EFTA00233329

Proceedings 
trying 
5 
5:16 
twelve 
12:5 
two 
61091 
12:1513:19 
15:11 
types 
14:7 
ultimately 
7:25 
understand 
13:22 
unique 
12:24 
unseal 
4:17 6:11 
10:12 11:15 
unsealed 
5:2 7:17 
unsealing 
4:8 
1 
vacate 
10:13 
vs 
1:9 3:8 
6:17 
1:19 
went 
7.1 
west 
1:21,25 2:4 
2:7 3:5 
we'll 
14:7 
we're 
9:17,19 11:6 
William 
2:10 3:10 
wish 
5:4 
words 
10:9 
written 
14:15 
Yeah 
12:13 14:18 
year 
13:9 
yelling 
10:18 
zealous 
10:17 
w 
#100578 
waiting 
12 : 5 
want 
4:17.6:21,22 
7:1,2,5,17 
13:18,23 
14:14 
wasn't 
8:15 
week 
13:19 
weeks 
12:15 13:20 
weighing 
1: 25 16: 11 
1 
1:30 
15:15 
10 
1:18 3:6 
10th 
16:8 
101 
2:19 
11:08 
1:19 3:6 
11:25 
1400 
2:3 
1500 
2:20 
1650 
2:13 
2 
2.303 
8:17 14:4 
2.420 
13:10 14:6 
2.420(d) 
8:18 
2006-C29454 
1:4 
2008-CF9381 
1:4 
2009 
1:18 3:6 
16:8 
22nd 
15:14 
25th 
15:15 
250 
2:3 
3 
3rd 
2:19 
33301-1181 
2:21 
33394 
2:14 
33401 
2:4 
33401-4349 
2:7 
400 
2:7 
401 
2:13 
4 
515 
2:7 
June 10, 2009 
EFTA00233789

IN THE CIRCUIT OCURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 2.303-9/08 
IN RE: SEALING OF COURT HEARINGS 
AND RECORDS 
The Florida constitution mandates that the public shall have access to court records, subject 
only to certain enumerated limitations which are restricted by operation of state law, federal law, or 
court rule. In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Admin. 2.420 - Sealing of Court Records, 
954 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2007). The Rules of the Supreme Court strongly disfavor court records that are 
hidden from public scrutiny. The Florida Supreme Court recently adopted Interim Rule 2.420 of the 
Florida Rules of Judicial Administration which addresses the procedures for sealing noncriminal 
court records. In order to ensure that both criminal and noncriminal court records are sealed properly 
it is 
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the authority conferred by Florida Rule of Judicial 
Administration 2.215, it is ORDERED as follows: 
1. 
A request to make court records or a court hearing confidential in any type of case must be 
made by written motion. Parties cannot submit an agreed-upon order. The Motion must be 
captioned "Motion to Make Court Records Confidential" or "Motion to Make Court Hearing 
Confidential". The Motion must identify with particularity the records or hearing to be made 
confidential and the grounds upon which it is based. The Motion must include a signed 
certification by the party making the request that the motion is being made in good faith and 
is supported by a sound factual and legal basis. 
2. 
The records that are the subject of a Motion to Make Court Records Confidential will be 
treated as confidential pending resolution of the motion. The case number, docket number, 
or other identifying number of a case will remain public. Pseudonyms may be used as 
permitted by the court. Court records made confidential under this rule must be treated as 
confidential during any appellate proceeding in this Circuit. 
3. 
A public hearing on any motion to seal a court record or court hearing will be held as soon as 
practicable but no less than ten (10) days prior to the notice being given to the public and the 
press and no later than 30 days after the filing of the motion. A party may seek to hold all or 
EFTA00233790

a portion of the hearing on a Motion to Make Court Records Confidential in camera if 
necessary to protect any of the interests listed in Interim Rule of Judicial Administration 
2.420(c)(9)(A). The moving party will be responsible for ensuring that a complete record of 
any hearing be created either by use of a court reporter or by any recording device that is 
provided as a matter of right by the court. 
4. 
A sealing order issued by a court must state with specificity the grounds for sealing and the 
findings of the court that justify sealing. The order granting the sealing request must contain 
as much detail as possible including the parties' names or pseudonyms, whether the progress 
docket is to be confidential, the court records that are to be confidential and the names of 
persons who arc permitted access. The order must contain specific findings that the degree, 
duration, and manner of confidentiality are no broader than necessary to protect the interests 
listed in Interim Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(9)(A). The order will not reveal 
the information that is to be made confidential. The order will direct whether the progress 
docket is to be sealed. 
5. 
If an order sealing a court file is silent as to whether the progress docket is to be sealed, the 
clerk shall seal the court file but maintain a public docket with no alternation of the parties' 
names. In accordance with Interim Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420(c)(9) the Clerk 
shall NOT seal the case number, docket number, or any other identifying number of a case 
that is sealed by court order. 
6. 
The Court will direct the Clerk to post the order sealing the court file on the Clerk's website 
as well as on the bulletin board located at the Main Courthouse within ten (10) days 
following the entry of the order and must remain posted in both locations for at least 30 days. 
7. 
A nonparty may file a written motion to vacate a sealing order in accordance with Florida 
Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420 (2007); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial 
Admin. 2.420 - Sealing of Court Records, 954 So.2d 16 (Fla. 2007). 
8. 
A public hearing must be held on any contested motion to vacate a sealing order. The court, 
in its discretion, may hold a hearing on an uncontested motion. While challenge hearings 
must be open to the public, a party may seek to hold a portion or all of the hearing in camera 
if necessary to protect the interests listed in Interim Rule of Judicial Administration 
2.420(cX9)(A). The movant must ensure that a record of the hearing is made. The movant 
seeking to vacate an order bears the burden of showing that the order is unsound. 
9. 
If the identity of a party is to remain confidential, all applicable pleadings will be filed with 
the following designation on the front of the pleading: "Confidential Party — Court Service 
Requested". The judicial assistant for the division in which the pleading is filed is 
responsible for providing such notice to the applicable parties. The judicial assistant is to 
provide such notice so as not to inadvertently reveal the identity of the confidential party. 
2 
EFTA00233791

