "from events that had happened nearly two decades previously." (Id.). Her 
unpersuasive after-the-fact efforts to justify her answer provide no basis to keep this question from 
the jury. As noted above, the transcript makes clear (and a jury could find) that when the defendant 
did not understand or could not answer a question, she said so. To the extent the defendant is 
arguing that her answer was literally true, a reasonable July could find otherwise. In this respect, 
the Government notes, among other things, that in response to the earlier question, the defendant 
said that she could not make a list not because she could not remember events from that long ago 
but "because that list -- it never happened that I can think of." (Ex. 10 at 382:4-13) (emphasis 
added). And in response to the charged question, the defendant said that she "was not aware of 
anybody" under 18—that is, the list would be empty. See Forde, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 413 ("Olivieri, 
if truly confused, could also have asked for clarification. Instead he replied with a strong 
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EFTA00077760

denial..."). A properly instructed jury could conclude after hearing all of the evidence at trial 
that the defendant intended the natural meaning of the words she used, not the allegedly truthful 
answer she suggests now, and therefore that she lied. In sum, the defendant's post-hoc efforts to 
inject confusion into clear questioning are unavailing and should be rejected, and the jury should 
decide whether the defendant's answers were false. 
2. 
July 2016 Deposition 
Count Six charges the defendant with perjury arising from three colloquies at the second 
deposition. 
ans 
thaelMr. EPalBea 
at 544 
Although she didiathe 
names of any of aomen,,
"bloand
llirrwyera 
tiefenarilTaWarlirt/d. 
Following that line of questioning, the following 
colloquy occurred: 
Er. When you and Mr. Epstein were engaged in sexual activity that 
included these other women, were any devices or sex toys used as 
part of the sexual activity? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you ever involved in sexual activities in Mr. Epstein's Palm 
Beach house that included the use of sex toys or any kind of 
mechanical or other device? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to form and foundation. 
A. No. 
Q. Were you ever involved in sexual activities in any of Mr. 
Epstein's properties other than Palm Beach that included the use of 
sex toys or any kind of mechanical or other device? 
129 
EFTA00077761

A. No. 
Q. Were you aware of the presence of sex toys or devices used in 
sexual activities in Mr. Epstein's Palm Beach house? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to form and foundation. 
L 
A. No, not that I recall. 
lId. at 87:15-88:14). 
After questions about Epstein's other properties, Cawing 
w whether Mr. Epstein possessed sex toys or 
— 
u
bctivities? 
MR. 
A: Objection to form and foundation. 
The defendant now argues that these questions are ambiguous because they contain 
"numerous undefined terms," such as "sex toy or device" and "sexual activities." (Def. Mot. 4 at 
14). She asks, for instance, whether "bath oil" would count as a sex toy or device. (Id.). Yet this 
argument is simply another attempt to imbue ambiguity after the fact into commonly used words 
with common sense meanings. The mere fact that a term could apply equally to several different 
objects does not automatically mean that the question is impermissibly vague and can never form 
the basis of a perjury charge. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607 (1958) ("A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the 
public park. Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles . 
?"). Instead, it is well-
settled that "[t]he jury should determine whether the question—as the declarant must have 
understood it, giving it a reasonable reading—was falsely answered." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 372. So 
130 
EFTA00077762

