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Memorandum 
SubjectDate 
Re: Operation Leap Year 
April 30, 2007 
ToFrom 
R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney 
Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney 
M
a, Chief, Criminal Division 
MAUSA, Northern Region 
, Chief, Northern Region 
1. Introduction 
This memorandum se sairoval for the attached indictment charging Jeffrey Epstein, 
a/k/a 
JEGE Inc., and Hyperion Air, Inc. 
The proposed indictment contains 60 counts and seeks the forfeiture of Epstein's Palm Beach home and 
two airplanes. aF
The FBI has information regarding Epstein's whereabouts on May 16th and May 19th and 
they would like to arrest him on one of those dates. Epstein is considered an extremely high flight 
risk and, from information we have received, a continued danger to the community based upon 
his continued enticement of underage girls. For these reasons, we would like to present a sealed 
indictment to the Grand Jury on May 15, 2007 , and we would like the presentation of that 
indictment and the status of the investigation to remain confidential. 
The investigation initially was undertaken by the City of Palm Beach Police Department in 
response to a complaint received from the parents of a 14-year-old girl, "Jane Doe #2," from Royal 
Palm Beach. When Jane Doe #2 and another girl began fighting at school because the other girl accused 
Jane Doe #2 of being a prostitute, one of the school principals intervened. The principal searched Jane 
Doe #2's purse and found $300 cash. The principal asked Jane Doe #2 where the money came from. 
Jane Doe #2 initially claimed that she earned the money working at "Chik-Fil-A," which no one 
believed. Jane Doe #2 then claimed that she made the money selling drugs; no one believed that either. 
Jane Doe #2 finally admitted that she had been paid $300 to give a massage to a man on Palm Beach 
Island. Jane Doe #2's parents approached the Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD") about pressing 
charges. 
PBPD began investi atin the recipient of the massage, Jeffrey Epstein, and two of his assistants, 
and 
. PBPD identified 27 girls who went to Epstein's house to perform 
"massage services" (not including one licensed massage therapist). The girls' ages ranged from 14 
years' old to 23 years' old. Some girls saw Epstein only once and some saw him dozens of times. The 
"massage services" performed also varied. Some girls were fully clothed while they massaged Epstein; 
some wore only their underwear; and some were fully nude. During all of these massages, Epstein 
masturbated himself and he would touch the girl performing the massage, usually fondling their breasts 
and touching their vaginas - either over their clothing or on their bare skin. Epstein often used a vibrator 
to masturbate the girls and digitally penetrated a number of them. For the girls who saw him more 
often, E stein 
duated to oral sex and vaginal sex. Epstein sometimes brow ht his assistant/girlfriend, 
into the sexual activity. One of the girls described 
as Epstein's "sex 
slave." 
On October 18, 2005, PBPD obtained a search warrant with the assistance of the Palm Beach 
County State Attorney's Office ("PBSAO"). By this time, PBSAO had already been contacted by 
Epstein's cadre of lawyers. When PBPD arrived at Epstein's home two days later (10/20/05) to execute 
the search warrant, they found several items conspicuously missing. For example, computer monitors 
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and keyboards were found, but the CPUs were gone. Fz Similarly, surveillance cameras were found, but 
they were disconnected and the videotapes were gone. Nonetheless, the search did recover some 
evidence of value, including message pads showing messages from many girls over a two-year span. 
The messages show girls returning phone calls to confirm appointments to "work." Messages were 
taken by 
. and 
. F3 The search also recovered 
numerous photos of Epstein sifting with naked girls whose ages are undetermined. 
Photographs taken inside the home show that the girls' descriptions of the layout of the home and 
master bedroom/bathroom area are accurate. PBPD also found massage tables and oils, the high school 
transcript of one of the girls, and sex toys. 
In sum, the PBPD investigation showed that girls from a local high school a would be contacted 
by one of Epstein's assistants to make an appointment to "work." Up to three appointments each day 
would be made. The girls would travel to E stein's home in Palm Beach where they would meet 
Epstein's chef and Epstein's assistant—usually 
in the kitchen. The assistant normally would 
escort the girls upstairs to the master bedroom/bathroom area and set up the massage table and massage 
oils. The girl sometimes was instructed to remove her clothing. The assistant would leave and Epstein 
would enter the room wearing a robe or a towel. He would remove the clothing and lie face down and 
nude on the massage table. Epstein would then instruct the girl on what to do and would ask her to 
remove her clothing. After some time, Epstein would turn over, so that he was lying face up. Epstein 
would masturbate himself and fondle the girl performing the massage. When Epstein climaxed, the 
massage was over, and the girl was instructed to get dressed and to go downstairs to the kitchen while 
Epstein showered. Epstein's assistant would be in the kitchen and the girl would be paid—usually $200-
and if it was a "new" girl, the assistant would ask for the girl's phone number to contact her in the 
future. Fs Girls were encouraged to find other girls to bring with them. If a girl brought another girl to 
perform a "massage," each girl would receive $200. 
The PBPD investigation consists primarily of sworn taped statements from the girls. When 
PBPD began having problems with PBSAO, they approached the FBI. The investigation was formally 
presented to FBI and to me after PBSAO "presented" the case to a state grand jury and that grand jury 
returned an indictment charging Epstein with three counts of solicitation of prostitution. 
Once I determined that there were federal statutes violated, FBI, ICE, and I opened files. The 
federal investigation has focused on the interstate nexus required for all of the federal violations, so a 
number of grand jury subpoenas were issued for telephone records, flight manifests, and credit card 
records. The federal agents also re-interviewed some of the girls, but limited their questions to "new" 
topics, such as the specific means of contact, to avoid creating inconsistent Jencks materials. The agents 
also delved into Epstein's history and interviewed others and obtained records to corroborate the girls' 
stories. FBI also interviewed girls who came forward after the PBSAO indictment was reported in the 
papers, and additional girls identified through those interviews. 
I will first address the different crimes with which Epstein can be charged, setting forth the 
elements of those offenses and the types of evidence that I intend to use to satisfy those elements. 
Second, I will summarize the evidence related to each girl who has been identified as a potential victim 
in this case. 
Following the discussion of the girls' statements and evidence, there is a discussion of the 
evidence from other witnesses, including corroborating evidence and information related to Epstein's 
background. The last section discusses forfeiture. 
II. The Law of the Offenses Charged 
Epstein's conduct violates a number of federal statutes, all of which are discussed herein. None 
of the statutes or their penalties changed during the time period charged (early 2004 through mid-2005), 
although many have changed since then. I use the language of the statutes as they appeared while 
Epstein was committing the offenses. 
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In addition to conspiracy charges, there are five statutes related to sexual activity that have been 
violated. First, Epstein traveled in interstate commerce with the intent to engage in illicit sexual 
conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Second, Epstein and his assistants used a facility of 
interstate commerce to induce or entice minors to engage in prostitution and sexual activi 
for which 
any person can be charged, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Third, Epstein transported 
in interstate commerce with the intent that 
engage in sexual activity for which a person can 
be charged, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421. For these three offenses, knowledge of the victim's age 
does not need to be proven, although a reasonable belief that a person is over 18 is an affirmative 
defense to a limited portion of § 2423(b). 
In those instances where Epstein and/or the assistants knew the ages of the girls (or had reason to 
know their ages but willfully blinded themselves to that knowledge), they can be char ed with sex 
traffickin , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). 
In such instances, 
and 
also can be charged with benefitting from their participation in a venture engaged in human 
sex trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2). 
Epstein and his assistants also can be charged with causing a money transmitting business to 
transmit funds intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1960(a). 
A. Violations of the Mann Act: 18 U.S.C.  §§ 2421-2423 
1. Knowledge of Age Is Not Required. 
The Mann Act criminalizes traveling in interstate commerce to engage in "illicit sexual conduct," 
(§ 2423(b)), using a facility of interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity or 
prostitution (§ 2422(b)), and transporting a person to engage in sexual activity (§ 2421). Sections 
2423(b) and 2422(6) require a minor victim, but they do not require that the defendant know that the 
victim is a minor. 