10. 
This administrative rule does NOT address the confidentiality of records admitted into 
evidence and it does NOT pertain to the statutory process for sealing or expunging criminal 
history records. Motions to Seal pleadings or court records filed in a criminal case must, 
however, comply with this Administrative Order. This administrative order also does NOT 
pertain to court records that are confidential pursuant to statute, rule or other legal authority. 
11. 
If a motion to seal is not made in good faith and is not supported by a sound legal and factual 
basis, the court may impose sanctions upon the movant. 
12. 
The Clerk of Court, or a deputy clerk, is hereby authorized to open any court file sealed by 
operation of law or court order for the purpose of filing documents pertinent to the particular 
file, as well as for microfilming or imaging files, and for preparing a record on appeal. The 
Clerk, or deputy clerk, shall reseal the file immediately upon completion of the task, with the 
date and time of the unsealing clearly marked on the outside of the file along with the initials 
of the deputy clerk. 
13. 
In all matters except adoption and surrogacy cases, the Clerk of Court will make the contents 
of a sealed file available to adult parties and their attorneys of record. The contents of 
adoption and surrogacy files shall not be made available to any person absent a court order. 
DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers in West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida 
this day of September, 2008. 
supersedes admin. order 2.032 10/06 
Kathleen J. 
oll 
Chief Jud 
3 
EFTA00233792

IN TIIE aRcurr COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY FLORIDA 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 2.032 - I0106 
IN RE: SF.ALINO COURT HEARINGS 
AND RECORDS 
WHEREAS all court proceedings are public events and a strong presumption of 
public access attaches to all proceedings and their records; and 
WHEREAS records made or received pursuant to court rule, law, or ordinance, or in 
connection with the transaction of official business arc subject to public disclosure; and 
WHEREAS privacy rights of litigants may in certain circumstances require that court 
records or documents in the record should be sealed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED that to balance the competing interests of 
litigants' privacy interests and the public's right to access to court records, the following 
procedures am established for scaling court records: 
I . When a Motion is received for the staling of a hearing or all or part or a court record, 
the Court will ditto a hearing be held on same. The Court will give notice of the hearing by 
posting same on the electronic bulletin board established by the Clerk of Court expressly for this 
purpose. Unless otherwise ordered with a reason given by the Court, notice should include 
enough disclosure to identify the case, the moven'. the respondent, and a brief, generic 
description of the matters sealed or sought to be sealed. 
2. 'the Court will not set a hearing less than ten (10) days prior to the notice being given 
to the public and the press. 
3. Where prior notice to the public and press regarding the scaling of a record is not 
practicable, the Court will address such Motion, and if granted, provide notice of any decision to 
seal on the Clerk's electronic bulletin board. Unless otherwise ordered with a reason given by the 
Court, notice should include enough disclosure to identify the case, the movant, the respondent, 
and a brief, generic description of the matters scaled or sought to be sealed. 
4. Access to court proceedings and records may be restricted to protect the 
interests of litigants only after a showing that the following has been met: 
(i) the measure limiting or denying access, closure or sealing of records or 
both, is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the 
administration of justice; 
EFTA00233793

(ii) no less restrictive alternative measures are available which would 
mitigate the danger; and 
(III) the measure being considered will in fact achieve the court's protective 
purpose. 
5. The reasons supporting sealing the file must be stated with specificity In the 
order sealing the court record or hearing. The Case number should tmain accessible on 
banner" regardless of whether the case has been scaled. 
DONE and ORDERED, in Chambers. at West Palm Reach. Florida this IP day of 
October. 2006. 
/S/ 
Judge Kathleen J. Kroll. Chief Judge 
• supersedes administrative order no. 2.032 •7/04 
•6 'Ilie Court recognizes the present technology (as of October 10, 2006) used by the Clerk 
supports this, however it can not happen without a system modification which shall he completed 
by December 31. 2006. 
EFTA00233794

