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This is an FBI investigation document from the Epstein Files collection (FBI VOL00009). Text has been machine-extracted from the original PDF file. Search more documents →

FBI VOL00009

EFTA00597318

33 pages
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 21 of 33 
CVRA. 
The Government seems to be suggesting that if, as a matter of "prosecutorial 
discretion," it decides that it would be useful to keep victims in the dark about how their case is 
being handled, then it has discretion to do so. The CVRA's protection of "prosecutorial 
discretion" does not extend so far as to allow the Government to decide which parts of the 
CVRA it will comply with and which parts it will ignore. This Court has a duty to construe the 
CVRA so that all the parts of the statute are harmonized with one another. See Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (it is an "elementary canon of construction that a statute 
should not be interpreted so as to render one part inoperative."). The CVRA's recognition of 
"prosecutorial discretion" means recognition of the Government's right to determine what 
charges to file and what charges not to file — not what important aspects of the resolution of a 
case the Government can conceal from victims. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 
2004) (defining "prosecutorial discretion" as "[a] prosecutor's power to choose from the options 
available in criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining, 
and recommending a sentence to the court"). In the context of this case, for example, the 
Government was free to make the final decision on whether or not to prosecute Epstein. But as 
this Court has previously held, the CVRA extends to victims a right to "the full unfettered 
exercise of their conferral rights at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those rights 
meaningfully." DE 189 at 9. Recognizing a right to confer about the Government's disposition 
of the case is "not an infringement ... on the government's independent prosecutorial discretion; 
instead, it is only a requirement that the government confer in some reasonable way with the 
victims before ultimately exercising its broad discretion." In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th
Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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The Government's conduct here was particularly egregious, because it repeatedly found 
time to confer with the attorneys for the Epstein — the man who had sexually abused the victims. 
And yet the Government did not extend the same opportunity to the victims, even though they 
had a congressionally-protected right to confer. Indeed, the Government here stepped over the 
line from mere passive failure to disclose to affirmative acts of concealment, such as sending 
letters to the victims counseling "patience" and asking victims' counsel to write a letter to the 
Government explaining why the case should be prosecuted — even though the Government was 
in the process of entering into an agreement barring that very prosecution. 
The Court should grant summary judgment on the victims' claim that the Government 
violated their right to confer. 
B. 
Partial Summary Judgment is Appropriate on the Victims' Argument that 
Government Violated their CVRA Right to Be Treated with Fairness. 
Partial summary judgment is also appropriate because the Government indisputably 
violated the victims' "right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity 
and privacy." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). Entirely apart from whether the victims had any right to 
confer with prosecutors, at a bare minimum they had a right to be treated fairly — i.e., a right not 
to be deceived — by the Government. Yet here the Government deliberately misled the victims 
about what was happening in their case, concealing from them the NPA's negotiation and 
consummation — until it was too late for the victims to do raise any objection. As with the 
violation of the right to confer, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Government violated 
the victims' right to fair treatment at multiple points in the process, including before the NPA 
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was signed, after the NPA was signed, when Epstein was entering his State guilty pleas, and after 
Epstein entered his State guilty pleas. 
While the Government tries gamely to defend its actions, DE 401-2 at 15-20, the 
undisputed facts show that in January (and later) 2008, well after the NPA had been signed, the 
Government sent the victims (and, in some cases, their attorneys) deceptive information that the 
case "is currently under investigation" and that "Titus can be a lengthy process and we request 
your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 
361 at 31, ¶ 94; Jane Doe 1 Decl., DE 361-26 at 1. The victim notification letters did not 
disclose that the federal investigation in the Southern District of Florida involving Jane Doe 1 
and Jane Doe 2 were the subject of the NPA entered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's 
Office previously, or that there had been any potentially binding resolution. Victims' S.J. Mot., 
DE 361 at 31-32, 1 94; See Gov't Fact. Resp. at 12, 1 94. 
The Government claims it had no duty to disclose the NPA. See DE 401-2 at 16. But the 
Government's concealment would be tortious and actionable if committed during the course of a 
business transaction. The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains the traditional American legal 
principles surrounding the tort of misrepresentation through non-disclosure during a business 
transaction: 
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, 
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and 
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his 
partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and 
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or 
misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to 
be so; and 
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(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it 
would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in 
reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and 
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to 
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the 
relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective 
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (1977). 
While fitting into only one of the five enumerated subsections would be enough to show 
that the Government committed a tort against the victims by concealing the NPA (assuming that 
the discussions with the victims are analogous to a "business transaction"), remarkably the 
Government's actions satisfy all five circumstances. 
