EFTA00227381

824 F.Supp. 330 
(Cite as: 824 F.Supp. 330, *334) 
contends that, just as the federal government has an 
interest in protecting the secrecy of federal grand 
jury material, the state has an interest in protecting 
state grand jury material from disclosure. 
Thus. 
the District Attorney argues that, in order to show 
proper deference to the State's interest in the 
confidentiality of the grand jury records, the United 
States should be required to move initially for 
disclosure before the presiding state court judge. 
The Court finds that no such requirement exists. 
[7] The Court recognizes that "policies of comity 
and federalism require some deference to the 
objective 
sought 
to 
be 
achieved 
by 
state 
confidentiality provisions." 
In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena for New York State Income Tax Records, 
468 F.Supp. at 577. 
The basic purposes of the 
state grand jury secrecy laws in question are: (1) to 
prevent an accused from escaping before he is 
indicted; (2) to prevent tampering with witnesses; 
and (3) to protect an accused person who is not 
indicted from unwarranted exposure. 
People v. 
McAdoo, 45 Misc.2d 664, 257 N.Y.S.2d 763, 
aff'd, 51 Misc.2d 263, 272 *335 N.Y.S.2d 412, 
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031, 87 S.Ct. 1479, 18 
L.Ed.2d 592 (1967). 
In this case, compliance with the federal grand jury 
subpoena will not subvert New York's interest in 
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings 
because federal grand jury proceedings are also 
conducted secretly. 
The secrecy requirements of 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e), will adequately ensure that 
none of the purposes of the state grand jury secrecy 
laws are undermined by compliance with the federal 
grand jury subpoena. 
See In re New York Grand 
Jury Subpoena for State Income Tax Records, 468 
F.Supp. at 577-78; see also United States v. Fuld, 
532 F.2d 404, 407438 (5th Cir.1976), cen. denied, 
429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 354, 50 L.Ed.2d 309; In re 
Grand Jury Ent panekd Jan. 21, 1975. 541 F.2d at 
377-78. 
Moreover, it is important to note that comity is a 
policy which must be balanced against "the 
necessity of thorough grand jury investigations into 
violations of federal law." 
In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena for New York State Income Tax Records, 
468 F.Supp. at 577. In this case, the subpoenaed 
documents are neenclry to the federal grand jury 
investigation. 
Thus, the policy of comity must 
yield to the constitutional right and duty of the 
federal grand jury to conduct a broad investigation. 
Page 15 
Id. 468 F.Supp. at 578. 
Finally, the District Attorney contends that the 
motion to quash should be granted because the 
subpoenaed materials are privileged. 
Specifically, 
the District Attorney argues that the state grand jury 
secrecy law creates a federal privilege under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
The Court finds 
this argument without merit. 
[8] Evidentiary privileges protect confidential 
communications 
between 
persons 
in 
special 
relationships from disclosure. By their very nature 
they impede the search for the truth and arc 
therefore generally disfavored. Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 63 
L.Ed.2d 186 (1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 
153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979); 
United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 709-10, 94 
S.Ct. 3090, 3108. 09, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). 
Accordingly, "the party asserting a privilege bears 
the burden of proving the applicability of the 
privilege," In re Bevil!, Bressler if Schulman Asset 
Management Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d 
Cir.1986), and privileges. "whatever their origins 
... [should] not [be] lightly created or expansively 
construed." Nixon. 418 U.S. at 710, 94 S.Ct. at 
3109. 
[9] When faced with a claim that a grand jury 
should be denied evidence because of privilege, the 
reviewing court must weigh the potential harm from 
disclosure against the benefits of disclosure. 
American Ovil Liberties Union of Miss., Inc. v. 
Finch, 638 F.2d 1336. 1343 (5th Cir.1981). In this 
case, the federal grand jury is investigating possible 
violations of federal criminal civil rights laws by 
police officers of the Buffalo Police Department. 
As fully explained in the United States' in camera 
statement of facts, the subpoenaed documents arc 
vital to the grand jury investigation and are not 
simply needed to assess credibility of potential 
witnesses. 
In addition, the information sought to 
be obtained from the subpoenaed material is not 
otherwise available since the police officers are 
unwilling to talk to the FBI. Thus, the grand jury 
may not be able to learn the truth of the allegations 
without the subpoenaed material. 
On the other side of the scale, the potential harm 
from disclosure of the state grand jury material is 
minimal. 
Because Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e) limits 
disclosure of federal grand jury material, the 
C 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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4 
. . • 
• 
• 
824 F.Supp. 330 
(Cite as: 824 F.Supp. 330, *335) 
secrecy of the subpoenaed documents would be 
closely guarded. 
Thus, since the benefits of 
disclosure in this case substantially outweigh the 
potential harm from disclosure, the Court fords that 
the state grand jury records are not privileged as a 
matter of federal common law. 
See Matter of 
Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d at 592.93; 
In re Grand Jury Proceeding. 563 F.2d 577. 582-85 
(3d Cir.1971); 
In re Grand Jury Ernpaneled 
January 21, 1975, 541 F.2d at 382-83. 
In sum, the United States has a strong interest in 
ensuring the just enforcement of its criminal laws. 
Public policy has long favored giving the grand jury 
broad powers of investigation. 
The District 
Attorney, who has the burden of proving that the 
subpoena should be quashed, has failed to establish 
*336 that the subpoena is unreasonable or that it 
Page 16 
violates any recognized privilege. 
Furthermore. 
because of the secrecy provisions of the federal 
grand jury, little or no prejudice would result to the 
state from compliance with the federal grand jury 
subpoena. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Court denies the District 
Attorney's motion to quash the federal grand jury 
subpoena. 
This Decision and Order and the entire 
file are to be filed under seal. 
It is so ordered. 
824 F.Supp. 330 
END OF DOCUMENT 
O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000122 
EFTA00227502