For example, in December, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in United States v. Jones , 471 
F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 2006). Jones was charged with transporting a minor across state lines for sexual 
purposes, in violation of Section 2423(a), which reads: 
A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years 
in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, 
or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 30 
years. 
Jones argued that the term "knowingly" in that section required the Government to prove that Jones 
knew the age of the victim. The Fourth Circuit soundly rejected the argument, citing the other circuits 
reaching the same conclusion. Jones , 471 F.3d at 538-39 (citing United States v. Griffith , 284 F.3d 
338, 351 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Scisum , 32 F.3d 1479, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton , 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 
1982)). 
Instead, the court concluded that the Government need only prove that the defendant 
"knowingly transported" someone. The Government must also prove that the person transported was, in 
fact, a minor, but need not prove that the defendant was aware of her minority. In conducting its 
analysis, the Jones Court relied upon cases interpreting sections of Title 21 relating to the distribution of 
drugs to a minor. See Jones at 540. Those cases have held that the Government must prove only that 
the defendant knowingly distributed the narcotics to someone who happened to be underage. 
While the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the question posed by Jones , it has addressed 21 
U.S.C. § 861(a)(3) and has reached the same conclusion in approving the district court's instructions to 
the jury: 
Section 845 of 21 U.S.C.A. provides that anyone who knowingly or intentionally 
distributes controlled substances to a person under twenty-one is subject to enhanced 
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penalties. . . . [T]he court instructed the jury that it is not an essential element of the 
crime that the person who distributes be knowledgeable that the person to whom he 
distributes is under twenty-one years old; it is the distribution that must be knowing, 
although it is an essential element that the person to whom the distribution is made is 
under twenty-one. 
United States v. Pruitt , 763 F.2d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1985). In reaching this decision, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied upon the Third Circuit's Hamilton decision, supra : 
There is, however, a precise analogue to this statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et seq. (White 
Slave Traffic Act), which prohibits the interstate transportation of persons in order to 
engage in immoral practices including prostitution, and which provides enhanced penalties 
for the knowing transportation of persons under the age of eighteen years. Under this 
statute, knowledge of the victim's age is not an element of the crime; the "knowing" 
component applies to the transportation itself. 
Id. at 1262 (citing Hamilton ). See also United States v. Williams , 922 F.2d 737, 739 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(using same rationale to decide that Government need not prove knowledge of age for a charge of 
knowingly employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a person under eighteen years 
of age in the commission of a drug offense). 
In United States v. Taylor , 239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit addressed a 
defendant's assertion that knowledge of minority is required to convict him of transporting a minor for 
purposes of prostitution. The Ninth Circuit held that the "more natural reading of the statute, however, 
is that the requirement of knowledge applies to the defendant's conduct of transporting the person rather 
than to the age of the person transported." Id. at 997. In Taylor , the defendant argued that the court 
should analogize the statute to the transportation of hazardous waste, which requires a showing that the 
defendant knew the waste was hazardous. The Ninth Circuit rejected that suggestion: 
in contrast, the transportation of any individual for purposes of prostitution or other 
criminal sexual activity is already unlawful under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2421. Under 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the fact that the individual being transported is a minor creates a 
more serious crime in order to provide heightened protection against sexual exploitation of 
minors. As Congress intended, the age of the victim simply subjects the defendant to a 
more severe penalty in light of Congress' concern about the sexual exploitation of minors. 
Cf. United States v. Figueroa , 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, if a criminal 
statute's language is unclear, its scienter requirement is presumed to be met once an 
individual forms the requisite intent to commit some type of crime). 
. . . Ignorance of the victim's age provides no safe harbor from the penalties in 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(a). If someone knowingly transports a person for the purposes of prostitution or 
another sex offense, the transporter assumes the risk that the victim is a minor, regardless 
of what the victim says or how the victim appears . 
Id. (emphasis added; additional internal citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Wild , 143 Fed. Appx. 
938, 942 (4th Cir. 2005) (the parties agreed that, to prove a violation of § 2423(a), the United States had 
to show that (1) the defendant transported the victim in interstate commerce; (2) the defendant did so 
knowingly and with the intent that the victim engage in prostitution; and (3) the victim was under the 
age of 18 at the time she was transported). 
This reading finds additional support in the Mann Act itself using the doctrine of "expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius" (to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other). Section 
2423(g) creates an affirmative defense to one portion of a violation of Section 2423(b). For purposes of 
that subsection alone, a defendant may raise an affirmative defense, which he must prove, that the 
defendant "reasonably believed that the person with whom the defendant engaged in the commercial sex 
act had attained the age of 18 years." 18 U.S.C. § 2423(g). The inclusion of that affirmative defense 
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shows that Congress considered the issue and decided that the United States does not have to make an 
initial showing of knowledge of age for violations of 2423(b). Congress likewise considered the same 
issue for the other portions of the Mann Act and reached the same conclusion. If Congress had intended 
to place the burden of proving age on the United States — or if it had decided that it should create an 
affirmative defense to those charges — it could have done so. Congress' use of similar offense language 
for the other sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of 
knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 
(1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of 
the same act are intended to have the same meaning"). 
In United States v. Scott , 999 F.2d 541, 1993 WL 280323 (6th Cir. 1993), the defendant argued 
that the Mann Act was unconstitutional for failing to include a requirement that the Government prove 
the defendant's knowledge of the age of the minor. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument. First, it 
found that "[k]nowledge that a girl is under 18 years of age when transported interstate is not part of the 
proof required of the government in order to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2423. The 
government proved, as it must, that [the victim] was in fact a minor at the time of the interstate 
transportation . . . The Mann Act does not require more." 
Id. , 1993 WL 280323 at *6 (citation 
omitted). The Sixth Circuit then stated: 
it does not offend due process for Congress to draft a statute that does not require the 
prosecution to show that a defendant believed the victim to be under the age of 18 when 
she was transported interstate, because the law has traditionally afforded minors 
substantial protection from others. . . . Similarly, the Constitution does not require that a 
defendant be provided a defense of mistake of age when accused of a Mann Act violation 
involving a minor. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
This approach is consistent with the law of statutory rape, which generally holds that a 
defendant's good faith mistake as to the victim's age is no defense. In United States v. Ransom , 942 
F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit addressed a federal statutory rape provision, which 
provides: "Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a 
Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 
12 years, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or 
both." Id. at 775 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c)). The defendant asserted that a "reasonable mistake as 
to age defense" should be read into the statute or, alternatively, that the statute was unconstitutional for 
failing to include such a defense. The Tenth Circuit rejected the arguments, noting that "the majority of 
courts that have considered the issue have rejected the reasonable mistake of age defense to statutory 
rape absent some express legislative directive." Id. (citations omitted). Further, the "Supreme Court 
has recognized that the legislature's authority to define an offense includes the power `to exclude 
elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition.'" Id. (quoting Lambert v. California , 355 
U.S. 225, 228 (1957)). The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the legislative history, finding that the statute 
"protects children from sexual abuse by placing the risk of mistake as to a child's age on an older, more 
mature person who chooses to engage in sexual activity with one who may be young enough to fall 
within the statute's purview." Id. at 777 (citing Nelson v. Moriarty , 484 F.2d 1034, 1035 (1st Cir. 
1973)). The Ninth Circuit addressed similar arguments in United States v. Juvenile Male , 211 F.3d 
1169 (9th Cir. 2000), and reached the same conclusions. 
As discussed in Ransom , Epstein and his assistants were the "older, more mature person[s]" who 
chose to engage in sexual activity and prostitution with young girls. The risk of mistake regarding the 
ages of those victims should lie with the targets. 
2. Coercion and Enticement: 18 U.S.C.  § 2422  [Counts 5 to 161 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate . . . commerce, . . . 
knowingly persuades, induces, [or] entices . . . any individual who has not attained the age 
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of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be 
charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and 
imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. 