Westlaw. 
Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Clr.Ct.)) 
C 
Florida Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Volusia County. 
JOHN DOE-I THROUGH JOHN DOE-4 and Par-
ents of John Doe-I through John Doe-4, Plaintiffs, 
MUSEUM OF SCIENCE AND HISTORY OF 
JACKSONVILLE, INC., Defendant. 
Nos. 92-32567-CI-CI, Div. 32. 
June 8, 1994. 
William H. Ogle, Ormond Beach, FL. 
W. Douglas Childs, Jacksonville, FL. 
Jonathan D. Kaney Jr., Daytona Beach, FL. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO 
CLOSE TRIAL 
RICHARD B. ORFINGER, Circuit Judge. 
*1 THIS MATTER is before the Court on the 
plaintiffs' motion to exclude the public from the tri-
al of this case. Notice of hearing was given to rep-
resentatives of the media as required by law. News-
Journal Corporation, publisher of The News-
Journal, filed a response and appeared in opposi-
tion to the motion. Defendant took no position. 
According to the complaint, a man who worked at 
the local museum sexually abused the minor 
plaintiffs. He had first come into contact with three 
of the minors as they served as volunteers under his 
supervision. More than four years ago, the abuser 
was prosecuted and sentenced to prison. Since then 
the plaintiffs have settled suits for damages result-
ing from this abuse against the Daytona Beach Mu-
seum of Arts and Sciences, the Volusia County 
School Board, and the Florida Department of 
Health and Rehabilitative Services. As a previous 
employer of the abuser, plaintiffs allege this de-
Page 1 
fendant failed to disclose information about the ab-
user's record of sexual abuse when it received an 
inquiry related to his employment in this com-
munity. 
Although so many persons have become familiar 
with the case that defendant has listed eighty-one 
potential fact witnesses, no victim has yet been 
identified in the media. 
Relying on a privacy interest in the facts relating to 
the sexual abuse, plaintiffs argue that closure is ne-
cessary to prevent the substantial harm that likely 
would result from revelation of these facts and 
identification as the victims.FNI Thus the motion 
calls upon the court to decide whether a privacy in-
terest in the facts relating to sexual abuse suffered 
by the minors provides a proper basis for closure of 
the trial of the minors' suit for damages arising out 
of this abuse. For the reasons that follow, the court 
concludes that this is not a proper basis for closure 
and denies the motion. 
FN1. Previously, plaintiffs moved for an 
order restraining anyone, including the me-
dia, from publishing information disclosed 
during the trial that would identify the 
minor victims. The court denied this mo-
tion. See: Nebraska Press Association I 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) and The Flor-
ida Star I B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
Whenever other interests compete with the public 
interest in open judicial proceedings, "[D]ur analys-
is must begin with the proposition that all civil and 
criminal court proceedings are public events, re-
cords of court proceedings are public records, and 
there is a strong presumption in favor of public ac-
cess to such matters." Sentinel Communications Co. 
I Watson, 615 So.2d 768, 770 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) 
(citing Barron I Florida Freedom Newspapers, 
Inc., 531 So.2d 113 (Fla.1988)). This presumption 
rests on the most fundamental values of American 
government. 
O2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
EFTA00233795

Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.)) 
"[T]he people have a right to know what is done in 
their courts.... [T]he greatest publicity to the acts of 
those holding positions of public trust, and the 
greatest freedom in the discussion of the proceed-
ings of public tribunals that is consistent with truth 
and decency, are regarded as essential to the public 
welfare." Barron, 531 So.2d at 116-7 (citing In re 
Shortridge, 34 P. 227, 228-29 (Cal.1893) ). Open-
ness in courts has a salutary effect on the 
propensity of witnesses to tell the truth and of judi-
cial officers to perform their duties conscientiously. 
It informs persons affected by litigation of its effect 
upon them and fosters "respect for the law[,] intelli-
gent acquaintance ... with the methods of govern-
ment', and] a strong confidence in judicial remedies 
... which could never be inspired by a system of 
secrecy...." Id., (citing 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 1834 (Chadboum rev.1976) ). These fundamental 
values come into play whenever the court is in ses-
sion; and the presumption of openness applies in 
hard cases as well as easy cases. "The reason for 
openness is basic to our form of government." Id 
*2 This motion is opposed by various news organ-
izations, but the presumption of openness is of lar-
ger importance than the immediate interest of the 
press in the case of the moment. To be sure, the 
press has a cognizable interest in maintaining open 
courts "because its ability to gather news is directly 
impaired or curtailed" by restrictions on access. 
Moreover, the press is assigned a fiduciary role in 
enforcing public rights of access because the press 
"may be properly considered as a representative of 
the public (for) enforcement of public right of ac-
cess." Nevertheless, the values of openness in 
courts transcend the interests of the press because 
"Mreedom of the press is not, and has never been a 
private property right granted to those who own the 
news media. It is a cherished and almost sacred 
right of each citizen to be informed about current 
events on a timely basis so each can exercise his 
discretion in determining the destiny and security 
of himself, other people, and the Nation." State ex 
re. Miami Herald Pub. Co. I. McIntosh, 340 So.2d 
904, 908 (Fla.1977). In serving the right of each cit-
Page 2 
izen to be informed, judicial openness, of which the 
press is an instrument, sustains public confidence in 
the judiciary and thus serves the ultimate value of 
popular sovereignty. 
This higher purpose of openness is not always ap-
parent in the public scrutiny of the daily business of 
the courts. Depending on the definition of news-
worthiness, it may be possible to dismiss as un-
worthy much that transpires in civil courts. Here, it 
is easy to ask what public interest is served by sub-
jecting these minor victims to the risk of public 
identification. However, Barron teaches that this is 
the wrong question because it overlooks the higher 
purpose of openness in the courts. 
In Barron, a case involving privacy concerns inher-
ent in a divorce case, the court strongly reaffirmed 
the presumption that Florida civil courts are open. 
In dissent, Justice McDonald saw the question in 
case-specific terms. He would have closed the pro-
ceeding because "the rights of the public to inform-
ation contained in a domestic relations lawsuit is 
minimal, if existent at all." 531 So.2d at 121. Impli-
citly, this approach would have required the pro-
ponent of openness to show a particular need to 
know facts of the specific case in order to gain ac-
cess. The majority rejected this approach because it 
saw the conflicting interests in broader terms. "The 
parties seeking a dissolution of their marriage are 
not entitled to a private court proceeding just be-
cause they are required to utilize the judicial sys-
tem." 531 So.2d at 119. 
A closure request implicates the integrity and cred-
ibility of the judicial system itself and not just the 
immediate concerns of the parties. The balance to 
be struck is not between the people's need to know 
the particular facts of the case versus the parties' 
need to keep these facts private but between the 
public interest in open courts versus the personal 
desire for a private forum. "Public trials are essen-
tial to the judicial system's credibility in a free soci-
ety." Barron at 116. 
*3 Although the Florida Supreme Court holds that 
O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
EFTA00233796

Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WI.. 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.)) 
"the public and the press have a fundamental right 
of access to all judicial proceedings," however, this 
right is not absolute. State ex rel. Miami Herald 
Pub. Co. 
McIntosh, 340 So.2d at 908-9. In Bar-
ron, the court took the occasion to establish the 
standards upon which the presumption of openness 
may be overcome when necessary "to protect corn-
pcting interests." The court wrote a "definitive 
statement ... to assist judicial officers in this sensit-
ive area." 531 So.2d at 117-8. 
Barron establishes a strong presumption of open-
ness for all court proceedings and records, places 
the burden on the proponent of closure, and grants 
standing to the public and media to challenge clos-
ure orders. Before a court may enter any order of 
closure it must determine there are no reasonable 
alternatives to closure and must order the least re-
strictive closure necessary to accomplish the pur-
pose of closure. 531 So.2d at 118-9. A closure or-
der should be "drawn with particularity and nar-
rowly applied." 531 So.2d at 117. 
Barron specifies an exclusive listing of those com-
peting interests that may under appropriate circum-
stances be sufficiently weighty to justify closure. 
Closure may be ordered "only when necessary" to 
serve one of six competing interests: 
(a) to comply with established public policy set 
forth in the constitution, statutes, rules, or case 
law; 
(b) to protect trade secrets; 
(c) to protect a compelling governmental interest 
[e.g., national security; confidential informants]; 
(d) to obtain evidence to properly determine legal 
issues in a case; 
(e) to avoid substantial injury to innocent third 
parties [e.g., to protect young witnesses from of-
fensive testimony; to protect children in a di-
vorce]; or 
(I) to avoid substantial injury to a party by disclos-
Page 3 
ure of matters protected by a common law or pri-
vacy right not generally inherent in the specific 
type of civil proceeding sought to be closed.... 
At the outset, the proponent of closure must identi-
fy one or more of such interests that is implicated in 
the proposcd closure. Here it is not necessary to go 
beyond this first level of analysis because plaintiffs 
have not connected their motion to a valid interest 
that would justify closure. 
This motion poses a direct confrontation between 
the individual interest in privacy and the public in-
terest in open courts. Because there is inherent in 
the case sensitive, intimate, and embarrassing 
private facts, plaintiffs seek to litigate their claim in 
a closed proceeding. They argue "[ghat revelation 
of [the identities of the minor plaintiffs) has the po-
tential to inflict substantial harm upon them [as] a 
matter of common sense." 
There is no question there are strong reasons to 
keep private the facts surrounding the abuse prac-
ticed on the minors by the now-imprisoned abuser. 
The question this court must decide, however, is 
whether these are reasons to secure the courtroom. 
The question is not whether to afford privacy to the 
plaintiffs but whether to afford plaintiffs a closed 
forum in which to disclose these facts. 
•4 Although there is no case directly on this point, 
the present question comes fully within the holding 
of Barron, which thoroughly considered the com-
petition between the people's interest in public 
courts and the personal interest in private facts. In 
effect, Barron raised the question of the role to be 
assigned to privacy in a system of public courts, 
and the majority resolved the issue by granting a 
narrow role to privacy based on considerations re-
lating to the legitimate expectations of privacy. 
In the Florida Supreme Court's well-developed pri-
vacy jurisprudence, the fundamental basis of the 
right of privacy is a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. Not every fact in every circumstance is 
private, and not every act of government violates 
C 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
EFTA00233797

Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.C1r.Ct.)) 
the right to be let alone. The concept by which the 
court separates the appropriate from the inappropri-
ate instance for invoking the privacy right is this 
expectation. Stall I 
State. 570 So.2d 257, 261 
(Fla.1990). In order to establish a right of privacy, 
the individual must establish that "a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy ... exist[s]." Winfield I Divi-
sion of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 547 
(Fla.1985). 
A right of privacy cannot attach when there is no 
expectation of privacy. Under our historic tradition 
of public courts, what reasonable expectation of 
privacy could a litigant possibly entertain? Concur-
ring in Barron, Justice Erhlich would have con-
ceded the litigant no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. He pointed out, "we have ... recognized that 
It]he potential for invasion of privacy is inherent 
in the litigation process.' Rasmussen 
I
 
South Flor-
ida Blood Service, 500 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla.1987). 
While civil litigants may have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in pretrial depositions and interrog-
atories which are not filed with the court (citations 
omitted), no such expectation exists in connection 
with civil proceedings and court files which histor-
ically have been open to the public. See Forsberg 
I
 
