EFTA00225044

agreement or deferred prosecution in favor of state prosecution in the way that the Epstein case 
was handled. I believed that the fairest course was to consult with the victims before the execution 
of any agreement. 
The second significant departure from my regular practice was the victim notification 
procedure. Never before or since have I shared "drafts" of victim notifications with counsel for 
the defendants. The CVRA places the entire burden of complying with the Act on the government 
and the court and provides that I "person accused of the crime may not obtain any form of relief 
under this Chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) (2004). But, in this case, I was required to provide 
draft victim notification letters, rewrite them due to objections from defense counsel, and refrain 
from sending them altogether. My protestations appear in my emails, and were shared with the 
agents, my legal assistant, and my supervisors. 
With regard to FBI policies and practices, I understood that the FBI had its own victim 
notification procedures. I had previously worked with 
on other cases (and worked 
with her on other cases after the Epstein investigation). I did not know the details of what FBI 
included in its letters or when they were sent. I did not instruct FBI on what to send or when to 
send it. My general rule is to tell agencies to follow their regular procedures. I don't remember 
saying anything different in this case. I did not see any FBI letters in this case prior to collecting 
the FBI letters to Brad Edwards' clients in connection with the Jane Doe. United States litigation. 
I did not instruct the FBI to include the language about the case being under investigation and that 
they should be patient. 
2. Identify all victims in this case to whom written or oral notifications were 
made, when and how each notification was made, and the contents of the 
notifications. Explain why notifications were made to some victims, and not 
to others, and who was responsible for those decisions. 
On the attached chart (Exhibit B-1), I listed all of the individuals identified as victims 
during the state investigation, the federal investigation, or after Epstein entered his state guilty 
plea, but who were brought to my attention by various attorneys. The chart lays out how and when 
each was contacted. Due to the passage of time, it is impossible for me to give exact dates and the 
exact content of each conversation. Also, there are some victims that I specifically remember 
meeting with. There are some that I know I did not meet with. There are others that I believe I 
met with, but I am not certain. I have qualified my answers on the chart accordingly. 
On August 4, 2006, I prepared 24 Victim Notification Letters for victims who had been 
identified during the state investigation. (Exhibit 12.) These were provided to Special Agent 
to hand-deliver to victims during interviews. I decided to prepare these letters and I 
decided on the content of those letters. 
On August 11, 2006, 18 amended letters were prepared. (Exhibit 13.) These letters 
clarified that the recipients were victims and/or witnesses, since we had not yet been able to 
confirm that they were minors during the time of their encounters with Epstein and we were still 
working to confirm federal jurisdiction. People who had already received the August 4, 2006 
responsible officials remain obliged to ensure that all such delegated responsibilities are 
discharged. The Attorney General designates the following responsible officials: . . . For cases in 
which charges have been filed—the U.S. Attorney in whose district the prosecution is pending.")) 
Page 41 of 58 
EFTA00225084

letters did not receive August 11, 2006 letters. If an August 11, 2006 letter was prepared, I believe 
that meant that the agents had not yet made contact with the person and the agents discarded the 
August 4, 2006 letter. We included letters for witnesses who we knew were over the age of 18 to 
advise them to contact us if they felt they were being harassed because the agents had learned of 
potential harassment during the early set of interviews. I decided to prepare these letters after 
discussing the issue with Special Agent 
and I decided on the content of those letters. 
Although I do not have I clear recollection of this, I believe that I new letter was issued 
for Individual #4 because the agents had difficulty interviewing her and did not want to provide 
her with I letter that was several months old. On June 7, 2007, I simply printed the same letter 
with I new date and signed it. (Exhibit 30.) I do not believe that the August II, 2006 letter was 
ever provided to her. The same explanation applies for the June 7, 2007 letters for Individuals 9, 
31, 38, and 43. (Exhibit 30.) Individuals 3 and 40 were not identified until several months into 
the federal investigation. Victim notification letters were prepared for them on June 7, 2007. 
Exhibit 30. 
I decided to prepare these letters after discussing the issue with Special Agent 
and I decided on the content of the letters. 
As discussed above, in July 2007 and September 2007, I raised in writing the need to confer 
with the victims regarding the proposed agreement with Epstein. I also raised the issue in internal 
conversations with supervisors, agents, and others. I was told that I could not discuss the matter 
with the victims. (See Exhibits 3 and 44.) 
After the Non-Prosecution Agreement was signed, I drafted I notification letter to inform 
the victims of the terms of the agreement and the date of the state court proceedings. After several 
delays, the state plea and sentencing date was set for December 9, 2007. On November 19, 2007, 
I prepared the draft notification that appears at Exhibit B-2 based upon my reading of the NPA and 
research I had conducted on state law. (See Exhibit B-7.) Several blanks appeared because we 
were still waiting for Epstein's counsel to confirm that Epstein would pay the fees of the attorney-
representative selected by the Special Master. 
I second draft of the plea notification letter was prepared on November 27, 2007 at 7:11 
p.m. for Jeff 
review. (Exhibit B-3.)36 On November 28, 2007 at 9:42 p.m. I third draft 
was prepared for Jeff 
review. (Exhibit B-4). This version was shared with counsel for 
Epstein. (Exhibits B-8). On November 29, 2007, Jay Lefkowitz, counsel for Epstein, objected to 
the victim notification letter in I letter to USA Acosta. (Exhibit B-9). USA Acosta asked Mr. 
Lefkowitz to discuss the matter with Jeff 
and me. (Exhibit B-10). 
On December 5, 2007, Kenneth Starr and Jay Lefkowitz wrote I letter to USA Acosta 
requesting an updated victim notification letter incorporating their objections. (Exhibit B-11). On 
December 6, 2007, Jeff 
sent I letter to Jay Lefkowitz, which attached another proposed 
victim notification letter. (Exhibit B-12). There was significant internal correspondence regarding 
my concerns that the Government needed to meet its obligation to inform the victims of the 
upcoming plea. (Exhibit B-13). After providing I final draft to the Miami office on December 7, 
36 This document was converted from Word Perfect, which caused the formatting 
problems. 
Page 42 of 58 
EFTA00225085

