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§2422(b) and cites generally to §2422 in an attempt to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. 
§2255. (Am Com, vs, 31-32). None of the State of Florida criminal statutes referenced 
by Plaintiff are a requisite predicate act required to prove a claim under 18 U.S.C. §2255. 
(See 129-30 of Am Comp.). 
Thus, in order to sustain a cause of action under §2255, Plaintiff is required to prove 
all the elements of one of the statutory enumerated predicate acts. See Gray v. Darby 
2009 WL 805435 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2005), requiring evidence to establish predicate act 
under 18 U.S.C. §2255 to state cause of action. As noted above, Plaintiff is relying on 
§2422 of Title 18, and tracks the language of subsection (b) of that statute. There is no 
evidence whatsoever of EPSTEIN "using the mail or any facility or means of interstate 
or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial Jurisdiction of the 
United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, ... ." 
In order to show a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), four elements must be proven: 
(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or 
coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to engage in any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempting to do so. U.S. v. 
Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Munro 394 F.3d 865, 869 (10th
Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Kaye, 451 F.Supp.2d 775, 782-83 (E.D. Va. 2006). The undisputed 
material facts show that EPSTEIN and JD7 never communicated at any time on any 
subject via the telephone, intemet, texting, e-mails, or other form of electronic 
communication. JD7 testified that she found out about getting $200 for a massage from 
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other girsl. JD7 decided she want to earn $200 for a massage after overhearing other 
girls talk about it and being asked by H.R. The only thing discussed with JD7 was the 
giving of a massage for $200 or coming to work. No other type of activity or conduct 
was discussed. There was no communication by any means in which sexual activity or 
illicit sexual conduct was brought up with Epstein. There is no testimony or complaint 
allegation that JD7 travelled anywhere with EPSTEIN by car or otherwise. 
(See 
Statement of Facts, 9¶7-11). 
Thus, there was no (1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly 
persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to 
engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempting to do so. See for e.g., U.S. v. Gagliardi 506 F.3d 140, 150-51 (2d 
Cir. 2007). In Gaeliardi, a defendant was convicted of violating §2422(b) where he 
initiated contact with girl he believed was a minor in an intemet chat room called "I Love 
Older Men," repeatedly made sexual advances toward girl and her "friend," asked them 
for their pictures, steered the conversation toward sexual activities, described the acts that 
he would engage in with them, tried to set up a meeting with both of them, and appeared 
for a meeting with condoms and a Viagra pill in his car. Thus, the Circuit court agreed 
had the requisite intent to violate § 2422(6). The Circuit Court determined that a 
reasonable juror could also have found that the defendant took a substantial step beyond 
mere preparation when he arrived at the meeting place with two condoms and a Viagra 
pill in his car. See also U.S. v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir.2005)(Defendant 
convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual acts by using computer 
connected to the internee, under §2422(b), where chat room communications included 
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defendant asking "girl" about her sexual history, her virginity, her experience wit oral 
sex, and the possibility of making a movie together; defendant further told "girl" about 
his desire to perform oral sex on her.); U.S. v. Barlow 568 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2009). See 
also U.S. v. Kave, 451 F.Supp.2d 775, supra, where defendant engaged in lengthy "chat 
room" communications of a sexual nature with individual he believed was a 13 year old 
boy, described what he was going to do with 13 year old, and traveled to the home of the 
13 year old. 
Thus, because the evidence (11:17's own sworn testimony) establishes that there 
was no violation of §2422(b), an essential element of Plaintiff's 18 U.S.0 §2255 claim 
asserted in Count III is missing. The claim fails as a matter of law and Defendant is 
entitled to the entry of summary judgment on the claim. Summary judgment is proper 
under Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 
317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Pursuant to Rule 56(b), "a party 
against whom relief is sought may move, with or without supporting affidavits, for 
summary judgment on all or part of the claim." 