832 F.2d 554 
832 F.2d 554, 24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 275 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554) 
N 
United States Court of Appeals. 
Eleventh Circuit. 
In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS--Subpoena to 
State Attorney's Office. 
Thomas H. Greene, Dawson A. McQuaig, Jake 
Godbold, Don McClure, Intervenors-
Appellants. 
Nos. 87-3228, 87-3412--87-3414, and 87.3472. 
Oct. 26. 1987. 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 10. 
1987. 
Persons whose state grand jury testimony had been 
subpoenaed by a federal grand jury appealed from 
order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida, Nos. MISC-J-86-183-14, 
MISC-1.86.183- 4, Susan H. Black, J., which 
denied motions to suppress subpoenas. 
The Court 
of Appeals, Tjoflat, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
appellants could appeal denial of the motions to the 
extent that they asserted a privilege, but (2) Florida 
statute imposing secrecy on grand jury does not 
create evidentiary privilege. 
Affirmed in pan and dismissed in part. 
West Headnotes 
Ill Criminal Law €1023(3) 
110k1023(3) 
Grand jury proceeding is not a 'civil action" for 
purposes of statute permitting interlocutory appeals 
in civil actions with respect to controlling questions 
of law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b). 
121 Criminal Law €1023(3) 
110k1023(3) 
Persons whose state grand jury testimony had been 
subpoenaed by federal grand jury could appeal the 
denial of their motions to quash the subpoenas to 
the extent that they asserted a privilege as to the 
material, but could not raise issues of procedural 
violations or federal-state comity on appeal. 
131 Criminal Law 48= 1023(3) 
110k1023(3) 
When party has been subpoenaed to testify or 
produce records for grand jury and third-party 
merely fears that privileged material may be 
disclosed along with other, nonprivileged material, 
Page 1 
the case is not ripe for appellate review until the 
subpoenaed party has actually been asked to reveal 
specific material covered by the assertive privilege. 
141 Grand Jury (8=36.9(2) 
193k36.9(2) 
Federal common-law presumption of grand jury 
secrecy cannot be asserted in the form of a privilege 
by those seeking to prevent disclosure to a federal 
grand jury of their state grand jury testimony. 
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 6(e), 18 U.S.C.A. 
151 Grand Jury C=41.10 
I93k41.10 
15] Witnesses eg=,184(1) 
410k184(1) 
Florida statute imposing secrecy on grand jury 
proceedings 
does 
not create 
an evidentiary 
privilege. 
West's F.S.A. § 905.27; 
Fed.Rules 
Evid.Rule 501, 28 U.S.C.A. 
'555 Lamar Winegeart, 111, Arnold. Stratford & 
Booth, Jacksonville, Fla., for Greene. 
Elizabeth L. White, Sheppard & White, William 
Sheppard, Jacksonville, Fla.. for McQuaig. 
Lacy Mahon, Jr., Jacksonville. Fla., for appellants. 
Robert W. Mericle, Curtis S. Fallgatter, M. Alan 
Ceballos, Asst. U.S. Attys., U.S. Attorney's 
Office, Jacksonville, Fla., for appellee. 
Appeals from the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida. 
Before TJOFLAT 
and KRAVITCH, Circuit 
Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: 
Appellants appeal from an order of the district 
court denying their motion to quash a federal grand 
jury subpoena directing a state prosecutor to 
produce transcripts of their testimony before a state 
grand jury. We affirm. 
1. 
In 1985, the State Attorney's Office for the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida initiated a 
grand jury investigation into allegations of improper 
O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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832 F.24 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.24 554, 1'555) 
influence peddling by certain public officials of the 
City of Jacksonville. 
Witnesses appearing before 
the state grand jury included the four appellants in 
this case: 
Jake Godbold, then the mayor of 
Jacksonville, 
Don 
McClure, 
Godbold's chief 
administrative aide, Dawson McQuaig. a former 
general counsel for the city, and Thomas Greene, a 
practicing attorney and an associate of Godbold's. 
Each of these witnesses appeared and testified 
voluntarily. 
No criminal charges resulted from the state grand 
jury investigation. 
In August 1985, however. the 
state grand jury issued a report that identified 
several instances in *556 which "political favors and 
game-playing for friends" had infected the City's 
process of awarding contracts for professional 
services. 
Godbold, McClure, McQuaig, and 
Greene each waived his right under Fla.Stat. § 
905.28(1) (1985) to suppress the report. 
The 
report, however, did not contain the substance of 
their testimony. 
Meanwhile, federal prosecutors had initiated a 
federal grand jury investigation into substantially 
the same matters investigated by the state grand 
jury. 
Godbold, McQuaig, McClure, and Greene 
each indicated that he would assert the fifth 
amendment if subpoenaed to testify before the 
federal grand jury. 
Relying on the disclosure 
provisions of F1a.Stat. § 905.27(1Xc) (1985). [FN 11 
the United States in August 1985 petitioned a state 
judge to order the State Attorney to turn over to the 
federal grand jury the appellants' state grand jury 
testimony. 
The United States made no factual 
submission in support of its petition. 
The state 
judge refused to enter the order, characterizing the 
effort to obtain the testimony as a "fishing 
expedition." 
FNI. Under this provision, a court may order 
disclosure of grand jury testimony for the purpose 
of elflunhering justice.' 
In October 1986, the federal grand jury issued a 
subpoena duces tecum ordering the State Attorney 
to produce appellants' state grand jury testimony. 
The State Attorney moved the federal district court 
to quash the subpoena, arguing that disclosure of 
grand jury transcripts was unlawful under Florida 
law, that the United States had not demonstrated 
sufficient need for the transcripts, and that comity 
required the district court to honor the state court's 
Page 2 
ruling against disclosure. 
