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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
vs.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN. 
JANE DOE NO. 3, 
VS. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN. 
/ 
JANE DOE NO. 4, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN. 
JANE DOE NO. 5, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN. 
CASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-KAM-L 
---- DC 
JUL 2 8 2008 
STEVEN 
CLERK M LAD 
U 
-EL-r-EyeAgr 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-  -KAM-L 
CASE NO.: 08-80380-CIV-KAM-LRJ 
CASE NO.: 08-80381-CIV-KAM-LRJ 
FILED UNDER SEAL.
EPSTEIN'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY 
This motion is filed under seal because the deferred-prosecution agreement between the United States Attorney's 
Office and Mr. Epstein. discussed herein, contains a confidentiality clause. 
A motion to seal has been filed 
contemporaneously. 
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The Pendine Federal Criminal Action 
In 2006, a Florida state grand jury indicted Jeffrey Epstein on allegations similar to those in 
the instant actions (State of Florida v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 2006 CF 09454, Fifteenth Judicial 
Circuit. Palm Beach County) (the "Florida Criminal Action")) Shortly thereafter, the United States 
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida (the "USAO") began a federal grand-jury 
investigation into allegations arising out of the same incidents alleged in the instant actions (Grand 
Jury No. 07-103 (WPB),2 United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida) (the 
"Federal Criminal Action"). 
In September 2007, the USAO and Mr. Epstein entered into a highly unusual and 
unprecedented deferred-prosecution agreement (the "Agreement"), in which the USAO agreed to 
defer (not dismiss or close) the Federal Criminal Action on the condition that Mr. Epstein continue 
to comply with numerous obligations, the first of which was pleading guilty to certain state charges 
in the Florida Criminal Action. 
The Agreement itself uses the term "deferred" (rather than 
"dismissed" or "closed") to describe the status of the Federal Criminal Action: 
THEREFORE, on the authority of R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of Florida, prosecution in this District for these offenses shall be 
deferred in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida, provided that Epstein abides by 
the following conditions and the requirements of this Agreement . . . . 
Agreement, at 2. 
By no stretch did the USAO finalize, close, complete, dismiss or abandon the Federal 
Criminal Action. Indeed, as the lead federal prosecutor recently explained, the USAO merely 
Since the filing of the motion to stay, Mr. Epstein has pled guilty and been sentenced in the Florida Criminal Action. 
See Notice Concerning Motion to Stay (7/1/08). Accordingly, the Florida Criminal Action is no longer a basis for this 
stay. Epstein relies exclusively on the pending Federal Criminal Action for this motion and therefore here provides 
additional background information relating to that action. 
At the USAO's request, we wish to clarify a minor issue regarding the form of a citation in Epstein's initial 
memorandum supporting his motion to stay. That memorandum cites to the Federal Criminal Action as "thn Grand 
Jury No. 07.103 (WPB)," rather than citing it simply as "Grand Jury No. 107-103 (WPB)." See Motion to Stay, at 2 
(6/20/08). Technically, a citation to in re Grand Jury No. 07-103 (WPB)" could be interpreted as referring to 
litigation arising from Epstein's motion to quash a subpoena previously issued by "Grand Jury No. 07-103 (WPB)," 
which subpoena, according to the terms of the deferred-prosecution agreement between Epstein and the USAO 
described infra at 1-3, the USAO is presently holding in abeyance. Accordingly, we hereby clarify that our citation on 
Page 2 of our motion to stay denoted the grand-jury investigation itself, not litigation arising from that grand-jury 
investigation. 
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"agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida . ... 
See In 
re. Jane Doe, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-Marra/Johnson (S.D. Fla.) (DE 14), 
5, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (emphasis added). Under the Agreement, 
the USAO presently retains the continuing right to indict Mr. Epstein - - or to unseal "any" 
already-existing federal "charges" that may already have been handed up by the federal grand jury 
and sealed - - should he breach any of its provisions. Agreement, at 2. 