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 
The United States must show either: 
First: That the Defendant knowingly used a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, 
or entice a person to engage in prostitution; and 
Second: That the person so persuaded was under the age of 18; 
or 
First: That the Defendant knowingly used a facility of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, 
or entice a person to engage in sexual activity; 
Second: That the person so persuaded was under the age of 18; and 
Third: That the Defendant could have been charged with a criminal offense under the law of 
Florida based upon the sexual activity. aa 
The statute does not define "facility or means of interstate commerce" or "prostitution." 
a. A telephone is a "facility of interstate commerce." 
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that evidence of the use of a telephone satisfies the element of 
using a facility or means of interstate commerce. United States v. Drury , 396 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (the term "facility of interstate commerce . . . establishes federal jurisdiction whenever any 
"facility of interstate commerce" is used in the commission of [the] offense, regardless of whether the 
use is interstate in nature ( i.e. , the telephone call was between states) or purely intrastate in nature ( i.e. 
, the telephone call was made to another telephone within the same state)."). In Drury , the defendant 
used his land-line telephone to call an undercover agent's cellular telephone. Although both the 
defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through 
VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or 
intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded: 
The calls were not accidentally or incidentally placed, but rather were made knowingly to 
further a scheme. . . . Accordingly, whether Drury knew or intended that they would travel 
across state lines is immaterial. 
Id. at 1313. In Drury , the Eleventh Circuit did not address whether the district court erred by 
instructing the jury that telephones are "facilities in interstate commerce." In an unpublished decision 
from last year, the Eleventh Circuit wrote, in dicta , that there was no error in instructing a jury that "the 
telephone system was a facility of interstate commerce." United States v. Roberts , 2006 WL 827293 
n.1 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2006). See also United States v. Strevell , 2006 WL 1697529, *3 (11th Cir. June 
20, 2006) (finding that a defendant's placing of "numerous phone calls from Philadelphia to Miami in 
order to arrange his sexual encounter" was sufficient to prove the use of a facility and means of 
interstate and foreign commerce). 
Earlier this year, the Eleventh Circuit found that the United States adequately proved the 
jurisdictional element of § 2422(b) when evidence was introduced that the defendant used both a 
cellular telephone and a land-line telephone to entice a minor to engage in prostitution, even though no 
evidence was introduced that the calls were routed through interstate channels. United States v. Evans , 
476 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit then held: 
Telephones and cellular telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Evans's 
use of these instrumentalities of interstate commerce alone, even without evidence that the 
calls he made were routed through an interstate system, is sufficient to satisfy § 2422(b)'s 
interstate-commerce element. 
Id. at 1180-81 (citations omitted). 
b. "Prostitution" 
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As noted above and discussed more thoroughly below, almost none of the girls engaged in 
traditional sexual intercourse with Epstein. The common activity included allowing Epstein to fondle 
the girl while he masturbated himself, Epstein's digital penetration of the girl, and Epstein's use of a 
vibrator on the girl while he masturbated himself. It is clear that this activity was done in exchange for 
money, but the defense will likely argue that some of the activity was not "sexual enough" to qualify as 
"prostitution." 
Title 18 carries no definition of "prostitution." In United States v. Prince , the Fifth Circuit 
approved of the generic definition "sexual intercourse for hire" where the West Virginia statues also 
lacked a definition. Prince , 515 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975). F9 In 1946, the Supreme Court defined 
prostitution as the "offering of the body to indiscriminate lewdness for hire." 
Cleveland v. United 
States , 329 U.S. 14, 17 (1946). Black's Law Dictionary contains several definitions of prostitution: 
Prostitution: Act of performing, or offering or agreeing to perform a sexual act for hire. 
Engaging in or agreeing or offering to engage in sexual conduct with another person 
under a fee arrangement with that person or any other person. Includes any lewd act 
between persons for money or other consideration. Within meaning of statute proscribing 
prostitution, comprises conduct of all male and female persons who engage in sexual 
activity as a business. 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) at 1222. The term "lewd" is especially broad, and probably 
covers all of the acts described below. 
The district court may decide to limit the term to the definition contained in Florida law. The 
Florida Statutes define prostitution as "the giving or receiving of the body for sexual activity for hire . . 
." Fl. Stat. § 796.07(1)(a) (2004). _FIO Sexual activity, in turn, means "oral, anal, or vaginal penetration 
by, or union with, the sexual organ of another, anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; 
or the handling or fondling of the sexual organ of another for the purpose of masturbation . . ." Fl. Stat. 
§ 796.07(1)(d). If this definition is used, those instances where the girls remained clothed and where 
Epstein did not fondle the girls' vaginas would probably fall outside the definition of "prostitution." Fil
c. "Any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense" 
Section 2422 outlaws both the use of a facility of interstate commerce to entice a minor to engage 
in prostitution and the use of that facility to entice a minor to engage in "any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense." According to the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury 
Instruction, the determination of what sexual activity is criminal is governed by Florida law. 
Florida law bars a person from procuring anyone under the age of 18 to engage in prostitution or 
to cause a minor to be prostituted. Fl. Stat. § 796.03 (2004). Florida also defines four categories of 
lewd or lascivious offenses that criminalize behavior between adults and children under the age of 16 : 
1. "Lewd or lascivious battery" occurs when an adult le]ngages in sexual activity -FI2 with a 
person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age." Fl. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) (2004). 
2. "Lewd or lascivious molestation" occurs when an adult "intentionally touches in a lewd or 
lascivious manner the breasts, genitals, genital area, or buttocks, or the clothing covering them, of a 
person less than 16 years of age, or forces or entices a person under 16 years of age to so touch the 
perpetrator." Fl. Stat. § 800.04(5)(a) (2004). 
3. "Lewd or lascivious conduct" occurs when a person intentionally touches a person under 16 
years of age in a lewd or lascivious manner or solicits a person under the age of 16 to commit a lewd or 
lascivious act. Fl. Stat. § 800.04(6)(a) (2004). 
4. "Lewd or lascivious exhibition" occurs when a person intentionally masturbates or exposes his 
genitals in a lewd or lascivious manner in the presence of a victim who is less than 16 years of age. Fl. 
Stat. § 800.04(7)(a) (2004). F13 
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All of these offenses are classified as second degree felonies when perpetrated by an adult. Fl. Stat. §§ 
800.04, 800.04(5)(c)(2), 800.04(6)(b), 800.04(7)(c) (2004). 
Section 800.04 affirmatively bars two defenses to these charges. First, "[n]either the victim's 
lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by this section." Fl. Stat. § 
800.04(2) (2004). 
Second, the "perpetrator's ignorance of the victim's age, the victim's 
misrepresentation of his or her age, or the perpetrator's bona fide belief of the victim's age cannot be 
raised as a defense in a prosecution under this section." Fl. Stat. § 800.04(3) (2004). 
Florida law also bars "sexual activity" between adults over the age of 24 and minors who are 16 
or 17 years' old. Fl. Stat. § 794.05(1) (2004). In those cases, "sexual activity" is defined as "oral, anal, 
or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another." Id. With this offense, ignorance 
of the victim's age, misrepresentation of the victim's age, and a bona fide belief that the victim is over 
the age of 17 are not defenses. Fl. Stat. § 794.021 (2004). 
d. Charging Decisions 
Due to the differences in these statutes, for girls who were under the age of 16, I have charged 
instances of enticement to engage in sexual activity for which a person may be prosecuted and 
enticement to engage in prostitution. For girls who were 16 or 17 at the time, I have charged only 
enticement to engage in prostitution, unless the conduct with the particular girl rises to the level of 
"sexual activity" as defined in Fl. Stat. § 800.04(1)(a). 
e. Conspiracy to Violate Section 2422(b) [Count 1] 
Unlike most of the other statutes discussed herein, Section 2422(b) does not include its own 
conspiracy prohibition. Accordingly, a conspiracy to violate Section 2422(b) requires the allegation of a 
Section 371 conspiracy. While, generally speaking, it is nice to avoid the trouble of alleging a 371 
conspiracy, in this case it actually may work to our benefit. First, it allows us to set forth in the 
indictment, in painstaking detail, the scope of the conspiracy. Second, it allows us to allege as "overt 
acts," items that might otherwise be excluded pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). For example, if Epstein 
and his assistants engaged the services of an eighteen-year-old girl ("A") to perform a sexual massage 
on Epstein, that could not be charged as a substantive offense. But, if A was asked to bring additional 
girls and A later brought Epstein girls who were under eighteen, then the activities with A were overt 
acts in the conspiracy. Fla 
f. Penalties and Forfeiture 
The charged offenses occurred before the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, so each count 
carries a sentence of 5 to 30 years in prison, supervised release of up to life, and a $250,000 fine. 
