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(I.S. Department of Justice 
United States Attorney 
Southern District of Florida 
000•0 
GOVERNMENT 
EXHIBIT 
CASE 
NODS-8073(-CV•MARRA 
SHEET 
NO.
500 South Australian Ave., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(361) 820-8711 
Facsimile: (561)8204777 
July 9, 2008 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Brad Edwards, Esq. 
The Law Offices of Brad Edwards & Associates, LLC 
Re: 
Jeffrey Epstein, 
IDENTIFIED VICTIM 
Dear Mr. Edwards: 
NOTIFICATION OF 
By virtue of this letter, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District 
of Florida asks that you provide the following notice to your client, 
On June 30, 2008, Jeffrey Epstein (hereinafter referred to as "Epstein) entered a plea 
of guilty to violations of Florida Statutes Sections 796.07 (felony solicitation of prostitution) 
and 796.03 (procurement of minors to engage in prostitution), in the 15th Judicial Circuit in 
and for Palm Beach County (Case Nos. 2006-cf-009454/OOOCMB and 2008-cf-
00938 I AXXXMB) and was sentenced to a term of twelve months' imprisonment to be 
followed by an additional six months' imprisonment, followed by twelve months of 
Community Control 1, with conditions of community confinement imposed by the Court. 
In light of the entry of the guilty plea and sentence, the United States has agreed to 
defer federal prosecution in favor of this state plea and sentence, subject to certain 
conditions. 
One such condition to which Epstein has agreed is the following: 
"Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an offense 
enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2255, will have the same 
rights to proceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein 
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%SO 
MAD EDWARDS, ESQ. 
NOTIFICATION OF IDENTIFIED VICTIM S -
Jul 9, 2008 
PAGE 2 OF 2 
had been tried federally and convicted of an enumerated offense. For purposes 
of implementing this paragraph, the United States shall provide Mr. Epstein's 
attorneys with a list of individuals whom it was prepared to name in an 
Indictment as victims of an enumerated offense by Mr. Epstein. Any judicial 
authority interpreting this provision, including any authority determining 
which evidentiary burdens if any a plaintiff must meet, shall consider that it is 
the intcnt of the parties to place these identified victims in the same position 
as they would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial. No more; no 
less." 
Through this letter, this Office hereby provides Notice that your client, S
la 
is an individual whom the United States was prepared to name as a victim of an 
enumerated offense. 
Should your client decide to file a claim against Jeffrey Epstein, his attorney, Jack 
him at Atterbury Goldberger and Weiss, 
Please understand that neither the U.S. Attorney's Office nor the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation can take part in or otherwise assist in civil litigation; however, if you do file a 
claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and Mr. Epstein denies that your client is a victim of an 
enumerated offense, please provide notice of that denial to the undersigned. 
Please thank your client for all of her assistance during the course of this examination 
and express the heartfelt regards of myself and Special Agents 
the health and well-being of Ms. 
B 
cc: 
Jack Goldberger, Esq. 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
ASSIS I A 
for 
EFTA00233830

C.M.A., 
Plaintiff, 
Sealed
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN and 
Defendants. 
Cape 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-80811-CIV-ZLOCH/SNOW 
FILED UNDER SEAL' 
S 
FILED b 
D.C. 
JUL 2 5 2008
STEVEN M. LARIMORE 
CLERK U.S. 
O191 
CT 
F 1 
FREY EPSTEIN AND 
MOTION FOR STAY 
' This motion is filed under seal because the deferred- rosecution agreement between the United 
States Attorney's Office (by Assistant U.S. Attorney 
sq.) and Mr. Epstein, 
discussed herein, contains a confidentiality clause. 
Lewis Tei n ri. 
3039 Ow.° Avows. SIMI 34 0, COComir GROVE. FLORIDA 33133 
EFTA00233831

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Defendants Jeffrey Epstein and 
respectfully move for a 
mandatory stay of this action under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3509(k), 
Section 1595(bX1), and alternatively, under this Court's discretionary authority to 
stay civil litigation, based on the existence of a pending federal criminal action. 