First, Government had disclosure 
obligations because it stands in a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" to 
crime victims, because Congress has directed that prosecutors must exercise their "best efforts" 
to protect victims' rights during the criminal justice process. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). 
Second, during the course of the case, government prosecutors learned information that 
made their earlier statements to the victims misleading. For example, when the prosecutors met 
with Jane Doe 1 at the end of January, she expressed her view that Epstein should be prosecuted. 
Gov't Fact. Resp. at 12-13 ¶ 96. Whatever the FBI agents had told Jane Doe 1 earlier in 
October, at the end of January the Government indisputably became aware that Jane Doe I 
thought that federal prosecution of her case was still possible. Yet the federal attorneys did not 
disclose to Jane Doe 1 at this meeting that they had already negotiated a NPA with Epstein. 
Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361, at 32 1 97. Indeed, Jane Doe I's understanding about the posture of 
the case had been reinforced, in early January, when the Government sent her a letter requesting 
her "continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." At that point, it became 
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necessary for the Government to set the record straight to prevent its "partial or ambiguous 
statement of the facts from being misleading." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b) 
(1977). If the CVRA's promise to victims that they have a right to fair treatment during the 
criminal justice process is going to mean anything, it must mean that the Government cannot 
hold a face-to-face meeting with a victim who is requesting federal prosecution for a man who 
sexually abused her while concealing the fact that it has previously signed an agreement barring 
such prosecution. While the CVRA may not give victims the right to "dictate the manner, 
timing, or quantity of conferrals," Jordan v. Dep't of Justice, 173 F. Supp. 3d 44, 52-53 
M
. 2016), during such a face-to-face meeting, the Government must at least proceed in a 
straightforward and upright way. 
Third and similarly, the Government had a duty to speak when it "subsequently acquired 
information that" it knew made "untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made 
was true or believed to be so." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977). The 
Government argues that it genuinely believed that the case was truly "under investigation" even 
well after the NPA was signed, because it did not know whether Epstein intended to plead guilty. 
While the victims strongly dispute this view of the Government's actions, even crediting them, 
this belief obviously was no longer genuine as of Friday, June 27, 2008, when Epstein told the 
prosecutors that he was going to Florida court on Monday morning, June 30, to plead guilty. 
Accordingly, when the Government was contacting the victims in the days before that hearing — 
such as when it called Mr. Edwards — it had a duty at that point, in light of the "subsequently 
acquired information" that Epstein was pleading guilty, to alert Mr. Edwards (and the victims) 
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that the case was no longer "under investigation" and was instead moving to a point where the 
NPA would be triggered.' 
Fourth, the Government had a duty to correct its concealment when it subsequently 
learned Mr. Edwards, for example, was "about to act in reliance upon [misleading government 
statements] in a transaction with [the Government]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
551(2)(d) (1977). The Government learned, for example, that Mr. Edwards was going to send it 
a letter explaining why federal charges should be brought against Epstein — even though Epstein 
could no longer be prosecuted due to the NPA. Indeed, Mr. Edwards took time from his busy 
law practice (and away from his family on the eve of the Fourth of July) to write a letter to the 
U.S. Attorney's Office on July 3, 2008, asking the U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute Epstein — 
even though the NPA blocking that prosecution had taken final effect three days earlier. The 
Government's duty to correct the false impression it had (deliberately) created with Mr. Edwards 
is manifest.' 
Fifth and finally, under the "objective circumstances" of this case, the victims would 
have "reasonably expect[ed] disclosure of the facts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
551(2)(e) (1977). 
The victims (and their attorneys) could hardly have expected that the 
prosecutors and the man who had sexually abused them would be working together to conceal an 
7 Here again, the detailed and recently-submitted affidavit from the victims' attorney, Bradley J. Edwards, provides 
additional detail about what he was told — and not told — about the state guilty pleas. See Edwards Aff. of Aug. II, 
2017 at 1 17. If the Government fails to dispute this part of the affidavit, of course that affidavit would provide 
additional evidence supporting summary judgment for the victims. 
8 Here again, the detailed and recently-submitted affidavit from the victims' attorney, Bradley J. Edwards, provides 
additional detail about how he was relying on misleading statements from the Government. See Edwards Aff. of 
Aug. II, 2017 at 1 19. If the Government fails to dispute this part of the affidavit, of course that affidavit would 
provide additional evidence supporting summary judgment for the victims. 
