EFTA00191396

3 has also made strong, credible claims against Jean Luc Brunel — corroborated allegations that 
parallel those made by others. See Exhibit 16 at 22. 
In contrast to this interlocking web of corroborating evidence, the Court should examine 
what Dershowitz says in his affidavit — and, more important, fails to say. The Court will notice 
that Dershowitz devotes only a single sentence in his affidavit to his activities at Epstein's Palm 
Beach and New York mansions. See DE 282-I at 3 ("As to Mr. Epstein's homes in New York 
City and Palm Beach, I categorically state that I never had any sexual contact with Jane Doe 
#3."). The Court may immediately wonder about the following questions: How long did 
Dershowitz spend at these homes? Was he with his wife and family, as he has suggested in 
television interviews? How many times was he there overnight? Did Dershowitz ever see any of 
the dozens and dozens of young girls whom Epstein was sexually abusing? Did Dershowitz ever 
get a "massage" from one of these young girls? 
The Court may also wish to contrast Dershowitz's very narrow affidavit with his more 
sweeping statements to the media. On popular television programs, Dershowitz has emphatically 
denounced Jane Doe No. 3 as a liar and said he can prove "conclusively" that lie has never even 
met her.30 Yet in his sworn affidavit, Dershowitz does not repeat that broad claim.}' Nor does 
Dershowitz ever address his knowledge of other young girls, in addition to Jane Doe No. 3, 
abused by Epstein in those houses. 
10 See, e.g., http://www.ctutcom/20 I 5/01/05/europe/prince-andrew-sex-abuse-allegations/index.html ("Q: 
"Have you ever met this woman named [Jane Doe No. 3]?" A: "No. Absolutely not, I don't know who 
she is."); CNN News Day 
http://www.cnn.com/videos/tv/20I5/0I/05/bts-newday-alan-dershowitz-prince-andrew-sex-scandal-
allegations.cnn (Jan. 5, 2015) ("1 never met this woman. I never touched her. I was never massaged by 
her. There was no contact, no contact whatsoever — and I will prove it conclusively."). 
31 In the media, Dershowitz has also offered to execute a waiver of the statute of limitations to enable 
Jane Doe No. 3 to file charges against him. Shortly after Dershowitz first made that offer, Jack Scarola, 
Esq., provided Dershowitz with a waiver form for hint to sign. Dershowitz declined to sign the fonn and 
later advised, through his counsel, that he was "considering" whether to waive the statute of limitations. 
34 
EFTA00191436

In his affidavit, Dershowitz also cagily states that he sent a letter to an attorney who was 
seeking a deposition, recounting that in that letter he (Dershowitz) said he was "not a witness to 
any alleged crimes." DE 282-1 at 3. But Dershowitz does not repeat under oath the broad claim 
that he never witnessed any alleged crimes — presumably because he is aware of certain child 
abuse reporting obligations that might be at issue if he did so. 
Against this mounting evidence of guilt, Dershowitz suggests in his affidavit that aircraft 
flight manifests will exonerate him. DE 282-1 ("I was on that plane on several occasion as the 
manifests will show, but never under circumstances where it would have been possible to have 
sex with Jane Doe #3."). In media statements, Dershowitz has repeatedly brought up the 
manifests as proof of innocence.32 Coincidentally and remarkably, it was Dershowitz himself, 
acting as Epstein's attorney, who personally collected and then provided flight manifests to the 
Palm Beach Police Department. See, e.g., Police Detective Joe Recarey Depo. at 281, Jane Doe 
No. 2'. Epstein, No. 9:08-cv-80119-KAM (Mar. 19, 2010). (excerpts attached as Exhibit 29) 
Dershowitz provided manifests covering just the 10 months: January 1, 2005, through October 
17, 2005, During civil litigation, believing that these flight manifests were grossly incomplete, 
counsel subpoenaed Epstein for complete flight logs. Epstein failed to provide any information 
at all. Counsel were then forced to request flight logs from Epstein's various private pilots. 
One of Epstein's pilots, David Rogers, provided certain flight logs covering some flights 
from a much broader time frame: 1997-2005. 
This production confirmed that the flight 
32 See, e.g.. The Today Show, Jan. 5, 2015 ("She claims I had sex with her in the airplanes, manifests of 
the flights will show I was never on the airplanes with her."); Halo Gorani — CNN Live, Jan. 5, 2015 ("As 
far as the planes are concerned, there arc flight manifests. They will prove I was never on any private 
airplane with any young women."). 
35 
EFTA00191437