Housing Authority, 455 So.2d 373, 375 (Fla.1984) 
(Overton, J., concurring) (there is traditionally no 
expectation of privacy in court files)." 531 So.2d at 
120. Justice Erhlich shows the conflict between pri-
vacy and publicness. If the privacy interest were al-
lowed unbounded scope, it would overcome the 
public nature of trials. Thus a system of public tri-
als must insist that litigants abandon qualms about 
disclosure of private facts when they place them in 
contest in the court. 
Without rejecting this view entirely, the majority 
nevertheless identified a limited scope of privacy 
within civil litigation. "We find that, under appro-
priate circumstances, the constitutional right of pri-
vacy established in Florida by the adoption of art-
icle I, section 23, could form a constitutional basis 
for closure under (e) or (f)." 531 So.2d at 118. The 
majority thus conceived of two instances in which a 
Page 4 
reasonable expectation of privacy might be found. 
•5 First, there is the privacy expectation of persons 
who are not parties to the case. Involuntary parti-
cipants may have a reasonable claim of privacy. 
Thus under item (g), Barron recognizes that closure 
may be justified if the proponent carries the heavy 
burden of showing closure is necessary "to avoid 
substantial injury to innocent third parties [e.g., to 
protect young witnesses from offensive testimony; 
to protect children in a divorce]." 531 So.2d at 118. 
Second, there is the more limited privacy expecta-
tion of a party. Again, the doctrine of legitimate ex-
pectation is applicable. Although a litigant has no 
right to expect privacy in matters involved in the 
case litigated in a public court, there may be mat-
ters extrinsic to the case with respect to which a lit-
igant has a reasonable privacy claim. Under Bar-
ron's item (f), a proponent may be entitled to clos-
ure if he or she carries the burden of showing that 
closure is necessary "to avoid substantial injury to a 
party by disclosure of matters protected by a com-
mon law or privacy right not generally inherent in 
the specific type of civil proceeding sought to be 
closed." 531 So.2d at 118. 
Barron rules out closure based on privacy interests 
of parties in the subject matter of the case itself. In 
recognizing a peripheral role for the privacy claims 
of civil litigants, the majority held there can be no 
privacy interest in that which is inherent in the 
case. Because litigation in a public court system in-
volves an inherent tendency to invade privacy, a lit-
igant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the subject matter of a case. This must be so if, as 
Barron soundly affirms, there is to be a system of 
open courts in Florida. 
Applying this standard in Barron, the court determ-
ined the medical history in question should not be 
scaled because it was inherent in the case. 
"Although generally protected by one's privacy 
right, medical reports and history arc no longer pro-
tected when the medical condition becomes an in-
tegral part of the civil proceeding, particularly 
O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
EFTA00233798

Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.O.), 22 Media L. Rcp. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WI., 741009 (Fla.C1r.Cr.)) 
when the condition is asserted as an issue by the 
party seeking closure.... [Mjedical information is an 
inherent part of these proceedings and cannot be 
utilized as a proper basis for closure." 531 So.2d at 
119. 
The same is true in this case. Those private facts 
which form the basis of the motion for closure are 
the facts inherent in the plaintiffs' case. Neverthe-
less, plaintiffs argue their request implicates the 
competing interests Barron listed in item (a) deal-
ing with public policy, item (e), dealing with pri-
vacy of third party, and item (f), dealing with pri-
vacy of a party. 
Plaintiffs first argue that closure of the trial is ne-
cessary under item (a) "to comply with established 
public policy set forth in the constitution, statutes, 
rules, or case law." 531 So.2d at 118. Plaintiffs 
rightly contend "[Ihe State of Florida has long re-
cognized, as a matter of public policy, the need to 
protect minors who come into contact with the 
justice systcm," and cite statutory provisions ex-
empting records of sex crimes and child abuse from 
public records disclosure and providing for closure 
of adoption and dependency proceedings. See 
Fla.Stat. §§ 119.07(h); 63.162; 39.408(c). 
*6 To be sure, it is public policy to protect minor 
victims of sex crimes from unnecessary public ex-
posure. The cited exceptions to public records laws 
illustrate this as does the practice of anonymous 
pleading. 
However, state policy neither requires nor permits 
closure of public trials on the basis of the privacy 
interests of minor victims of sex crimes. The trial of 
the perpetrator of a sex crime against a minor must 
be conducted in public as a matter of Florida com-
mon law.FN2 Under Fla.Stat. § 918.16, the court 
has a certain ability to clear the courtroom during 
testimony of a person under the age of 16 but the 
press specifically may not be excluded .R43 A re-
cent statute protecting minor witnesses does not 
purport to authorize closure of the trial to protect 
minor witnesses.FN4 When the state prosecutes the 
Page 5 
parent of a minor child for sexual abuses practiced 
on the child, the trial is not closed nor is there sup-
pression of the identity of the parent from which, as 
plaintiffs argue here, the identity of the child is 
readily inferred.FN5 Indeed, from the reports of 
tort suits by minor victims of sexual crimes seeking 
damages from the perpetrator or those vicariously 
liable, it can be seen that the courts of this state 
conduct cases like the present as open public trials 
in the name of the party.
F142. Bundy'. State, 455 So.2d 330 
(Fla.1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109 
(1986). Miami Herald Publishing Co.'. 
Lewis, 426 So.2d 1 (Fla.1982). See also 
Globe Newspaper Company 
Superior 
Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (1982) (Same under 
First Amendment). 
F/43. See Palm Beach Newspapers'. 
Nourse, 413 So.2d 467 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1982) (Error to summarily exclude press 
from arraignment of defendant charge with 
lewd and lascivious act on child under age 
14); News-Press Pub. I. Shearer, 5 
Med.L.Rptr. 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) 
(Error to exclude press from courtroom 
while juvenile witness in sex crime testi-
fies and error to seal record from press). 
Compare Miami Herald Pub. Co. 
Morphonios, 467 So.2d 1026 (Fla.1985) 
(Error to gag press from publishing testi-
mony of minor witness via prerecorded 
video) and Thornton'. State, 585 So.2d 
1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (Statute cannot 
override defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to public trial without case-by-case 
balancing test). See also Doe'. Doe, 567 
So.2d 
1002 
(Fla. 
4th DCA 
1990) 
(Affirming denial of motion to close pro-
ceedings in which mother seeks authority 
for surgical sterilization of mentally handi-
capped daughter). 
F144. Fla.Stat. § 92.55 (Authorizing the 
court to permit or prohibit "the attendance 
O 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
EFTA00233799

Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.C1r.Ct.)) 
of any person 
at 
the 
proceeding") 
(emphasis supplied). 
FNS. See, e.g., Schmidt J State, 590 So.2d 
404 (Fla.1991) (Father prosecuted for 
crime of video recording of minor daughter 
in violation of statute concerning depiction 
of sex acts); Sanders 
State, 568 So.2d 
1014 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (Father prosec-
uted for lewd and lascivious acts against 
minor daughter). 
FN6. See, e.g., Zordan I  Page, 500 So.2d 
608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (Suit by minor 
and parents against carrier for damages in-
curred when insured fondled private parts 
of minor plaintiff); Hennagan I Depart-
ment of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles, 467 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1985) (suit by minor and parents against 
FHP for damages when minor driver was 
allegedly sexually abused by patrolmen 
after being stopped on pretext of suspi-
cion); Drake 1 Island Community Church, 
Inc., 462 So.2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) 
(Suit by minor and parents for damages 
from sexual abuse by teacher on minor pu-
pil). Compare Freehauf I  School Board of 
Seminole County, 623 So.2d 761 (Fla. 5th 
DCA)cause dismissed, 629 So.2d 132 
(Fla.1994) (Suit for abuse inflicted on son 
by stepmother; failure to retort suspected 
abuse by school); Fischer 1 Metcalf 543 
So.2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (Suit by 
minors against psychologist for damages 
from abusive father when suspicion of ab-
use was not reported). 
The court concludes that it is not necessary to close 
this trial in order to comply with any public policy 
of the State of Florida. 
The plaintiffs next argue that closure is necessary to 
serve the interest of innocent third parties whose 
privacy warrants closure under item (e) of Barron. 
The plaintiffs assert that each minor in this consol-
Page 6 
idated cause is a third party as to the other three ac-
tions and thus the trial should be closed to protect 
them as third parties in the consolidated cases. Hav-
ing voluntarily joined to bring the action, they can-
not claim to be third parties to the action nor assert 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the disclos-
ures that necessarily follow from their decision to 
act in concert. 
Plaintiffs also assert the privacy interest of other 
minors who were victims of this same abuse but 
who have not joined in this suit. There is no evid-
ence that trial of this case would implicate these 
third parties. In any event, plaintiffs lack standing 
to assert the interest of these third parties, and the 
Court will not decide any issue affecting their rights 
unless a party with standing raises the issue. 
Finally, plaintiffs attempt to bring their motion un-
der item (f) relating to the privacy interest of a 
party. To be entitled to an order of closure under 
this item, however, plaintiffs must show that clos-
ure is necessary "to avoid substantial injury to a 
party by disclosure of matters protected by a com-
mon law or privacy right not generally inherent in 
the specific type of civil proceeding sought to be 
closed." 531 So.2d at 119.(emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs argue their identities are not inherent facts 
in the case and thus the trial should be closed to 
prevent revelation of the identity. However, 
plaintiffs also contend it will be impossible to try 
the case without revelation of their names. Their ar-
gument refutes itself. The identity of a party is in-
herent in the case, and that conccm alone could not 
justify total closure. This argument is a proxy for 
the ineffective argument that the sensitive nature of 
inherent private facts should justify a private forum. 
Facts regarding abuse form the core of their case, 
and thus it "is an inherent part of these proceedings 
and cannot be utilized as a proper basis for clos-
ure." 531 So.2d at 119. The decision to litigate this 
issue is tantamount to a decision to place the in-
formation before the public. 
*7 As sympathetic as their claim is, it fails to state 
a cognizable reason for closure under the law. The 
2009 Thomson Rcuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
EFTA00233800

Not Reported in So.2d 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
(Cite as: 1994 WL 741009 (Fla.Cir.Ct.)) 
request to close a civil trial because of a party's dis-
closural concerns with facts inherent in the cause 
cannot be reconciled with Barron. Facts generally 
protected by a party's privacy right are no longer 
protected from disclosure when they become an in-
tegral part of a civil proceeding. Indeed, plaintiffs' 
argument for a private forum could be asserted as 
the basis for a wide array of exceptions that would 
swallow up the presumption of openness. "The ... 
argument based on this interest therefore proves too 
much. (T)hat same interest could be relied upon to 
support an array of mandatory closure rules ... 
proves too much, and runs contrary to the very 
foundation of the right of access...." Globe Newspa-
per Company 
Superior Court, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 
2622 (1982). 
Accordingly, having considered the briefs and argu-
ments of counsel for the reasons set forth in this 
opinion, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Close 
Trial be denied. 
DONE AND ORDERED. 
Fla.Cir.Ct.,1 994. 
John Doc-1 Through John Doe-4 I Museum of Sci-
ence and History of Jacksonville, Inc. 
Not Reported in So.2d, 1994 WL 741009 
(Fla.Cir.Ct.), 22 Media L. Rep. 2497 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Page 7 
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EFTA00233801