The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 2428 states that the Court, in imposing sentence, " shall order, 
in addition to any other sentence imposed . . . that such person shall forfeit to the United States — (1) 
such person's interest in any property, real or personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit 
or to facilitate the commission of such violation[.]" Applying this language, Epstein's Palm Beach 
home and the two airplanes that he used to travel to West Palm Beach are subject to forfeiture. 
Section 2428 went into effect on January 10, 2006, so unless we can show activity continuing 
past that date, it will not apply. For the relevant time period (2004 to late 2005), criminal forfeiture was 
governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a), which states: 
[a] person . . . who is convicted of an offense under section 2421, 2422, or 2423 of chapter 
117, shall forfeit to the United States such person's interest in — . . . (3) any property, real 
or personal, used or intended to be used to commit or to promote the commission of such 
offense. 
This language also should apply to Epstein's Palm Beach home and the two airplanes. 
The charge of conspiracy to violate Section 2422 carries a penalty of only 5 years in prison 
because it must be charged as a Section 371 conspiracy, and there is no provision for forfeiture of the 
relevant property. 
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3. Traveling with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct: 18 U.S.C. § 2423(6) 
[Counts 17 to 50] 
A person who travels in interstate commerce . . . for the purpose of engaging in any illicit 
sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than 30 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). 
Thus, the United States must prove that Epstein knowingly traveled in interstate commerce and 
that he did so for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct, as defined below. 
a. Proof of intent to travel 
In Appendix C, Epstein's attorneys assert that Epstein's trips to Florida were not undertaken for 
the sole purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct—he traveled just to visit his home and attend 
meetings, etc.— and, therefore, he lacked the requisite intent to violate Section 2423(b). 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that, in order to be convicted of violating Section 2423(b), the 
United States must prove that the defendant "had formed the intent to engage in sexual activity with a 
minor 
when he crossed state lines." United States v. Hersh , 297 F.3d 1233, 1246 (11th Cir. 2002). 
See also United States v. Han , 230 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000) (defendant could be convicted of violating 
Section 2423(b) even though no sexual activity occurred and "minor" was really an undercover officer 
because the defendant had formed the necessary intent by developing a plan to cross state lines to 
engage in sexual acts with the minor); United States v. Root , 296 F.3d 1222, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2002). 
Just a few weeks ago, the Eleventh Circuit addressed for the first time the issue of a "combined 
motive" for traveling, and approved the following instruction: 
the Government [] does not have to show that engaging in criminal sexual activity with a 
minor was the Defendant's only purpose, or even his primary purpose, but the 
Government must show it was one of the purposes for transporting the minor or for the 
travel. In other words, the Government must show that the Defendant's criminal purpose 
was not merely incidental to the travel. 
United States v. Hoschouer , 
F.3d 
2007 WL 979931, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). 
The decision of the Eleventh Circuit was consistent with every other circuit that has addressed 
the issue: 
It is not necessary for the government to prove that the illegal sexual activity was the sole 
purpose for the transportation. A person may have several different purposes or motives 
for such travel, and each may prompt in varying degrees the act of making the journey. 
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that a significant or 
motivating purpose of the travel across state or foreign boundaries was to have the 
individual transported engage in illegal sexual activity. In other words, the illegal sexual 
activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. 
United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez 
, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was 
sufficient for the Government to prove that one of the [the defendant's] motives in traveling was to 
engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); 
United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 
(2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th Cir.1995) ("[I]t is not necessary 
to a conviction under the [Mann] Act that the sole and single purpose of the transportation of a female in 
interstate commerce was such immoral practices."); United States v. Ellis , 935 F.2d 385, 389-90 (1st 
Cir.1991) (jury could consider that defendant's personal motive for bringing minor on interstate family 
vacations and business trips was to have her available for sexual abuse even though there were other 
purposes for the trips); United States v. Snow , 507 F.2d 22, 24 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Harris , 
480 F.2d 601, 602 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Cole , 262 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The illicit 
EFTA00229869

behavior must be one of the purposes motivating the interstate transportation, but need not be the 
dominant purpose," and a defendant's intent may be inferred from all of the circumstances) (citations 
omitted). 
As will be explained below, for each substantive count of violating § 2423(6), we have evidence 
that Epstein or one of his assistants called a girl a day or two before traveling to Florida, and called 
again while he was in Florida. The evidence consists of cell phone records for the assistants and the 
girls, the message pads recovered from the search of Epstein's home and from trash pulls, the flight 
manifests from Epstein's private planes, and testimony from the girls about how the appointments were 
made. 
b. Illicit Sexual Conduct 
The United States must prove that one of the purposes of the defendant's travel was to engage in 
"illicit sexual conduct." "Illicit sexual conduct" means: 
(1) a sexual act (as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of age that 
would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual act occurred in the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or (2) any commercial sex act (as defined 
in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age. 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(f). 
(I) A "sexual act" 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2246(2) defines "sexual act" as: 
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for purposes of 
this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however, slight; 
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and 
the anus; 
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another by a hand or 
finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person; or 
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person 
who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, 
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 
And Chapter 109A states: "Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who — (1) has 
attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years 
younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so" has committed a federal offense. 
Thus, for purposes of this case, when the victim is under the age of 16, and Epstein either 
digitally penetrated the girl or used a vibrator on her vagina, I have alleged that the defendant has 
violated Section 2423(b) when he traveled in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in a 
sexual act as defined in this statute. 
(ii) A "commercial sex act" 
"The term `commercial sex act' means any sex act, on account of which anything of value is 
given to or received by any person." 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c)(1). The statute does not go on to define "sex 
act," but the legislative history of this statute makes clear that the term is to be read very broadly. The 
term "commercial sex act" replaced the term "prostitution" in an earlier version of the statute. 
Section 1591 was enacted as part of the "Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000." Pub. L. 106-384, 114 Stat. 1464. In drafting that legislation, Congress noted: "The sex industry 
has rapidly expanded over the past several decades. 
It involves sexual exploitation of persons, 
predominantly women and girls, involving activities related to pmstitution , pornography, sex tourism, 
and other commercial sexual services ." 
Id. at § 102(b)(2). The highlighted language shows that 
"commercial sexual services" is a broader term than "prostitution," and is meant to include prostitution, 
the creation of pornography, and other [undefined] acts. 
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When the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to correspond with this 
new legislation, it replaced the term "prostitution" with "commercial sex acts" in the heading of part G 
of Section 2 and throughout that section. 
The Commission gave a stated reason for the amendment: 
This amendment ensures that appropriately severe sentences for sex trafficking crimes 
apply to commercial sex acts such as production of child pornography, in addition to 
prostitution . . It proposes several changes to § 2G1.1 . . . to address more adequately the 
portion of section 112(b) of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000 . . . The amendment proposes three substantive changes to § 2G1.1. First, this 
amendment broadens the conduct covered by the guideline beyond prostitution to 
encompass all commercial sex acts, consistent with the scope of the Act.. . . 
U.S.S.G. App. C, Vol II, Amendment 641 (emphasis added). 