information Dershowitz provided to police was incomplete. 
A comparison of the flight 
manifests and logs confirms that the flight logs provided by Rogers were also incomplete. A 
cursory review of both logs reveals that together the logs produced cover only a small fraction of 
the flights taken and the passengers on board. While this is obvious for multiple reasons, a few 
examples may help to make this point. For instance, the flight records provided by Dershowitz 
for a February 3, 2005, flight from CMH (Columbus, Ohio) to PBI (Palm Beach, Florida), 
indicate that in addition to Jeffrey Epstein, Sarah Kellen, Nadia Marcinkova, and Jean Luc 
Brunel, on board were three "females." The existence of these three "females" is conspicuously 
absent from the Rogers' logs. Compare Composite Exhibit 25 with Composite Exhibit 26 
(Rodgers Logs). Other flights, such as the March 18, 2005 flight from New York to Florida, 
taken by Maxwell, Epstein and Dana Bums are missing altogether from the Rogers logs. 
Likewise, flights that appear on the Rogers logs are missing from the logs produced by 
Dershowitz. 
Multiple examples lead to the clear conclusion that all produced logs are 
incomplete and may well have been heavily sanitized. For example, on February 9, 1998, 
Dershowitz flew on Epstein's private plane from Palm Beach, Florida, to Teterboro, New Jersey. 
One of the passengers is listed as "1 female." Exhibit 27. Who is that "female" — and what is 
her age? Similarly, Jane Doe No. 3 appears on a July 16, 2001, flight from Santa Fe, New 
Mexico to Teterboro, New Jersey, along with Epstein, Maxwell and Emmy Tayler. Yet there is 
no earlier flight that would have landed Jane Doe No. 3 in New Mexico. According to the logs, 
the next flight is from Palm Beach to the U.S. Virgin Islands on July 23, 2001, although Jane 
Doe No. 3 does not appear. The impression is that she remained in the New Jersey area. 
However, on July 28, 2001, Jane Doe No. 3 is on a flight with Epstein from the Virgin Islands 
back to Palm Beach. See Exhibit 26. How did she get to the Virgin Islands? 
36 
EFTA00191438

The flight logs provide evidence of some of the individuals who were on some of the 
flights - nothing more. Accordingly, it would not be surprising to find that some of these flight 
logs do not mention Dershowitz, because they were likely designed to hide evidence of criminal 
activity — or perhaps later cleansed of such evidence. With that said, some interesting things do 
appear in the flight logs. Unlike any other of Epstein's numerous criminal defense attorneys, 
Dershowitz appears in the flight logs for flights on Epstein's private planes produced by pilot 
Rogers on numerous occasions. 
Dershowitz also appears on flights with various females, 
including Epstein's known procurer of underage girls, Sarah Kellen. And, in contrast to recent 
media suggestions by Dershowitz, his family does not appear on any of the flights with him. 
Jane Doe No. 3 is listed on the logs as a passenger at a time when she is under age I8. 
While the logs do not show Dershowitz on the same flight with her, it is abundantly clear that the 
logs do not contain evidence of all of the flights that she was on and that they are grossly 
incomplete. The flight logs do confirm that she was transported by Epstein to Florida, New York, 
London, New Mexico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands -- locations where she states under oath that 
Epstein forced her to have sex with various individuals, including Dershowitz. 
Finally, in Dershowitz's vociferous attacks on Jane Doe No. 3, the Court will see an eerie 
parallel to the Jeffrey Epstein criminal investigation. Back in 2005, when the Palm Beach Police 
Department was first investigating Epstein's sexual abuse, it interviewed more than a dozen 
minor girls. These girls all provided information about abuse similar to the abuse that Jane Doe 
No. 3 says she suffered in Florida. The Department accumulated overwhelming evidence 
placing underage girls at Epstein's residence with no obvious legal purpose. The logical 
explanation was that these young girls were being truthful when they told law enforcement that 
Epstein (and others) were sexually abusing them. 
37 
EFTA00191439

Rather than acknowledge sexual abuse of these girls, Dershowitz blustered down to 
Florida to meet with the State Attorney and to viciously attack the credibility of these victims — 
to call them liars, defame them as prostitutes, and convince the State Attorney that these girls 
could not even believably establish that they had ever even gone to Epstein's mansion. See, e.g., 
Depo. of Police Chief Michael Reiter at 53-55, 102-06, B.B. 
Epstein, No. 502008CA037319 
XXXX-MB-AB (Palm Beach Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 2009) (excerpts attached as Exhibit 28); see 
also Depo. of Police Detective Joe Recarey at 301-302 and 309-10, Jane Doe No. 2'. Epstein, 
No. 9:08-cv-80119-ICAM (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2010) (excerpts attached as Exhibit 29) Later, 
Dershowitz would write to tell the Justice Department that "Epstein never targeted minors." 
Letter from Gerald Lefcourt & Alan Dershowitz, July 6, 2007 to U.S. Atty.'s Office for the S.D. 
Fla (attached as Exhibit 30). Now, nearly a decade later, there should be no doubt in anyone's 
mind that the minor girls who cooperated with the authorities told the truth about their sexual 
abuse inside Epstein's home -- and that Dershowitz's attack on their credibility was duplicitous. 
In fact, according to credible eyewitness testimony recounted above, Dershowitz was clearly 
present in the home while some of these girls were being abused. The Court should not allow 
Dershowitz's similar bullying tactics to succeed in this case.33
CONCLUSION 
Dershowitz's motion for intervention (DE 282) should be denied. 
"In the media, Dershowitz has said that he will prove that 
o. 3 is lying "beyond any doubt by 
physical and documentary evidence." The Last Word with 
O'Donnell — MSNBC (Jan. 8, 2015) 
http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/watch/alan-dershowitz-on-a egations—totally-false-
381942851573. The Court should compare this media assertion with the materials that Dershowitz files 
along with his reply brief. 
38 
EFTA00191440