Introduction 
This lawsuit arises from a pending federal criminal action concerning, 
among other things, an alleged assault of the plaintiff Jane Doe, who, according to 
her complaint, on "numerous occasions" provided "massages" to Epstein with "no 
credentials to provide massage therapy" and was "sometimes paid . . . for the 
`sessions'." Compl., ¶¶ 6, 11. A federal statute directly on point provides that 
when a civil suit alleging damages to a minor victim arises out of the same 
occurrence as a "criminal action," the civil suit "shall be stayed until the end of all 
phases of the criminal action." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added).' 
The full text of the mandatory-stay provision reads: 
If, at any time that a cause of action for recovery of compensation for damage or 
injury to the person of a child exists, a criminal action is pending which arises out 
of the same occurrence and in which the child is the victim, the civil action shall 
be stayed until the end of all phases of the criminal action and any mention of the 
civil action during the criminal proceeding is prohibited. As used in this 
subsection, a criminal action is pending until its final adjudication in the trial 
court. 
IS U.S.C. § 3509(k). 
Teinr.
3039 GLAND Amyl, Sun 340. Cocomir GRove. FLORIDA 3313) 
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Accordingly, a stay of this case is mandatory until the criminal action arising from 
the same allegations is no longer pending. 
The Pending Federal Criminal Action 
In 2006, a Florida state grand jury indicted Jeffrey Epstein on allegations 
similar to those in the instant action (State of Florida" Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 
2006 CF 09454A, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County) (the "Florida 
Criminal Action"). Shortly thereafter, the United States Attorney's Office for the 
Southern District of Florida (the "USAO") began a federal grand-jury investigation 
into allegations arising out of the same incidents alleged in the instant action (Grand 
Jury No. 07-103 (WPB), United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida) ("the Federal Criminal Action"). 
In September 2007, the USAO and Mr. Epstein entered into a highly unusual 
and unprecedented deferred-prosecution agreement (the "Agreement"), in which the 
USAO agreed to defer (not dismiss or close) the Federal Criminal Action on the 
condition that Mr. Epstein continue to comply with numerous obligations, the first of 
which was pleading guilty to certain state charges in the Florida Criminal Action. 
The Agreement itself uses the term "deferred" (rather than "dismissed" or "closed") 
to describe the status of the Federal Criminal Action: 
THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of Florida prosecution in this 
District, for these offenses shall be deferred in favor of prosecution by 
2 
Lewis asin M. 
3059 GRAND Aveave, Suns 340. Cocostrt Otoys. FLOIUDA 33133 
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the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by the following 
conditions and the requirements of this Agreement . . . . 
Agreement, at 2. 
By no stretch did the USAO finalize, close, complete, dismiss or abandon 
the Federal Criminal Action. 
Indeed, as the lead federal prosecutor recently 
explained, the USAO merely "agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of 
prosecution by the State of Florida . . . ." 
See In re: Jane Doe, Case No. 08-
80736-CIV-Marra/Johnson (S.D. Fla.) (D.E. 14), Decl. of AUSA Villafana, 
07/09/08, ¶ 5, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (emphasis added). 
Under the 
Agreement, the USAO presently retains the continuing right to indict Mr. Epstein - 
- or to unseal "any" already-existing federal "charges" that may already have been 
handed up by the federal grand jury and sealed - - should he breach any of its 
provisions. Agreement, at 2. 
The period of the deferral continues until three months after Mr. Epstein 
completes service of his sentence in the Florida Criminal Action. Id. Indeed, the 
final three months of the Agreement's term constitute an extended period during 
which the USAO expressly retains the ability to evaluate whether Epstein 
committed any breaches of his numerous obligations under the agreement while he 
was serving his state sentence, and, if it so determines, reserves the right to indict 
3 
Le3S;I:Q.in n 
1059 GRAND Aratut Sun 340. COCONUT Gliove, FloitsuA 13133 
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(or unseal an existing indictment against) Mr. Epstein - - even after he has 
completed serving his entire state sentence. 
The Agreement further provides that upon Epstein's execution of a plea 
agreement in the State Criminal Case, the Federal Criminal Action "will be 
suspended" and all pending grand jury subpoenas "will be held in abeyance unless 
and until the defendant violates any term of this agreement." Agreement, at 5 
(emphasis added). The Agreement directs the USAO and Epstein to "maintain 
their evidence, specifically evidence requested by or directly related to the grand 
jury subpoenas that have been issued," and to maintain such evidence "inviolate." 
Id. (emphasis added). It also expressly provides that the grand-jury subpoenas 
continue to remain "outstanding" until "the successful completion of the terms of 
this agreement." Id. (emphasis added). 