The reference to child pornography is especially helpful to us, because the child pornography 
statutes use the term "sexually explicit conduct," which is extremely broad, and includes masturbation 
and the "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A). 
c. Charging Decisions 
For girls who were under the age of 16, I have charged instances of travel with the intent to 
engage in a "sexual act" with a girl under the age of 16 and travel to engage in a "commercial sex act" 
with a minor. For girls who were 16 or 17 at the time, I have charged only travel to engage in a 
"commercial sex act." I also have elected to treat all of these sexual massages as "commercial sex acts" 
regardless of whether there was any penetration. Epstein exchanged money for the opportunity to view 
underage girls in various states of undress and to masturbate in front of them. As described by the girls, 
Epstein received sexual gratification from the experience and he constantly tried to "push the envelope" 
to convince the girls to become more and more sexual. As 
. described, when a girl refused to let 
Epstein touch her, Epstein "down-promoted her" to become a recruiter. 
d. Conspiracy [Count 21 
Section 2423(e) creates a separate offense for conspiring to violate Section 2423(b), so the 
indictment will contain a single conspiracy count, without the allegation of overt acts, for the entire 
period of the conspiracy. 
e. Additional Ancillary Offense [Count 31 
The statute contains an additional ancillary offense making it illegal, for the purpose of 
commercial advantage or private financial gain, to arrange, induce, procure, or facilitate the travel of a 
person knowing that such person is traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in 
illicit sexual conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). One of 
job responsibilities, for which she was paid 
handsomely, was to arrange both the ailments with the underage girls and also to arrange Epstein's 
travel. Epstein's pilots testified that 
was the person who would call them to have them at the 
airport alien 
time and who would tell them where they would be traveling to. Accordingly, I have 
charged 
alone with a single count of violating § 2423(c). 
f. The Affirmative Defense Regarding Knowledge of Age 
Section 2423(g) provides that in "a prosecution under this section based on illicit sexual conduct 
as defined in subsection (O(2), it is a defense, which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the defendant reasonably believed that the person with whom the defendant engaged 
in the commercial sex act had attained the age of 18 years." So, for those allegations involving 
commercial sex acts with 16- and 17-year-old girls, the defendant can come forward and present 
affirmative evidence that he reasonably believed that the girls were 18 or older. The defense cannot be 
asserted for the sex acts with girls under the age of 16. 
Congress's decision to include an affirmative defense to part of the statute shows that it has 
considered the issue and determined that the Government does not have to prove that the defendant 
EFTA00229871

knew the victims were underage for the other portions of the statute. This is consistent with the cases 
interpreting various sections of the Mann Act. 
Thus, for those instances where we know that a 16- or 17-year-old girl affirmatively told Epstein 
that she was 18 — and it would have been reasonable for Epstein to believe that statement — I have not 
charged Epstein with violating 2423(b). 
g. Penalties and forfeiture 
A violation of section 2423, including the conspiracy provision of 2423(e), has no mandatory 
minimum sentence, and the maximum sentence is 30 years in prison, lifetime supervised release, and a 
$250,000 fine. As explained above, for the relevant time period (2004 to late 2005), criminal forfeiture 
was governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a), which also applies to violations of section 2423. 
4. Transportation of an Individual to Engage in Sexual Activity: 18 U.S.C.  § 2421 
[Counts 
to 
1 
Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce . . with 
intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 2421. This traditional "Mann Act" section can be used to charge Epstein alone with 
transporting his girlfriend, 
from New York to Florida to en age in sexual activity 
with one of the girls. As will be explained below, one of the victims, 
., estimates that she 
engaged in sexual activi
 Epstein "hundreds of times." 
. reports that, at some oint, 
Epstein agreed to pay 
more money if she would enga e in sexual activity with 
while Epstein watched. Some of this activity occurred before 
. turned 18 and some occurred 
afterwards. 
and 
. also report getting paid to engage in sexual activity with 
but we cannot determine their ages at the time. Regardless of the Florida girl's age at the 
time. 
"could have been charged with" the following criminal offenses: 
• offering to commit or committing prostitution or lewdness, Fl. Stat. § 796.07(2)(e) (2004); 
• soliciting, inducing, or enticing another to commit prostitution or lewdness, Fl. Stat. § 796.07(2) 
(1) (2004); 
• aiding, abetting, or participating in either of the above-listed offenses, Fl. Stat. § 796.07(2)(h) 
(2004); or 
• purchasing the services of any person engaged in prostitution, Fl. Stat. § 796.07 2 I (2004). 
Since the transported individual is considered a "victim" under this statute, 
cannot be 
charged, so Epstein is named alone. See, e.g., United States v. Love , 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 
1979) (citing Gebardi v. United States , 287 U.S. 112, 118-19 (1932)). Just as with Section 2423(b), the 
Government must prove that the defendant had the requisite intent prior to the travel, but the 
Government does not have to prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the 
individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 
U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). 
This offense carries a statutory maximum of ten years in prison. During the relevant time period, 
the forfeiture provision of 18 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) applied, which mandates the forfeiture of assets used 
in the commission of the violation of Section 2421. 
B. Sex Trafficking of Children: 18 U.S.C.  § 1591(a)
For those cases where there is evidence that the defendants either knew or, but for their willful 
blindness, would have known that the victim was under 18, the defendants can be charged with violating 
two subsections of the child sex trafficking statute. Section 1591(a)(1) prohibits recruiting or obtaining 
children to engage in a commercial sex act. Section 1591(a)(2) punishes those who benefit financially 
from child sex trafficking. 
1. Obtaining Children to Engage in Commercial Sex Acts: 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) 
(Counts 51 to 581 
EFTA00229872

Section 1591(a)(1) makes it illegal for any person to knowingly, in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce, recruit, entice, transport, provide, or obtain by any means a person knowing that the 
person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. The 
term "commercial sex act" has the same meaning as discussed above ("any sex act, on account of which 
anything of value is given to or received by any person "). 
This charge has frequently been used in connection with "sex tourism" cases prosecuted by the 
Office, where the defendant arranged through an undercover "travel a enc " to travel overseas to have 
sex with underage prostitutes. This case is analogous with M, 
, and 
serving 
as Esptein's "travel agency" for his interstate travel to Florida to engage in prostitution with young girls. 
In United States v. Roberts , 174 Fed. App. 475 (11th Cir. 2006), Roberts challenged his 
conviction for attempting to engage a minor in commercial sex acts in violation of Section 1591(a)(1), 
all in violation of Section 1594(a). 
Roberts contacted an undercover website promising travels to 
Costa Rica to meet underage prostitutes. Roberts arranged a trip with the undercover website, but then 
changed his mind because he did not want to travel internationally. Roberts and the undercover agent 
then arranged for the [non-existent] prostitutes to travel to Florida to meet Roberts at a hotel there. 
Roberts challenged the proof of the jurisdictional element of the offense. The Eleventh Circuit found 
sufficient evidence that Roberts' activities were "in or affecting interstate commerce" based upon 
Roberts' use of a credit card to pay for his trip with the travel agency, his decision to meet the prostitutes 
at a hotel that served interstate travelers, and the fact that the prostitutes were supposed to move in 
international commerce. Id. at 478-79. 
The case of United States v. Strevell , 185 Fed. Appx. 841 (11th Cir. 2006), involved one of the 
people who actually tried to travel to Costa Rica using the undercover website. Strevell also challenged 
his conviction, claiming that the United States did not have jurisdiction over activity that was to take 
place overseas. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument, stating that Section 1591(a)(1): 
criminalize[s] the use of interstate commerce in an attempt to obtain and entice a minor for 
prostitution. Although all of Strevell's actions occurred in the United States, it is clear that 
he used means of interstate commerce in attempting to obtain and entice a minor for sex. 
He made numerous phone calls from Philadelphia to Miami to order to arrange his sexual 
encounter in Costa Rica. . . . he attempted to board a plane from Miami to Costa Rica in 
order to meet one, if not two, 14-year-old prostitutes. 
Id. at 845. 
Thus, the evidence of Epstein's violation of this statute includes his travel in interstate commerce 
to commit the offense; directing his assistants to make interstate telephone calls to set up the 
appointments; and wiring money interstate to some of the girls as "bonuses." 
In United States v. Evans , 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Sims , 161 Fed. 
Appx. 849 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Section 1591(a)(1) convictions for "pimps" 
who obtained underage girls and forced the girls to engage in prostitution. In Evans , the defendant 
argued that his purely intrastate activity was not "in or affecting interstate commerce." The Eleventh 
Circuit found that Evans' "conduct substantially affected interstate commerce" based on his "use of 
hotels that served interstate travelers and distribution of condoms that traveled in interstate commerce." 
Evans , 476 F.3d at 1179. 