DATED: January 21, 2015 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Bradley J. Edwards 
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, 
EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. 
425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 
Telephone (954) 524-2820 
Facsimile (954) 524-2822 
E-mail: brad€mathtojustice.com 
and 
Paul G. Cassell 
Pro Hoe Vice 
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah' 
332 S. 1400 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Telephone: 801-585-5202 
Facsimile: 801-585-6833 
E-Mail: cassellp®law.utah.edu 
Attorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 
• This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is 
not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah 
39 
EFTA00191441

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that the foregoing document was served on January 21, 20 I 5, on the following 
using the Court's CM/ECF system: 
Dexter Lee 
A. Marie Villafafia 
500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(561) 820-8711 
Fax: (561) 820-8777 
E-mail: Dexter.Lee®usdoj.gov 
E-mail: ann.marie.e.villafanalausdoi.uov 
Attorneys for the Government 
Thomas Scott 
thomas.scott®csklegal.com 
COLE, SCOTT & KISSANE, P.A. 
Dadeland Centre II 
9150 South Dadeland Boulevard, Suite 1400 
Miami, Florida 33156 
Telephone: (305) 350-5300 
Facsimile: (305) 373-2294 
-and-
Kendall Coffey 
kcoffey®coffeyburlington.com 
Gabriel Groisman 
ggroisman®coffeyburlington.com 
Benjamin H. Brodsky 
bbrodslcy®coffeyburlington.com 
COFFEY BURLINGTON, P.L. 
2601 South Bayshore Drive, PH 1 
Miami, Florida 33133 
Telephone: (305) 858-2900 
Facsimile: (305) 858-5261 
Attorneys for Alan Dershowitz 
ts/ Bradley J. Edwards 
40 
EFTA00191442

SEALED 
DOCUMENT 
EXHIBIT 30 
EFTA00191443

LAW OFFICES OF 
GERALD B. LEY/COURT, P.G. 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
140 CAST 
STREET 
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021 
GERALD B. LEFCOURT 
• 
lercourtelekourtlaw.com 
Sin 
SHERYL E. REICH 
rokfteelcourew.com 
RENATO E. STABILE 
FabliSokswilawoom 
FAITH A. FRIEDMAN 
IM•cimweelcoutlaw.com 
BY FEDERAL EXPRESS 
July 6, 2007 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq., First Assistant United States Attorney 
Matthew Menchel, Esq., Chief, Criminal Division 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
99 NE 4'h Street 
Miami, Florida 33132 
Andrew Lourie, Deputy Chief, Northern Region 
A. Marie Villafafia, Assistant United States Attorney 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
500 South Australian Avenue, Suite-400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Dear Messrs. Sloman, Menchel and Lourie and Ms. Villafafia: 
We write as counsel to Jeffrey Epstein to follow-up on our meeting on June 26, 
2007. We thought the meeting was extremely productive and appreciate your giving us 
the opportunity to engage you on the facts, law and policy that will inform any decision 
you make on how and whether to proceed. 
I. 
18 U.S.C. §2422(b) Has No Applicability to the Facts Here. 
Even assuming the facts as you believe them to be, as demonstrated below, a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §2422(b) would violate the explicit terms of the statute, pose 
insurmountable constitutional barriers, and be unprecedented, unwise, and utterly 
inappropriate. This statute, with its mandatory minimum sentence' was designed to reach 
The statute in effect during the events at issue carries a mandatory five-year period of 
incarceration. The current ten-year mandatory minimum was instituted in 2006. 
MIA_CEOS_00077 
EFTA00191444