The period of the deferral continues until three months after Mr. Epstein completes service 
of his sentence in the Florida Criminal Action. Id. Indeed, the final three months of the 
Agreement's term constitute an extended period during which the USAO expressly retains the 
ability to evaluate whether Epstein committed any breaches of his numerous obligations under the 
Agreement while he was serving his state sentence, and, if it so determines, reserves the right to 
indict (or unseal an existing indictment against) Mr. Epstein - - even after he has completed 
serving his entire state sentence. 
The Agreement further provides that upon Epstein's execution of a plea agreement in the 
State Criminal Case, the Federal Criminal Action "will be suspended" and all pending grand-jury 
subpoenas "will be held in abeyance unless and until the defendant violates any term of this 
agreement." Agreement, at 5 (emphasis added). The Agreement directs the USAO and Epstein to 
"maintain their evidence, specifically evidence requested by or directly related to the grand jury 
subpoenas that have been issued," and to maintain such evidence "inviolate." Id. (emphasis 
added). It also expressly provides that the grand-jury subpoenas continue to remain "outstanding" 
until "the successful completion of the terms of this agreement." Id. (emphasis added). 
Finally, the Agreement provides that the USAO's declination of prosecution for certain 
enumerated offenses and dismissal of any existing (sealed) charges will not occur until 90 days 
following the completion of his state sentence: 
If the United States Attorney should determine, based on reliable evidence, that, 
during the period of the Agreement, Epstein willfully violated any of the conditions 
of this Agreement, then the United States Attorney may, within ninety (90) days 
following the expiration of the term of home confinement discussed below, provide 
Epstein with timely notice specifying the condition(s) of the Agreement that he has 
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violated, and shall initiate its prosecution on any offense within sixty (60) days' of 
[sic] giving notice of the violation. Any notice provided to Epstein pursuant to this 
paragraph shall be provided within 60 days of the United States learning of facts 
which may provide a basis for a determination of a breach of the Agreement. 
After timely fulfilling all the terms and conditions of the Agreement, no 
prosecution for the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2 of this Agreement, nor any 
other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's Office, nor any offenses 
that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation will be instituted in this 
District, and the charges against Epstein, if any, will be dismissed. 
Agreement, at 2. 
Consistent with the Agreement and its position that the Federal Criminal Action continues 
to remain pending, the USAO recently sent letters to attorneys for people that the USAO has 
designated as -victims." In those letters, the USAO asked, "[1]f you do file a claim under 18 
U.S.C. § 2255 and Mr. Epstein denies that your client is a victim of an enumerated offense, please 
provide notice of that denial to the undersigned [AUSA]." See Decl. of 
Exhs. 6 
& 7, at 2 (July 9, 2008). The clear implication of the USAO's request (by which the USA() 
appears to involve itself in the instant litigation, despite advising the recipients that it cannot "take 
part in or otherwise assist in civil litigation," id.), is that the USAO believes that such denial might 
breach the Agreement. 
Accordingly, the Federal Criminal Action remains "pending." 
Discussion 
I. 
Section 3509(k) Applies to Investigations, Not Just Indictments. 
While there is no unsealed indicted criminal case against Mr. Epstein, the government's 
criminal investigation against him remains open. Section 3509(k) clearly applies to stay civil 
cases during the pendency, not only of indicted criminal cases, but also of yet-to-be-closed 
investigations. 
The term "criminal action" is not expressly defined in § 3509(k). It is defined, however, 
by a closely related statute. Title 18, U.S.C. § 1595 provides a civil remedy for "forced labor" and 
"sex trafficking" violations, but stays such actions "during the pendency of any criminal action 
arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim." (A copy of § 1595 is 
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attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). In enacting § 1595, Congress specifically intended that the term 
"criminal action" would be applied extremely broadly. Accordingly, Congress took pains to 
ensure that courts would give it the broadest possible construction and, for that reason, specified in 
the definition provision that "criminal action" also "includes investigation." 