Evans shows that 
and 
are equally liable for violating Section 
1591(a)(1), since their actions were in and affecting interstate commerce (using the telephone and 
traveling with Epstein), and they recruited, enticed, provided, and obtained underage girls to work as 
prostitutes for Epstein. 
2. Benefitting Financially from Participating in a Venture Engaged in Sex 
Trafficking: 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2) [Count 4l 
EFTA00229873

Section 1591(a)(2) makes it illegal for a person to knowingly benefit "financially or by receiving 
anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of 
paragraph (1), knowing that . . . the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to 
engage in a commercial sex act." 
The term "commercial sex act" has the same meaning as discussed above. The statute defines 
"venture" as "any group of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity." 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
With respect to 1591(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit has stated the elements as: 
1. the defendant knowingly benefitted financially from participating in a venture; 
2. the acts engaged in by the venture were in or affecting interstate commerce; 
3. the venture recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or obtained by any means a 
person; 
4. the defendant knew that the person was under the age of eighteen; 
5. the defendant knew the minor would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. 
United States v. Wild, 143 Feciamonx. 938, 942 10th Cir. 2005 . 
Epstein's assistants, 
and 
la 
could be 
considered people who benefitted financially from their participation in that venture based upon the 
salaries that they received from Epstein. They will, no doubt, argue that the salaries that they received 
were unrelated to the work of setting appointments for Epstein to meet with prostitutes. The evidence, 
however, reveals the importance of this part of their jobs. For example, in reviewing 
telephone records, during periods that they were traveling to Florida, more than 50% of the calls that she 
makes — on a cellular telephone paid for by Epstein — are to girls whom we have identified. There are, 
no doubt, girls whom we have not identified. Setting up the appointments and travel arran ements, 
purchasing birthday gifts for the girls, wiring funds to them add u to
significant portion of 
duties and, therefore, a significant part of her pay. With respect to 
she participated in some 
of the sexual performances. During the relevant period, 
and 
all received 
a salary and free housing in Manhattan, as well as the ability to travel with Epstein on his private plane, 
staying in his home, and being fed by his private chef All of these amount to "something of value" and 
the relationship of the three assistants as co-employees amounts to a "group of two or more individuals 
associated in fact, whether or not a legal entity," that is, a "venture" as defined in Section 1591(b)(3). 
3. Conspiracy 
The Child Sex Trafficking statutes do not include a separate conspiracy charge, so, if charged, it 
would have to be an object of a Section 371 conspiracy. In light of Section 1591(a)(2), which is directed 
to "ventures," a separate conspiracy charge might be subjected to a multiplicity challenge. That 
challenge would probably be fruitless, as evidenced by the fact that Epstein cannot be charged in the 
Section 1591(a)(2) count but certainly could be charged in a conspiracy to violation Section 1591(a)(1), 
but I have erred on the side of caution and have not included violating Section 1591(a)(1) as a second 
object of the Section 371 conspiracy. 
4. Penalties and Forfeiture 
These violations of Section 1591(a) carry a statutory maximum of 40 years' imprisonment, 
supervised release of up to life, and a $250,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2). As discussed further 
below, some of the girls were told that they would only have to "model lingerie." A violation of Section 
1591(a) carries a harsher penalty if the offense was "effected by fraud." There still is no mandatory 
minimum, but the maximum term of imprisonment is life. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2). 
As part of the slavery legislation, Congress included a separate forfeiture provision, which states: 
The court, in imposing sentence on any person conviction of a violation of this chapter, 
shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of 
State law, that such person shall forfeiture to the United States—(1) such person's interest 
EFTA00229874

in any property, real or personal, that was used or intended to be used to commit or to 
facilitate the commission of such violation . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1594(b). Section 1594 also makes contraband any property used or intended to be used to 
commit or to facilitate the commission of slavery violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)(1)(A). Thus, 
these violations are another basis for forfeiting the Palm Beach home and the two airplanes. 
D. Charges that Were Considered and Rejected
1. Promotion Money Laundering: 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A) 
Section 1956(a)(3)(A) states: 
Whoever, with the intent — (A) to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; . 
. . conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction involving . . . property used to 
conduct or facilitate specified unlawful activity, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both. 
"'Conducts' includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initiating, or concluding a transaction." 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(2). The "term `transaction' includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, 
delivery, or other disposition, and with respect to a financial institution includes a deposit, withdrawal, 
transfer between accounts, . . . or any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial 
institution, by whatever means effected." 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3). A "financial transaction" is: 
(A) a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (I) 
involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more 
monetary instruments, . . . or 
(B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree. 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4). 
The "specified unlawful activity" is one of the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), namely 
"any act which is indictable" under Section 1591(a) (sex trafficking) and Sections 2421 through 2423 
(relating to white slave traffic). See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). 
Epstein's Palm Beach property manager, Janusz Banasiak, was interviewed and served with a 
subpoena for records relating to his employment. Banasiak resides in the "guest house" on Epstein's 
property, and has access to a "Jeffrey Epstein Household Account." Banasiak uses that account to pay 
for various household expenses. Banasiak's practice was to withdraw $1500 at a time from the bank, 
and he then would keep a detailed accounting of how the money was spent and, when the $1500 was 
used up, he would send a copy of the accounting to Epstein's accountant and he maintained a copy for 
himself A review of those records showed a number of entries that would simply have a girl's name 
and a round dollar amount — usually $200. Banasiak explained that on several occasions when Epstein 
was "in residence," Epstein or 
M would ask Banasiak to pay one of the girls after a massage was 
completed. On other occasions when Epstein and 
were not in Florida, 
would call 
Banasiak to say that a girl was coming to the house and Banasiak should give the girl $200 in an 
envelope. Banasiak stated that he would follow these instructions and that he knew that the money was 
for "massages," but he insisted that he did not know that sexual activity was occurring. Why Epstein 
would pay "masseuses" when he was out of town cannot be explained. 
Epstein also sent funds via Western Union as "bonuses" for some of the girls. These transactions 
could also be considered to "facilitate" the criminal activity by insuring the girls' loyalty and continued 
available to Epstein for his sexual gratification. 
Epstein's behavior seems to fall squarely within the language of the statute as written, including 
the Eleventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction. 
In conducting research, however, all cases charged 
under this section involved undercover "sting" operations. 
I contacted the Department's Money 
Laundering Section and learned that subsection 1956(a)(3) was drafted specifically to apply to money 
EFTA00229875

laundering "sting" operations, and was not intended to reach the activity that Epstein was involved in. 
Accordingly, I chose the more conservative route and decided not to charge Epstein with this offense. 
2. Aiding and Abetting an Unlawful Money Transmitter: 18 U.S.C. § 1960 
Section 1960(a) makes it a crime for someone to knowingly conduct or direct all or part of an 
"unlicensed money transmitting business." An "unlicensed money transmitting business" means "a 
money transmitting business which affects interstate or foreign commerce in any manner or degree and . 
. . (C) otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are . . . intended to be used to 
promote or support unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1). 
The term "unlawful activity" is not defined in Section 1960. Another one of the money 
laundering statutes, Section 1956 cross-references Section 1961(1) for the definition of "specified 
unlawful activity." Section 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is 
indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: . . . sections 1581-1591 
(relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons), . . . [and] sections 2421-24 (relating to while 
slave traffic) . ." 
1. The Money Transmitting 
As I mentioned above, Epstein's property manager, Janusz Banasiak, would withdraw $1500 at a 
time for household expenses from Commerce Bank. The funds in that bank account were transferred 
from Epstein's main bank account in New York on an "as needed" basis. Banasiak documented how he 
used the funds, including payments made to various girls at the request of Epstein or 
. Epstein 
also sent funds via Western Union as "bonuses" for some of the girls. These transactions could also be 
considered to "promote or support" the criminal activity by insuring the girls' loyalty and continued 
available to Epstein for his sexual gratification. 