Greene and McQuaig 
then moved the court to permit them to intervene 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 and to file similar 
motions to quash. In his motion to intervene, 
McQuaig asserted that prior to testifying before the 
state grand jury, he had received assurances from 
the State Attorney that Florida law prohibited any 
disclosure of his grand jury testimony. Greene did 
not allege in his motion that he had received similar 
assurances 
but stated that he was entitled to 
intervene because "state grand jury proceedings 
(are) secret and confidential by virtue of the 
provisions of Chapter 905 of the Florida Statutes." 
The district court granted the motions to intervene, 
and subsequently permitted Godbold and McClure 
to intervene as well. [FN2) 
FN2. Godbold and McClure also based their 
motions to intervene on the Florida grand jury 
secrecy requirement. 
The substance of the 
privilege that appellants assert is discussed in Pan 
Ill, infra. 
In November 1986, the district court entered an 
order inviting the United States to make an cx pane 
factual submission showing why it needed the state 
grand jury transcripts. The government declined to 
accept the invitation and made no submission. The 
court then entered an order granting the motions to 
quash. 
Applying the balancing test set forth in 
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest. 441 
U.S. 211, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.24 156 (1979), 
the court found that the government had failed to 
establish a sufficient need for the testimony. 
Twenty-eight days after the court granted the 
motions to quash, the United States filed a "Motion 
for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order" along 
with an ex parte affidavit 
identifying facts 
supporting the grand jury's need for the testimony. 
The district court 
questioned 
the procedural 
correctness of 
the government's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, and stated that under ordinary 
circumstances it would not consider the motion. In 
the court's view, however, denial of the motion 
would not prevent the United States from obtaining 
the testimony: 
the United States could simply 
reissue the subpoena and defeat any motion to quash 
on the strength of the information contained in the 
ex pane affidavit. 
The court concluded that the 
most efficient solution was to consider the newly 
submitted information in the context of the 
government's motion for reconsideration. 
After 
C 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554, '556) 
considering the new information in camera, the 
district court entered an amended order in which it 
reversed its original order denying the motion to 
quash. 
The district court certified its amended 
order for interlocutory '557 appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. II 1984), and this 
court granted permission to appeal. The four 
intervenors appealed, although the State Attorney 
did not. 
Appellants make two arguments before this court. 
First, they argue that the government's motion for 
reconsideration was untimely and that the district 
court therefore had no authority to hear it. 
According to appellants, the applicable time limit 
for 
the motion 
was 
the 
ten-day limit of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), not, as the government 
contends, the thirty-day limit of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 
(1982 & Supp. II 1984). Second. appellants argue 
that the district court's amended order was in error 
for the following reasons: (I) the government had 
failed to demonstrate a sufficient need for 
appellants' grand jury testimony, and (2) comity 
required the court to give greater deference to the 
state 
judge's 
decision 
against 
releasing 
the 
testimony. 
Because of the nature of our ruling 
today, we do not reach the merits of these 
arguments. 
11. 
We first address the threshold issue whether we 
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Although this 
court granted the intervenors permission to appeal 
pursuant to section 1292(b), we must of course 
dismiss the appeal if we are without jurisdiction. 
See Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d 1378, 1379 (11th 
Cir.1986), ctn. denied, 481 U.S. 1039, 107 S.Ct. 
1979, 95 L.Ed.2d 819 (1987). 
Under section 1292(b), a district court may certify 
for appeal a non-final order entered in a civil action 
if the court is of the opinion that the order involves 
a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion" and 
that resolution of the question "may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.' 
By its terms, section 1292(b) applies only to orders 
in civil actions, and has no application to appeals in 
criminal cases. 
See United States v. Doucet, 461 
F.2d 1095 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Lowe, 
433 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.I970). Therefore, we have 
no jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
section 1292(b) unless the district court's order 
Page 3 
denying the motion to quash can be considered an 
order entered in a "civil action." 
[1] We hold that a grand jury proceeding is not a 
"civil action" for purposes of section 1292(b). lust 
in terms of the plain meaning of words, it seems 
self-evident that an order denying a motion to quash 
a subpoena issued by a grand jury investigating 
possible criminal violations is not part of a "civil 
action." 
We base our conclusion on more than a 
mechanical labeling of the proceedings below, 
however. 
By expressly limiting section 1292(b)'s 
application to "controlling question14 of law' in 
"civil" cases, Congress clearly indicated its intent 
not to disturb well-established precedent forbidding 
piecemeal review of grand jury proceedings. 
In 
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 
S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940), decided eighteen 
years before Congress enacted section 1292(b), the 
Supreme Court held that a district court's denial of 
a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena was not an 
appealable final decision within the meaning of the 