Thus, under the undisputed material facts and applicable law, EPSTEIN is entitled 
to summary judgment on Count III of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as a matter 
of law. JD7's own testimony establishes that EPSTEIN never used a facility or means of 
interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her to engage in 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Under the undisputed material facts, .1136 
cannot show a violation of the enumerated predicate act, §2422(b) on which she relies, in 
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order to prove her claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255; thus, an essential element of her 
§2255 cannot be established, entitling Defendant to the entry of summary judgment on 
Count 
III. A. As a matter of law, Defendant is entitled to the entry of summary 
judgment determining that the remedy afforded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 42255 
allows for a single recovery of "actual damages" by a plaintiff against a 
defendant. The recovery afforded is not on a per violation or per incident (or 
per count) busis.4
As noted above, certain of the Jane Does allege a single encounter with EPSTEIN 
while others allege multiple encounters. Here JD7 alleges one §2255 count in her 
complaint, and also alleges and testified that she went to EPSTE1N's Palm Beach home 8 
to 10 times. To the extent that the Plaintiff is seeking a multiplication of her damages, 
under the plain meaning of the statutory text, §2255 does not allow for a multiplication of 
the presumptive "actual damages" by the number of incidents or violations (or counts) 
alleged. Nowhere in the statutory text is there any reference to the "civil remedy" 
afforded against a defendant by this statute as being on a "per violation" or "per incident" 
or "per count" basis. 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a "civil remedy" for "a minor who is a 
victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 
2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such 
violation ... ." The presumptive minimum damages amount speaks in terms of "actual 
damages." See 18 U.S.C. §2255, quoted above in part I; See Smith v. Husband, 428 
In other §2255 actions filed against Defendant, Defendant has previously asserted the 
position that 18 U.S.C. §2255's creates a single cause of action on behalf of a plaintiff 
against a defendant, as opposed to multiple causes of action on a per violation basis or as 
opposed to an allowance of a multiplication of the statutory presumptive minimum 
damages or "actual damages." EPSTEIN asserts his position regarding the single 
recovery of damages in order to properly preserve all issues pertaining to the proper 
application of §2255 for appeal. See C.M.A. v. Epstein, Case No. 08-CIV-80811 
Marra/Johnson; and Jane Doe II v. Epstein, Case No. 09-C1V-80469 Marra/Johnson. 
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F.Supp.2d 432 (ED. Va. 2006); Smith v. Husband. 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va, 2006); 
Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007); and the recent cases in front 
of this court on Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and For More Definite Statement — woe 
Flo. 2 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383332 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Doe No. 3 v. Epstein. 2009 
WL 383330 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); Poe No. 4 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383286 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 12, 2009); and Doe No. 5 v. Epstein, 2009 WL 383383 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2009); 
see also U.S. v. Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. 1 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 11, 2010); 
U.S. v. Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. v. Ferenci, 2009 
WL 2579102, fn. 1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. v. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, fn. 1 
(ED. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. v. Zane 2009 WL 2567832, fn.1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 18 
2009). 
18 U.S.C.A. §2255 - Civil Remedy for Personal Injuries, creates a federal cause of 
action or "civil remedy" for a minor victim of sexual, abuse, molestation and 
exploitation, and allows for a single recovery of the "actual damages" sustained and 
proven by a "minor who is a victim of a violation" of an enumerated predicated act mg 
who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation." "18 U.S.C. §2255 gives 
victims of sexual conduct who are minors a private right of action." Martinez v. White 
492 F.Supp.2d 1186, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 18 U.S.C.A. §2255 "merely provides a 
cause of action for damages in `any appropriate United States District Court."' j, at 
1189. 
Under the plain meaning of the statute, §2255 does not allow for the actual 
damages sustained to be duplicated or multiplied on behalf of a plaintiff against a 
defendant on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. Nowhere in the 
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statutory text is there any reference to the recovery of damages afforded by this statute as 
being on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. 18 IJ S C. 2255(a) 
creates a civil remedy for "a minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 
2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who 
suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... ." The statute speaks in terms of 
the recovery of the "actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of suit, including 
attorney's fees." See 18 U.S.C. §2255(a), endnote i. See Smith v. Husband, 428 
F.Supp.2d 432 (ED. Va. 2006); Smith v, Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (ED. Va. 2006); 
Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
As to the meaning of "actual damages," the Eleventh Circuit in McMillian v. 