MI
Further, it includes a promise not to prosecute movant/defendant 
only if "Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of th[e] 
agreement." Id. 
Finally, the Agreement provides that the USAO's declination of prosecution 
for certain enumerated offenses and dismissal of any existing (sealed) charges will 
not occur until 90 days following the completion of his state sentence: 
If the United States Attorney should determine, based on 
reliable evidence, that, during the period of the Agreement, Epstein 
willfully violated any of the conditions of this Agreement, then the 
4 
Liewia3Ceinn 
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United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days following the 
expiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide 
Epstein with timely notice specifying the condition(s) of the 
Agreement that he has violated, and shall initiate its prosecution on 
any offense within sixty (60) days' of [sic] giving notice of the 
violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts 
which may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the 
Agreement. 
After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the 
Agreement, no prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of 
this Agreement, nor any other offenses that have been the subject of 
the joint investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses that arose from the 
Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this District, and 
the charges against Epstein, if any, will be dismissed. 
Agreement, at 2. 
Consistent with the Agreement and its position that the Federal Criminal 
Action continues to remain pending, the USAO recently sent letters to attorneys for 
people that the USAO has designated as "victims." In those letters, the USAO 
asked, "[I]f you do file a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and Mr. Epstein denies that 
your client is a victim of an enumerated offense, please provide notice of that 
denial to the undersigned [AUSA]." See Decl. of AUSA Villafana, Exhs. 6 & 7, at 
2 (July 9, 2008). The clear implication of the USAO's request (by which the 
USAO appears to involve itself in the instant litigation, despite advising the 
recipients that it cannot "take part in or otherwise assist in civil litigation," id. at 2), 
is that the USAO believes that such denial might breach the Agreement. 
5 
LeaVein,,, 
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Accordingly, the Federal Criminal Action remains "pending." 
Discussion 
1. 
Section 3509(k) Imposes a Mandatory Stay. 
The language of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3509(k) is clear and 
mandatory: a parallel "civil action shall be stayed until the end of all phases of the 
criminal action." 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). The word "shall" means 
that the statute's command is mandatory and not subject to a Court's discretion. 
See, e.g., Lopez' Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a 
mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); 
Lexecon Inc. I. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) 
(explaining that "the mandatory `shall' . . . normally creates an obligation 
impervious to judicial discretion") (emphasis added). Cf. Miller'. French, 530 
U.S. 327, 350 (2000) (construing the litigation-stay provision of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, holding, "Through the PLRA, Congress clearly intended to 
make operation of the automatic stay mandatory, precluding courts from 
exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay. And we conclude that this 
provision does not violate separation of powers principles.") (emphasis added). 
One District Court within the Eleventh Circuit recently construed "the plain 
language of § 3509(k)" as "requirfing/ a stay in a case . . . where . . . a parallel 
criminal action [is] pending." Doe'. Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260, 2005 WL 950623, 
6 
Lewis :Term a 
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at *2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2005) (Francis II) (emphasis added). Accord Doe I 
Francis, No. 5:03 CV 260, 2005 WL 517847, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2005) 
(Francis I) (staying federal civil action in favor of "a criminal case currently 
pending in state court in Bay County, Florida, arising from the same facts and 
involving the same parties as the Instant action," noting that "the language of 18 
U.S.C. § 3509(k) is clear that a stay is required in a case such as this where a 
parallel criminal action is pending which arises from the same occurrence 
involving minor victims") (emphasis added). There is no contrary opinion from 
any court. 
In determining that the federal stay provision is mandatory, the Francis ll 
court expressed that there was apparently no case law supporting, or even 
"discussing the [avoidance] of a stay [under the command of] § 3509(k)." Francis 
II, 2005 WL 950623, at *2. Deferring to the statute as written, the Francis II court 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that some of the alleged victims had already 
reached their majority. 
See id. 
The court similarly rejected the plaintiffs' 
argument that it would be in the victims' best interests to avoid a stay so as to 
counteract the victims' "ongoing and increasing mental harm due to the 'frustrating 
delay in both the criminal case and [the civil] case.'" Id. 
7 
l'eVA-Xein 
3039 GIIM413 AVENUE, SUITS 340. COCONUT GlOvt. FUN/DA 33133 
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II. 