predecessor section of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). 
Noting that the Constitution itself makes the grand 
jury part of the criminal process, the Court 
concluded that lijt is no less important to safeguard 
against undue interruption the inquiry instituted by a 
grand jury than to protect from delay the progress 
of the trial after an indictment has been found." Id. 
at 327, 60 &Ct. at 542; see also Di Bella v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Ct. 654, 656-57. 7 
L.Ed.2d 614 (1962) ("This insistence on finality and 
prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue 
litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of 
justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of 
criminal cases."). 
Although Cobbledick was based on the principle of 
finality found in section 1291, that same principle 
fords expression in section 1292(b). We arc unable 
to 
conclude 
that 
Congress. 
by 
authorizing 
permissive interlocutory appeals of "controlling 
questionts1 of law" in "civil" actions, intended to 
undermine the strong policy against permitting 
appellate 
interruption 
of 
grand 
jury 
'558 
proceedings. 
Accord In re April 1977 Grand Jury 
Subpoenas, 584 F.2d 1366, 1369 (6th Cir.1978) 
("Section 1292(b) J limits interim review of 'a 
controlling question of law' to civil cases only and, 
therefore, should not be read to allow interlocutory 
review of grand jury proceedings.'), cen. denied, 
440 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 1277, 59 L.Ed.2d 492 
(1979). 
tt, 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Otig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
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832 F.2d 554 
(ate as: 832 F.2d 554, •558) 
RI We next examine whether there is a separate 
basis for appellate jurisdiction in this case. 
As we 
have already indicated, orders denying motions to 
quash grand jury subpoenas arc ordinarily not 
appealable final orders under section 1291. 
The 
subpoenaed party can obtain review by refusing to 
comply with the subpoena and then contesting a 
contempt citation, which is immediately appealable. 
See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33, 
91 S.Ct. 1580. 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). 
The 
contempt route for obtaining review, however, is 
not open to a third party who claims a privilege of 
nondisclosure with respect to materials in the 
custody of the subpoenaed party. 
In such a case, 
the putative privilege-holder has no power to 
compel the subpoenaed party to incur a contempt 
citation. 
And the subpoenaed party, unless he has 
either a particularly close relationship to the putative 
privilege-holder 
or 
a 
personal 
interest 
in 
nondisclosure of the material, is unlikely to risk a 
contempt citation simply to vindicate the rights of 
the third party. In this situation, the order denying 
the motion to quash is indeed final with respect to 
the putative privilege-holder, for any prejudice he 
suffers as a result of disclosure will remain forever 
unredressed unless appeal is permitted. 
Accordingly, this circuit follows the so-called 
Perlman exception to the general rule prohibiting 
interlocutory appeal of orders denying motions to 
quash grand jury subpoenas. 
See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (
is:), 689 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir.1982) 
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine). 641 F.2d 
199 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981): 
cf. In re 
International Horizons, Inc.. 689 F.2d 996 (11th 
Cir.1982) 
(discovery 
order 
in 
bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
This exception, derived from 
Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 
417, 62 L.FAL 950 (1918), and confirmed in United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 
3099, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). permits an order 
denying a motion to quash to be 'considered final as 
to the injured third party who is otherwise 
powerless to prevent the revelation." 
Fine, 641 
F.2d at 202. 
131 The circumstances supporting application of the 
Perlman exception are present in this case. 
Relying on the Florida grand jury secrecy 
requirement, appellants in essence assert a privilege 
of nondisclosure. 
The material with respect to 
which they assert the privilege--transcripts of their 
state grand jury testimony—is in the custody of the 
Page 4 
State Attorney. 
The State Attorney has indicated 
his intention to produce the transcripts. In light of 
these circumstances, the order denying the motion 
to quash is a final order as far as appellants arc 
concerned. 
We therefore have jurisdiction to hear 
their appeal. (FN31 
FN3. We note that the only material sought from 
the subpoenaed party in this case is material that 
falls squarely within the privilege asserted by the 
third parties. 
This is not a case, then, where a 
party has been subpoenaed to testify or produce 
records and a third party merely fears that 
privileged material may be disclosed along with 
other, nonprivileged material. 
In the latter 
situation, the case is not ripe for appellate review 
until the subpoenaed party has actually been asked 
to reveal specific material covered by the asserted 
privilege. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe 
), 831 F.24 222 (11th Cir.1987). 
111. 
In deciding that the narrow Perlman exception 
applies in this case 
we have also necessarily 
defined the scope of the matters properly before us 
for review. 
Appellants raise several objections to 
disclosure, including procedural objections and 
objections based on comity considerations and the 
need to protect the integrity of the Florida grand 
jury system. 
However, the only matter that the 
Perlman exception gives us jurisdiction to review is 
the appellants' claim of privilege to prevent 
disclosure of their state grand jury testimony. 
•559 The rationale of the Perlman exception 
extends only to appeals based on privileges personal 
to the third party seeking review: if the subpoenaed 