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2008 
Page 1 of 8 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
IN RE: JANE DOE, 
Petitioner. 
FILED by
JUL 0 9 2008 
STEVEN N. LAMMORE 
CLERK U.S MST. CS 
s.o. or nA.-wra. 
GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO VICTIM'S EMERGENCY PETITION 
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS ACT, 18 U.S.C. 6 3771 
The United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, files its Response 
to Victim's Emergency Petition for Enforcement of Victim Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, and 
states: 
I. 
THERE IS NO "COURT PROCEEDING" UNDER 18 U.S.C. & 377I (b) 
Petitioner complains that she has been denied her rights under the Crime Victims Rights 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. In the emergency petition filed by the victim, she alleges the Government 
has denied her rights since she has received no consultation with the attorney for the government 
regarding possible disposition of the charges (18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)); no notice of any public 
court proceedings (18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2)); no information regarding her right to restitution (18 
U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6)); and no notice of rights under the Crime Victim Rights Act (CVRA). 
Emergency Petition, I 5. 
The instant case is unique in several respects. First, in 2006, Jeffrey Epstein was charged 
with felony solicitation of prostitution in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 
Beach County, Florida. This charge was based upon the offenses alleged in paragraph 1 of the 
petition. Second, while Epstein has been under federal investigation, he has not been charged in 
EFTA00233802

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2008 
Page 2 of 8 
the Southern District of Florida. 
Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3771(b)(1) provides in pertinent part that. "Din any court 
proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the crime 
victim is afforded the rights described in subsection (a)." There is no "court proceeding" in the 
instant case since Epstein has not been charged with violation of any federal statute. No federal 
grand jury indictment has been returned, nor has any criminal information been filed. There can 
thus be no failure of a right to notice of a public court proceeding or the right to restitution. 
In her memorandum, petitioner relics upon In Re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008), 
where the Fifth Circuit held that the CVRA required the government to "confer in some 
reasonable way with the victims before ultimately exercising its broad discretion." Id. at 395. In 
Dean, the government sought and obtained an ex pane order permitting it to negotiate a plea 
agreement with BP Products North America, without first consulting with the victims, 
individuals injured and survivors of those killed in a refinery explosion. A plea agreement was 
ultimately negotiated and the victims objected. The appellate court found that the CVRA granted 
a right to confer. However, the court declined to grant mandamus relief for prudential reasons, 
finding that the district court had the benefit of the views of the victims who chose to participate 
at the hearing held on whether the plea agreement should be accepted. Ida at 396. 
Dean is legally distinguishable in several respects. For one thing, the court's discussion 
of the scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the court ultimately declined to issue 
mandamus relief. Dean, 527 F.3d at 395. Also, in offering its view that this right applies pre-
charge, it is noteworthy that the court, in purporting to quote the statute, omitted the last three 
words of section 3771(aX5)("in the case"), words that arguably point in the opposite direction by 
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EFTA00233803

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2008 
Page 3 of 8 
%se 
suggesting that the right applies post-charge. Further, the court went to great lengths to 
emphasize that its holding was limited to the particular circumstances presented in that case (i.e., 
the simultaneous filing of a plea agreement and formal charges), which of course, is not the case 
here. No federal charges have been filed in the instant case, and this case, unlike Dean, involves 
an agreement to defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida and not a 
guilty plea. 
at 394. Finally, the Dean court expressly declined to "speculate on the (right to 
confer's) applicability to other situations." a Nothing in § 3771(a)(5) supports the petitioner's 
claim that she had a right to be consulted before the Government could enter into a non-
prosecution agreement which defers federal prosecution in exchange for state court resolution of 
criminal liability, and a significant concession on an element of a claim for compensation under 
18 U.S.C. § 2255. 
II. 
THE GOVERNMENT HAS USED ITS BEST EFFORTS TO COMPLY WITH 
18 U.S.C. 6 3771(a) 
The Epstein case was investigated initially by the Palm Beach Police Department in 2006. 
Exhibit A, Declaration of Assistant United States Attorney 
 
¶ 2. 
Subsequently, the Palm Beach Police Department sought the assistance of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). 
Throughout the investigation, when a victim was identified, victim 
notification letters were provided to the victim by both the FBI Victim-Witness Specialist and 
AUSA a¶ 
3. Petitioner's counsel, Brad Edwards, Esq., currently represents C.W., 
T.M., and S.R. The U.S. Attorney's Office victim notification letter to C.W. was provided by the 
1:131. and the letter to T.M. was hand-delivered by AUSA UMto 
her when she was 
interviewed in April 2007. FBI victim notification letters were mailed to C.W. and .r.m. on 
- 3 - 
EFTA00233804