Section 3509(k) Applies to Investigations, Not Just Indictments. 
While there is no unsealed indicted criminal case against Mr. Epstein, the 
government's criminal investigation against him remains open. Section 3509(k) 
clearly applies to stay civil cases during the pendency, not only of indicted 
criminal cases, but also of pre-indictment criminal investigations. 
The term "criminal action" is not expressly defined in § 3509(k). It is 
defined, however, by a closely related statute. Title 18, U.S.C. § 1595 provides a 
civil remedy for "forced labor" and "sex trafficking" violations, but stays such 
actions "during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same 
occurrence in which the claimant is the victim."2 In enacting § 1595, Congress 
'The full text of that statute provides: 
§ 1595. Civil remedy 
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of section 1589, 
1590, or 1591 of this chapter may bring a civil action against 
the perpetrator in an appropriate district court of the United 
States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys 
fees. 
(b) 
(1) 
Any civil action filed under this section shall be 
stayed during the pendency of any criminal action 
arising out of the same occurrence in which the 
claimant is the victim. 
18 U.S.C. § 1595. 
(2) 
In this subsection, a "criminal action" includes 
investigation and prosecution and is pending until 
final adjudication in the trial court. 
8 
Le_vykt 
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specifically intended that the term "criminal action" would be applied extremely 
broadly. Accordingly, Congress took pains to ensure that courts would give it the 
broadest possible construction and, for that reason, specified in the definition 
provision that "criminal action" also "includes investigation." 
18 U.S.C. 
§ 1595(b)(2). The only reported decision addressing this provision interpreted it 
according to its plain language. See Ara i. Khan, No. CV 07-1251, 2007 WL 
1726456, *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2007) (ordering "all proceedings in this case 
stayed pending the conclusion of the government's criminal investigation of the 
defendants and of any resulting criminal prosecution") (emphasis added). 
Given that the USAO's Agreement with Epstein indicates that: 
• 
the grand-jury's subpoenas remain "outstanding" (Agreement, at 5); 
• 
the subpoenas are "h[e]ld . . . in abeyance" (id.); 
• 
the subpoenas are not "withdrawn" (id.); 
• 
the parties must "maintain their evidence" (id.) (which would be 
entirely unnecessary if the investigation against Epstein were closed); 
• 
"any" existing "charges" will not "be dismissed" until after Epstein 
has "timely fulfill[ed] all the terms and conditions of the Agreement" 
(id. at 2) (emphasis added); and 
• 
"prosecution in this District . . . shall be deferred" (id.) (but not closed 
or dismissed) - - 
then the only reasonable conclusion is that the Federal Criminal Action remains 
"pending." 
9 
LeeaStnn.
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The ordinary meaning of the adjective "pending" is "[r]emaining undecided; 
awaiting decision . . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004)2 See also 
White 
Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Black's Law 
Dictionary, in the context of a criminal case, for the definition of "pending" as 
"awaiting decision"); Swartz I Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421 (3d Cir. 2000) (relying 
on Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of "pending," expressly because 
"'pending' is not defined in the statute"). Any common-sense reading of the 
Agreement and the USAO's recent sworn construction of it, is consonant with the 
Federal Criminal Action's "remaining undecided" and "awaiting decision." See 
Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County $ Athens Newspapers, LLC, No. 
S07G1133, 
____, 2008 WL 2579238, *3 (Ga. June 30, 2008) (reviewing a 
public-records request against Georgia's "pending investigation" exception to its 
open-records law, and holding that "a seemingly inactive investigation which has 
not yet resulted in a prosecution logically "remains undecided," and is therefore 
"pending," until it "is concluded and the file closed') (emphasis added). 
' The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit routinely relies on Black's Law 
Dictionary for the definition of statutory terms, including in criminal cases. See e.g., United 
States' Young, 528 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (definitions of criminal "complaint" 
and "indictment"); United States I Brown, 526 F.3d 691, 705 (11th Cir. 2008) (definition of 
"knowingly" in criminal statute). 
10 
LesyrA rtsin n. 
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III. 
Section 3509(k) Applies Even After a Plaintiff Turns 18. 
The parallel stay provision in § 1595, discussed supra at 8-9, mandates, 
without exception, that any civil action brought under that section for violation of 
§ 1591 (prohibiting transportation of minors for prostitution) "shall be stayed 
during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in 
which the claimant is the victim." 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). Whether the § 1595 
plaintiff has turned 18 does not vitiate the efficacy of this mandatory stay. 