2007, (Exhibit B-637), later that day, my legal assistant and I prepared 32 victim notification letters 
and envelopes to send. (Exhibit B-14). At 5:08 pm, I received an email from Jeff 
that 
said, "Hold the letter" (Exhibit B-54). 
On December 10, 2007, I contacted Jim Eisenberg, counsel for Individual # 28, who is Jane 
Doe #2 in the Jane Doe'. United States suit. As noted on the attached chart, Mr. Eisenberg was 
paid for by Mr. Epstein. I told Mr. Eisenberg that I was preparing victim notification letters and 
needed to know if he was still representing Individual #28. He said that he was and instructed me 
to send the letter to him. My continued designation of Individual #28 as I victim, based upon the 
statements of other witnesses and the documentary evidence collected by federal and state agents, 
was one of the main bases that Epstein's counsel used to support their allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct with officials at the Department of Justice. (See Exhibit B-20.) Based upon those 
attacks, which relied upon the videotaped statement given by Individual #28, I was instructed by 
either Jeff 
or Alex Acosta, not to consider Individual #28 as I victim for purposes of the 
NPA because she was not someone whom the Office was prepare to include in an indictment. 
On December 7, 2007, Lilly 
sent I letter to Jeff 
finally providing the 
USAO with the date and time of the change of plea for Mr. Epstein. (Exhibit B-15). Based upon 
that information, on December 14, 2007, I prepared another version of the victim notification 
letter. (Exhibit B-1639. I provided I copy via email to Alex Acosta, Jeff 
and 
. (Exhibit B-17). On December 17, 2007, I sent an email to Jeff 
inquiring about the status of the case and informing him that the agents also were expressing their 
concerns about the delays in victim notifications. (Exhibit B-18). Over my objection, my request 
to send the victim notification letter was not approved, and on December 19, 2007, USA Acosta 
sent I letter to Lilly 
stating, "I understand that the defense objects to the victims 
being given notice of [the] time and place of Mr. Epstein's state court sentencing hearing. I have 
reviewed the proposed victim notification letter and the statute. ... We will defer to the discretion 
of the State Attorney to determine if he wishes to provide victims with notice of the state 
proceedings, although we will provide him with the information necessary to do so if he wishes." 
(Exhibit B-19.) Although I did not know it at the time, in preparing this response, I noticed that, 
in FAUSA 
June 3, 2008 letter to DAG Filip, he stated that the quoted language was 
proposed by USA Acosta "in consultation with DAAG 
." (Exhibit B-123 at 7.) 
On December 21, 2007, attorney Jay Lefkowitz expounded on I new challenge — that Mr. 
Epstein had not been provided with I list of the victims and an opportunity to challenge the list 
prior to signing the NPA. I made clear verbally and in writing that I would not expose the victims 
to further harassment while Epstein was clearly trying to wheedle his way out of pleading guilty 
and going to prison. As I told Mr. Lefkowitz, I had devised I system to address this concern prior 
to the signing of the NPA; since Epstein's team of attorney's had not requested the right to see and 
challenge the list, I had not offered it. I few days later, Lefkowitz again wrote to the U.S. Attorney 
stating that he did not think our Office should provide any notifications; they should come only 
37 This document was converted from Word Perfect, which caused the formatting 
problems. 
38 This document was converted from Word Perfect, which caused the formatting 
problems. 
Page 43 of 58 
EFTA00225086

from the State Attorney's Office. Lefkowitz insisted on the right to review the letters. (Exhibit 
B-22).39
The matter was tabled while Epstein was allowed time to raise his federal jurisdiction, 
sufficiency, and prosecutorial misconduct challenges with CEOS, the DAAG, and the AAG. 
While everything was supposed to be "on hold" pending those reviews, I learned that Epstein was 
hying to contact some of the victims — victims who would have been represented if Epstein had 
performed his obligations under the terms of the NPA. I then worked to find pro bono counsel for 
those victims (Exhibit B-23). 
On May 15, 2008, CEOS, DAAG 
and AAG Fisher completed their review, 
finding that our case against Epstein was neither improper nor inappropriate (Exhibit B-24). By 
that time, I revised indictment package had already been reviewed and approved (Exhibits B-25 
through B-28). Additional victims also had been identified through the continued investigation 
(Exhibits B-29 through B-31). 
On May 19, 2008, FAUSA 
wrote to counsel for Epstein giving Epstein two weeks 
to enter his guilty plea in state court in accordance with the terms of the NPA (Exhibit B-32). 
Rather than performing, Epstein sought continued review, again alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct and challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and the federal interest in the 
case. At this point, Epstein sought review from Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip (Exhibit B-
33), and he hired Joe Whitley to join his defense team. I was informed that Epstein's deadline to 
enter his guilty plea would be extended again, and we continued preparinii indictment (Exhibits 
B-34 through B-37). So on May 27, 2008, 
who took 
place as 
Criminal Chief Jeff 
who had taken 
or USA Acosta due to his recusal from the 
Epstein matter, 
and I all had an email exchange agreeing that there would be no 
further negotiations and that the case would be indicted (Exhibit B-38). 
At the same time, the agents heard that Epstein was trying to strike I new deal with the 
State Attorney's Office — one that would require less jail time (Exhibit B-39) (discussed below). 
While the DAG completed his review, I was told that the grand jury presentation would be 
delayed again (Exhibit B-40). I was then tasked with drafting the USAO's letter to DAG Filip in 
response to Epstein's challenges. 
While the case was being investigating and prepared for indictment, I did not prepare or 
send any victim notification letters — there simply was nothing to update. I did not receive any 
victim calls during this time. I did receive communications from two attorneys. In March 2008, 
I received I letter from attorney Richard Willits, advising me that he represented Individual #3 and 
that he had filed suit on her behalf against Epstein in Palm Beach County Circuit Court (Exhibit 
B-41). I responded, acknowledging his representation (Exhibit B-42). On June 18, 2008, I 
received I call from attorney Brad Edwards, who told me that he represented Individual #43, who 
is also Jane Doe #1 in the Jane Doe.. United States lawsuit. Mr. Edwards expressed an interest 
in assisting with the case. We were still waiting to hear about whether we would be moving 
39 On the State side, Lefkowitz has consistently taken the position that there were only two 
victims related to the state offenses. Thus, if only the State provided notifications, only two victims 
would receive notices of the hearing and Epstein would avoid I full sentencing hearing. 
Page 44 of 58 
EFTA00225087