18 U.S.C. § 
1595(b)(2). The only reported decision addressing this provision interpreted it according to its 
plain language. See Ara v. Khan, No. CV 07-1251, 2007 WL 1726456,'2 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 
2007) (ordering "all proceedings in this case stayed pending the conclusion of the government's 
criminal investigation of the defendants and of any resulting criminal prosecution") (emphasis 
added). 
Given that the USAO's Agreement with Epstein indicates that: 
• 
the grand-jury's subpoenas remain "outstanding" (Agreement, at 5); 
• 
the subpoenas are "held in abeyance" (id.): 
• 
the subpoenas are not "withdrawn" (W.); 
• 
the parties must "maintain their evidence" (id.) (which would be entirely unnecessary if 
the investigation against Epstein were closed); 
• "any" existing "charges" will not "be dismissed" until after Epstein has "timely 
fulfill[ed] all the terms and conditions of the [A]greement" (id. at 2); and 
• 
"prosecution in this District . . . shall be deferred" (id.) (but not closed or dismissed), 
- - then. the only reasonable conclusion is that the Federal Criminal Action remains "pending.-3
The plaintiffs argue that a § 3509(k) stay would be "inconsistent with Mr. Epstein's 
Agreement with the U.S. Attorney" which the plaintiffs claim is reproduced in the lead 
3 The ordinary meaning of the adjective "pending" is "(r]emaining undecided; awaiting decision . . .. Black's Law 
Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit routinely relies on 
Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of statutory terms, including in criminal cases. See e.g., United States v. 
Young. 528 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (definitions of criminal "complaint" and "indictment"); United 
States v. Brown, 526 F.3d 691, 705 (11th Cir. 2008) (definition of "knowingly" in criminal statute). A Westlaw 
search revealed that in 2008 alone, the Eleventh Circuit has already published eight opinions relying on Black's Law 
Dictionary for definitions. See also, White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Black's Law 
Dictionary, in the context of a criminal case, for the definition of "pending" as "awaiting decision"); Swam v. 
Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421 (3d Cir. 2000) (relying on Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of "pending," 
expressly because "'pendi,g' is not defined in the statute"). Any common-sense reading of the Agreement and the 
USAO's recent sworn construction of it, is consonant with the Federal Criminal Action's "remaining undecided" and 
"awaiting decision." See Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County v. Athens Newspapers, LLC, No. S07Gl133. 
_S.E.2d 
2008 Wt. 2579238, '3 (Ga. June 30, 2008) (reviewing a public-records request against Georgia's 
"pending investigation" exception to its open-records law, and holding that "a seemingly inactive investigation which 
has not yet resulted in a prosecution logically "remains undecided," and is therefore -pending," until it -is concluded 
and the file closed') (emphasis added). 
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prosecutor's July 10 letter to their counsel (attached to Plaintiffs' responses as Exhibit A). 
Apparently, on July 10, the lead prosecutor sent a letter to the plaintiffs' lawyer stating that "[o]ne 
. . . condition to which Epstein has agreed" is that each plaintiff "will have the same rights to 
proceed under Section 2255 as she would have had, if Mr. Epstein had been tried federally and 
convicted of an enumerated offense." See Response Memo, at 5 & Ex. A, at 1-2 (emphasis 
added). This argument warrants absolutely no consideration, however, since the plaintiffs have 
not pled any claims under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. 
H. 
Section 3509(k) Applies Even After a Plaintiff Turns 18. 
Without citing to a single case, the plaintiffs argue that § 3509(k) does not apply to 
plaintiffs over the age of 18. An examination of the legislative history and related statutes shows 
that this unsupported argument must be rejected. 
The parallel stay provision in § 1595, discussed supra at 3-4, mandates, without exception, 
that 
any 
civil 
action 
brought 
under 
that 
section 
for 
violations 
of 
§ 1591 (prohibiting transportation of minors for prostitution) "shall be stayed during the pendency 
of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim." 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(bX1). Whether the § 1595 plaintiff has turned 18 does not vitiate the efficacy of 
this mandatory stay. 