F.D.I.C. 81 F.3d 1041, 1055 (11th Cir.1996)5, succinctly explained: 
... "Compensatory damages" are defined as those damages that "will 
compensate the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more; such 
as will simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury." 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1991). "Actual damages," roughly 
synonymous with compensatory damages, are defined as "Neal, 
substantial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complainant 
in compensation for his actual and real loss or injury as opposed ... to 
`nominal' damages [and) 'punitive' damages." It 
Finally, Idjirect 
damages are such as follow immediately upon the act done." Id Thus, 
"actual direct compensatory damages" appear to include those damages, 
flowing directly from the repudiation, which make one whole, as opposed 
to those which go farther by including future contingencies such as lost 
In IVIchifillian, the 1I* Circuit was faced with the task of the interpretation of the 
statutory term "actual direct compensatory damages" under FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. 
§1821(eX3)(i). In doing so, the Court began with the plain meaning of the phrase. See 
Perrin v. United States 444 U.S. 37, 4243, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) 
("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words 
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary common meaning."); United 
States v. McLvmont, 45 F.3d 400, 401 (11th Cir.), cm. denied 514 U.S. 1077, 115 S.Ct. 
1723, 131 L.Ed.2d 581 (1995) ("Mhe plain meaning of this statute controls unless the 
language is ambiguous or leads to absurd results."). 
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profits and opportunities or damages based on speculation. [Citation 
omitted]. ... 
FN15. According to Corpus furls Secundum, "'Compensatory damages' 
and 'actual damages' are synonymous terms ... and include[ ] all 
damages other than punitive or exemplary damages." 25 C.J.S. 
Damages § 2 (1966). 
(Emphasis added). 
See also, ?win v. U.S. Dept. of Veteran Affairs, 2009 WL 1677233 (11'h Cir. June 
17, 2009), citing Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 1982), abrogated on 
other grounds by Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204 (2004),( "Actual damages" 
recoverable under the Privacy Act are "proven pecuniary losses and not for generalized 
mental injuries, loss of reputation, embarrassment or other non-qualified injuries;" and 
the statutory minimum of $1,000 under the Privacy Act is not available unless the 
plaintiff suffered some amount of "actual damages."). 
Considering the plain meaning of "actual damages" and the purpose of such 
damages is to "make one whole," to allow a duplication or multiplication of the actual 
damages sustained is in direct conflict with the well entrenched legal principle against 
duplicative damages recovery. See generally, E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 
279, 297, 122 S.Ct. 754, 766 (2002X"As we have noted, it 'goes without saying that the 
courts can and should preclude double recovery by an individual.'"), citing General 
Telephone. 446 U.S., at 333, 100 S.Ct. 1698. 
The purpose of damages recovery where a Plaintiff has suffered personal injury 
as a result of Defendant's misconduct is to make the plaintiff whole, not to enrich the 
plaintiff. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages §36, stating the settled legal principle that—
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The law abhors duplicative recoveries, and a plaintiff who is injured by a 
defendant's misconduct is, for the most part, entitled to be made whole, not 
enriched. Hence, for one injury, there should be one recovery, irrespective of 
the availability of multiple remedies and actions. Stated otherwise, a party 
cannot recover the same damages twice, even if recovery is based on 
different theories. 
• • • 
, a plaintiff who alleges separate causes of action is not permitted to recover 
more than the amount of damages actually suffered. There cannot be a 
double recovery for the same loss, even though different theories of liability 
are alleged in the complaint. ... . 
See also, 22 Ani.Jur.2d Damages § 28 — 
The law abhors duplicative recoveries; in other words, a plaintiff who is 
injured by reason of a defendant's behavior is, for the most part, entitled to be 
made whole, not to be enriched. The sole object of compensatory damages is 
to make the injured party whole for losses actually suffered; the plaintiff 
cannot be made more than whole, make a profit, or receive more than one 
recovery for the same harm. Thus, a plaintiff in a civil action for damages 
cannot, in the absence of punitive or statutory treble damages, recover more 
than the loss actually suffered. The plaintiff is not entitled to a windfall, and 
the law will not put him in a better position than he would be in had the 
wrong not been done or the contract not been broken. 
See also recent case of U.S. v. Baker, supra, at *8, wherein the Court was inclined 
to agree with the defendant's interpretation of §2255(a) of allowing for a single recovery 
of the statutory minimum damages amount as opposed to the government's argument that 
"the minimum amount of damages mandated by 18 U.S.C. §2255(a) applies to each of 
(pornographic) image produced by [defendant]." The government attempted to argue that 
restitution should be equal to the statutory minimum amount times the 55 photos 
produced by defendant. In rejecting the government's argument, the Court reiterated that 
the statutory minimum is a floor for damages - in other words, a mandated minimum. 