LAW °VICES OF 
GERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafia, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 2 
those who deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally target and exploit children through 
the intemet. Though the literal language may superficially apply to a wider variety of 
behaviors, we submit that the statute cannot properly be used to prosecute what have 
traditionally been viewed as state offenses, even if some facility or means of interstate 
commerce can be said to have been used by someone at some point during the course of 
events. 
1. 
Congress's Purpose 
Section 2422(b), the so-called "Internet Luring Statute", addresses online 
enticement of children. The subsection was included in Title I of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, entitled "Obscenity and Violence", after the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held a hearing regarding child endangerment via the Internet. See 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 193 (1996), quoted in United States '  Searcy, 418 F.3d 
1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 2005); see also K. Seto, "Note: How Should Legislation Deal with 
Children and the Victims and Perpetrators of Cyberstalking?" 9 Cardozo Women's L.J. 67 
(2002). 
In enacting the statute, Congress recognized that young people were using the 
intemet in ever-increasing numbers, and it was proving to be a dangerous place. 
According to a DO) study, one in five youths (aged 10 to 17) had received a sexual 
approach or solicitation over the intemet in the previous year. One in 33 had received an 
"aggressive sexual solicitation", in which a predator had asked a young person to meet 
somewhere or called a young person on the phone. U.S.D.O.J., Office of Justice 
Programs, OVC Bulletin," Internet Crimes Against Children" (12/2001); 
www.oip.usdoi.gov/ovc/oublications/bulletons/internet  " 2 2001/intemet _2_01_6.html. 
Congress saw that, with so many children online, the intemet created a new place 
— cyberspace — where predators could easily target children for criminal acts. Use of the 
intemet, which occurs in private, and the secrecy and deception that acting in cyberspace 
permits, eliminated many of the risks predators face when making contact in person, and 
presented special law enforcement problems that are difficult for any local jurisdiction to 
tackle. Theinandatory minimum sentence for a violation of this section was increased 
from five years to ten years in 2006, by virtue of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006, which also eliminated any statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. 
M IA_CEOS_00078 
EFTA00191445

LAW °MCC.' or 
GERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafta, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 3 
§3299.2 The law was named in memory of Adam Walsh who, 25 years earlier, had been 
abducted from a department store and was later found murdered, and whose parents had 
become advocates for missing children. In his signing statement, President Bush noted 
that it increased federal penalties for crimes against children, imposing "tough mandatory 
minimum penalties for the most serious crimes against our children." 2006 
U.S.C.C.A.N. S35, 2006 WL 3064686 (emphasis added). The five-year mandatory 
minimum it replaced was itself established as part of the PROTECT Act of 2003, another 
law designed to strengthen the government's ability to deal with certain dangerous sexual 
predators who exploited children in ways the states had been unable to address fully.3
2. 
General Overview 
It must be remembered that §2422(b), by using the phrase "any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense", in some sense incorporates 
all the sex offense laws of all 50 states, in all their variety and in all their ambiguity. This 
in itself raises questions of the utmost seriousness, implicating fairness and the due 
process clause. It also constitutes an extreme example of federal pre-emption, or, more 
precisely, the wholesale annexation of the enforcement responsibility of each of the 50 
states' sex-related crime statutes — whether felony, misdemeanor or violation — wherever 
there has been use of the ever-present wires. To make every state sex "offense" involving 
a person under 18 potentially into a mandatory minimum ten-year federal felony without 
any statute of limitations is certainly not what Congress had in mind when it enacted 
§2422(b). 
2 Other federal crimes with ten-year mandatory minimum involve very serious acts. See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. §2113(e) (bank robbery where a person is killed or kidnapped); 18 U.S.C. §924 (involving 
discharge of firearm). 
3 Section 2422(b) has always carried a substantial penalty. 
en first enacted, the maximum 
sentence it permitted was ten years. Pub.L. 104-104, Title 
Sec. 508, 110 Stat. 137. After that, 
the maximum was increased to 15 years. Pub.L. 105-314, Title I, sec, 102, 112 Stat. 2975 (Oct. 
30, 1998 to April 29, 2003). 
4 A phrase which, by itself, and in the context of the remainder of the statute, raises mind-
numbing questions as to what, exactly, is proscribed. 
MIA_CEOS_00079 
EFTA00191446