An example illustrates why the stay provided in § 3509(k) has the same broad scope as the 
stay provided in § 1591(b)(1). As discussed above, § 3509(k) stays any civil suit for injury to a 
minor, arising out of the same occurrence as a pending criminal action. One type of civil suit 
falling within § 3509(k)'s ambit is a suit seeking redress for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). 
Section 2423(a) - - just like § 1591 - - prohibits transportation of minors for prostitution. The 
elements of both statutes are identical. There would simply be no legitimate basis for Congress to 
differentiate between the consequences attached to violating these two sections. Thus, just as 
Congress mandated under § 1595(bX1) that civil discovery shall be stayed when there is an 
ongoing federal investigation under § 1591 (even after the victim turns 18), the identical treatment 
should apply under § 3509(k) to civil actions brought for the identical violation of § 2423(a). 
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Logic compels a rule requiring continued application of the § 3509(k) stay to a putative 
victim who has since turned 18. Consider again the example of § 2243(a). Assume that the 
USAO is investigating a § 2243(a) violator with two alleged victims: one who is now 17, and one 
who has turned 19. Assume further that both decide to sue the alleged offender while the USAO 
is still in the process of conducting its criminal investigation. Why would Congress prohibit the 
defendant from conducting civil discovery in the 17-year-old's lawsuit, but permit him to conduct 
full discovery in the 19-year-old's lawsuit, including taking the depositions of both the 19- and the 
17-year-old, the federal investigating agents and all the grand-jury witnesses? This could not have 
been Congress' intent. 
The legislative history to a statute resembling § 1595 is also instructive. When Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2255, it provided a civil remedy to any "minor . . . victim" of enumerated 
federal sex offenses. See Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 
1783. § 703 (1986). In 2006, Congress amended the statute to clarify that the civil cause of action 
was available not just while the victim was a minor, but even after she or he turned IS. See Pub. 
1. 109-248, 120 Stat. 650, § 707 (bX1XA) (amending § 2255 to permit suit by adults who were 
victims of enumerated federal offenses whcn they were minors, by deleting "Any minor who is [a 
victim]" and adding "Any person, who, while a minor, was [a victim]"). 
Meanwhile, the stay 
provisions of § 3509(k) remained unchanged. There is no reason to think that Congress would 
afford prosecutors protection for their investigations while the victims were minors, but 
completely eliminate those protections the moment one of the victims turned 18. 
The District Court for the Northern District of Florida confirmed this position and 
specifically rejected the plaintiffs' contrary argument. See Doe v. Francis. No. 5:03 CV 260, 2005 
WI 950623, at "2 (N.D. Fla. 2005). The plaintiffs there argued that "the stay should be lifted due 
to the fact that the minor Plaintiffs have now reached the age of majority during the pendency of 
the state criminal case." Id. The court found this argument "unavailing . . . given the victims' 
minor status at the time of the events giving rise to the underlying claims." Id. (Interestingly. the 
arguments made by Jane Doe Nos. 2-5 in their oppositions to Epstein's motion to stay presently 
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pending before this Court, are literally lifted° from the plaintiffs' brief submitted to, and rejected 
by, the Northern District of New York in Francis.) The court specifically held that "because the 
victims were minors at the time of the Defendants' actions alleged in both [the civil and 
criminal] cases, § 3509(k) applies." Id. (emphasis added). 
The United States Department of Justice has itself emphatically embraced the 
interpretation of § 3509(k) as applying to stay all civil actions relating to sex offenses against 
minors, pending the completion of a parallel criminal action, without regard to whether the 
plaintiff has turned 18 during her civil lawsuit: 
The subsection should stay all pending civil actions in the wake of a criminal 
prosecution. Notably, in the context of 18 USC § 2255 ("civil remedy for personal 
injuries"), all civil actions are stayed pending the completion of a criminal action. 
See also 18 USC § 3509(k). 
H.R. Rep. 108-264(11), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), reprinted at 2003 WL 22272907, at •16-17 
("agency view" by the Department of Justice on bill later codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1595). 