Nothing prevents a plaintiff from proving that he or she suffered damages in a greater 
amount. 
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Had Congress wanted to write in a multiplier of actual damages recoverable it 
could have easily done so. For an example of a statute wherein the legislature included 
the language "for each violation" in assessing a "civil penalty," see 18 U.S.C. §216, 
entitled "Penalties and injunctions," of Chapter 11 — "Bribery, Graft, and Conflict of 
Interests," also contained in Title 18 — "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." Subsection (b) 
of §216 gives the United States Attorney General the power to bring a "civil action ... 
against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under" specified 
sections of the bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest statutes. The statute further 
provides in relevant part that "upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the 
evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 EN 
each violation or the amount of compensation which the person received or offered for 
the prohibited conduct, which ever amount is greater." As noted, 18 U.S.C. §2255 does 
not include such language. 
11I. B. As a matter of law, Defendant is entitled to the entry of summary' 
judgment determining that the minimum statutory damages awarded under 18 
U.S.C. 42255(a) are not subject to multiplier on a per incident or per violation 
or per count basis. 
As discussed above herein, by its own terms, §2255 provides for the recovery of 
"actual damages the minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees." 
The next sentence expressly states — "Any minor as described in the preceding sentence 
shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value." (Even the 
2006 amended version provides — "Any person as described in the preceding sentence 
shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.") There is 
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absolutely no language that allows for a plaintiff to multiply the presumptive minimum 
damages recoverable on a "per violation" or "per incident or "per count" basis. 
If a plaintiff were alleging multiple counts in an effort to multiply the statutory 
minimum, such recovery would be improper based on the same legal principles that a 
duplication or multiplication of the "actual damages" sustained and proven would also be 
improper under the plain meaning of the statute. The $50,000 is a statutory minimum; 
nothing prevents a plaintiff who suffers personal injury as a result of a violation of any 
enumerated predicated act from proving she sustained actual damages in an amount 
greater than the statutory minimum. At the same time, if she proves she suffered 
personal injury and suffered actual damages in an amount less than the statutory 
minimum, she is able to recover the minimum amount. 
W. C. In the alternative, pursuant to constitutional law principles of statutory 
interpretation, 18 U.S.C. 42255 is required to be interpreted as allowing for a 
single recovery of actual damages or the statutory minimum, where personal 
iniury and actual damages are sustained and proven, on behalf of a plaintiff 
against a defendant. The recovery of damages is not subject to duplication or 
multiplication on a "per violation" or "per incident" or "per count" basis. 
As set forth above, it is Defendant's position that under applicable law, 18 U.S.C. 
§2255 does not allow a Plaintiff to pursue the recovery of actual damages or the 
minimum afforded under the statute on a "per violation" or "per incident" basis by 
attempting to allege multiple counts thereunder or prove multiple predicate act violations. 
In the alternative, if one were to assume that the language of §2255 were vague or 
ambiguous, under the constitutional based protections of due process, judicial restraint, 
and the rule of lenity applied in construing a statute, Defendant's position as to the 
meaning of the statute would prevail. See United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 
(2008). As summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: 
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... The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in 
favor of the defendants subjected to them. See United States v. Gradwell, 243 
U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917); McBoyle v. United States, 
283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931); United States v. Bass, 
404 U.S. 336, 347-349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). This venerable 
rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be 
held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, 
or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the 
weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more 
clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead. ... 
In Santos, the Court was faced with the interpretation of the term "proceeds" in 
the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §1956. "The federal money-laundering 
statute prohibits a number of activities involving criminal `proceeds.'" Id, at 2023. 
Noting that the term "proceeds" was not defined in the statute, the Supreme Court stated 
the well settled principle that "when a term is undefined, we give it its ordinary 
meaning." Id, at 2024. Under the ordinary meaning principle, the government's position 
was that proceeds meant "receipts," while the defendant's position was that proceeds 
meant "profits." The Supreme Court recognized that under either of the proffered 
"ordinary meanings," the provisions of the federal money-laundering statute were still 
coherent, not redundant, and the statute was not rendered "utterly absurd." Under such a 
situation, citing to a long line of cases and the established rule of lenity, "the tie must go 
to the defendant." M, at 2025. See portion of Court's opinion quoted above. "Because 
the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendant friendly that the 'receipts' 
definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted." Id. 