forward to indictment. I invited him to send whatever information he could and expressed that 
time was of the essence (Exhibit B-43). Given the uncertainty of the situation — Epstein was still 
challenging our ability to prosecute him federally, pressing allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct, and trying to negotiate better plea terms, while the agents, my supervisors, and I were 
all moving towards indictment — I did not feel comfortable sharing any information about the case. 
It also is my practice not to talk about status before the grand jury. For those reasons, and because 
I had never met Mr. Edwards, I listened more than I spoke. 
Early on June 23, 2008, FAUSA 
emailed Criminal Chief 
saying that, if the 
USAO received the go-ahead from the DAG's Office, I should immediately notify Epstein's 
attorneys that Epstein would only have until June 30th to comply with the September 24th 
agreement or be held in breach. Later that day, Mr. 
responded, cc'ing me, instructing me 
to send out that notification (Exhibit B-49). On June 23, 2008, DAG Filip completed his review, 
and 
Roth sent I letter to Attorneys Starr and Lefkowitz stating their finding that there was no 
abuse of discretion and no misconduct (Exhibit B-44). I immediately sent an email to Jay 
Lefkowitz in accordance with Mr. 
instructions (Ex. B-49). The following day, Roy Black 
and Jack Goldberger, as local counsel for Epstein, contacted me to wrap up the details of 
performing pursuant to the terms of the NPA (Exhibit B-45). On June 25 and 26, 2008, there were 
series of internal communications regarding victim notification letters and providing Epstein 
with I final list of victims (Exhibits B-46, B-47, B-48). I provided my draft victim notification 
letter to FAUSA 
and USA Acosta (Exhibits B-47, B-48).4° Since Mr. Acosta had agreed 
in December 2007 that we would not provide written notice of the state change of plea, the written 
victim notifications were prepared to be sent immediately following Epstein's guilty plea. The 
FBI was working on finalizing the victim list to disclose to Epstein (Exhibit B-50). I requested 
permission to make oral notifications to the victims regarding the upcoming change of plea, but 
the Office decided that victim notifications could only come from 
state investigator, and Jeff 
asked PBPD Chief 
to assist (Exhibit B-52). 
On Friday, June 27, 2008, we received notification that Epstein's change of plea and 
sentencing would occur the following Monday, June 30, 2008 (Exhibit B-51). I made two calls to 
try to spread the word about the state change of plea. Following up on FAUSA 
call from 
the previous day, I called Chief 
and asked him to notify the victims (Exhibit B-53). I also 
called Brad Edwards as counsel for Individuals 35 and 43,41 and strongly encouraged him and his 
clients to attend. He said that someone would try to be there. I had not been authorized by the 
Office to disclose the terms of the NPA, so I could not be more explicit in my conversation with 
him (Exhibit B-54). 
After the change of plea on June 30, 2008, I made calls to the attorneys whom I knew 
represented identified victims in civil suits to confirm that they wanted me to send their clients' 
victim notification letters to the attorneys (Exhibit B-55). Also, as directed by my Office, I 
4° Exhibits B-47 and B-48 consist of emails with draft victim notification letters attached. 
Due to changes in word processing systems, some of the attachments, as well as other drafts, have 
formatting issues when they were printed. My original draft was prepared on 6/25/2008 at 3:57 
pm. I revised it at 5:23 p.m. that same day. I received I revised version from USA Acosta and 
FAUSA 
at 6:00 p.m. on June 25'h. 
41 Mr. Edwards also was representing Individual #28 at the time, but I did not know that. 
Page 45 of 58 
EFTA00225088

provided I draft of the proposed victim notification letter to counsel for Epstein (Exhibit B-56). I 
was concerned that Epstein and his counsel were again creating I potential problem. USA Acosta 
had taken the position that the final NPA consisted of three documents — the 9/24/2007 NPA, the 
10/29/2007 Addendum, and the 12/19/07 letter from USA Acosta to Lilly 
. I prepared 
victim notifications (and, later, I Declaration in the Jane Doe litigation) based upon this 
understanding. When Epstein entered his guilty plea, Judge McSorley required him to file his 
federal Non-Prosecution Agreement with the Court since that formed part of the consideration for 
the state plea. I wanted to confirm that Epstein was taking I consistent position with the State 
Attorney's Office, Judge McSorley, and the USAO, so I asked for I copy of what was filed in the 
State Court. This led to multiple letters with counsel for Epstein before I could finalize the victim 
notification letters (Exhibits B-57 through B-65). On July 9, 2008, I finally sent the first two 
victim notification letters to two of Brad Edwards' clients, Individuals 35 and 43 (Exhibit B-66). 
Whenever I sent I victim notification letter, I redacted version of the letter also was sent to Jack 
Goldberger, counsel for Jeffrey Epstein. I was not authorized to send I victim notification letter 
to Individual # 28 or to include her on the list of persons provided to Epstein because she was not 
person that the Office was prepared to name in an indictment.42
On July 10, 2008, I sent victim notification letters to I number of other represented victims, 
Individuals 3, 8, 17, 25, 26, 37, and 44 (Exhibit B-67). The FBI also asked for some assistance of 
language to use in its own victim notifications (Exhibit B-68), and I was waiting for contact 
information for the unrepresented victims (Exhibit B-69). On July 21, 2008, I sent victim 
notification letters to I group of unrepresented victims, Individuals 1, 2, 4, 9, 13, 14, 21, 23, 30, 
32, and 38 (Exhibit B-70). There were some unrepresented victims who did not receive 
notification letters on July 21, 2008 because the FBI had not been able to confirm mailing 
addresses by that time — Individuals 10, 11, 16, 18, 20, 24, 31, 33, 36, 39, 40, and 42. 
In August 2008, the issue of "which version of the NPA controls" finally came to I head. 
On August 5, 2008, in the context of I Notice of Breach, I pressed my Office to clarify the issue 
(Exhibit B-7I). The decision was made to require Epstein to elect either the 12/19/07 letter or not, 
but to make it clear in writing (Exhibits B-73 through B-82). On August 15, 2008, I wrote to Roy 
Black and Jay Lefkowitz confirming their position that the final agreement consisted only of the 
NPA and Addendum (Exhibit B-83). By discarding USA Acosta's December 2007 modification, 
the original terms providing for the attorney representative for the victims came back into effect, 
and the victim notification letters for the unrepresented victims were even more important. Mr. 
Lefkowitz responded on August 18, 2008 with "objections" in advance to the language of the 
victim notifications (Exhibit B-84). On August 21, 2008, I responded to Mr. Lefkowitz with
draft victim notification letter corresponding to the language contained in the NPA and Addendum 
and noted the importance of promptly providin corrected information to the victims (Exhibit B-
85). The following day, Mr. Lefkowitz sent I letter with indeterminate objections to the letter 
(Exhibit B-86). I responded by pointing out that the language in the victim notification letter was 
taken verbatim from the NPA and Addendum (Exhibit B-87). 
On September 2, 2008, Mr. Lefkowitz finally confirmed that Mr. Goldberger would be the 
designated recipient for victim notifications and that Mr. Epstein would pay the attorney 
representative's fees (Exhibit B-88). I immediately started distributing victim notification letters. 
42 That decision was made by USA Acosta and/or FAUSA 
I do not know which. 
Page 46 of 58 
EFTA00225089