LAW °MCC!, or 
ALD B. LEFCOURT, P.C. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafia, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 4 
The bulk importation of complex bodies of state law is highly problematic, and 
strongly counsels that such matters should be left to the states except in those rare 
circumstances where both a federal interest is clear and weighty, and the states are for 
some reason incapable of acting. Like issues of family law, these issues are 
quintessentially of state concern within our federal system. 
State laws regarding both sexual activity and the age of consent to engage therein 
are hugely varied, reflecting different histories, values, politics, and personalities. See 
Richard A. Posner & Katharine B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America's Sex Laws (1996). The 
various and shifting societal reasons underlying those laws, and the societal pressures 
operating in the area, where sexual mores change over time, complicate the matter even 
further. See generally Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (1992). The history of the 
Mann Act confirms the caution with which the federal government should approach this 
entire area. For example, historically, the Act was used by some prosecutors in some 
jurisdictions to prosecute acts — such as a man traveling with his paramour — which, we 
submit, never implicated a legitimate federal concern. See generally D.J. Langum, 
Crossing the Lines: Legislating Morality Under the Mann Act (1994). 
Even where there is broad agreement that certain conduct should be criminalized, 
the various states treat the very same conduct differently; to apply such laws selectively 
by different federal prosecutors would undermine further what uniformity does exist. In 
New York, for example, a 50 year old man who patronizes a 15 year old prostitute is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. New York Penal Law §230.04. If §2422(b) were read 
expansively, then such person would face a 10-year mandatory minimum if he used the 
telephone to set-up his date with the young prostitute, even if the date never happened. 
And that would be so even if the prostitute were 17 V2 (and despite the fact that in New 
York the age of consent is 17, since prostitution is a "sexual offense" in New York). 
Clearly, these are applications and outcomes Congress did not contemplate when it 
enacted the law. 
Instead, these are matters best left to state law and state law enforcement. In the 
state, prosecutors and law enforcement authorities, who have far more experience dealing 
with sexual crimes, can exercise their discretion as to whom to prosecute and for what 
charges, taking into account both local attitudes and the wide range of circumstances that 
may exist when sexual offenses, or possible sexual offenses, involving minors were, or 
may have been, committed. That is particularly so since state laws generally permit the 
exercise of sentencing discretion, allowing the punishment to fit both the crime and the 
M IA_C EOS0 0080 
EFTA00191447

LAW Orrialf or 
GERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafia, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 5 
perpetrator. Section 2422(b), with its ten-year mandatory minimum is far too blunt a tool 
to use in any circumstances except the narrow, clear-cut, and egregious circumstances 
Congress had in mind when it enacted this law.5
Though §2422(b) is susceptible to multiple interpretations, it was designed to 
address a specific a problem with which Mr. Epstein's case has nothing in common. If 
stretched to reach beyond the core concern of the statute, a host of problems immediately 
arise. A simple reading of the words of the statute leaves any reasonable reader with far 
more questions than answers as to what is illegal. Any attempt to apply the statute to Mr. 
Epstein's situation highlights the many problems of vagueness, overbreadth, and simple 
incomprehensibility lurking in or just below the statute's text. 
3. 
The Statute's Text And Its Thrust 
Section 2422(b) currently provides: 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of 
interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States knowingly persuades, induces, entices or 
coerces any individual who has not attained the age 
of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined 
under this title and imprisoned not less than ten 
years or for life. 
The statutory language and reported decisions confirm the statute's important, but 
narrow, focus: the luring of children over the Internet. Unlike 18 U.S.C. §§224I et seq., 
Penalties under state statutes criminalizing online enticement also vary widely. According to the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, though the offense can be a felony in all 
states, 15 states permit misdemeanor sentences in some cases (generally where the victim is 14 or 
older). Nineteen states classify online enticement as a felony, but grant judges statutory 
discretion to sentence offenders to less than one year in prison 
/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlettanguageCountry=en... 6/28/2007. 
MIA_CEOS_0O081 
EFTA00191448

LAW ornccs 
or 
'GERALD B. LEFCOUHT, PC. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafia, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 6 
§2422(b) does not establish any federal sex crimes with a minor. Section 2422's subject 
is not sex or sexual activity or face-to-face sexual exploitation of minors. Such behavior 
remains a matter of state, not federal, concern. The plain language of the statute 
mandates focus on the communication and demands that the knowing "persuasion", 
"inducement", "enticement" or "coercion" be done "using the mail or any facility or 
means of interstate . . .commerce" (emphasis added). Any other reading would violate 
constitutional principles of fair warning, notice, lenity and due process. Additionally, any 
broader reading would violate the clearly stated intent of Congress that enacted the law 
and the President who signed it. It would also exceed the authority of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause by federalizing virtually all state sex offenses involving people under 
the age of 18. 
Section 2422(b) defines a crime of communication, not of contact. It makes 
unlawful a narrow category of communications, ones not protected by the First 
Amendment. Both the attempt and the substantive crime defined by §2422 are complete 
at the time when communication with a minor or purported minor takes place; the essence 
of the crime occurs before any face-to-face meeting or any sexual activity with a minor, 
and regardless of whether any meeting or activity ever occurs. 
Turning the statute on its head by first looking at the alleged sexual activities and 
then seeking to find a mailing, a use of the wires, or the involvement of another facility or 
means of interstate commerce as a pretext for the invocation of federal jurisdiction would 
be without precedent and make a narrowly-focused statute into virtually a complete 
federalization of all state sex offenses involving minors. 
4. The Statute Is Violated Only If A Facility Or Means Of Interstate 
Commerce Is Used To Do the Persuading Or Inducing 
Though the statute raises several difficult issues of construction, on one point it is 
clear and unambiguous: To be guilty of a crime under §2422(b), the mail or a facility or 
means of interstate commerce must be used to do the persuading or inducing. As the 
Court wrote in United StatesIM, 165 F.3d Appx. 586, 2006 WL 226038 (10th Cir. 
2006), to prove a violation, the government must show "(1) the use of a facility of 
interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, induce, entice or coerce, as well as 
the other elements. See also United States' Bolen, 136 Fed. Appx. 325, 2005 WL 
1475845 (11th Cir. 2005). 
MIA_CEOS_00082 
EFTA00191449

