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Case 9:08-cv-80804-KAM 
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Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2008 Flietit0A ()MO D.C. 
ELECT 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
08-80804-Civ-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CASE NO.: 
JANE DOE, 
a/k/a JANE DOE #1, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, HALEY ROBSON, 
and SARAH KELLEN, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF REMOVAL 
July 18, 2008 
STEVEN M. LARIMORF 
CLERK D.S. DIST. CT. 
S.O. OF FLA. • MIAMI 
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, and 1332(a)(1), the defendants, 
Jeffrey Epstein, 
hereby remove this action' from 
Palm Beach County Circuit Court to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, and respectfully state as follows: 
Introduction 
Six months ago, this plaintiff filed virtually the identical lawsuit in this 
Court. See Jane Doe #1 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-cv-80069-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed 
Doe v. Epstein et at, Case No. 50 2008 CA 006596 XXXX MB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 
filed Mar. 6, 2008). 
Lewis "Fein 
1059 044.444vEleuf Skim 340, E0coRuT Good, Etas 33133 
1 REM 
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Jan. 24, 2008) (the "First Federal Action"). The First Federal Action named 
Jeffrey Epstein as the sole tortfeasor, made the identical operative allegations as 
the instant Amended Complaint, and demanded damages of $50 million. (The 
amount of the demand against Epstein is evidently the product of recent reports in 
the press that Epstein is wealthy.) 
The First Federal Action was quickly followed by a series of substantially 
identical "Jane Doe" lawsuits, all filed by the same attorney in a three-month span. 
Compare Jane Doe #1 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-cv-80069-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed 
Jan. 24, 2008), with Jane Doe #2 v. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80119-KAM (S.D. Fla. 
filed Feb. 6, 2008) (asserting identical causes of action based on the same operative 
allegations), Jane Doe #3 v. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80232-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 
5, 2008) (same), Jane Doe #4 v. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80380-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed 
Apr. 14, 2008) (same), and Jane Doe #5 v. Epstein, No. 08-80381-CV-KAM (S.D. 
Fla. filed Apr. 14. 2008) (same). 
On February 20, amid these filings, Jane Doe #1 was deposed in State of 
Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, 502006CF009454AXXXMB (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct., filed 
Jul. 19, 2006), a parallel state-court criminal action. During that deposition, she 
made numerous admissions that completely undermined the allegations against 
Epstein that she had pled in her complaint. A copy of her deposition, with names 
2 
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redacted, is attached hereto (Exhibit A). Two days later, counsel for Jane Doe #1 
filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice in the First Federal Action. 
See Doe #1 v. Epstein, Case No. 08-CV-80069-KAM, DE 9. 
Two weeks later (March 6, 2008), having changed lawyers, Jane Doe #1 
refiled her complaint in Florida Circuit Court as the instant case, adding two 
nominal defendants 
Mr. Epstein's personal secretary, and 
MB one of Jane Doe #1's contemporaries. These defendants have nothing to 
do with the plaintiffs case against Mr. Epstein, except that the presence oa 
as a defendant in this new case, because she is a citizen of Florida (Am. 
Compll 4), would ostensibly prevent complete diversity.2
As discussed below, however, 
was named in the refiled 
lawsuit only to destroy diversity jurisdiction, and to prevent any application of 18 
§ 3509(k), a mandatory stay provision applicable in federal court 2 
2 
Defendant Kellen is a citizen of New York (Am. Compl. ¶ 5), and is therefore a 
nonresident defendant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and removal. 
3 
Section 3509(k) of Title 18, United States Code, provides as follows: 
It; at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for 
damage or injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is pending 
which arises out of the same occurrence and in which the child is the 
victim, the civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the 
criminal action and any mention of the civil action during the criminal 
proceeding is prohibited. As used in this subsection, a criminal action is 
pending until its final adjudication in the trial court. 
3 
Lewis Tein 
3 of 316 
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besides having nothing to do with the substantive allegations of the 
plaintiff's $50,000,000 case, is a community-college student with no assets 
whatever. 
Even if this case purports to identify a new (and strategically nondiverse) 
tortfeasor, the reified lawsuit is still directed against only one defendant—Jeffrey 
Epstein. Then and now, the operative allegations are the same: Jane Doe alleges 
that Jeffrey Epstein assaulted her "in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida 
Statutes."4 (Am. Compl. 1 18.) To sharpen her lawsuit, the plaintiff says she is 
seeking damages in connection with a "conspiracy" (Am. Compl. ¶ 22), a "plan" 
(Am. Compl. ¶ 32), a "scheme" (Am. Compl. ¶ 32), and an "enterprise" (Am. 