2. How Epstein "directed" an unlicensed money transmitting business. 
As mentioned above, I originally considered charging Epstein with promotion money laundering, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A). After conferring with the Money Laundering Section at the 
Department of Justice, it was recommended that I forego the Section 1956 charge and, instead, I should 
charge Epstein with aiding and abetting the unlicensed money transmitting by causing his bank and 
Western Union unwittingly to transmit funds intended to be used to promote and support sex trafficking 
and white slave traffic. 
The Money Laundering Section referred me to the case of United States v. Tobon-Builes , 706 
F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983), where a defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 by causing 
banks to fail to file Currency Transaction Reports ("CTRs") by structuring transactions. a ) Over a six-
hour period, Tobon-Builes and an accomplice went to ten different banks in Northern Florida where they 
each purchased a $9,000 cashier's check with cash. Because each individual purchase was less than 
$10,000, thereby escaping the banks' duty to file a CTR for each transaction. Tobon-Builes was 
arrested and admitted that he had won over $100,000 playing poker and was purchasing cashier's check 
in amounts less than $10,000 to avoid bank reporting requirements because he did not want to pay 
federal taxes on his winnings. Tobon-Builes argued that he could not be charged with concealment of 
material information in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because he did not have a duty to file a CTA —
only the financial institution has that legal obligation. 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument, stating that the government: 
charged and proved that Tobon willfully and knowingly caused financial institutions not to 
report currency transactions that they had a duty to report and would have reported if they 
had known about such transactions. Support for this holding is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) 
which provides that one who "willfully causes an act to be done which if directly 
performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable 
as a principal." 
EFTA00229876

Id. at 1099 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2(b)). Further, "it is well established that § 2(b) was designed to 
impose criminal liability on one who causes an intermediary to commit a criminal act, even though the 
intermediary who performed the act has no criminal intent and hence is innocent of the substantive 
crime charged, in this case concealment." 
Id. (citations omitted). The operation of Section 2(b) 
foreclosed Tobon-Builes' legal incapacity argument, and the Eleventh Circuit noted a series of cases 
where someone without a legal duty used an innocent agent to violate that agent's legal duty. In each of 
those cases, the defendant was convicted via operation of Section 2(b). See id. at 1100-01 (citations 
omitted). Since its issuance, Tobon-Builes has been cited in numerous cases for the proposition that a 
defendant can be convicted as a principal, even where he uses as innocent intermediary to commit the 
charged offense. 
In this case, Commerce Bank and Western Union were the innocent intermediaries who operated 
the money transmitting business. Nonetheless, Epstein's directions to pay the girls caused Western 
Union to transmit funds that were intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity — the 
prostitution of minors. Epstein's directions to Banasiak caused Commerce Bank to transmit funds via 
its ATM to Banasiak, who withdrew those funds that Epstein intended to use or promote the same 
unlawful activity. Accordingly, one could charge Epstein alone with individual counts of violating 
Section 1960 for each Western Union transfer and for each ATM withdrawal that occurred immediately 
prior to one of Banasiak's documented payments to one of the girls. 
I decided not to include these charges because I felt that the charge would confuse the jury or 
make them feel that the Government was overreaching, and the penalty for this activity is less than the 
penalties for the other charged offenses. 
2. The Travel Act: 18 U.S.C. § 1952 
Section 1952 bans the travel in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering. So, if a person travels 
in interstate commerce with the intent to promote an unlawful activity, which can include prostitution, 
and after this travel he performs an act to promote that unlawful activity, then he has violated the Travel 
Act. At first blush, this appears to apply, but the "unlawful activity" must be a " business enter rise 
involving" prostitution. If Epstein were a pimp who was soliciting girls for other men and 
was 
assisting him in that effort, the Travel Act would apply. However, since Epstein is using 
to 
solicit girls on Epstein's own behalf, I don't believe that Epstein's personal use of the prostitutes can be 
considered a business enterprise. 
III. Victims 
A. Jane Doe #1 a)AMI. 
Some time in early 2004, the exact date being unknown, Jane Doe #1 was approached by two 
individuals, 
and Tony, while at a beach club on Singer Island. 
was a classmate of JD#1 at 
Royal Palm Beach High School. 
asked JD#1 if she wanted to make some money giving a 
massage to a wealthy man on Palm Beach Island. JD#1 was told that she would be paid $200, she 
would have to remove some of her clothing, and that there might be some "fondling." JD#1 agreed to 
go to the house. Within a few days, JD#1 was called by 
and Tony, and all three drove to Epstein's 
home on Brillo Way in Palm Beach. 
The three were admitted through the gate and went to the "back entrance" of the house, entering 
through the kitchen. In the kitchen, JD#1 was met by 
and some other members of the household. 
led JD#1 upstairs to Epstein's dressing area 
where the massage table was already set up. 
then left the room and Epstein entered wearing a towel. Epstein laid face down and JD#1 was 
told to remove her clothes (she remained in her panties). JD#1 then began to massage Epstein as he 
directed her. After massaging his back area for some time, Epstein turned over so that he was laying 
face up. Epstein began masturbating and tried numerous times to touch JD#1, grabbing her rear end and 
trying to touch other places in a sexual manner. JD#1 pulled away several times, telling Epstein that she 
did not want him to touch her. Epstein continued to masturbate, and instructed JD#1 to pinch his 
EFTA00229877

nipples, which she did. Epstein climaxed and the massage ended. Epstein stood up and wiped himself 
off. Epstein went into the master bathroom while JD#1 got dressed. After both were dressed, Epstein 
paid JD#1 $200 in cash (2 $100 bills). Because JD#1 would not let Epstein touch her, Epstein told JD#1 
that she shouldn't give him any more massages, but she could bring girls to the house and she would get 
paid $200 for every girl that she brought.
When JD#1 went downstairs, 
asked JD#1 for her telephone number so that 
could 
contact JD#1 directly. JD#1 gave her telephone number to M, 
and all future communications were 
directly with 
. JD#1 says that she received the first call from 
soon after her first visit to 
Epstein's residence. Telephone records for 
telephone and JD#1's telephone were subpoenaed. 
The first telephone contact between JD#1 and 
was on March 12, 2004, and it continued through 
July 24, 2005. 
JD#1 described how 
would call to arrange appointments for Epstein. 
would call to 
ask JD#1 if anyone was available to "work." JD#1 says that some of these calls occurred prior to 
Epstein's travel to Florida others would occur when Epstein was already in town. During some of the 
telephone calls, 
would request a particular girl, other times she would just ask JD#1 to find a girl 
or girls to come over. JD#1 stated that she sometimes received multiple calls during one of Epstein's 
stays. Once JD#1 received a call from M, 
JD#1 would call one or more girls to see if they were 
available and then would call 
back to confirm the date and time. This is consistent with the 
telephone records that were received. The phone records that were subpoenaed show approximately 70 
telephone calls between 
and JD#1. -F22 M#1 also placed one call to 
telephone. 
JD#1 brought seven (7) underage girls to Epstein's home. Every time that she brought a girl, 
JD#1 was paid $200, always in cash, always in $100 bills, always by Epstein. JD#1 also brought one 
23-year-old woman to Epstein's home. Epstein "didn't care for her" and told JD#1 that the woman was 
too old. Epstein told JD#1 "the younger the better," and told JD#1 that he didn't like to have problems 
with girls who didn't know what to expect, so she should always tell the girls in advance what would 
happen when they arrived. JD#1 reported that she always told the girls that they would have to get 
undressed and give a massage and that there might be some "fondling." JD#1 reports that she told all of 
the girls that they could tell Epstein that they were uncomfortable with anything and he would stop. 
JD#1 stated that she had asked 
about a rumor that a girl who had intercourse with Epstein had 
been paid $1,000. 
said that she doubted that was true because Esptein "doesn't have sex with the 
girls, he just plays around with them." 
JD#1 also reports that 
had told JD#1 to tell Epstein that she was 18 if he asked and that 
JD#1 told that to the girls whom she recruited. JD#1 said that she told Epstein that she was 18 but that 
"he knew better." JD#1 also said that she was never instructed by Epstein or 
to make sure that 
the girls that she brought were over 18 and was never asked to provide identification/proof of her age 
for herself or for any of the girls whom she brought. One of JD#1's friends described Jane Doe #2 as 
"the youngest-looking girl" that JD#1 had brought to Epstein's house. Yet 
made another 
appointment for JD#2 to come to Epstein's house without either 
or Epstein asking about JD#2's 
age. JD#2 was 14 years' old. 