The Department specifically argued to Congress in the clearest terms: "We believe that 
prosecutions should take priority over civil redress and that prosecutions should be complete prior 
to going forward with civil suits." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Nowhere did the Department 
remotely suggest - - as the plaintiffs have implied - - that pending prosecutions warrant less 
protection (Le., should be "hinder[ed]") simply because a particular civil plaintiff happens to reach 
his or her 18th birthday. 
III. 
A Stay is Mandatory Despite Resulting "Delay" to Civil Lawsuits. 
Inherent in any § 3509(k) stay is delay to the progress (discovery, trial, appeal) of all 
related civil lawsuits. Congress recognized this in enacting the stay provision, which necessarily 
prioritized the interests of completing a criminal investigation and prosecution over the interests of 
a particular plaintiff in seeking personal pecuniary damages. Based on this reasoning, the Francis 
Compare Doe it Fronds, Case No. 5:03cv260-MCR-WCS (N.D. Ha.), Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Reconsider Plaintiffs' Motion to Lift Stay and for Status Conference (DE 92, available on PACER), with 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant's Motion to Stay, filed in Case Nos. 08-cv-80119-KAM 
Woe No. Z DE 25), 08-cv-80232-KAM (Doe No. 3. DE 20), 08-cv-80380-KAM (Doe No. 4, DE 31), and 08-cv-
8038I-KAM (Due No. 5. DE 29). 
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court specifically refused to provide any relief to plaintiffs "simply because the state [criminal] 
matter is not progressing as fast as they would hope." 2005 WL 950623, at *2. The court made 
this determination despite the plaintiffs' complaints about the "frustrating delay" and that "the 
state criminal case 'has languished for almost two years with no end in sight,' finding that this "is 
a matter to be addressed in state [criminal] court." Id. Accordingly, the anticipated delay in this 
case, attendant to the term of the deferred-prosecution agreement, does not change the clear 
command of § 3509(k). 
According to their own pleadings, the plaintiffs waited between three and six years before 
filing these lawsuits, and so cannot rightfully claim prejudice from additional temporary delay. 
IV. 
Section 3509 Aside, a Discretionary Stay is Warranted. 
Even, arguendo, were this Court not to apply the mandate of § 3509, a discretionary stay 
should still be entered during the pendency of the Federal Criminal Action. SEC v. Healthsouth 
Corp.. 261 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1326 (N.D. Ala. 2003) ("No question exists that this court has the 
power to stay a civil proceeding due to an active, parallel criminal investigation."). Other federal 
statutes support such a stay -- particularly when the criminal action may be adversely affected by 
the civil litigation. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 2712(e)(1), "the court shall stay any action 
commenced [against the United States] if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely 
affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related investigation or prosecution of a related 
criminal case." Allowing these lawsuits to progress while Epstein remains subject to the Federal 
Criminal Action will prejudice him irrevocably and irreparably. As provided below, there are 
several adverse effects to allowing the civil litigation to proceed while the Federal Criminal Action 
remains pending. 
In these lawsuits, Epstein has a right to defend himself. In the Federal Criminal Action, 
Epstein has a right against self-incrimination' Without a stay, Epstein will be immediately forced 
to abandon one of these rights. 
' Jane Does No. 2 and No. 3 allege that their claims arose niiIn or about 2004-2005;" Jane Does No. 4 and No. 5 
allege that their claims arose -Ian or about 2002-2003.- Complaints, 1 8. 
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Should he choose his Fifth Amendment rights, he will expose himself to an adverse 
inference at the summary-judgment stage and at trial. See generally. Wehling v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., 611 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that "invocation of the privilege would be 
subject to the drawing of an adverse inference by the trier of fact"). 
On the other hand, should Epstein choose his right to defend himself in these lawsuits, the 
USAO will be able to use his responses at every stage of the discovery and trial process (e.g., his 
Answer, responses to document requests, responses to requests for admissions, sworn answers to 
interrogatories, answers to deposition questions, and trial testimony) to his detriment in the 
Federal Criminal Action.' 