party has a direct or primary interest in the right or 
privilege in question, the concerns giving rise to the 
Perlman exception simply are not present. 
Here, 
to the extent that their objections to disclosure are 
based on concerns relating to comity and the 
integrity of the Florida grand jury, appellants 
cannot argue that the subpoenaed party had no 
interest in seeking to vindicate their derivative 
rights. 
Indeed, the subpoenaed party—the State of 
Florida as represented by the State Attorney-- had 
as its primary interest the protection of its grand 
jury system. Accordingly. the Perlman exception 
does not give us jurisdiction to review the 
appellants' arguments concerning comity and the 
need to preserve the integrity of the Florida grand 
jury. (FN41 Nor does it give us jurisdiction to 
review their procedural arguments. 
Thus, we do 
not pass upon the district court's disposition of 
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832 F.2d 554 
(ate as: 832 F.2d 554, •559) 
those matters and we turn to appellants' claims of 
privilege. 
F744. We should emphasize that this discussion 
relates only to appellants' right to appeal under the 
Perlman exception. 
It does not relate to their 
standing to raise these claims before the district 
COWL 
The appellants' motions to intervene in the district 
court proceedings reveal the nature of the privilege 
they assert. 
Appellant McQuaig's motion stated 
that "lp]rior to appearing before the (state) Grand 
Jury, Mr. McQuaig was advised by the State 
Attorney that pursuant to Section 905.27, Fla.Stat. 
(1985): a) none of the testimony he provided to the 
Grand Jury was disclosable under the law; and b) 
any disclosure of said testimony was a crime." 
Appellant Green's motion stated that 'Mel state 
grand jury proceedings were secret and confidential 
by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 905 of the 
Florida Statutes." 
Appellant Godbold's motion 
stated that "testimony was provided with the 
understanding on the pan of Jake Godbold that 
pursuant to § 905.27 of the Florida Statutes, his 
testimony would not and could not be disclosed 
under the law." 
Finally, appellant McClure's 
motion stated that "Itihe substantial interest of Don 
McClure is equal to or greater than that of the two 
other parties previously allowed to intervene." 
In essence, then, appellants derive the privilege 
they assert from the Florida statutory grand jury 
secrecy requirement. 
The statute imposing that 
requirement provides as follows: 
(I) A grand juror, state attorney, assistant state 
attorney, reporter, stenographer, interpreter, or 
any other person appearing before the grand jury 
shall not disclose the testimony of a witness 
examined before the grand jury or other evidence 
received by it except when required by a court to 
disclose the testimony for the purpose of: 
(a) Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the 
testimony given by the witness before the court; 
(b) Determining whether the witness is guilty of 
perjury; or 
(c) Furthering justice. 
Fla.Stat. § 905.27 (1985). (FNS] 
FN5. The remainder of section 905.27 provides as 
follows: 
(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to 
publish, 
broadcast, 
disclose, 
divulge, 
or 
communicate to any other person, or knowingly to 
Page 5 
cause or permit to be published, broadcast, 
disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other 
person, in any manner whatsoever. any testimony 
of a witness examined before the grand jury, or the 
content. gist, or import thereof, except when such 
testimony is or has been disclosed in a court 
proceeding. When a court orders the disclosure of 
such testimony pursuant to subsection (I) for use in 
a criminal case, it may be disclosed to the 
prosecuting attorney of the court in which such 
criminal case is pending. and by him to his 
assistants, legal associates. and employees. and to 
the defendant and his attorney, and by the latter to 
his legal associates and employees. 
When such 
disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to 
subsection (I) for use in a civil case, it may be 
disclosed to all parties to the case and to their 
attorneys and by the latter to their legal associates 
and employees. 
However, the grand jury 
testimony afforded such persons by the court can 
only be used in the defense or prosecution of the 
civil or criminal use and for no other purpose 
whatsoever. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall affect the attorney-
client relationship. A client shall have the right to 
communicate to his attorney any testimony given 
by the client to the grand jury, any matters 
involving the client discussed in the client's 
presence before the grad jury. and any evidence 
involving the client received by or proffered to the 
grand jury in the client's presence. 
(4) Persons convicted of violating this section shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. 
punishable as provided in s. 775.083, or by fine 
not exceeding 55,000. or both. 
(5) A violation of this section shall constitute 
criminal contempt of court. 
(41 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that 
privileges in federal court proceedings "•560 shall 
be governed by the principles of the common law as 
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience." 
The 
privilege appellants assert, as stated in their motions 
to intervene, is based solely on state law. (FN6J 
We acknowledge that some federal courts have 
recognized state law evidentiary privileges in 
particular cases when to do so would not 
substantially burden federal policies. 
See, e.g., 
Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 
(E.D.N.Y.); cf. ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 
1342-45 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981). 
R46. In their briefs, appellants suggest that the 
privilege they assert has an independent basis in the 
federal common law presumption of grand jury 
secrecy. 
That presumption, which is codified in 
C 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to 04. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000127 
EFTA00227507