On that date, Notification Letters were sent directly to Individuals I, 2, 4, 9, 10, 11,43 13, 14, 16, 
20,44 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32,45 33, and 38, and via counsel to Individuals 3, 8, 17, 25, 26, 37, and 
44 (Exhibit B-89). On September 3, 2008, Notification Letters were sent via counsel to Individuals 
35 and 43, and via FBI Legal Attaches to Individuals 36 and 42 (Exhibit B-90). On September 
12, 2008, I sent I Notification Letter to Individual 39 (Exhibit B-91). On September 15, 2008, I 
sent Notification Letters to Individuals 18 and 32 (Exhibit B-92). 
Soon thereafter, I received I letter from Jeffrey Herman, one of the civil attorneys who 
represented I number of victims, notifying me that he had complained to the Florida Bar that the 
Victim Notification Letters violated the Florida Bar rules against solicitation. He had filed 
complaints against myself and against Robert Josefsberg — the attorney-representative selected by 
the Special Master. On September 18, 2008, I wrote to the Florida Bar asking for an Ethics opinion 
(Exhibit B-93). I did not feel that I could send out any additional notifications until I received I 
response to that inquiry. The Florida Bar eventually issued I letter reviewing the relevant rules 
that (I) contacts with represented and unrepresented persons required by law are permitted and (b) 
business solicitation prohibitions are limited to those motivated by pecuniary gain. Thereafter, I 
issued notification letters to Individuals 20 and 40 on November 14, 2008 (Exhibit B-94). 
I only issued one other set of victim notifications: when I learned that Epstein had been 
allowed out on work release. While it technically was not required, I knew that the State 
Attorney's Office had not provided the notice, so I wanted to provide the victims with at least the 
option to take advantage of "exclusionary zones."46 On December 4, 2008, I drafted I work release 
notice, which was approved by my office (Exhibit B-95). The following day, I sent work release 
notices to attorneys for Individuals 1, 2, 3, 8, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 35, 35, 43, and 
44 (Exhibit B-96). On December 8, 2008, I sent work release notices to attorneys for Individuals 
7, 9, 17, and 37, and I sent notices directly to Individuals 11, 39, and 40 (Exhibit B-97). On 
December 9, 2008, I mailed work release notices directly to Individuals 4, 10, 16, 18, 23, 24, 30, 
33, and 38 (Exhibit B-98). On December 11, 2008, I followed up with the attorneys about whether 
any of their clients wanted to take advantage of the "Exclusionary Zone" option in Epstein's GPS 
unit (Exhibit B-99). There was I bit of correspondence and telephone calls about this, but 
ultimately none of the victims elected to participate in this. On December 12, 2008, I send the 
work release notice to Individual #42 (Exhibit B-100). 
I am not aware of any other notices provided to victims in connection with this case. 
43 The letter was returned on September 12, 2008, and Individual #11 was contacted by 
phone. She came to the office and picked up the letter in person on September 16, 2008. 
44 The letter was returned on September 15, 2008. I new letter was sent on November 14, 
2008 to I corrected address. 
43 The letter was returned on September 11, 2008. I new letter was sent on September 15, 
2008. At Individual #32's request, I copy was sent to her and with I copy to Jeffrey Herman, Esq. 
" "Exclusionary zones" can be rogrammed into I GPS tracking unit to send an alarm if I 
prisoner on work release enters into I prohibited area — e.g., I four-block radius of I victim's 
residence. 
Page 47 of 58 
EFTA00225090

3. Identify all individuals within the USAO and FBI who had • role in 
determining whether, when, how, and to which victims to provide victim 
notifications in the Epstein case and explain what decisions were made and the 
basis for them. 
Greater detail is provided in the answer to Item B-2, above, and the exhibits referenced 
therein. Normally the line 
is the person who handles deciding who should receive victim 
notifications. Prior to indictment, the line 
has responsibility for those notifications, in 
conjunction with the case agents. Post-indictment, I victim list is provided to the victim-witness 
coordinator who is supposed to issue letters (again, I do not know how automated that was in 2006-
2008). In this matter, I made the decision to make contact with victims early and I decided on the 
content of the introductory letters as well as the recipients of those letters. At the time of plea 
negotiations, Criminal Chief 
made the decision that he had the authority to vary from the 
general policy of conferring with victims before entering into I plea. I do not know the basis for 
that decision (see Exhibit 3). His email to me said that the decision was made with USA Acosta's 
concurrence. I do not know the veracity of that statement. I know that, even after Chief-
left the USAO, as the plea negotiations continued, when I re-raised the issue of conferring with 
the victims after discussing it with CEOS Chief Drew 
(see Exhibit 44), the Office still 
did not confer. I do not know the basis for this decision. 
Regarding providing notifications of the date of the change of plea, I drafted several 
iterations of I notification letter and also asked to provide oral notifications. USA Acosta decided 
that the USAO should not provide any notifications of I state court proceeding. From the 
correspondence that he drafted, the basis for doing so was that it was I state proceeding, not I 
federal one, so the notice should come from the State Attorney's Office. 
With regard to the FBI, m understanding is that 
the victim specialist, in 
conjunction with 
, the case agent, had primary responsibility for making 
victim notifications and the content of those. I do not know if anyone else within the FBI played 
any role in those decisions, and, with regard to their standard victim notification letters, I do not 
believe that anyone from the USAO played any role. I know that the FBI deferred to the USAO, 
and to USA Acosta's decision not to confer with the victims in advance of signing the NPA. I also 
know that the FBI also deferred to USA Acosta's decision not to inform the victims of the state 
court plea. 
4. Identify any effort made by the government to notify the victims, either in 
writing or through other means, that it intended to enter into I non-
prosecution agreement with Mr. Epstein, or had entered into such an 
agreement. For all such efforts, identify the victims notified, when, and by 
whom. If some or all of the victims were not notified about the non-
prosecution agreement, explain why and identify the individuals responsible 
for the decision. 
Greater detail is provided in the answer to Item B-2, above, and the exhibits referenced 
therein. In short, while I requested permission to confer with the victims in advance of entering 
into the NPA, that permission was denied. So no one notified the victims that the government 
intended to enter into I non-prosecution agreement. Immediately after the government entered 
into the NPA, I prepared notification letters, but the U.S. Attorney decided that these letters also 
should not be sent out. The case agents made oral notifications to two identified victims in October 
Page 48 of 58 
EFTA00225091