LAW OrrICCS or 
N 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafta, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
• Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 7 
The statutory language can bear no other construction. The words "whoever, 
using . . . knowingly persuades . . ." necessarily requires that the "whoever" must "use" 
the interstate facility to knowingly persuade. That is, the word "using" is in the present, 
not the past, tense. Thus, the "using" must occur at the same time as the "persuading". If 
the statute meant otherwise, it could and would have been drafted differently: "whoever 
having used the mail and knowingly persuades" or "whoever uses the mail and 
knowingly persuades". But, as it is written, the actor muss use the interstate facility to 
persuade or to entice, or to attempt to do so; use of the instrumentality cannot be 
incidental or peripheral. 
Indeed, assuming, arguendo, that the grammar and structure of the statute would 
allow another interpretation — which we believe it does not — nevertheless the obvious, 
straightforward reading controls. Anything else would violate the rule of lenity, requiring 
strict construction of penal statutes, as well as the requirement of fair notice guaranteed 
by the due process clause. 6 As Thomas Jefferson put it in 1823: "Laws are made for men 
of ordinary understanding, and should therefore be construed by the ordinary rules of 
common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which 
may make any thing mean every thing or nothing, at pleasure". 
According to one of the world's leading experts on grammar and specifically, the 
syntax and semantics of verbs, these rules of "ordinary understanding" and "common 
sense" dictate that 
. . . an English speaker, reading the statute, would naturally 
understand it as applying only to persuasion (etc.) that is 
done while "using the mail" (etc.). To understand it as 
applying to persuasion (etc.) done subsequent to the use of 
6 We note that the structure of this statute is radically different from the structure of §1341, the 
mail fraud statute. There, the statute first describes the fraud and recognizes the federal concern 
by requiring, for purposes of executing such scheme or artifice, that the defendant use the mail. 
Section 2422(b) on the other hand defines the crime as using the mail to knowingly persuade, etc. 
The difference in the language and structure of the two crimes clearly shows that with §2422(b), 
using the mail to knowingly persuade is the essence of the crime. 
MIA_CEOS_00083 
EFTA00191450