Compl. ¶ 32). These theories of liability, however, cannot be supported by the 
allegations in the Amended Complaint. 
Even if everything in the Amended 
Complaint were true, recovery against Haley Robson, under any formulation, is 
impossible under Florida law. 
Focusing on the real parties to this controversy, the instant case could have 
(once again) been brought here in federal court—just like the four other "Jane 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). 
Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, is entitled, "Lewdness; Indecent Exposure." 
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Doe" lawsuits presently pending against Epstein, filed by this plaintiff's former 
lawyer. 
This case is properly removed to federal court, first, because there is 
complete diversity among the real parties-in-interest, second, because the amount 
in controversy exceeds $75,000, and third, because this Notice complies with the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. 
Discussion 
A. This case is properly removable because it falls within the original 
jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida. 
A state-court case is properly removable when "it could have been brought, 
originally, in a federal district court." Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 83 
(2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). This case was originally filed in federal 
district court, and it is the same case today. Even though it was reconfigured to 
look like a state-court lawsuit, this action falls squarely within the bounds of the 
diversity-jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(aX1) (establishing that federal 
district courts have original jurisdiction over cases where the amount in 
controversy [is more than $75,000] . . . and [when the controversy] is between 
citizens of different states"). 
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1. The amount in controversy in this action exceeds $75,000. 
This case is a duplicate of the First Federal Lawsuit. In that case, Jane Doe 
pled "damages in excess of $50 million." See Doe v. Epstein, No. 08-80069-KAM 
(S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 24, 2008) (Compl. 1 6). That allegation is now deleted and the 
Amended Complaint substitutes a generic prayer for relief.5 It is clear, however, 
that Jane Doe still seeks more than $75,000 in damages. 
This case, precisely like the First Federal Action, seeks damages in 
connection with an alleged assault. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16-19.) 
The Amended 
Complaint alleges that Jane Doe "has suffered and will continue to suffer severe 
and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological, and emotional 
damages." (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) These are the identical injuries Jane Doe asserted 
in the First Federal Action, and are no less serious simply because pled under a 
state-court caption. Cf., e.g., Woods v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 
812, 820 (N.D. III. 2007) (determining, in the context of diversity jurisdiction, that 
the $75,000 threshold had been satisfied, and "clearly [surpassed]," based on "the 
nature of the injuries alleged" in the complaint). 
5 The Complaint seeks damages for "[more than] . . . $15,000." (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) This 
boilerplate is routinely used in Florida pleading practice to trigger application of section 
26.012, Florida Statutes, the statute that establishes the jurisdictional amount required for 
filing in Florida's Circuit Court (as opposed to County Court). 
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To cement this point, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has said that 
"[w]hen [a] complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages, removal from 
state court is proper if it is facially apparent from the complaint that the amount in 
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement." Williams v. Best Buy Co., 
Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). This case meets that standard, and 
satisfies the first prong of diversity jurisdiction. 
2. There is complete diversity among the real parties to this 
controversy. 
Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity. 
Carden v. Arkoma 
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990) ("Since its enactment, we have interpreted the 
diversity statute to require `complete diversity' of citizenship." (citing Strawbridge 
v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806))). See also MacGinnitie v. Hobbs 
Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (1 1 th Cir. 2005) (stating that "[c]omplete 
diversity requires that no defendant in a diversity action be a citizen of the same 
state as any plaintiff"). As demonstrated below, this case satisfies the statutory 
requirement of complete diversity. 
(a) Plaintiff Jane Doe is a citizen of Florida. (Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) 6
Jane Doe may, in fact, be a citizen of Georgia. not Florida, as she pled in her Amended 
Complaint. See New York Post, Jul. 1, 2008 (reporting that "On his way into court [for 
his state-court guilty plea on June 30], Epstein was served with a copy of a lawsuit by 
Doe, who has since moved to another state."); Jane Doe Depo. at 77, 112 (indicating that 
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(b) Defendant Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands! 
(c) Defendant Sarah Kellen is a citizen of New York. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) 
3. Defendant 
was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity. 