2007, but they became concerned that it appeared that Epstein was going to renege on the NPA. 
The agents suspected that, at trial, Epstein would allege that the agents had told the victims that 
they could get money from Epstein. So they decided to suspend the notifications until Epstein was 
indicted or his "challenges" to the NPA and the investigation were settled. 
5. Explain why victims who received victim notification letters after the non-
prosecution agreement was first signed in September 2007 were notified in the 
letters that the federal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein "is currently under 
investigation." 
Explain whether you, or other government personnel, 
considered whether the statement was accurate in light of the non-prosecution 
agreement; describe the process leading to the decision to so advise the victims; 
and describe any discussions among government personnel concerning the 
statement and its accuracy, occurring before or after it was made. 
The letters containing the quoted language were prepared by FBI victim-witness specialist 
and I was unaware of them until they were collected in connection with the Jane 
Doe 
United States litigation. I do not recall ever discussing the wording of the FBI's letters 
prior to their distribution. The decision to issue the letters and the wording of those letters were 
exclusively FBI decisions. 
Even though I was unaware of the language at the time, there is no doubt that from the 
perspective of the agents and myself the matter was, in fact, "currently under investigation." The 
NPA was signed on September 24, 2007. The letters that Judge Marra referred to in his order were 
dated January 10, 2008 and May 30, 2008. During the period that the letters were sent, Epstein 
was asserting that: (I) there was insufficient evidence to charge him with any offense; (b) there 
was no basis for federal prosecution and that federal prosecution violated the Petite policy; (c) I 
had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during the investigation and resolution of the matter; (d) 
Jeff 
had engaged inprosecutorial misconduct during the investigation and resolution of 
the matter; (e) Special Agent 
had engaged in misconduct during the investigation of 
the matter; and (f) the NPA violated public policy because of its inclusion of the provision for § 
2255 damages in lieu of mandatory restitution. Setting aside items (I) through (e), if the 
Department agreed with item (f) or if Epstein accepted USA Acosta's invitation to "unwind" the 
NPA and proceed to trial, we were faced with I target who had committed numerous identified 
crimes and had unlimited resources to flee the jurisdiction. The investigative team wanted to be 
prepared to arrest him as quickly as possible with the strongest criminal case at the ready. I also 
believed that either the U.S. Attorney or someone at DOJ would stop allowing Epstein to use the 
NPA as both I sword and I shield — attacking terms that Ken Starr had once thanked me for 
recommending while keeping the USAO from indicting Epstein. 
On December 12, 2007, Criminal Chief 
and I finalized I revised indictment package 
to present to the grand jury (Exhibit B-101). On Janua
 7, 2008, I sent an email to my entire 
advisory chain — up to the U.S. Attorney — laying out I series of steps in furtherance of the 
investigation (Exhibit B-I02). Next, I secured the assignment of I CEOS attorney, 
as co-counsel, and she immediately traveled to West Palm Beach to participate in 
interviews to familiarize herself with the case and to re-connect with the victims
 them 
for potential trial testimony (Exhibits B-103, B-104). On January 14, 2008, Ms. 
and I went 
over charging and investigative strategy, as well as her next trip to West Palm Beach (Exhibit B-
105). I also asked the agents to compile the evidence so that it would be more manageable for 
Page 49 of 58 
EFTA00225092

Chief 
ongoing indictment review (Exhibit B-106). Ms. 
the agents, and I 
continued working on the best way to charge the case, and collecting evidence to corroborate 
witness statements (see Exhibit B-107). On January 31, 2008, another group of grand jury 
subpoenas was prepared and served (Exhibit B-108). On January 31 and February I, 2008, Ms. 
the agents and I re-interviewed I series of victims (Exhibit B-109). As you can see from 
Exhibit B-109, it wasn't simply the agents and I who thought that the investigation was ongoing, 
the supervisory chain (up to and including the U.S. Attorney and the Chief of CEOS) was aware 
that: (1) victim and witness interviews were occurring; (2) grand jury subpoenas were being issued; 
and (3) an indictment package was being revised and reviewed. 
In February 2008, I was focused on working with the agents and Ms. 
to finalize
revised indictment package and having it reviewed and signed bail 
On February 20, 2008, I sent an email to USA Acosta, FAUSA 
Criminal Chief M, 
and others in the supervisory chain letting them know t at 
a prow 
the final indictment
 to my immediate supervisor the previous day (Exhibit B-111). I also 
informed Ms. M=Ithat I reserved time with the grand jury on March II, 2008 and asked her to 
attend on that date id.). On February 25, 2008, I conferred with my immediate supervisor and 
with one of our 
Litigation Counsel, who also was one of our Professional Responsibility 
Officers, about whether there was any reason to re-present the case to I different grand 
(Exhibit B-112). I provided the resul 
to FAUSA 
, Criminal Chief 
the West Palm Beach supervisors, and 
xhibit B-113). My supervisor completed her 
review the following day (see Exhibit B-114). 
Also on February 26, 2008, FAUSA 
informed me that he had told attorney Jay 
Lefkowitz that, if CEOS rejected Epstein's position, Epstein would be allowed "one week to abide 
by the terms and conditions of the September 24, 2007 Agreement" (Exhibit B-115). I wrote to 
FAUSA 
telling him that I could not understand why Epstein would be allowed to plead to 
the same terms in light of Epstein's false allegations and in light of the new evidence we had 
uncovered, including six confirmed additional victims and three potential new victims in New 
York (id.). I don't recall receiving any response. 
Despite that communication to Epstein's counsel, the Office continued towards indictment. 
On February 27 and 28, 2008, FAUSA 
, Criminal Chief = 
Civil Rights Chief 
Weinstein, and I communicated about the USAM requirement that DOJ's Civil Rights Section be 
consulted when violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 are included in an indictment (Exhibit B-116). I 
continued reviewing records received in response to grand jury subpoenas and the agents continued 
working towards identifying additional witnesses and victims (Exhibit B-117). The following day, 
I advised the same gentlemen about identifying another New York witness/potential victim and 
her upcoming planned interview and inquired about the status of CEOS' review (Exhibit B-118). 
In March 2008, there were several developments in the investigation. The case agent and 
I decided to present search warrants for memory cards that the Palm Beach Police Department had 
collected. They had been reviewed by the PBPD near the time they were collected and no images 
of child pornography had been seen, but I forensic examiner had recently opined that forensic 
examination might result in the recovery of deleted images. I advised that I new forensic 
examination would require search warrants, so they were prepared and executed (Exhibits B-1 I 9, 
B-I20). 
Page 50 of 58 
EFTA00225093