In these lawsuits, even before civil discovery begins, under the Initial Disclosures required 
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and S.D. Fla. Local Rule 26.1, Epstein "must" disclose the identities of all 
the witnesses he would call in his defense to the Federal Criminal Action (Rule 26(aXI XAXi)), 
copies of "all documents" he "may use to support [his] defenses" (Rule 26(aX1XA)(ii)), as well as 
the identity of "any" expert witness he "may use at trial," along with mandatory disclosure of "a 
written report" containing "a complete statement of all opinions the [expert] will express and the 
basis and reasons for them" (Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and (B)(i)). 
In contrast, in the pending Federal Criminal Action, which is governed exclusively by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the USAO would not be entitled to compel pm-trial 
production of any of this information. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 16(bX1)(A), (C), and 16(bX2); United 
States v. Argomaniz, 925 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining act-of-production 
privilege). 
Thus, absent a stay of this civil action, the USAO would receive fundamentally unfair 
access to defense information and highly prejudicial advance insight into criminal defense 
The privilege applies in "instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger" of criminal 
liability. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951). 
This could give the USAO a tremendous advantage in prosecuting Epstein in the Federal Criminal Action. See 
Comment, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1023. 1030 
(1985) (observing that '-the prosecutor may have access to detailed civil depositions of the accused witnesses, while 
the rules of criminal procedure bar the accused from deposing the prosecutor's witnesses"). 
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strategy. See Comment, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 1030 ("To the extent that a prosecutor acquires 
evidence that was elicited from the accused in a parallel civil proceeding, the criminal process 
becomes less adversarial."). 
Without a stay in place, discovery will proceed, including against third parties. Mr. 
Epstein will have no alternative but to issue subpoenas seeking evidence from state and federal 
law-enforcement officers. For example, Epstein is clearly entitled to discover evidence of prior 
statements (including inconsistent statements) given by witnesses whom law-enforcement has 
previously interviewed. See. e.g., Cox v. Treadway. 75 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
district court properly admitted testimony of prosecutor about prior inconsistent statements that 
witness made to the prosecutor). Likewise, Epstein may be entitled to discovery of relevant 
evidence that is in the present possession of the grand jury or other law-enforcement agencies. 
See, e.g., Simpson v. Hines, 729 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Tex. 1989) ("The grand jury has 
concluded its deliberations ... . The need for secrecy of these specific tapes no longer outweighs 
other concerns."); Golden Quality Ice Cream Co., Inc. v. Deerfield Specialty Papers. Inc., 87 
F.R.D. 53, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[W]here, as here, the grand jury has completed its work and all 
that is sought are those documents turned over to the grand jury by the corporations which are 
defendants in the civil case, the considerations . . . militating against disclosure are beside the 
point.") (citing Douglas Oil Co. of Calif. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 (1979)). 
In response to such third-party subpoenas to law-enforcement witnesses, we anticipate that 
it will be the government, not Mr. Epstein, who will object to discovery in these civil cases, until 
the final conclusion of the Federal Criminal Action. 