The recent case of United States v. Berdeal 595 F.Supp.2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2009), 
further supports Defendant's argument that the "rule of lenity" requires that the Court 
resolve any statutory interpretation conflict in favor of Defendant. Assuming for the sake 
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of argument that Plaintiffs multiple counts, leading to a multiplication of the statutory 
damages amount, is a reasonable interpretation, like Defendant's reasonable 
interpretation, under the "rule of lenity," any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the least 
draconian measure. In Berdeaj, applying the rule of lenity, the Court sided with the 
Defendants' interpretation of the Lacey Act which makes illegal the possession of snook 
caught in specified jurisdictions. The snook had been caught in Nicaraguan waters. The 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting the statute did not encompass snook caught 
in foreign waters. The United States disagreed. 
Both sides presented reasonable 
interpretations regarding the reach of the statute. In dismissing the indictment, the Court 
determined that the rule of lenity required it to accept defendants' interpretation. 
To allow a duplication or multiplication would subject Defendant EPSTEIN to a 
punishment that is not clearly prescribed — an unwritten multiplier of the "actual 
damages" or the presumptive minimum damages. The rule of lenity requires that 
Defendant's interpretation of the remedy afforded under §2255 be adopted. 
In addition, under the Due Process Clause's basic principle of fair warning - 
... a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a 
crime ... . As was said in United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 
S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 Ltd. 989, 
'The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying 
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct 
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' 
Thus we have struck down a [state] criminal statute under the Due Process 
Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject 
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' 
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 
Ltd. 322. We have recognized in such cases that 'a statute which either 
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forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential of due process of law,' ibid., and that 
'No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the 
State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 
S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888. 
Thus, applying these well-entrenched constitutional principles of statutory 
interpretation and application, Defendant is entitled to the entry of summary judgment 
determining that 18 U.S.C. §2255 allows for a single recovery of damages against a 
Defendant; the statutory minimum is not subject to a multiplier on a per incident or per 
violation (or per count) basis. 
IV. The Version of 18 U.S.C. 82255 Tn Effect When The Predicate Acts 
Alleaedly Were Committed Allowed Only "Minors" To File Suit. 
The Amended Complaint is predicated on conduct that occurred sometime in 2003 
and 2004. JD7's date of birth is June 30, 1987. JD7 turned 18 on June 30, 2005. (See 
Statement Facts above). The original Complaint in this matter was filed on September 
10, 2008. Thus, JD7 was 21 years old at the time this suit was filed and no longer a 
minor. (The age of majority under both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18 
U.S.C. §2256(1), defining a "minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years;" and 
§1.01, Definitions, Fla. Stat., defining "minor" to include "any person who has not 
attained the age of 18 years.") 
From 1999 to July 26, 2006, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provided: 
Any minor who is a victim of a violation of [certain specified federal 
statutes] and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may 
sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the 
actual damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding 
sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
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$50,000 in value. 
It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the 
text and structure of the law. CBS. Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Venture. 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 
(11th Cir. 2001) ("We begin our construction of [a statutory provision] where courts 
should always begin the process of legislative interpretation, and where they often should 
end it as well, which is with the words of the statutory provision.") (quoting Harris v. 
Gamer, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en bane)) (first alteration omitted). In this 
case, the plain text of the 2003 statute is both clear and unmistakable. It allowed only 
minors (or the representative of a then-minor, see Fed It. Civ. P. 17(c)) to initiate suit 
under § 2255. It provided only that "any minor ... may sue" and that "any minor ... 
shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains" as a result of the predicate acts. 
Id. (emphasis added). The law's use of the present tense further underscored its limited 
scope: It spoke of "any minor who is a victim," provided that "such minor ... shall 
recover" damages arising from the underlying offense, and stated that "any minor ... 
shall be deemed" to have sustained at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). 
Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here—the "judicial inquiry is 
complete." Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation 
omitted)). Under the pre-July, 2006 version of the statute, only minors could initiate suit. 