832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554, •560) 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e), relates to disclosure of federal 
grand jury records. It cannot be asserted in the 
form of a privilege by appellants, who seek to 
prevent disclosure of their state grand jury 
testimony. 
151 We need not apply any such balancing test 
here, however, because we find that the privilege 
asserted by appellants is without a basis in Florida 
law. We find no evidence that the Florida courts 
derive an evidentiary privilege from Fla.Stat. 
905.27. 
Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has 
noted that 
Mlle 
rule of 
secrecy 
concerning 
matters 
transpiring in the grand jury room is not designed 
for the protection of witnesses before the grand 
jury, but for that of the grand jurors, and in 
furtherance of the public justice. 
A witness 
before the grand jury has no privilege of having 
his testimony there treated as a confidential 
communication.... 
State ex rel. Brown v. Delvell, 167 So. 687, 690 
(Fla.1936). 
Florida case law directly construing 
section 905.27 
fails 
to provide 
a 
contrary 
interpretation of the relationship between the 
secrecy requirement and the rights of grand jury 
witnesses. (FN7] Accordingly, we conclude that 
Page 6 
appellants have no privilege of nondisclosure under 
state law. A federal court will not selectively reach 
into a state code and fashion evidentiary privileges 
merely to suit the purposes of the parties before it. 
FN7. Some Florida cases refer to the "privilege" 
of a grand jury witness, but only with reference to 
the general principle under Florida law that a 
witness' testimony in a judicial proceeding cannot 
be used as the basis of a defamation anion. See, 
e.g.. 
State 
v. 
Tiller, 
Ill 
So.2d 
716 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1959). 
IV. 
In light of our conclusion that appellants have no 
privilege of nondisclosure under state law, we 
affirm the district court's order denying their 
motion to quash. 
Because we must observe the 
limitations on our appellate jurisdiction discussed 
above, we dismiss their appeal to the extent that it is 
based on other objections to disclosure. 
AFFIRMED in part: DISMISSED in part. 
832 F.2d 554, 24 Fed. R. Evil. Serv. 275 
END OF DOCUMENT' 
A 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000128 
EFTA00227508