"A non-diverse defendant who is fraudulently joined does not defeat 
diversity because his citizenship is excluded from the diversity calculus." Shenkar 
v. Money Warehouse, Inc., No. 07-20634-CIV, 2007 WL 3023531, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 
her twin sister lives with her mother in Georgia); Affidavit of Dawn LaVogue Sandberg, 
at ¶ 1(stating, "I am the mother and natural guardian for Jane Doe #1" with jurat executed 
in Georgia before a Georgia notary), DE 4-2, Jane Doe No. I v. Epstein, Case No. 08-
80069-Civ-Marra (1/29/08); Intervenor's Complaint, at ¶ 2 (filed by "Jane Doe's Mother" 
and stating that "Jane Doe's Mother is a citizen and resident of the State of Georgia."). 
DE 5-2, Jane Doe No. I v. Epstein, Case No. 08-80069-Civ-Marra (1/29/08); Petition for 
Removal of Disability of Non-Age, at ¶¶ 1, 2. 7 (filed "on behalf of S.D.G.." alleging that 
"The mother is Da[w]n Lavogue Sandberg, and her address is .... Ga.," and stating that 
- S.D.G. is also the unnamed party in a lawsuit filed by her father on her behalf in the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 08-80069, which was 
filed without the consent of the mother"), In re Sandberg v. Gonzalez, Case No. 50 2008 
DR 001141 (Palm Beach Co. Family Ct.) (1/31/08). If this turns out to be the case, there 
is complete diversity, regardless of Robson's citizenship. Although the Eleventh Circuit 
has recently indicated that a district court may not conduct jurisdictional discovery under 
such circumstances, another division of this Court has since allowed it. Compare Lowery 
v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1215-16, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
jurisdictional discovery to determine citizenship upon removal is inappropriate), with 
Calixto v. BASF Constr. Chemicals, LLC, slip op., Case No. 07-60077-CIV-ZLOCH, 
2008 WL 1840717, *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2008) (ordering that parties "shall engage in 
jurisdictional discovery for the Court to determine the citizenship of BASF and whether it 
has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action"). 
The Amended Complaint erroneously states that Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen of New 
York. 
8 
Lewis "reins 
3059 Gt.** Avt Nur, Sum 340. Cooaaul Gaov1, Rama 33133 
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Oct. 15, 2007) (Moreno, J.) (citing Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)); accord, e.g., Tedder v. F.M.C. Corp., 
590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1979) (denying motion to remand where two resident 
defendants were joined for the fraudulent purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction). 
In this case, the plaintiff relies on her original allegations to support three causes of 
action against Haley Robson: civil conspiracy (Am. Compl. 920-23); Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-28); and civil RICO (Am. 
Compl. ¶¶ 29-34). These allegations, however, do not support these claims, or 
any other theory of liability that would allow recovery against 
CI 
Parks v. The New York Times Ca, 308 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1962) (observing 
that "determination of fraudulent joinder is to be based on whether there was a real 
intention on colorable grounds to procure a joint judgment") (emphasis added).8
(a)Nonresident defendants have a right of removal. 
The removal statute was enacted specifically "to protect defendants." Legg v. 
Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005). Cf., e.g., Picquet v. Amoco Prod. 
Co., 513 F. Supp. 938, 941 (M.D. La. 1981) (explaining that courts developed the 
fraudulent-joinder doctrine to protect "the right [of removal] granted to 
8 
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en bane), the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the 
former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October I, 1981. 
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[defendants] by . . . Congress"). In this case, by reconstituting her original federal 
lawsuit and refiling it in state Court, the plaintiff has clearly sought to avoid the 
strictures of the mandatory stay of this case that federal law requires under 18 
U.S.C. § 3509(k).9
In federal court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k), this action must be 
automatically stayed pending final disposition of an ongoing parallel criminal 
action against Mr. Epstein. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (providing that a parallel civil 
9 
By filing in state court, the plaintiff's attorney has also evidently sought to avoid the 
clear command of our local rules forbidding public comment about the merits of a 
pending lawsuit. Compare S.D. Fla. Local Rule 77.2(7) (-A lawyer or law firm 
associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or litigation make or 
participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference 
to public records, which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means 
of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will 
interfere with a fair trial and which relates to (a) Evidence regarding the occurrence or 
transaction involved. (b) The character . . . of a party . . 