Conclusion 
Because these lawsuits arise from the same allegations as the Federal Criminal Action, this 
Court should stay these cases until that criminal action is no longer pending. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS TEIN, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 
Tel: 305 442 1101 Fax: 305 442 6744 
By: 
GUY A. EWIS 
Fla. Bar No. 623740 
lewis®Iewistein.com 
MICHAEL R. TEIN 
Fla. Bar No. 993522 
tein@lewistein.com 
ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & WEISS, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Tel. 561 659 8300 Fax. 561 835 8691 
By: 
Jack A. Goldberger 
Fla. Bar No. 262013 
jgoldberger®agwpa.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Jay Epstein 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 711.A.3 
While defense counsel admittedly did not confer with plaintiffs' counsel prior to filing the motion 
to stay, it was by no means in willful disregard of the Local Rule. Shortly after the filing of the 
motion and before plaintiffs filed their response memoranda suggesting that no conference had 
taken place, the parties did confer in a good faith and specific attempt to resolve the motion and 
were unable to do so, because plaintiffs' counsel would not agree to a stay. Accordingly, the brief 
delay in conducting the Rule 7.1 conference did not prejudice the plaintiffs at all or result in 
unnecessary judicial intervention. It is perhaps worth noting that, contrary to their Rule 7.1 
certificate, plaintiffs did not confer prior to filing their motion to extend time to file their response 
memoranda (which extension defendant did not oppose anyway, including on the basis of failure 
to comply with Rule 7.1). Further information on the reasons the Rule 7.1 conference for the 
instant motion to stay was conducted after filing the motion to stay will be provided to the Court 
upon its request, preferably ex pane in order to avoid disclosure of privileged information. The 
defendant respectfully requests the opportunity to make such an ex pane disclosure in the event 
that the Court considers denying the motion under Local Rule 7.1.A.3. In any event, we apologize 
to the Court for non-compliance with the pre-filing requirement of the Rule, would have conferred 
even sooner had plaintiffs pointed the issue out immediately upon receipt of our motion, did 
confer with plaintiffs' counsel prior to filing the motion to seal this reply, and commit to precise 
compliance with the Rule for the remainder of this litigation. 
14
.
Jack oldberger, Michael 1 ein 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was served on July 28, 2008 by U.S. 
mail on all counsel named on the service list. 
4444 
Michael R. Tein 
SERVICE LIST 
Jeffrey M. Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Herman & Mermelstcin, P.A. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Rule 7.1(A) of the Local Rules for the Southern District of 
Florida, moves to dismiss Count I of plaintiffs complaint,' and states as follows: 
' The time to answer the remaining allegations of the complaint is tolled pending the Court's 
ruling on the present motion. See Beaulieu v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of W. Fla., No. 
3:07cv30/RV/EMT, 2007 WL 2020161, * 2 (N.D. Fla. July 9, 2007) (holding that defendant's 
partial motion to dismiss "automatically extends its time to answer . . . until after the court has 
ruled on [its] motion to dismiss"); Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 
249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding "that the filing of a motion that only addresses part of a 
complaint suspends the time to respond to the entire complaint, not just to the claims that are the 
subject of the motion"); Schwartz v. Berry College, Inc., No. Civ.A. 4:96CV338-HLM, 1997 WL 
579166, *1 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 1997) (noting that there is significant case law to support the 
position that "when a defendant files a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, addressing only some of 
the claims contained in the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant is not required to file an answer 
until the court rules on the motion to dismiss"). 
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CASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
This action arises out of the alleged assault of the plaintiff. According to the 
allegations in her complaint, the plaintiff went to Mr. Epstein's house to give him 
"a massage for monetary compensation" (Compl. ¶ 12), where Mr. Epstein 
allegedly assaulted her "in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes." 
(Comp!. ¶ 18). 
The plaintiff tries to assert a claim for sexual assault (Compl. ¶¶ 15-19.) 
This theory of liability, however, cannot be supported by the allegations in the 
complaint. In fact, even if everything in the complaint were true, recovery against 
Jeffrey Epstein, for Count I, under any formulation, is impossible under Florida 
law. Accordingly, this count must be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) should be granted when a 
court cannot identify "each of the material elements necessary to sustain a 
recovery under some viable legal theory." Snow v. DirectTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 
1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. For Choice, Inc., 253 
F.3d 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, a court should dismiss a complaint 
"when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual 
allegations will support a cause of action." Marshall County Bd. of Ethic. v. 
Marshal County Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). "[T]o survive a 
2 
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motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions; 
they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions . 
Holt v. Grist, No. 06-14617, 2007 WL 1156938, *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2007). As 
such, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions 
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Snow, 450 F.3d at 1320. 
I. 
Count I Fails to State a Cause of Action For Assault Recoenized by 
Florida Law. 