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arrangement that would prevent his prosecution for crimes against them. And the Government 
must have been aware that it was keeping the victims in a position where they could not object to 
the plea arrangement until it was consummated.9 A duty of disclosure was manifest. 
The foregoing analysis simply applies conventional America tort principles to the 
Government's concealment, showing that the Government's actions were tortious under those 
principles. But, of course, the victims need not demonstrate that the Government's actions were 
so extreme as to amount to tort in order to obtain relief. All the victims need show is that the 
Government failed to discharge its obligation to treat them with "fairness." 
Congress made clear what it meant by promising victims a right to fairness, describing 
these CVRA as "broad rights" in the relevant legislative history: 
The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be rights themselves and 
are not intended to just be aspirational. One of these rights is the right to be 
treated with fairness. Of course, fairness includes the notion of due process. Too 
often victims of crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the 
criminal justice system. This provision is intended to direct government agencies 
and employees, whether they are in executive or judicial branches, to treat victims 
of crime with the respect they deserve and to afford them due process. 
It is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or 
marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. This legislation is meant to 
correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the 
criminal process. 
150 Cong. Rec. 22952 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). The Government did not treat 
victims with the respect they deserve when it concealed what it was doing. 
9 Here again, the detailed and recently-submitted affidavit from the victims' attorney, Bradley I. Edwards, provides 
additional detail about what was reasonable under these circumstances. See Edwards Aff. of Aug. 11, 2017 at 1 23. 
If the Government fails to dispute this part of the affidavit, of course that affidavit would provide additional 
evidence supporting summary judgment for the victims. 
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To be sure, now that the victims have moved for summary judgment, the Government 
claims that the reason for this concealment was to prevent cross-examination of the victims about 
the financial consequences of a guilty plea. DE 401-2 at 16-17. The Government argues that "it 
was completely appropriate for the Government to avoid creating additional impeachment 
material by not alerting the victims that the Government was seeking a resolution that would 
facilitate their collecting money damages from Epstein." DE 401-2 at 17. If the Court accepts 
this argument as a basis for assessing CVRA compliance, then the Government will never have 
to give any information in any case to any victim. Of course, whenever the Government obtains 
a guilty plea from a criminal defendant to crimes he has committed against victims, that 
resolution will "facilitate their collecting money damages" from the defendant through operation 
of collateral estoppel. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(1) ("A conviction of a defendant for an offense 
involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution shall estop the defendant from denying the 
essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil 
proceeding, to the extent consistent with State law, brought by the victim"). Thus, even 
assuming that the Government's alleged motivation is true,10 it cannot serve as a basis for 
withholding information from victims, or the CVRA would be sapped of meaning. 
In sum, even if the Court limits its view to the undisputed facts, ample basis exists for 
concluding that the Government violated the victims' right to fair treatment. Of course, if this 
case were to go to trial, the victims have alleged many more actions by the Government that 
I° If this case were to go to trial, the victims intend to prove that the Government's true motivation was. among other 
things, the one explained in an email to Epstein's defense attorneys — i.e., that the line prosecutor had an admitted 
"bias against plaintiffs' attorneys," Victims' Si. Mot., Ex. 70, and thus worked in concert with Epstein's attorneys 
to keep Epstein from being sued civilly. 
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violated their rights. See Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361 at 51-53; see also Victims' Resp. to Gov't 
S.J. Mot., Part VI (filed contemporaneously with this brief). But the simplest way for the Court 
to proceed at this juncture is to grant the victims' motion for partial summary judgment based on 
the undisputed facts showing the Government's concealment of the NPA in violation of their 
CVRA right to fair treatment. 
C. 
Partial Summary Judgment is Appropriate on the Victims' Argument that 
the Government Violated their CVRA Right to Reasonable and Accurate 
Notice. 
Partial summary judgment is also appropriate on the undisputed ground that the 
Government violated the victims' CVRA "right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice of any 
public court proceedings . . . involving the crime." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (emphasis added). In 
a contemporaneously-filed brief, the victims have refuted the Government's legal argument that 
this right-to-notice provision lacks application with regard to state court proceedings, at least on 
the unique facts here involving a federal NPA that was directly intertwined with state court 
guilty pleas needed to trigger its effectiveness. See Victims' Resp. to Gov't S.J. Mot., Part V.A. 
And in that same brief, the victims have shown why, as a factual matter, the Government is not 
entitled to summary judgment on this issue. Id. at Part V.B. For purposes of this reply, a few 
words are appropriate on why the undisputed facts are now so clear as to warrant partial 
summary judgment in favor of the victims. 