United States District Court 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
FGJ 05-02(WPB)-FriJNo. OLY-10 
SUBPOENA FOR: 
I 
PERSON 
X 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECTril 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Beach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
August 18, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or object(s): 
Please coordi 
of this subpoena and confum the date and time of ur a 
ante with 
Special Agen 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Telephone: 
Please see additional information on reverse 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
CI.F.RIC 
This subpoena is issued upon application 
of the United States of America 
°If not applicable, es -none, 
DATE: 
August 2, 2006 
Name. Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S. Attorney 
ustra tan Avenue, Suue 
West Palm Beach. FL 33401-6235 
Folly.001;10fi 
EFTA00227509

United States District Court 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
FG1 05-02(WPB)-Fri./No. OLY-10/2 
SUBPOENA FOR: 
K 
PERSON 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECT'S] 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Beach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
September 15, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or object(s): 
Please coordinate your compliance of this subpoena and confirm the date and time of your appearance with 
Special Agen
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Telephone: 
Please see additional information on reverse 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
CLERK 
'Ibis subpoena is issued upon application 
So. Australian Avenue, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6235 
• II not applicable. enta "none' 
HA It 
August 28. 2006 
S. Attorney 
EFTA00227510

401 N Owe Rightly. Wes* Palm Reach. Fkrida 11401 4209 
(561) 353.7100 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000131 
EFTA00227511