(d) The lawyer's opinion as to 
the merits of the claims . . . ."), with Ricci—Leopold Home Page, http:// 
www.riccilaw.com (click on "Breaking News," then access the hyperlink entitled, 
03/13/08 - Consumer Justice Attorney Ted Leopold Files Case to aid Jane Doe in seeking 
justice against sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein and his associates. ) (describing character 
of party defendant Epstein as a "sexual predator" (a term defined by Florida criminal 
statutes) and quoting the plaintiff's attorney "Ted Leopold, managing partner" as 
characterizing Epstein as "an extremely powerful and wealthy man," with "vast 
resources," who acted "in the vilest way" at his "lavish mansion" with "lurid fantasies" 
and inflicting "untold damage," and opining that he should "be held accountable;" also 
quoting the plaintiff's attorney as opining that "[t]his case is both about justice and 
making sure that a wealthy and powerful man knows that he is not above the law;" also 
quoting the plaintiff's attorney's view of the evidence that plaintiff "continues to endure 
emotional trauma daily") (Web site last visited July 17, 2008). 
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action arising from an alleged sexual assault of a minor "shall be stayed until the 
end of all phases of [any] criminal action") (emphasis added). In this case, there is 
a parallel federal criminal grand jury action pending in the Southern District of 
Florida, In re Grand Jury, No. FGJ 07-103(WPB) (S.D. Fla.), which arises out of 
the same allegations pled here. Thus, in resorting to fraudulent joinder, the 
plaintiff has sought to avoid any application of this otherwise controlling statute. 
Cf. Doe v. Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260 MCR/WCS, 2005 WL 517847, at *1-2 (N.D. 
Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) (staying civil diversity action over plaintiffs' objections on 
grounds that "the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) is clear that a stay is required in 
a case . . . where a parallel criminal action is pending which arises from the same 
occurrence involving minor victims") (emphasis added). 
Even outside the context of a mandatory federal statute, "the Supreme Court 
[has] admonished [that] `the Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to 
prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should be 
equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court.'" Lea, 428 
F.3d at 1325 (citing Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 
186 (1907)). See also id. (observing that "Congress `did not extend [to defendants 
a right of removal] with one hand, and with the other give plaintiffs a bag of tricks 
I I 
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to overcome it"' (quoting McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees of Maryland Cmty. Coll.. 
955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992))). 
To protect a nonresident defendant's right of removal, a federal court will 
"determine the matter of jurisdiction" by examining "the true situation both as to 
parties and causes of action." 
Bernblum v. Travelers' Inc. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34, 35 
(W.D. Mo. 1934) (emphasis added). See also id. (observing that "[t]he federal 
courts will . . . strike out the fiction injected into a case by a party to prevent 
removal"). In accordance with these principles, a plaintiff cannot destroy diversity 
jurisdiction simply by conjuring up a nondiverse defendant; there must be at least 
some "possibility that the state law might impose liability on [the nondiverse] 
defendant under the circumstances alleged in the complaint." Florence v. Crescent 
Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). See also, 
Holloway v. Morrow, No. 07-0839-WS-M, 2008 WL 401305, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 
11, 2008) (emphasizing that "ItJhe potential for legal liability must be reasonable, 
not merely theoretical" (quoting Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5 (11th 
Cir. 2005))) (emphasis added). 
In this case, the plaintiffs have tried to whip Jane Doe's original, one-
defendant complaint into a froth that looks non-federal. Cf. Owens v. Swan, 962 F. 
Supp. 1436, 1439 (D. Utah 1997) (noting that "although plaintiffs' amended 
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complaint contains four claims for relief, the first and second claims state only one 
cause of action") (emphasis added). Using her original allegations and adding 
nothing, Jane Doe has tried to add claims against 
for civil 
conspiracy (Am. Compl. ¶1 20-23), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-28), and civil RICO (Compl. ¶9 29-34) in order to append a 
nondiverse defendant to her Complaint. These claims, however, are untenable 
under Jane Doe's own allegations, and therefore cannot be used to destroy 
diversity jurisdiction. 
(b) There is no 
ssibili 
that the plaintiff can establish a cause of 
action agains 
under Florida law. 
(i) The conspiracy claim against 
must fail. 