To grant partial summary judgment for the victims, the Court need only put together 
three undisputed facts. The first is that the NPA between the Government and Epstein made 
Epstein's guilty plea to Florida state crimes the triggering event for the NPA, which barred 
federal prosecution of Epstein's crimes against the victims. The plain language of the NPA 
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establishes this fact, see Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361 at 17 (Executed Non-Prosecution 
Agreement, Ex. 62), and the Government does not contend otherwise. Second, Epstein pled 
guilty in Florida state court to those triggering offenses on June 30, 2008. 
Again, the 
Government does not dispute this obvious fact. Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361, at 361 112. And 
third, the Government did not notify the victims that what was happening when Epstein pled 
guilty on June 30, 2008, was that he was triggering this NPA barring prosecution of the crimes 
against them. Again, this fact is undisputed. See Gov't Fact. Resp. at 10, 1 82 ("The government 
did not inform the victims of the NPA, until after Epstein entered his plea . . . ."). 
Based on these simple and uncontested facts, summary judgment for the victims is 
appropriate. 
Given the circumstances of the case, the Government's notice was neither 
"reasonable" nor "accurate." 
As explained in the victims' response to the Government's 
summary judgment motion, "accurate" is commonly defined as "in exact conformity to truth or 
to some standard." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 14 (1993). The 
Government did not provide notice exactly conforming to the truth when it concealed from the 
victims what was really happening. And "reasonable" is commonly defined as being "fair [or] 
proper . . . under the circumstances; sensible." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (10 ed. 2014). 
Under the circumstances of this case, it was not fair or proper for the Government to conceal that 
Epstein's guilty pleas to the state crimes triggered the NPA. Indeed, the Government did not 
inform the victims' (or their attorneys) of the single most important thing about Epstein's guilty 
pleas: that his pleas would, via operation of the NPA, block federal prosecution of Epstein for his 
federal crimes against the victims. 
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Of course, if this case were to go to trial, the victims would prove in more detail why the 
Government refused to give notice to the victims. In particular, the victims would show that the 
Government was trying to keep the victims from raising any objection to the plea deal in front of 
the Florida judge, and thus the Government needed to conceal the NPA's existence until the 
pleas had been accepted. But the Court need not delve into the Government's motivations to 
grant summary judgment for the victims. The Court should simply grant summary judgment on 
the undisputed facts, which establish unreasonable and inaccurate notice. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts of this case prove that, rather than forthrightly discharging its 
obligations to numerous child sexual assault victims, the Government chose to enter into a secret 
deal with the man who had victimized them. Perhaps before Congress enacted the CVRA, such 
outrageous behavior could escape a judicial response. But now that the CVRA is the law of the 
land, the Court is obligated to take all necessary steps to "ensure" that the victims' rights are 
protected. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b). 
On the undisputed facts, this is not a close case. This is a summary judgment case. For 
all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find the Government violated the rights of Jane Doe 
1, Jane Doe 2, and other similarly situated victims under the CVRA — specifically, their 
"reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case," their right "to be 
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy," and their right "to 
reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), 
(8), (2). 
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If the Court grants their motion, the victims would then ask the Court to set an 
appropriate schedule for briefing and a hearing on the issue of the remedy for the violations of 
their rights. 
DATED: August 11, 2017 
Respectfully Submitted, 
AI Sada/ 9 E&04414 
Bradley J. Edwards 
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, 
EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, ■. 
425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 
Telephone (954) 524-2820 
Facsimile (954) 524-2822 
E-mail: 
And 
Paul G. Cassell 
Pro Hac Vice 
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah' 
332 S. 1400 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone:801-585-5202 
Facsimile:801-585-6833 
E-Maikcassellp@law.utah.edu 
Attorneys for Jane Does 1 and 2 
This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not 
intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that the foregoing document was served on August 11, 2017, on the following 
using the Court's CM/ECF system: 
Dexter Lee 
A. Marie Villafafia 
500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(561) 820-8711 
Fax: (561) 820-8777 
E-mail: Dexter.Lee@usdoj.gov 
E-mail: ann.marie.c.villafana@usdoj.gov 
Attorneys for the Government 
Roy Eric Black 
Jacqueline Perczek 
Black Srebnick Komspan & Stumpf 
201 S Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 1300 
Miami, FL 33131 
305-371-6421 
Fax: 358-2006 
Email: 
Attorneys for Jeffrey Epstein 
Isl &alai j2. £dagvu[a 
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