long as the question involves a phrase "which could be used with mutual understanding by a 
questioner and answerer," it is not fundamentally ambiguous. Id. at 375 (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see United States v. Jenkins, 727 F. App'x 732, 735 (2d Cir. 2018) ("An individual of 
ordinary intelligence would not think that a question asking for information regarding `real estate, 
stocks, bonds, ... or other valuable property' would allow omission of information regarding 
money market funds ...."). 
The use of broad or inclusive terms does not render the question fundamentally ambiguous. 
As the Second Circuit explained in the context of the term "employment activities," "[t]he broad 
language of the question is not fundamentally ambiguous; it is instead designed to capture all 
employment activities in an applicant's recent history." United States v. Polos, 723 F. App'x 64, 
65-66 (2d Cir. 2018). So too here. A "sex toy or device" is an intelligible phrase with an 
understood 
meaning. 
See 
Sex 
Toy, 
Oxford 
English 
Dictionary 
Online, 
https://www.oed.corn/view/Entry/176989 (last visited February 12, 2021) ("[A] device or object 
designed for sexual stimulation (as a dildo, vibrator, etc.) or to enhance sexual pleasure or 
performance."). To the? 
al ac 
ins a 
, it was de t 
earlier in the depositimardniyities" 
to include "Kissing, 
touchinpwith hands ox mouths or otaa.1.= 
The defendant's objections to the next colloquy in the indictment are similarly unavailing. 
Shortly after the above exchange, the following conversation occurred: 
17.11 atrme
tiittany circri=r
i
tsprcWres,taialyou engage in 
lexual activities with any woman other than when you had three-
'ray sexual activities with Mr. Epstein? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Object to the form. 
131 
EFTA00077763

A. Can you repeat the question? 
Q. At any time, inl 
Mr. Eripproperties, did you engage 
in sexual activities 
any woma 
r than when you had three-
way sexual activities with Mr. Epstein? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Same objection. 
A. No. 
Q. Other ONIMIIIIINPand the blond and brunette that you have 
identified as having been involved in three-way sexual activities, 
with whom did Mr. Epstein have sexual activities? 
MR. PAGLIUCA: Objection to form and foundation. 
A. I wasn't aware that he was having sexual activities with anyone 
when I was with him other than myself. 
Q. I want to be sure that I'm clear. Is it your testimony that in the 
1990s and 2000s, you were not aware that Mr. Epstein was having 
sexual activities with anyone other than yourself and the blond and 
brunette on those few occasions when they were involved with you? 
A. That is my testimony, that is correct. 
The defendant primarily argues that her answers were literally true. In the defendant's 
telling, the phrase "(w]hen I was with him," refers not to the duration of the defendant's 
relationship with Epstein, but instead to only those moments when she was in the act of having sex 
with Epstein and either the blond or brunette identified above. (Def. Mot. 4 at 16). 
as the defalimuld 
thlIWINEPENErglIMPrin anieMPIONAMINI 
three-per ar 
rEfenco—Mis invad  a fourth person, the answer to which is no, she arguta 
because t
tal activitOlby deft-not 
 involve four people. And in any event, 
she further argues, because the question asked the defendant about the 1990s and 2000s, it 
therefore covered any 'sexual activities' spanning more than a millennium." (Id. at 16-17). 
132 
EFTA00077764

The defendant, therefore, argues that the questioner asked whether a logically impossible 
event occurred or will occur at some point over the course of a millennium. But the defendant's 
professed confusion—which again was not raised during the deposition itself—ignores the plain 
and obvious context of the question, which did not refer to a time period far exceeding the human 
life span, and was not limited to only the times in which the defendant was in the act of having sex 
with Epstein. Plainly, a jury could find that the defendant correctly understood the question when 
she answered it in July 2016, and that she ascribed a natural meaning to the words used in the 
questions, and not the tortured illogical meaning she now assigns to those questions: whether, 
during the course of her relationship with Epstein, she was aware of anyone other than herself 
having sexual relations with Epstein. The Government expects its evidence to show that she was. 
See, e.g., Indictment ¶ 1 (stating that the defendant "assisted, facilitated, and contributed to" 
Epstein's sexual abuse of minors). At a minimum, the defendant's answers were not "literally true 
under any conceivable interpretation of the questions." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 374. And the 
defendant's professed confusion now and proposed illogical reading of the questions in the instant 
motion does not render them fundamentally ambiguous. See Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221 ("A 
defense to a charge of perjury may not be established by isolating a statement from context, giving 
it in this manner a meaning entirely different from that which it has when the testimony is 
considered as a whole."). Accordingly, a jury should be permitted to determine what meaning the 
defendant ascribed to those questions and whether her answers were in fact false. 
Finally, the defendant answered the following questions: 
Q. Did you ever give a massage to anyone other than Mr. Epstein at 
any of Mr. Epstein's properties? 
A. First of all, I never said I gave Mr. Epstein a massage. 
133 
EFTA00077765