As a general rule, "[a]n actionable conspiracy [under Florida law] requires 
an actionable underlying tort or wrong." Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1165 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).1°
10 
This case is governed by the general rule. Cf. Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 
So. 2d 547,550 (Fla. 1977) (noting that while there is "ordinarily . . . no independent tort 
for conspiracy," there is a narrow exception to this rule when "the plaintiff can show 
some peculiar power of coercion possessed by the conspirators by virtue of their 
combination") (emphasis added). See generally Liappas v. Augoustis, 47 So. 2d 582,583 
(Fla. 1950) (observing that "'instances of conspiracy which is in itself an independent tort 
are rare and should be added to with caution" (quoting Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 
609, 611, (Mass. 1939))) (emphasis added). Plainly, this case involves the general rule, 
not the narrow exception, because only one person could have caused Jane Doe's 
injuries. CI Martin v. Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (upholding 
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Here, Jane Doe cannot assert a cause of action for "violation of Chapter 800, 
Florida Statutes" (Am. Compl. ¶ 18) because there is no private right of action 
under that Chapter. See generally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials 
Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 374 (Fla. 2005) (observing that "not every statutory 
violation carries a civil remedy" (citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, 
Inc.. 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 2003))). See also, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. 
Ferre, 636 F. Stipp. 970 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (King, C.J.) (holding that violation of 
Florida's criminal extortion statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action for 
damages); Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So. 2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (per 
curiam) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim for parental kidnapping where 
"the mentioned statutes concern only criminal violations and do not afford a civil 
remedy") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 
1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (holding that "[a]n act which does not constitute a basis 
for a cause of action against one person cannot be made the basis for a civil action 
for conspiracy"). 
In this case, Jane Doe's claim under Count II (civil conspiracy) fails because 
it derives exclusively from Count I (violation of Chapter 800, Florida Statutes). Cf 
grant of summary judgment against claim for independent conspiracy, noting that 
-[w]hen the concerted acts of the defendants do not create a greater harm than if the acts 
were committed by one person alone. then there can be no recovery"). 
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Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 230 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1969) (holding that 
where Count I of the complaint had failed to state a cause of action for malicious 
prosecution, there could be no civil-conspiracy claim in Count II "based on the 
allegations of Count I"). Because the statute she expressly pleads as the basis for 
Count I, Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, provides no civil remedy, Jane Doe cannot 
prevail on Count I. Therefore, she cannot prevail on her claim for conspiracy 
(Count II) to violate Chapter 800, Florida Statutes (Count I). 
(ii) The plaintiff cannot prevail against nondiverse defendant 
Haley Robson on her claim for Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress (LIED). 
Even if the plaintiff, for the sake of argument, can assert an LIED claim 
against Jeffrey Epstein, the plaintiff still does not have a cause of action for LIED 
against 
First, the plaintiff cannot recover damages in connection 
with her own illegal conduct; and second, the plaintiff's purported LIED claim fails 
as a matter of law. 
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1. 
The plaintiff seeks damages in connection with her 
own illegal conduct. 
The plaintiff concedes that she went to Jeffrey Epstein's house "to give 
Epstein a massage for monetary compensation." (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) The plaintiff 
also concedes, in the guise of an allegation, that 
"brought Jane Doe 
to Epstein's mansion in Palm Beach" to help the plaintiff execute her own plan. 
(Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Yet, the plaintiff's plan was illegal: under Florida law, it is a 
crime "to practice massage" without a license. § 480.047, Fla. Stat. (1997). To say 
it another way, the plaintiff admits that she went to Mr. Epstein's house to commit 
a crime. 
Based on these allegations, it is clear that the plaintiff seeks damages in 
connection with her own illegal conduct; this is enough to support a finding of 
fraudulent joinder. See Florence v. Crescent Resources, LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1298 
n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that "under some circumstances, application 
of an affirmative defense can support a finding of fraudulent joinder). This 
conclusion is supported by well-established principles. 
Under Florida law, a plaintiff cannot recover damages flowing from her own 
illegal conduct. See Hall v. Hall, 93 Fla. 709, 112 So. 622, 628 (1927) (referring to 
"the universal rule of our law that one in a court of justice cannot complain .. . of 
another's wrong whereof he was a partaker") (internal quotation marks and citation 
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omitted) (emphasis added); Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, (Fla. 4th DCA 
1998) ("[N]o public policy should allow appellant to recover damages as a result of 
engaging in criminal conduct such as occurred in this case."). CI Ewell v. Daggs, 
108 U.S. 143, 149 (1883) (stating that "`[n]o court will lend its aid to a [plaintiff] 
who founds [a] cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act'") (quoting 
Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775)); see also id. (explaining that 
this policy is ("not for the sake of the defendant, but because [the courts] will not 
lend their aid to such a plaintiff" (quoting Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120)) 
(emphasis added); Balas v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076, 1082 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) 
(Harris, J., concurring) (remarking in the context of an action brought against an 
alleged prostitution house that "the court should continue its tradition of not 
interceding in civil conflicts involving transactions that are either illegal or are 
against public policy"). 