On March 5, 2008, I updated the Office supervisory chain and CEOS Chief 
on 
I number of case developments (Exhibit B-121). In that email, I noted that, if we were not going 
to proceed, we needed to be mindful of the state statute of limitations, to allow the PBPD to present 
charges to the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office (id.). I also reported on the status of indictment 
review and my plan to start presenting to the grand jury on March 18, 2008, so that the grand jury 
would have sufficient time to hear all of the evidence and reflect on it before voting on an 
indictment (id.). On March 14, 2008, the head of the West Palm Beach office completed his review 
of the indictment package and it was forwarded to Criminal Chief 
for final review and 
approval (Exhibits B-25, B-122). On March 18, 2008, I began my grand jury presentation (Exhibit 
B-26). The planned continued presentation to the grand jury was postponed while we awaited 
CEOS' review. I expressed my concerns about the impact on the ongoing investigation (Exhibit 
B-I24). 
In mid-May, 2008, CEOS completed its review, finding that 
federal prosecution of 
Epstein's conduct was factually and legally sound (Exhibit B-24). The agents and I immediately 
prepared to go back to the grand jury (Exhibit B-125). My supervisors also immediately prepared 
to review and finalize an indictment incorporating the results of the continued investigation 
(Exhibit B-38). The agents continued locating and interviewing more victims (see, e.g., Exhibit 
B-126). When DAG Filip agreed to consider Epstein's challenges, the planned grand jury 
presentation was canceled (Exhibit B-40). 
Even after that delay, the agents and I pressed on. In June 2008, even as I was assisting 
with the USAO's submissions to DAG Filip (Exhibits B-123, B-127, and B-128), the agents and I 
were working on additional grand jury subpoenas and obtaining 6001 immunity for I witness 
(Exhibit B-129). On June 17, 2008, I applied for, and received ermission to seek DOJ approval 
for 6001 immunity (Exhibit B-130). On June 24, 
designee granted the 
application (Exhibit B-131). I also received permission to travel to New York with the agents to 
conduct additional witness interviews (B-132). Time with the grand jury was scheduled and the 
supervisory chain was informed of those plans as well as the status of the application for 6001 
immunity (Exhibit B-133). I also was corresponding with counsel for the witness about her travel 
for the grand jury appearance, which was scheduled for July 1, 2008 (Exhibit B-134). Even when 
the witness' attorney told me that Epstein would be pleading guilty on June 30, 2008, I would not 
release the witness (id.). I formally withdrew the subpoena on June 30, 2008, following Jeffrey 
Epstein's entry of his guilty plea in state court (Exhibit B-135). 
These activities took us up to the time of Jeffrey Epstein's June 30, 2008 guilty plea. From 
September 2007 until the end of June 2008, the agents and I: collected additional evidence; 
reviewed that evidence; interviewed new victims and witnesses; re-interviewed previously 
identified victims and witnesses; identified new crimes and charges; developed new charging 
strategies; drafted supplemental pros memos; revised the indictment package; and presented new 
evidence and testimony to the grand jury. Although I did not know that Victim-Witness Specialist 
letters contained the language that the Epstein case was "currently under investigation," 
from my perspective, that language was absolutely true and, despite being fully advised of our 
ongoing investigative activities, no one in my supervisory chain ever told me that the case was not 
under investigation. 
Page 51 of 58 
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C. General 
1. As to all of the foregoing matters, identify any disagreements or concerns 
expressed by government personnel as to these matters, the parties involved, 
how the disagreements were resolved, and any concerns you had about any 
such resolution and the individuals, if any, with whom you discussed your 
concerns. 
I raised I multitude of concerns during the investigation, negotiations, and enforcement 
periods. They ranged from the explicit — my July 2007 email exchange with = 
about 
his violations of the USAM, CVRA, and Ashcroft Memo (Exhibit 3) — to the subtle — repeated 
requests to just meet with the victims. Here is one especially poignant request from January 31, 
2008: 
Hi Jeff and Alex - We just finished interviewing three of the girls. I wish you could 
have been there to see how much this has affected them. 
One girl broke down sobbing so that we had to stop the interview twice within 1 20 
minute span. She regained her composure enough to continue 1 short time, but she 
said that she was having nightmares about Epstein coming after her and she started 
to break down again, so we stopped the interview. 
The second girl, who has 1 baby girl of her own, told us that she was very upset 
about the 18 month deal she had read about in the paper. She said that 18 months 
was nothing and that she had heard that the girls could get restitution, but she would 
rather not get any money and have Epstein spend 1 significant time in jail. 
The FBI's victim-witness coordinator attended and she has arranged for counseling 
for several of the girls. 
Please reach out to Alice to make her decision. These girls deserve so much better 
than they have received so far, and I hate feeling that there is nothing I can do to 
help them. 
We have four more girls coming in tomorrow. Can I persuade you to attend? 
(Exhibit C-1.) 
Many of the disagreements have been catalogued above, but I will try to collect them into 
general categories in chronological order. 
1. 
b. 
I did not want to meet with counsel for Epstein (Lilly Ann 
and Gerald Lefcourt) 
prior to completi.n investigation. My co-counsel 
agreed with me. 
Our supervisor, 
M, 
overruled us. 
and I did not want to have 
subsequent meeting with another set of 
attorneys for Epstein, including Lilly = 
, Gerald Lefcourt, Alan Dershowitz, and 
Roy Black, that would also include Criminal Chief 
=
 
Over my objections, 
Mr. 
also instructed me to provide defense counsel with list of the federal statutes 
that we had under consideration. Mr. 
asked me to provide all of my evidence to 
the defense and only withdrew that instruction when I reminded him that federal statutes 
Page 52 of 58 
EFTA00225095

protected child victims' identities. I told my supervisor, 
my concerns and 
that I thought I should ask to have the case reassigned, and she counseled against it (Exhibit 
C-4). 
c. Ms. a
 the agents, and I all tried to impress upon the others that, due to the nature of 
the crimes under investigation, time was of the essence — Epstein was accused of 
committing sexual offenses against dozens of minor girls. Our expert witness, as well as 
our own experience, led us to believe that Epstein would not cease his criminal behavior 
voluntarily. We also knew that Epstein was continuing to travel extensively using his 
private airplanes, and that he would have the ability to flee to I jurisdiction that did not 
extradite if he knew that charges were coming. At one point in May 2007, after the 
indictment had been reviewed on several levels, we knew wheraein would be and I 
asked to arrest him on I criminal complaint. Criminal Chief 
responded that he 
was "having trouble understanding — given how long this case has been pending — what the 
rush is." (Exhibit C-5). There was another instance I month or two later where we knew 
that Epstein was traveling to serve as I judge for I beauty contest and I again asked for 
permission to prepare I criminal complaint. Criminal Chief 
denial of the 
request was even more emphatic. 
d. In July 2007, Mr. 
and I exchanged strong words when he reported that he had 
engaged in plea negotiations without the input or knowledge of the agents, victims, or 
myself (Exhibit 3). My objections included: 
i. The failure to meet and consult with the victims, agents, and me before 
deciding what plea offer to extend. 
ii. Offering I plea to I state offense. There was never any explanation of why 
I federal investigation would be resolved with I state plea, and I understood 
that I state plea would remove all control over the plea and sentencing 
procedure. 
iii. Starting the negotiations at only 24 months' imprisonment, which was 
unreasonably low and not in keeping with any of the federal crimes under 
investigation.47
iv. Sending the message to defense counsel that plea negotiations would be 
handled by the executive division rather than the line prosecutor and the 
West Palm Beach supervisory team. 
e. From the beginning of the federal investigation, the agents and I had pushed to get the 
computer equipment that Epstein had removed from his home prior to the execution of the 
state search warrant. 
When Epstein's counsel had stated that Epstein wanted to 
"cooperate" with the federal investigation, we asked that they turn it over voluntarily; they 
never did. We sought it via grand jury subpoena and they moved to quash the subpoena. 
Every time the matter was set for I hearing, Epstein's counsel would ask the Office to agree 
47 Mr. 
responsive email in July 2007, suggested that, in light of the statement 
by Ms. 
that 24 months' imprisonment was I "non-starter," we would be able to re-set plea 
negotiations at higher number, but that never happened. 
Page 53 of 58 
EFTA00225096