LAW WINCES Or 
N 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafla, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 8 
the mail, phone, etc., would be an unnatural and 
grammatically inaccurate reading of the language. 7
That the statute is so limited is also confirmed by the fact that prosecutors have 
clearly understood this limitation. After conducting extensive research, we find no case 
of g defendant being prosecuted under §2422(b) where he has used the Internet or the 
telephone, and then, by some other means, such as personal contact, attempted to 
persuade, induce, or entice. On the contrary, all §2422(b) prosecutions we have reviewed 
are premised on a defendant's use of the Internet (or occasionally the text messaging on a 
phone) as the vehicle of the inducement. See, e.g., United States '  Murrel, 368 F.3d 
1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004) (government must ... prove that Murrell, using the intemet, 
acted with a specific intent to persuade a means to engage in unlawful sex). 
In fact, we have reviewed every indictment filed in the Southern District of 
Florida in which there is at least one allegation of a violation of §2422(b). To the extent 
the facts could be discerned from the indictment, we found no case brought where the use 
of the means of communication was remote from the persuading, coercion, etc.8
Such prosecutorial restraint is in full accord with the legislative intent, which, as 
set forth above, was to go after intemet predators who use the means of communication 
to persuade, coerce, etc. That the statute also makes reference to the mails and facilities 
or means of interstate commerce other than the Internet does not suggest that the statutory 
purpose was broader it is a common modus operandi of intemet predators to continue to 
pursue young people whom they first contact on the intemet. If the statute were read to 
make it a crime to induce or persuade where the inducement or persuasion did not occur 
over the wires, the statute would sweep within it conduct that Congress had no intention 
of making a federal crime. Given the ubiquity of the telephone in modern life, especially 
? To confirm our view of the "plain meaning" of the words, we asked Steven Pinker, Johnstone 
Family Professor at Harvard University's Department of Psychology and a noted linguist, to 
analyze the statute to determine the natural and linguistically logical reading or readings of the 
section. Specifically, we asked whether the statute contemplates necessarily that the means of 
communication must be the vehicle through which the persuading or enticing directly occurs. 
According to Dr. Pinker, that is the sole rational reading in the English language. See Letter 
annexed at Tab "A" at 3. 
8 Annexed at Tab "B" is a chart in which each of the cases and its relevant facts are listed. 
MIA_CEOS_00084 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
ERALD B. LEPCOURT. P.C. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafana, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 9 
in the lives of young people, de-coupling the "persuasion/enticement" element from the 
"use of the interstate facility" would make virtually any sexual activity with a minor, 
chargeable under state law, a federal offense — with no statute of limitations and a 
mandatory ten-year minimum sentence. 
Indeed, given that the interstate highway system is itself an avenue of interstate 
commerce, United States' Home, 474 F.2d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007), allowing a 
prosecution wherever a means or facility of interstate commerce is used and a forbidden 
inducement later occurs, would mean that anyone who used the interstate highways, and 
then, at some other time, induced a minor face-to-face to engage in forbidden activity (or 
attempted to do so), would be subject to the mandatory ten years. The complete 
federalization of sex crimes involving children would have occurred, though there is no 
indication whatsoever that such a sea change in the federaUstate balance was intended or 
is even needed. 
Moreover, such an expansive reading, even if permissible, would very likely 
exceed the Co 
erce Clause power as the Supreme Court presently construes it. In 
United States 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, holding that it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 
In so ruling, the Court reaffirmed a set of fundamental principles, including that the 
powers delegated to the federal government are few and defined, and that this 
"constitutionally mandated division of authority was adopted by the Framers to ensure 
protection of our fundament l li erties." Id. at 552, quoting Gregory' Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 458 (1991). The 
majority concluded that the statute before the Court 
"upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the 
commerce power." Id. at 580. In so ruling, the Court expressed its concern that an 
overly expansive view of the interstate Commerce Clause "would effectively obliterate 
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government." Id. at 557. 
Makin it clear that the Court meant what it said in 
M
,
 