Based on the foregoing, the plaintiff cannot blame someone els 
for the consequences of her own criminal conduct. CI Fe/d & Sons, Inc. 
v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfe, Rounick and Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 552 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1983) (holding that law-firm clients could not recover damages flowing from 
their own criminal acts, even though clients' lawyers had suggested the unlawful 
conduct to begin with). See also Turner v. Anderson, 704 So. 2d 748, 751 (Fla. 4th 
17 
Lewis 'Minn. 
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DCA 1998) (approving reasoning in Feld & Sons, holding that "no public policy 
should allow [a plaintiff] to recover damages as a result of engaging in criminal 
conduct" where the plaintiff had provided false testimony at an arbitration 
proceeding). 
2. 
The plaintiffs LIED claim fails as a matter of law. 
To state a cause of action for TIED, a complaint must allege four elements: 
i I ) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct; (3) 
the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress was severe. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985). Whether conduct is 
outrageous enough to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
is a question of law, not a question of fact. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 
So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citations omitted). 
In this case, without reaching the question of "outrage," the plaintiff has 
failed to show that , 
conduct - - allegedly arranging an illegal 
sexual massage that the plaintiff herself agreed to perform - - itself caused the 
plaintiff to suffer any emotional distress. Even if the alleged agreement was 
fraudulently induced, the plaintiff's LIED claim flows from Epstein's alleged 
conduct, not the joint conduct o 
nd Doe in planning the massage. 
18 
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(iii) The plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim for civil remedies 
for criminal practices or racketeering ("civil RICO") pled in 
Count IV. 
A cause of action under section 772.104, Florida Statutes ("Civil Remedies 
for Criminal Practices") requires a showing of direct injury. Even assuming for 
the sake of argument that Jane Doe can establish that the defendants engaged in a 
"pattern of criminal activity," she cannot establish that she was directly injured by 
those activities. 
Section 772.104 allows someone to bring a civil RICO claim only if "he or 
she has been injured by reason of any RICO violation. § 772.104, Fla. Stat. 
(2007). Here, the allegations in Count IV, even if they are true, do not add up to a 
civil RICO claim because there is no proximate cause between the purported 
"pattern of criminal activity" and Jane Doe's alleged injuries. 
In a doomed attempt to satisfy the extremely high burden of pleading civil 
RICO under Florida law, the Amended Complaint lists a series of violations rooted 
in Florida's prostitution statutes. (Am. Compl. 1 31.) According to the Amended 
Complaint, the defendants participated in a criminal enterprise . . . or conspir[acy]" 
(Am. Compl. 1 30) over an unspecified length of time "to repeatedly find and 
bring [Jeffrey Epstein] underage girls . . . in order for Epstein to solicit, coerce, 
entice, compel, or force such girls in acts of prostitution and/or lewdness" (Am. 
19 
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Compl. ¶ 32). The alleged "pattern of criminal activity" comprises violations of 
Chapter 796, Florida Statutes—the chapter that proscribes various crimes of 
prostitution.°
These allegations do not tie directly into Jane Doe's alleged psychic injuries. 
In contrast to a cognizable RICO claim, this action concerns only an isolated 
occurrence. More important, the alleged injuries in this case are pled to have 
resulted from an alleged sexual assault, an assault "in violation of Chapter 800 of 
the Florida Statutes" (Am. Compl. ¶ 18)—not anything having to do with the 
facilitation of prostitution, or more succinctly, the violation of Florida's 
prostitution law. 
Civil RICO claims are extraordinarily difficult to plead successfully. There 
are examples in the case law of RICO claims stemming from a prostitution 
enterprise, but they are vastly different from what plaintiff pleads here. They 
involve, for example, prostitutes who sued a house of prostitution (as an 
"enterprise") for inflicting systematic and repetitive abuse on them, over time. See 
Baku v. Ruzzo, 703 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (offering an example 
of a civil RICO claim against the operators of an alleged "house of prostitution," 
The Amended Complaint alleges a "pattern of criminal activity" comprising the 
following criminal violations: §§ 796.03, 796.07(2)(0, 796.07(2Xh), 796.045, and 
796.04, Fla. Stat. (Am. Compl. 131.) 
20 
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