to "continue" the hearing pending our "plea negotiations." I repeatedly recommended 
moving forward on the computer equipment because it was obvious that they did not want 
to turn it over and the equipment likely contained hard evidence of travel, contact with 
victims, obstruction of justice, and possibly child pornography offenses. Instead, the 
Office continuously agreed to put off the hearing and even when Epstein's attorneys tried 
to use the existence of the pending motion to quash as I basis to stay some of the victims' 
civil suits. 
f. Once I was informed that I had to devise 
plea agreement with I sentencing cap of 24 
months' imprisonment, I drafted I plea to 
conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2422, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 — one of the crimes that had been the subject of the 
investigation and that was included in the indictment. That crime was I felony with I five-
year statutory maximum, and the guidelines would have exceeded the five-year max, so 
the plea agreement would have had to be I binding plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(c)(1)(C), which is what I drafted. I was informed by Mr. 
that USA Acosta did 
not want to do I (c)(1)(C) plea, so I had to find charges that would result in I two-year 
statutory maximum. This resulted in me having to research misdemeanors and find facts 
that would fit those misdemeanors. I thought it was totally inappropriate. Luckily, 
finally stepped in and told Lefkowitz that we would not agree to I misdemeanor 
charge unrelated to the crimes that we had investigated. 
Throughout the drafting of the NPA, every time Jay Lefkowitz and I reached an impasse, he 
and/or Ken Starr would appeal to 
, Jeff 
or Alex Acosta, making it 
impossible to hold I firm line or keep singular negotiating strategy. I tried to work from 
the Office's standard plea agreement language, but even after language was agreed to, it 
would be rewritten by Mr. Acosta. 
i. I strenuously objected to the reduction of the prison term from 24 months to 
18 months. 
g. 
ii. I objected to the clear efforts at delay for no reason other than delay (for 
example, going back and forth from I federal plea to I state plea and back 
to I federal plea — all the while asking me to provide copious drafts). 
iii. At various points, it was apparent that Epstein was not engaging in good 
faith plea negotiations and I asked to terminate the negotiations and proceed 
to indictment. Every time, Mr. Acosta refused. For example, near the end 
of the negotiations, Mr. Lefkowitz tried to "slip in" I citation to I different 
state crime that did not require sex offender registration. When I brought 
this to Mr. Lefkowitz's attention, he admitted that, despite their explicit 
agreement that Mr. Epstein would plead guilty to I crime that required sex 
offender registration, they originally believed that the crimes listed in the 
NPA did not require registration. When they realized their error — and the 
Epstein would, indeed, have to register, they tried to replace the statute with 
I different one. This was the clearest example of bad faith amongst many, 
yet I was told that I had to continue working with Mr. Lefkowitz to finalize 
the agreement. USA Acosta told me that he did not want to punish Epstein 
for the bad behavior of his attorneys — even though Epstein clearly was 
directing every aspect of his defense. 
Page 54 of 58 
EFTA00225097

iv. I told FAUSA 
and USA Acosta that I did not want to sign the NPA 
because I did not think that it was "my" agreement. USA Acosta asked me 
to sign it. 
h. After the NPA was signed, USA Acosta continued to concede points that had already been 
decided. For example, he agreed to the preparation of the Addendum. He then made
number of concessions regarding the letter to the Special Master, including I statement that 
we would not vouch for the veracity of the victims, despite the fact that these were victims 
that we intended to include in an indictment. These were all areas that were the subject of 
I signed, binding agreement. On October 5, 2007, and October 23, 2007, I against asked 
for permission to proceed to indictment (Exhibits C-6, C-7). 
i. After the Addendum was signed, USA Acosta wrote in the 12/19/2007 letter to Lilly 
that he had "considered defense counsel arguments regarding the Section 2255 
portions of the Agreement. .. . During the course of negotiations [our] intent was reduced 
to writing in Paragraphs 7 and 8, which as I wrote previously, appear far from simple to 
understand." (Exhibit B-19). I raised concerns about undermining an Agreement entered 
into by our Office and giving away one of the protections that had been negotiated for the 
victims — representation by an attorney selected by the Special Master. 
I raised concerns about delays in entering Epstein's guilty plea and sentencing. These were 
portrayed as "professional courtesies" but it quickly became obvious that the NPA was 
signed with no intention of actual performance — it was simply I way for Epstein to buy 
time to avoid indictment and intimidate victims. 
k. I raised objections to the multiple "appeals" to DC and the delays that those entailed. USA 
Acosta explained that "every defendant" has the right to appeal to DC and raise federalism 
concerns. I explained that the objections should have been raised prior to signing the NPA, 
not after, and, if they were legitimate "policy questions," Epstein should agree that he 
would not use the time to harass and intimidate victims. 
I. As detailed above, after the NPA was signed, the agents and I repeatedly raised concerns 
about the Office's deference to the defense's objections to providing notification to the 
victims of the resolution of the investigation and the date and time of the Epstein's plea 
and sentencing. 
m. On February 26, 2008, I learned that, if CEOS conducted its review and concluded the 
federal prosecution of Epstein was appropriate, the Office was going to allow Epstein to 
plead guilty pursuant to the NPA with no additional terms or conditions, despite the fact 
that additional victims had been located during the ongoing investigation. I wrote to 
FAUSA 
and expressed my view that this was an unjust result (Exhibit B-115). I 
re-raised this objection every time the Office allowed Epstein another opportunity to 
maintain the benefits of the NPA even as he was attacking the NPA's legitimacy. 
n. On March 19, 2008, I informed the supervisory chain up to FAUSA 
of the toll that 
the delay was taking on the victims and the grand jury. In particular, one of the grand 
jurors had told another that he was concerned that we were going to "whitewash" the case 
and not charge it. Epstein was using the delay to harass the victims, and one of the victims 
tried to commit suicide. I wrote how the "FBI's victim-witness coordinator is doing her 
Page 55 of 58 
EFTA00225098