The recent case of U.S. v. Baker, 2009 WL 4572785, *7-8 (E.D. Tx Dec. 7, 
2009), in discussing the restitution under 18 U.S.C. §2255 noted that when the statute 
was amended in 2006 — "Masha's Law increased the minimum damages amount from 
$50,000 to $150,000 and broadened the language of section 2255 to allow adults to 
recover for damages sustained while they were a minor." The plain reading of the statute 
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makes clear that prior to the 2006 amendment, the remedy was created for the benefit of 
minors who suffered sexual exploitation as a result of violation of a statutorily 
enumerated criminal act(s). 
To the extent there is any ambiguity in the text—and there is none—the law's 
legislative history further underscores Congress's intent to limit the right of action to 
minors: "Current law provides for a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from 
child pornography offenses. This section expands the number of sex offenses in which a 
minor may pursue a civil remedy for personal injuries resulting from the offense." H.R. 
Rep. 105-557, at 23 (1998), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 692. And perhaps 
most telling, Congress amended § 2255 in 2006—three years after the alleged 
misconduct in this case supposedly took place—to make the civil action available to 
persons who had turned 18 by the lime they filed suit: 
(a) In general.—Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a 
violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 
2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a 
result of such violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while 
such person was a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States 
District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person 
as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained 
damages of no less than $150,000 in value. 
18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006) (emphasis added). 
The contrast between the prior and 2006 versions of § 2255 is stark. The 2006 
law replaces each of the prior law's uses of the term "minor" with the term "person." 
Where the 2006 law does refer to a "minor," it changes the prior law's present-tense 
references ("is") to past-tense references ("was"). And the 2006 law's new language now 
makes clear that, unlike the prior statute, those victimized while under the age of 18 may 
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sue after they turn 18. Given that amendments must be interpreted "to have real and 
substantial effect," Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), there can be no doubt that 
Congress recognized the prior statute's strict limitations and for the first time expanded 
the right of action to adults. 
Indeed, the history of the 2006 amendments clearly shows that Congress intended 
to change the law, not merely to clarify it. Those amendments were made by § 707 of the 
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 650 
(2006), and are known as "Masha's Law." As Senator Kerry—the author of Masha's 
Law—explained: 
What Masha's law does, and what is incorporated in here, is it changes 
"any minor" to "any person," so that if a minor is depicted in 
photographs pornographically that are distributed over the Internet, but 
by the time the abuser is caught, the minor is an adult, they can still 
recover. They cannot now, and that is ridiculous. It makes sure that 
recovery on the part of a minor can take place when they become an 
adult.... 
Although I don't think there is any price too high to cost an individual 
who would take advantage of a minor, I think it is only appropriate to 
make sure that reaching the age of adulthood does not exempt someone 
from recovery. It is a tribute to continuing to do what this bill does, and 
that is look after the protection of minors and ensure that those who 
violate them are caught and punished and have to pay to the maximum 
extent. 
152 Cong. Rec. S8012-02 at S8016 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (emphasis 
added). Courts typically give special weight to the statements of a bill's sponsor, Corlev 
v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (Apr. 6, 2009) ("[A] sponsor's statement to the full Senate 
carries considerable weight' ).6 There is no basis to depart from that rule here. 
a 
Similarly, the official summary prepared by the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") 
explained that Masha's Law Irlevises provisions allowing victims of certain sex-related crimes to seek 
civil remedies to: (I) allow adults as well as minors to sue for injuries; and (2) increase from $50,000 to 
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It thus is no answer that the pre-amended statute's limitations clause provided that 
"in the case of a person under a legal disability, [the complaint may be filed] not later 
than three years after the disability," 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2003), such that the 
unamended version of the law implicitly must have permitted victims to sue even after 
they turned 18. That interpretation not only would render Masha's Law superfluous; it 
would make Masha's Law's internally redundant, because Masha's Law retained the 
"legal disability" language from the prior version of § 2255(b). See 18 U.S.C. § 2255(6) 
(2006). In short, the retained "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) of the 2006 statute 
would be entirely redundant were it construed to do implicitly what the law elsewhere did 
expressly. 
In these circumstances, the traditional rules against surplusage and 
redundancy apply with double force. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 
(2001). The "legal disability" language in § 2255(b) should be interpreted to reference 
classic legal disabilities like insanity, mental disability, or imprisonment—not age. 