The plaintiff attempts to plead a cause of action against Mr. Epstein for 
"sexual assault" based on a "violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes"2 for 
the "lewd and lascivious acts committed by Epstein upon Jane Doe." (Compl. 
18.) Plaintiff cannot assert a cause of action for "violation of Chapter 800, Florida 
Statutes" because there is no private right of action under that Chapter. See 
generally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 374 
(Fla. 2005) (observing that "not every statutory violation carries a civil remedy" 
(citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 
2003)). See also, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ferre, 636 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. 
Fla. 1985) (King, C.J.) (holding that violation of Florida's criminal extortion 
statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action for damages). 
2 Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, is entitled, "Lewdness; Indecent Exposure." 
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Where a plaintiff brings a civil action pursuant to a criminal statute that 
provides no civil remedy, her complaint is properly dismissed for failure to state a 
cause of action. See Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So. 2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1990) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim for parental kidnapping 
where "the mentioned statutes concern only criminal violations and do not afford 
a civil remedy") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Even if Chapter 800 provided a civil remedy (which it does not) the statute 
does not apply to the plaintiff. The statute prohibits sexual activity with or lewd or 
lascivious offenses against "a person . . . less than 16 years of age." § 800.04, Fla. 
Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). 
By her own admission, the plaintiff was 
"approximately 16 years old." (Comp/. ¶ 8.) (emphasis added). 
Plainly, the 
plaintiff falls outside of the scope of the statute's protection. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff's claim for sexual assault against Mr. Epstein, pursuant to a violation of 
Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, must be dismissed. 
Should the Court look beyond the plain language of the plaintiff's complaint 
and construe Count I as a claim for common-law assault, that claim would also 
fail. As the court explained in Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1982), an assault is "an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to 
another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward another under such 
circumstances as to create a fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent 
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present ability to effectuate the attempt." An assault thus requires "an affirmative 
act—a threat to use force, or the actual exertion of force." Sullivan v. Ad. Fed. 
Say. & Loan Assoc., 454 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (affirming dismissal of 
assault claim where there was no affirmative act). 
In this case, there is no such affirmative act. The only thing that Mr. Epstein 
is alleged to have said to the plaintiff is "to take off her clothes" and "to give him a 
massage." (Compl. ¶ 12.) These allegations fall far short of an "offer of corporal 
injury by force." There are no allegations that Jane Doe was placed in any fear of 
imminent peril. See Gatto v. Pubblx Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1980) (holding that where there was no evidence to show that Gatto was 
placed in fear of imminent peril, there was no assault). In fact, the plaintiff does 
not even allege that Mr. Epstein touched her. Thus, there was no assault. 
Accordingly, because the plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action for 
assault recognized in Florida, Count I against Mr. Epstein must be dismissed. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully 
requests that Count I of the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. 
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CASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS TEIN, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 
Tel: 305 442 1101 
Fax: 305 442 6744 
By: /s/ Michael R. Tein 
GUY A. LEWIS 
Fla. Bar No. 623740 
lewis@lewistein.com 
MICHAEL R. TEIN 
Fla. Bar No. 993522 
tein@lewistein.com 
ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & 
WEISS, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Tel. 561 659 8300 
Fax. 561 835 8691 
By: 
Jack A. Goldberger 
Fla. Bar No. 262013 
jgoldberger@agwpa.com 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & 
COLEMAN, LLP 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Tel. 561 842 2820 
Fax. 561 515 3148 
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CASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
By: 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
Fla. Bar No. 224162 
rcritton@bc1claw.com 
Michael J. Pike, Esq. 
Fla. Bar No. 617296 
mpike@bc1claw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1 
Undersigned counsel has conferred in good faith with counsel for the 
plaintiff, who opposes the relief requested in this motion. 
/s/ Michael R. Tein 
Michael R. Tein 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 4, 2008, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the 
foregoing document is being served this day on all individuals on the following 
service list via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF. 
/s/ Michael R. Tein 
Michael R. Tein 
7 
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