An example illustrates why the stay provided in § 3509(k) has the same 
broad scope as the stay provided in § 1591(b)(1). As discussed above, § 3509(k) 
stays any civil suit for injury to a minor, arising out of the same occurrence as a 
pending criminal action. One type of civil suit falling within § 3509(k)'s ambit is a 
suit seeking redress for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Section 2423(a) - - just 
like § 1591 - - prohibits transportation of minors for prostitution. The elements of 
both statutes are identical. There would simply be no legitimate basis for Congress 
to differentiate between the consequences attached to violating these two sections. 
Thus, just as Congress mandated under § 1595(b)(1) that civil discovery shall be 
stayed when there is an ongoing federal investigation under § 1591 (even after the 
victim turns 18), the identical treatment should apply under § 3509(k) to civil 
actions brought for the identical violation of § 2423(a). 
II 
Lewis "reins. 
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Logic compels a rule requiring continued application of the § 3509(k) stay to 
a putative victim who has since turned 18. 
Consider again the example of 
§ 2243(a). Assume that the USAO is investigating a § 2243(a) violator with two 
alleged victims; one who is now 17, and one who has turned 19. Assume further 
that both decide to sue the alleged offender while the USAO is still in the process 
of conducting its criminal investigation. Why would Congress enact § 3509(k) to 
prohibit the defendant from conducting civil discovery in the 17-year-old's lawsuit, 
but permit him to conduct full discovery in the 19-year-old's lawsuit, including 
taking the depositions of both the 19- and the 17-year-old, the federal investigating 
agents and all the grand-jury witnesses? This could not have been Congress' 
intent. 
The legislative history to a statute resembling § 1595 is also instructive. 
When Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2255, it provided a civil remedy to any 
"minor . . . victim" of enumerated federal sex offenses. See Child Abuse Victims' 
Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783, § 703 (1986). In 2006, 
Congress amended the statute to clarify that the civil cause of action was available 
not just while the victim was a minor, but even after she or he turned 18. See Pub. 
L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 650, § 707 (bX I XA) (amending § 2255 to permit suit by 
adults who were victims of enumerated federal offenses when they were minors, 
by deleting "Any minor who is [a victim]" and adding "Any person, who, while a 
12 
Lewis Tein ri 
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completion of a criminal action. See also 18 USC § 3509(k). 
H.R. Rep. 108-264(11), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), reprinted at 2003 WL 
22272907, at *16-17 ("agency view" by the Department of Justice on bill later 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595). 
The Department specifically argued to Congress in the clearest terms: "We 
believe that prosecutions should take priority over civil redress and that 
prosecutions should be complete prior to going forward with civil suits." M. at 17 
(emphasis added). Nowhere did the Department suggest that pending prosecutions 
warrant less protection (Le., should be "hinder[ed]") simply because a particular 
civil plaintiff happens to reach his or her 18th birthday. 
IV. 
A Stay is Mandatory Despite Resulting "Delay" to Civil Lawsuits. 
Inherent in any § 3509(k) stay is delay to the progress (discovery, trial, 
appeal) of all related civil lawsuits. Congress recognized this in enacting the stay 
provision, which necessarily prioritized the interests of completing a criminal 
investigation and prosecution over the interests of a particular plaintiff in seeking 
personal pecuniary damages. 
Based on this reasoning, the Francis II court 
specifically refused to provide any relief to plaintiffs "simply because the state 
[criminal] matter is not progressing as fast as they would hope." The court made 
this determination despite the plaintiffs' complaints about the "frustrating delay" 
and that "the state criminal case `has languished for almost two years with no end 
14 
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in sight,' finding that this "is a matter to be addressed in state [criminal] court." 
Id. Accordingly, the anticipated delay in this case, attendant to the term of the 
deferred-prosecution agreement, does not change the clear command of § 3509(k). 
According to her own pleadings, the plaintiff waited seven years before 
filing this lawsuit, Compl. ¶¶ 2,6, and so cannot rightfully claim prejudice from 
additional temporary delay. 
Section 3509 Aside, a Discretionary Stay is Warranted. 
Even, arguendo, were this Court not to apply the mandate of § 3509, a 
discretionary stay should still be entered during the pendency of the Federal 
Criminal Action. SEC I. Healthsouth Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1326 (N.D. 