five years later, in 
United Stalest Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court struck down the civil remedy 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, ruling that it, too, was beyond 
Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Once again, the majority expressed concern that 
"Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's 
distinction between national and local authority." Id. at 615. 
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LAW OFFICES or 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafarla, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 10 
To the extent that §2422(b) criminalizes the use of the intemet (or telephone) by a 
sexual predator to target a vulnerable minor and to convince, or to try to convince, her to 
engage in conduct roscribed by law, the statute may not be unconstitutional on its face. 
See United States'Thikarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006) (both §§ 2422(b) and 
2423(b) "fall squarely within Congress's power to regulate the first two categories of 
activities described in ='). 
The statute would, however, be plainly unconstitutional if 
it were applied to situations like Mr. Epstein's, where neither the telephone nor the 
Internet was used in that fashion, and where the use of the telephone was, at most, a 
tenuous link in a chain of events that may, or may not, have preceded or followed sexual 
contact with a minor.9 In other words, if the instrumentality of commerce is not the 
vehicle used to facilitate the harm Congress is trying to address, but is simply a 
"jurisdictional hook," the hook is too weakly connected to the problem (sexual crimes 
against minors) to sustain the statute as a proper exercise of Commerce Clause power. 
Questions about the nature of federalism, and, specifically, just how far the 
federal government may go into matters of traditionally state concern, will continue to 
arise and will be answered case-by-case. As Justice O'Connor said in her dissent in 
Gonzales I Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 47 (2005), ". . . the task is to identify a mode of analysis 
that allows Congress to regulate more than nothing ... and less than everything. . ." 
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). United States' Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2005), 
illustrates the difficulty of the task. In that case, the deeply split en banc Court 
considered whether and to what extent the Commerce Clause authority included the 
power to punish a church arsonist who had traveled in interstate commerce to commit his 
arsons. 
Though clearly not settled, what is clear is that Congress's specification of a 
jurisdictional element such as the use of an instrumentality or channel of interstate 
9 As can be readily noted on the chart at Tab "B", to the extent discernable, every case brought 
under §2422(b) in this district includes use of the intemet. There are only four reported cases in 
the Eleventh Circuit involving use of the phones only: three of them concern telephone calls to 
travel agencies advertising overseas underage sex touriand involved explicit talk of sexual 
activity with known minors. A fourth is United States I Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(11th Cir, 2007). But there, in facts far different from those presented here, the defendant 
"admitted using both a cellular telephone and a land-line telephone to entice Jane Doe to engage 
in prostitution" (emphasis added). That admission makes Evans no precedent for a prosecution 
here, since there is no evidence the phones were used "to entice". 
MIA_CEOS_00086 
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LAW Of FUCKS OF 
GERALD B. LEFCOURT. PC. 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafia, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 11 
commerce does not, in and of itself, end the inquiry. Where the use of such 
instrumentality is far removed from the conduct being targeted (in the case of §2422(b), 
sexual exploitation of children), the lack of any basis for federal jurisdiction presents 
itself squarely. 
• 
In Mr. Epstein's case, since the crime being considered (as Congress intended) is 
the use of the intemet by intemet predators to target and lure vulnerable children to 
engage in illicit sex, the law is arguably within Congress' Commerce Clause powers. But 
Mr. Epstein's conduct would be outside the law's scope. If you were to contend that any 
use of the telephone which is connected in any fashion to an act of sexual misconduct 
with a minor is within the statute's scope, Congress would then have reached well into 
traditional state spheres, and there is a powerful argument that Congress would have been 
acting in excess of its Commerce Clause authority. 
Elimination of Constitutional uncertainty regarding §2422(b) depends upon 
confining it to situations where an instrumentality of interstate commerce has itself been 
used for an immoral or injurious purpose. Statutes must be read to eliminate serious 
doubts as to Constitutionality, as long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the 
intent of Congress. United States t X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994), 
citing Edward J DeBartolo Corp. . Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Thades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). At the least, to eliminate questions as to its 
constitutionality, §2422(b)'s reach must be limited to situations where there is a very 
close connection between the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce and the 
persuasion or attempted persuasion that the statute makes a crime. 
Moreover, even if, arguendo, the expansive reading of the statute would not 
violate the Commerce Clause — which current case law strongly suggests it would —
nevertheless the federal interest in prosecuting sexual offenses involving minors where 
the facility or means of interstate commerce was not the vehicle for committing the crime 
is so attenuated that no such federal prosecution should be brought. 
Mere, there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein himself ever persuaded, induced, 
enticed, or coerced anyone under the age of 18 over the telephone or intemet to engage in 
prostitution or other illegal conduct. Any prosecution would therefore have to be 
predicated on a theory that he was criminally culpable for a telephone call made by a 
third party. Such a theory of vicarious liability requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the person making the telephone call and Mr. Epstein shared the same criminal intent 
MIA_CEOS_00087 
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LAW Of /ICES Or 
GERALD B. LEFCOURT. P.C. 
N 
Jeffrey Sloman, Esq. 
Matthew Menchel, Esq. 
Andrew Lourie, Esq. 
A. Marie Villafafia, Esq. 
The United States Attorney's Office 
Southern District of Florida 
July 6, 2007 
Page 12 
and knowledge and, critically, that the shared intent and knowledge existed at the time of 
the communication in question. Absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Epstein had actual knowledge that the person making a telephone call would induce or 
persuade a specific underage person during the telephone call to engage in unlawful 
sexual activity or to engage in prostitution, there can be no federal crime. 
If the telephone call in question were simply to schedule a topless massage, then 
the call lacked the essential element of inducement, persuasion, enticement, or coercion. 
If the telephone call in question was to schedule a topless massage (or even more) with a 
woman whose age was not known by Mr. Epstein to be under 18, it also fails to satisfy 
the requirements of §2422(b). If Mr. Epstein had not formed the intent to engage in 
unlawful sexual activity as of the time of the communication (even if he did form the 
intent thereafter), an essential element of the federal statute is again lacking. If the 
person making the call had knowledge or a criminal intent or belief not fully shared by 
Mr. Epstein (for example, Mr. Epstein did not know the telephone call was intended to 
induce a minor to engage in unlawful activity), the essential element of shared intent and 
shared knowledge is again lacking.10 Finally, even if there were a call to schedule a 
second meeting with someone who had previously been to the Epstein residence, this call 
lacks the necessary element of persuasion, inducement, or enticing even if the person 
receiving the call hoped or expected remuneration from the return visit. That is so 
because the statute focuses on the content of the communication, not on any quid pro quo 
that occurs thereafter at a meeting. The latter conduct is exclusively within the ambit of 
state prosecution. 
5. Other Reasons Why & 2422(b) Does Not Analy 
As we demonstrate above, this statute is addressed to those who purposely and 
intentionally target children. Here, there was no such targeting. As the Sixth Circuit said 
in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the statute: "The statute only applies to those 
who `knowingly' persuade or entice, or attempt to persuade or entice minors. United 
Stalest Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000). See United Stalest Panfil, 338 F.3d 
10 Indeed, this last problem is best illustrated by any calls 
may claim to have made 
to solicit persons to massage Mr. Epstein. Though Ms. 
may ave known the actual ages 
of the women whom she called at the time she called, an may therefore have known that one or 
more was in fact under 18, she was clear in speaking to detectives that she never communicated 
such information to Mr. Epstein. Rather, she understood Mr. E stein wanted massages from 
women at least 18 years of age. (Video Interview of 
on October 3, 2005). 
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