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2008 
Page 4 of 8 
%et 
Niast 
January 10, 2008, and to S.R. on May 30, 2008. Villafafla Decl., ¶ 3. 
Throughout the investigation, AUSAInauld the FBI's Victim-Witness Specialist 
had contact with C.W. 
¶ 4. Earlier in the investigation, T.M. was represented by 
James Eisenberg, E:sq. Consequently, all contact with T.M. was made through Mr. Eisenberg. 
In mid-2007, Epstein's attorneys approached the U.S. Attorney's Office in an effort to 
resolve the federal investigation. a,j 5. At that time, Mr. Epstein had been charged by the 
State of Florida with solicitation of prostitution, in violation of Florida Statutes § 796.07. Mr. 
Epstein's attorneys sought a global resolution of this matter. The United States subsequently 
agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, so long as 
certain basic preconditions were met. One of the key objectives for the Government was to 
preserve a federal remedy for the young girls whom Epstein had sexually exploited. Thus, one 
condition of that agreement, notice of which was provided to the victims on July 9, 2008, is the 
following: 
"Any person, who while a minor, was a victim of a violation of an 
offense enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 2255, 
will have the same rights to proceed under Section 2255 as she 
would have had, if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and 
convicted of an enumerated offense. For purposes of 
implementing this paragraph, the United States shall provide Mr. 
Epstein's attorneys with a list of individuals whom it was prepared 
to name in an Indictment as victims of an enumerated offense by 
Mr. Epstein. Any judicial authority interpreting this provision, 
including any authority determining which evidentiary burdens if 
any a plaintiff must meet, shall consider that it is the intent of the 
parties to place these identified victims in the same position as they 
would have been had Mr. Epstein been convicted at trial. No 
more; no less." 
The Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance (May 2005), Article 
- 4 - 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2008 
Page 5 of 8 
IV, Services to Victims and Witnesses, provides the following guidance for proposed plea 
agreements: 
(3) Proposed Plea Agreements. Responsible officials should make reasonable 
efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims' views about, 
prospective plea negotiations. In determining what is reasonable, the responsible 
official should consider factors relevant to the wisdom and practicality of giving 
notice and considering views in the context of the particular case, including, but 
not limited to, the following factors: 
(a) The impact on public safety and risks to personal safety. 
(b) The number of victims. 
(c) Whether time is of the essence in negotiating or entering a proposed plea. 
(d) Whether the proposed plea involves confidential information or conditions. 
(e) Whether there is another need for confidentiality. 
(f) Whether the victim is a possible witness in the cast and the effect that relaying any 
information may have on the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Throughout negotiations, Epstein's attorneys claimed that one reason victims came 
forward and pressed their claims was their desire for money. They argued that victims might 
have an inducement to fabricate or enhance their testimony, in order to maximize their 
opportunities to obtain financial recompense. 
ci., ¶ 8. The Government was 
extremely concerned that disclosure of the proposed terms would compromise the investigation 
by providing Epstein the means of impeaching the victim witnesses, should the parties fail to 
reach an agreement. In light of the fact (i) that the United States agreed to defer prosecution to a 
previously filed state criminal case; (ii) that as a result sentencing would take place in state court 
before a state judge; (iii) that if the state resolution failed to meet minimum standards such that a 
federal prosecution was warranted, the victims would be witnesses and thus potential 
- 5 - 
EFTA00233806

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07115/2008 
Page 6 of 8 
%sr 
•••••• 
impeachment issues were of concern; and (iv) the United States was already making efforts to 
secure for victims the right to proceed federally under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 even if prosecution took 
place in state court, the Government determined that its actions in proceeding with this 
agreement best balanced the dual position of the Jane Does as both victims and potential 
witnesses in a criminal proceeding. 
On Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15 p.m., AUSA 
keceived a copy 
of the proposed state plea agreement, and learned that Epstein's state plea hearing was scheduled 
for Monday, June 30, 2008, at 8:30 a.m.-eel„ 
1 10. AUSA Villafafia and the Palm 
Beach Police Department attempted to provide notification to victims in the short time that they 
had. jj Although all known victims were not notified, AUSila 
did call attorney 
Edwards to provide notice to his clients regarding the hearing. AUSA Maid 
this, even 
though she had no obligation to provide notice of a state court hearing. Mr. Edwards advised that 
he could not attend but that someone would be present at the hearing. 1,04
the Government has complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) by using its best efforts to 
'•see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a)." 
Specifically, petitioner was afforded the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government under 18 U.S.C. §3771(a)(5). Disclosure of the specific terms of the negotiation 
were not disclosed prior to a final agreement being reached because the Government believed 
doing so would jeopardize and prejudice the prosecution in the event an agreement could not be 
made. Further, although 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) does not apply to state court proceedings, the 
government nonetheless notified petitioner's counsel on June 27, 2008, of the plea hearing in 
state court on June 30, 2008. 
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EFTA00233807

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM 
Document 13 
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/15/2008 
Page 7 of 8 
Section 3771(d)(6) provides, in relevant part, that "(n)othing in this chapter shall be 
construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his 
direction." The Government exercised its judgment and discretion in determining that there was 
a need for confidentiality in the negotiations with Epstein. The significant benefit of obtaining 
Epstein's concession that victims suing him under 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) were "victims" of the 
enumerated offenses, despite the fact he has not been convicted in federal court, was of sufficient 
importance to justify confidentiality of the negotiations. 
III. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S DISCUSSIONS WITH T.M., C.W.. AND S.R. 
Attorney Brad Edwards has advised the Govemment that he represents T.M., C.W., and 
S.R. Victim letters were provided to all three individuals. The letters to C.W. and T.M. were 
forwarded on January 10, 2008. ed., 
¶ 3. On May 28, 2008, S.R.'s status as a victim 
was confirmed when she was interviewed by federal agents. a The FBI Victim Witness 
specialist sent her a letter on May 30, 2008. a 
When the agreement was signed in September 2007, T.M. was openly hostile to a 
prosecution of Epstein, and S.R. had refused to speak with federal investigators. Id., ¶ 7. While 
individual victims were not consulted regarding the agreement, none of Mr. Edwards' clients 
had expressed a desire to be consulted prior to the resolution of the federal investigation. 1. 
In October 2007, C.W. was not represented by counsel. Id., ¶ 8. She was given 
telephonic notice of the agreement, as were three other victims. a These four individuals were 
also given notice of an expected change of plea, in state court, in October 2007. 
In mid-June 2008, Mr. Edwards contacted AUSA =to 
advise that he represented 
C.W. and S.R., and requested a meeting. 
¶ 9. AUSA 
asked Mr. Edwards to send 
- 7 - 
EFTA00233808