On March 11, 2004, JD#1 called Tony at 9:13 p.m. Epstein arrived the same day, at 11:20 p.m. 
On March 12, 2004, JD#1 called Tony at 8:59 a.m. and 9:21 a.m. At 3:38 that afternoon, JD#1 received 
her first call from 
JD#1 provided one sexual massage where Epstein masturbated while trying to fondle JD#1. 
JD#1 was 17 years' old at the time. JD#1 told Epstein that she was 18 years' old, but believes that 
Epstein "knew better." 
1. The Overt Acts Based upon Activity with Jane Doe #1 
1. On or about March 11, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
and 
traveled from Teterboro, New Jersey, to Palm Beach County, Florida aboard 
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the Gulfstream aircraft owned by Defendant HYPERION AIR, INC. 
2. On or about March 12, 2004, Defendants JEFFREY EPSTEIN and 
caused 
Jane Doe #1 to travel to 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, Florida. 
3. On or about March 12, 2004, Defendant JEFFREY EPSTEIN made a payment of $200 to Jane 
Doe #1. 
2. The Substantive Offenses related to Jane Doe #1 
Count 
Date(s) 
Offense 
Statute 
Defendant(s) 
5 
3/7/04 - 3/11/04 Use of cellular phone to persuade, 
induce, or entice Jane Doe #1 to 
engage in prostitution 
2422(b) 
EPSTEIN 
Although Epstein traveled to Florida on March 11, 2004, after the appointment with 
had 
affirmatively told Epstein that she was 18, so he probab y could succeed in raising 
been made,
the affirmative defense. 
4. Possible Credibility Challenge 
Jane Doe #1 has been granted 6001 immunity by the Department and has appeared before the 
Grand Jury. After her experiences with Epstein, JD#1 became a stripper and worked in various clubs in 
West Palm Beach and Orlando. JD#1 is currently working as a waitress at a regular restaurant in the 
Fort Lauderdale area. She currently is living with her parents but is scheduled to move out soon. 
JD#1's primary credibility challenge is that she brought several girls to Epstein's home — knowing that 
they were underage — and she has been given immunity for her testimony. JD#1 suffers from depression 
and takes medication for that condition. 
The grand jurors listened attentively to JD#1 and seemed to believe her. After her testimony they 
were anxious to indict Epstein, asking when an indictment would be forthcoming. JD#1 is very 
straightforward about Epstein's actions, and her own. 
B. Jane Doe #2 (a) 
- 
As mentioned above, Jane Doe #2's parents originally brought Epstein's behavior to the attention 
of the Palm Beach Police Department. 
went to Epstein's house once, on February 6, 2005, when she was 14 years' old. 
I . was in the 9 II, grade at Ro al Palm Beach ',
School at the time. 
. was recruited by 
cousin, 
, was dating 
at the time. On February 5, 2005, 
and her 
boyfriend went to 
house to watch a movie. That evening, 
used her cell hone to call 
heard 
describing 
to 
over the tele hone. After 
hung up, 
asked why she was giving her physical description to someone. 
asked 
if she wanted 
to make $200 giving a masse e to a very rich man on Palm Beach. 
and 
began arguing 
because 
didn't want 
to do a massage. 
decided to go anyway so that she could make 
$200. 
states that she knew she would have to take her top off and that Epstein would masturbate 
during the massage. 
states that 
knew she would have to strip down to her bra and panties 
and that "the more she did, the more [money] she would make." 
instructed 
that, if Epstein 
asked, 
would say she was 18 and was a senior at Wao. 
itsll School. 
On February 6, 2005, atikm
called 
cell phone. Two minutes later, 
.. At 1:01 pm,
called Epstein's Palm Beach house and, one minute later, 
again called 
and 
both say that
and another girl [M] 
went to 
called 
house 
and picked her up. They drove to the Palm Beach house. A security guard asked why they were there, 
and 
said they were there to see Jeffrey. The guard let them in and they entered the house through 
a side door into the kitchen. 
Epstein and an assistant [either 
or 
arrived and the assistant led 
upstairs 
to the master bedroom where all the massages took place. 
was able to describe the bathroom and 
the pictures of naked girls in the home accurately, and she describes how she and the assistant picked 
EFTA00229879

out massage lotions. 
states that the assistant told her to take her top off. Epstein entered shortly 
thereafter and forcefully ordered 
to take her pants off. 
removed her pants while Epstein left 
the room. When Epstein returned, he was wearing only a towel. Epstein laid face down and told 
to straddle him 
to massage his back. 
bare buttocks touched Epit
i's lower back/top of his buttocks. Epstein 
asked 
age and where she went to school and 
said that she was 18 and was a senior at 
Wellington. Epstein got up from the massage table and went to the toilet area where he masturbated and 
made moaning noises. Epstein then returned and laid down facing up. He continued to masturbate 
while directing 
to massage his chest. 
Epstein then told 
to grab a large back 
massager/vibrator that was across the room. At Epstein's request, 
removed her underwear. 
akin used the massager on
vagina while he masturbated. Epstein then digitally penetrated 
looked at Epstein to express her displeasure with the penetration and Epstein looked at her 
and sarcastically said, "What's the matter?" 
looked away. When Epstein ejaculated, the contact 
stopped. Epstein gave 
$300, ex laining that the extra $100 was because he "fingered her" and 
used a vibrator on her. Esptein left 
to get dressed. Epstein also asked 
to leave her telephone 
number. 
got dressed, went downstairs, and left with 
and 
received $200 for 
bringing 
In the car on the way home, 
told 
that Epstein "fingered" her and paid her $300. 
confirms this, which should be admissible as a prior consistent statement.) 
joked that they 
could et rich if they went to Epstein's house every weekend. The girls went shopping and 
then 
took 
home. 
When 
returned to school on Monday, she told a friend what had happened. As discussed in 
the introduction, rumors started flying around the school and
and another girl got into a 
One of the school administrators searched 
purse and found the $300. When confronted, 
initially stated that she earned the $300 through her job at Chik-Fil-A. She then stated she had sold 
drugs to get the money, and finally admitted that she had gotten the money from Epstein. 
began working with a Palm Beach Police Detective. Controlled calls were made to 
was initially suspicious because she had heard about the problems at the school. 
convinced 
that she wanted to return to Epstein's house because she needed more money. 
was recorded saying, "the more you do, the more you make." 
On March 30 and 31, 2005, 
placed controlled calls to 
about setting up another 
meeting with Epstein. Also on March 30 and 31, 2005, 
and 
made calls to and from each 
other. On March 31 and April 1, 2005, 
called 
and left voicemail messages, which were 
recorded, to confirm a visit to Epstein's house. Epstein flew in to Palm Beach International Airport 
("PBIA") on March 31, 2005. The April 1 recorded voicemail messages, were to confirm a visit to 
Epstein's house on "Saturday" which would have been Saturday, April 2, 2005. On Tuesday, April 5, 
2005, Palm Beach Police Department did a trash pull at Epstein's home, and recovered a handwritten 
note, "= 
with Sage on Saturday at 10:30." Epstein departed PBIA on April 6, 2005. 
1. Overt Acts based upon Activity with Jane Doe #2 
On or about February 3, 2005, Defendants EPSTEIN, 
and 
traveled from Columbus, Ohio, to Palm Beach County, Florida, aboard the Boeing 727 aircraft owned 
by Defendant JEGE, INC. 
 
. On or about February 6, 2005, EPSTEIN and 
caused Jane Doe #1 to make 
one or more telephone calls to a telephone used by Jane Doe #2. 
# 
. On or about February 6, 2005, EPSTEIN and 
caused Jane Doe #1 to transport 
Jane Doe #2 to 358 El Brillo Way, Palm Beach, Florida. 
 
. On or about February 6, 2005, EPSTEIN made a payment of $300 to Jane Doe #2 and 
a payment of $200 to Jane Doe #1. 
EFTA00229880