Indeed, that is precisely how Congress typically uses the term "legal disability": 
most federal statutes that use the term make clear that it doesn't include age. See, e.g., 25 
U.S.C. § 590c ("A share or interest payable to enrollees less than eighteen years of age or 
under legal disability shall be paid ....") (emphasis added); id. § 783 ("Funds payable 
under sections 781 to 785 of this title to minors or to persons under legal disability shall 
$150,000 the minimum level of damages." Official Stmunary of Pub. Law No. 109-248 (July 27, 2006), as 
reprinted at http://thomasdoc.goWcgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109;HR04472:@®@)L&summ2emm& (emphasis 
added) (last visited May 10, 2009). Courts have long consulted official CRS summaries to assess 
legislative intent, see, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Ben, Guar. Cow. 744 F.2d 133, 145 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
PIRVCTV Inc. v. Citmarella No. Civ.A 03-2384, 2005 WL 1252261 at •7 (D.N.J. May 24, 2005); 
Ciohessv v. St. Francis Hosp. & Healthcare No. 98-C-4818, 1999 WL 46898 •2-*3 (N.D. III. Jan. 28, 
1999), and there is good reason to do so. By design, CRS summaries are intended to "objectively 
describe() the measure's ... effect upon ... current law" so that Congress can make informed judgments 
about the impact of proposed bills. See The Library of Congress, About CRS Summary, available at 
littp://thomasloc.gov/bss/abt dgst.litml (last visited May 10, 2009). 
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Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein 
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be paid....") (emphasis added); id. § 1128 ("Sums payable to enrollees ... who are less 
than eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....") 
(emphasis added); id. § 1253 ("Sums payable ... to enrollees ... who are less than 
eighteen years of age or who are under a legal disability shall be paid....") (emphasis 
added); id. § 1273 (same); Id. § 1283 (same); id. § 1295 (same); id. § 1300a-3 (same); id. 
§ 1300c-3 (same); id. § 1300d-7 (same); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3501. 
Needless to say, Congress would not have had to address age expressly in any of 
these statutes if the term "legal disability" necessarily included one's status as a minor; 
instead, Congress's mere use of the term "legal disability" already would account for a 
would-be plaintiff's minority status. Given the rule "against reading a text in a way that 
makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 
U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon 
that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning 
... in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that sense," 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911), § 2255's reference to "legal 
disability" can only be interpreted as a reference to classic disabilities like insanity or 
mental incapacity, but not age. 
Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment determining that the 
applicable version of §2255 allows for a minor to pursue the remedy thereunder. JD7 
was 21 years old at the time she instituted this action, no longer a minor. 
Conclusion 
Thus, under the undisputed material facts and applicable law, Defendant is 
entitled to the entry of summary judgment determining that (1) the version of 18 U.S.C. 
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§2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time during which EPSTEIN's 
alleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255; (2) 
JD7's own testimony establishes that EPSTEIN never used a facility or means of 
interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce her to engage in 
any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempting to do so. 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). Her testimony and the allegations of the 
complaint also show that EPSTEIN never traveled interstate with the specific intent of 
engaging in sexual activity with her. 18 U.S.C. 2423(b) and (e). Under the undisputed 
material facts, JD6 cannot show a violation of the enumerated predicate acts on which 
she relies, in order to prove her claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255; thus, an essential 
element of her §2255 cannot be established, entitling Defendant to the entry of summary 
judgment on Count III; (3) 18 U.S.C. §2255 allows for a single recovery of the 
presumptive minimum damages amount against a single Defendant, and not a 
multiplication thereof based on the number of statutory predicate act violations or 
incidents or counts; and (4) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the predicate 
acts allegedly were committed allow only "minors" to file suit. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court enter the summary judgments 
sought herein. Defendant further requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs in 
defending this claim. 
By: /s/ Robert D. Critton, Jr. 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
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Jane Doe No. 7 v. Epstein 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is 
being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following service list in 
the manner specified via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by 
CM/ECF on this t h day of  Mav, 2010: 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Mermelstein & Horowitz, P.A. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami. FL 33160 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm 
3401-5012 
Counsel for Defendant Jeffity Epstein 
Respectfully submitted, 
By:  1s/ Robert D. Critton. Jr, 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 224162 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTT1ER & 
COLEMAN 
303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400 
3401 
(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffiey Epstein) 
18 USCA §2255 (effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 20061 
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