ZE1OOVIDIVIAI-A3-9£L08-80 v 
BARRY E. KRISCHER 
STATE ATTORNEY 
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit 
Palm Beach County 
401 Noah Dixie Highway 
Weil Palm Beach, Florida 33401-4209 
3340i+6236 
—00 COED 
EFTA00227512

Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000133 
EFTA00227513

0 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000134 
EFTA00227514

nited States District ourt 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
FGJ 05-02(WPB)-Fri./No. OLY-1 1 
SUBPOENA FOR: 
PERSON 
n 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECT'S' 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testifybefore the Grand Jury of the United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Beach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
August 25, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or object(s): 
Please coordinate your compliance of this sub oena and confirm the date and time of your 
appearance with Special A ent 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Telephone 
Please see additional information on reverse 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
DATE: 
August 15, 2006 
(BY) DEPUTY CLERK 
Name, Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S. Attorney 
This subpoena is issued upon application 
of the United States f Amer' 
08-80736-CV
5 
. us 
an venue,
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6235 
a-000135 
EFTA00227515

0 
r4 
'". 
IN 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000136 
EFTA00227516

United Sti
s, anirsnia ourt 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
FGJ 05-02(WPB)-FriJNo. OLY- I 2 
a
SUBPOENA FOR: 
PERSON 
a 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECTISI 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Beach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
August 25, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or object(s): 
Please coordinate your compliance of this subpoena and confirm the date and time of your 
appearance with Special Agent 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Telephone 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you arc granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
DATE 
August 18, 2006 
This subpoena is issued upon application 
Name, Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S. Attorney 
of the Unit 
States of Ameri • 
West Palm Beach Fl 33401-6235 
Australian
o. 
 Avenue, suite 
•If not applicable. enter 'none ' 
P 000137 
FORM ORD-227 
EFTA00227517

United States District Court 
.S'OUllIERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
FGJ 05-02(WPB)-Fri./No. OLY-12 
SUBPOENA FOR: 
PERSON 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECT'S! 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify be fore the Grand Jury of the United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Bach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Beach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
August 25, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or object(s): 
Please coordinate your complia 
d confirm the date and time of your 
appearance w 
ent 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Telephone: 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
CLERK 
(BY) DEPUTY CLERK 
DATE 
August IS, 2006 
This subpoena is issued upon application 
of the United States of America 
si y
•AV
N 
A 
e
k rs and phone Number of Assistant 
U.S. Attorney 
500 So. Australian Avenue, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6235 
•If not apphable. alit: 'none 
Lase NomMigalashoV-IVIARRA 
Foitt+04104titi 
EFTA00227518

United States District Court 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
Fat 05-02(WPB)-FriJNo. OLY-12/2 
SUBPOENA FOR: 
PERSON 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECTISI 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Reach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
September I, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following documcnt(s) or objcct(s): 
Please coordinate your compliance of this sub oenaandconfirmthedateandtimeofyour 
appearance with Special Agent 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Telephone 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you arc granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
CLERK 
(DY) DEPUTY ('I IRK 
"Reis subpoena is issued upon application 
•If not applicable. nun 'none 
DATE: 
August 23, 2006 
Name, Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S. Attorney 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-6235 
ice No 08-"0736-f 
T• Le und sin et AO110 
FORM ORD-227 
EFTA00227519

0 
r 
r.; 
Case No. 08-80736-CV-MARRA 
P-000140 
EFTA00227520