best to get counseling for all of our needy victims, but I just can't stress enough how 
important it is for these girls to have I resolution in this case. The `please be patient' 
answer is really wearing thin, especially when Epstein's group is still on the attack while 
we are forced to wait on the sidelines. Your guidance is needed." (Exhibit C-2) I followed 
up on March 19 and 22, 2008 to let everyone know that Epstein was subpoenaing victims 
and was using particularly aggressive means of service — having the Sheriff's Office serve 
the subpoenas at the places of work, calling them into the Dean's Office at their colleges, 
etc. I explained that Epstein was issuing these subpoenas in the context of the state criminal 
case — even thou il
hese victims were not named victims in the state criminal case, and I 
asked FAUSA 
to try to have Epstein's attorneys stop this contact as it was 
inconsistent with Epstein's alleged interest in resolving the matter (Exhibit C-3). I do not 
believe that anyone contacted Epstein's attorneys about this. I worked to secure pro bono 
counsel for as many victims as possible so that Epstein would only be able to contact them 
through counsel (id.). My concerns about the victims' mental health were brought to the 
attention of management in emails and telephone calls throughout the entire period from 
2006 through 2008 and probably into 2009. 
o. Even after Epstein enter his guilty plea and was sentenced, there were I number of material 
breaches. Every time I tried to enforce the agreement and enforce the Office's authority to 
proceed to indictment, the Office would accept Epstein's excuse that he received "bad 
advice" from his attorneys and then he would "cure" the breach. With regard to the work 
release, either Roy Black or Jay Lefkowitz informed me that USA Acosta had agreed, after 
the NPA was signed, that Epstein would be allowed to participate in work release like an 
other state prisoner — in direct contravention of discussions and communications that 
and I had with the defense. I was not allowed to invoke this as I breach. 
2. Identify any occasion during which you were or felt pressured, intimidated, 
threatened, coerced, or in any other manner inappropriately influenced to 
take I position or action in the Epstein case with which you disagreed or which 
caused you concern, and the individuals, if any, with whom you discussed such 
concerns. 
Throughout this memo, I have listed I number of disagreements. In broad categories, I 
disagreed with: (1) meeting with defense counsel before the investigation was completed and 
disclosing to them our charging strategy; (2) members of the Executive Division engaging in plea 
and strategy discussions outside the presence of the prosecution team and encouraging defense 
counsel to avoid the prosecution team; (3) entering into pre-indictment plea negotiations; (4) 
agreeing to delay the litigation regarding Epstein's computer equipment while pursuing plea 
negotiations; (5) enterin
 into an agreement deferring federal prosecution; (6) entering into any 
agreement that required I sentence of only 18 months' (or even 24 months') imprisonment; (7) 
agreeing to I length of I sentence and then trying to find I charge with I statutory max to match; 
(8) reaching an agreement without conferring with the victims, the agents, or even the prosecution 
team; (9) refusing to hear from/meet with the victims even after meeting repeatedly with Epstein's 
representatives; (10) during the drafting of the NPA, allowing Epstein's attorneys to complain 
directinl,e First Assistant and U.S. Attorney when they were dissatisfied with answers from 
the line 
and West Palm Beach supervisors; (11) repeatedly overruling my efforts to hold 
Epstein to the original terms, including reducing the term of imprisonment from 24 months down 
to 18; (12) dismissing my repeated warnings that the attorneys were not negotiating in good faith 
Page 56 of 58 
EFTA00225099

and were delaying for strategic reasons; (13) repeatedly ceding our discretion to the defense, for 
example, agreeing that they could review and comment on victim notification letters and decide 
whether or not we could provide notice; (14) even after the NPA was signed, continuing to water 
it down, with the Addendum, the 12/19/07 Acosta letter, and then later offering Epstein the option 
of not having to provide the attorney-representative for the victims; (15) refusing to allow the 
agents and Ito notify the victims about the terms of the NPA and about the change of plea; (16) 
allowing Epstein to continue to enjoy the benefits of the NPA even after he failed to promptly 
perform its terms and filed specious delays in order to try to negotiate better terms or win I battle 
of attrition; (17) refusing to defend me from the false allegations of prosecutorial misconduct; (18) 
refusing to step in and protect the victims from harassment from Epstein's attorneys when Epstein 
was "appealing" to DC; and (19) allowing Epstein to repeatedly breach the NPA and then claim 
that he just got bad advice from his lawyers and "cure" the breaches. 
At various times during the investigation, negotiations, etc., I s u oke with 
number of 
people about 
ents with the Office, including m su • ervisor, 
m co-
counsel 
pecial Agents 
and 
and DOJ Trial Attorneys 
On several 
occasions, I drafted emails about re-assigning the case because the Office's handling of the matter 
was so contrary to my methods. I shared at least one of these with Ms. 
(Exhibit C-4). 
She counseled against sending it. The agents asked me not to leave the case because they believed 
that, if I left, the case would simply disappear. I couldn't disagree with them. 
Criminal Chief 
response to my email in July 2007 was, in my mind, 
inappropriate and meant to intimidate. It is,ittiankly, unheard of, for I Criminal Chief to 
engage in plea negotiations without the line 
knowledge, much less blessing. And the 
offer that was made was inexplicable. To this day, I do not understand the NPA — 24 months/I 8 
months - it is I completely random amount of time. Allowing I federal defendant to plead guilty 
to state charges also is conj./unheard of. No one has ever explained to me where the idea 
originated from. For Mr. 
to suggest that my judgment was questionable or that I was 
unable to handle "major" cases was obviously meant to "put me in my place." In my July 13, 2007 
response to Mr. 
, I wrote: 
With respect to your questions regarding my judgment, I will simply say that 
disagreements about strategy and raising concerns about the forgotten voices of the 
victims in this case should not be classified as I lapse in judgment. This Office 
should seek to foster spirited debate about the law and the use of prosecutorial 
discretion. I know of other instances where disagreements about the a plication of 
the law to different defendants and defense attorneys has resulted in I call for the 
resignation of the 
who dared to challenge the Executive Office's 
conclusions. I find that very disheartening. However, my first and only concern in 
this case (and my other child exploitation cases) is the victims. If our personality 
differences threaten their access to justice, then please put someone on the case 
whom you trust more, and who will also protect their rights. 
After my response to Mr. 
I know that he spoke with 
who 
was Chief of Appeals at the time, about moving me to the Appellate Section. 
The results of the disagreements catalogued above were communicated to me (orally or via 
e-mail) as decisions of the Executive Division. They sometimes followed extensive debate. They 
Page 57 of 58 
EFTA00225100

sometimes followed no debate. I was sometimes heard on the issue; other times I knew nothing 
about it until I received the directive. There were times that I learned of communications between 
defense counsel and the Executive Division where concessions were made only after the decision 
was made. Many of these decisions were incorrect, in my opinion, but I did not believe that they 
were illegal. As I line M, 
I was dut bound to follow the directives of the U.S. Attorney, 
which I did. I do not know that following direct order from the Executive Division would qualify 
as coercion — even if it follows very strong objections. 
I felt strongly that we should have conferred with the victims before entering into the NPA 
and that we should have informed them of the change of plea and sentencing. I felt strongly that 
Epstein's attorneys were given unprecedented access to members of the Executive Division, and 
that the victims were given no access -- I could not even talk with them about plea negotiations or 
notify them about the plea hearing. At one point, my assistant and I had letters and envelopes 
ready to be stuffed and put through the franking machine and we received notice from Miami that 
they could not go out. While I felt that conferring was the right thing to do, as noted above, the 
AG Guidelines vest discretion in the U.S. Attorney, so I could not say that USA Acosta's decision 
was illegal. I also believed that, because the resolution of the federal case rested on Epstein's state 
guilty plea, the federal victims were entitled to notice of the state hearing. But I could not say that 
USA Acosta's decision that the CVRA was limited to notice of federal proceedings was illegal. 
I think that pressure was brought in more subtle ways. For example, I believe that one of 
the reasons why USA Acosta did not take an aggressive stance against the prosecutorial 
misconduct claims against me was because he disliked my insistence on pushing the case forward. 
After the NPA was signed, USA Acosta recommended that I transfer to the Civil Division. 
I agreed to meet with them and talk about their work. Despite USA Acosta's recommendation, I 
decided not to follow his recommendation, and I stayed in the criminal division. 
Please advise if further information is needed. 
Sincerely, 
sa 
Page 58 of 58 
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