Ala. 2003) ("No question exists that this court has the power to stay a civil 
proceeding due to an active, parallel criminal investigation."). 
Other federal 
statutes support such a stay -- particularly when the criminal action may be 
adversely affected by the civil litigation. 
For example, under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2712(e)(1), "the court shall stay any action commenced [against the United 
States] if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the ability 
of the Government to conduct a related investigation or prosecution of a related 
criminal case." Allowing this lawsuit to progress while Epstein remains subject to 
the Federal Criminal Action will prejudice him irrevocably and irreparably. As 
15 
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provided below, there are several adverse effects to allowing this case to proceed 
while the Federal Criminal Action remains pending. 
In this lawsuit, Epstein has a right to defend himself. 
In the Federal 
Criminal Action, Epstein has a right against self-incrimination." Without a stay, 
Epstein will be immediately forced to abandon one of these rights. 
Should he choose his Fifth Amendment rights, he will expose himself to an 
adverse inference at the summary judgment stage and at trial. See generally, 
Wehling 
Columbia Broad. Sys, 611 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing 
that "invocation of the privilege would be subject to the drawing of an adverse 
inference by the trier of fact"). On the other hand, should Epstein choose his right 
to defend himself in this lawsuit, the USAO will be able to use his responses at 
every stage of the discovery and trial process (e.g., his Answer, responses to 
document requests, responses to requests for admissions, sworn answers to 
interrogatories, answers to deposition questions, and trial testimony) to his 
detriment in the Federal Criminal Action! 
' The privilege applies in "instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend 
danger" of criminal liability. Hoffman' United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
This could give the USAO a tremendous advantage in prosecuting Epstein in the Federal 
Criminal Action. See Comment, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and 
Criminal Actions, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1023, 1026 (1985) (observing that "the prosecutor may have 
access to detailed civil depositions of the accused witnesses, while the rules of criminal 
procedure bar the accused from deposing the prosecutor's witnesses"). 
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In this lawsuit, even before civil discovery begins, under the Initial 
Disclosures required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and S.D. Fla. Local Rule 26.1, Epstein 
"must" disclose the identities of all the witnesses he would call in his defense to 
the Federal Criminal Action (Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i)), copies of "all documents" he 
"may use to support [his] defenses" (Rule 26(a)(I)(AXii)), as well as the identity 
of "any" expert witness he "may use at trial," along with mandatory disclosure of 
"a written report" containing "a complete statement of all opinions the [expert] will 
express and the basis and reasons for them" (Rule 26(a)(2XA) and (B)(i)). 
In contrast, in the pending Federal Criminal Action, which is governed 
exclusively by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be 
entitled to compel pre-trial production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. 
P. 16(b)(1)(A), (C), and 16(b)(2); United States I Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 
1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production privilege). 
Thus, absent a stay of this civil action, the USAO would receive 
fundamentally unfair access to defense information and highly prejudicial advance 
insight into criminal defense strategy. See Comment, 98 Harv. L. Rev, at 1030 
("To the extent that a prosecutor acquires evidence that was elicited from the 
accused in a parallel civil proceeding, the criminal process becomes less 
adversarial."). 
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Without a stay in place, discovery will proceed, including against third 
parties. 
Mr. Epstein will have no alternative but to issue subpoenas seeking 
evidence from state and federal law-enforcement officers. For example, Epstein is 
clearly entitled to discover evidence of prior statements (including inconsistent 
statements) given by witnesses whom law-enforcement has previously interviewed. 
See, e.g., Cox' Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that district court 
properly admitted testimony of prosecutor about prior inconsistent statements that 
witness made to the prosecutor). Likewise, Epstein may be entitled to discovery of 
relevant evidence that is in the present possession of the grand jury or other law-
enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Simpson'. Hines, 729 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. 
Tex. 1989) ("The grand jury has concluded its deliberations . . . . The need for 
secrecy of these specific tapes no longer outweighs other concerns."); Golden 
Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. I Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 53, 59 
(ED. Pa. 1980) ("[W]here, as here, the grand jury has completed its work and all 
that is sought are those documents turned over to the grand jury by the 
corporations which are defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . 
militating against disclosure are beside the point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of 
Calif. I Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). 
In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we 
anticipate that it will be the government, not Mr. Epstein, who will object to 
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