EFTA00188608

(USAFLS) 
From: 
Roy Black < 
Sent: 
Wednesda , Februa 
11, 2015 8:50 AM 
To: 
(USAFLS) 
Subject: 
RE: Your phone call 
Great. Speak to you then. 
 
Original Message 
From: 
(USAFLS) Imailt 
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2015 8:49 AM 
To: Roy Black 
Subject: Re: Your phone call 
Hi Roy. Thanks for your message. Dexter wants to participate in the call so it is helpful to have a roadmap of the 
discussion points. We will call your office at 2:00. If there is a better number to call, just shoot me an email. 
Talk to you soon. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Southern District of Florida 
500 S. Australian Ave, Ste 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
On Feb 10, 2015, at 7:35 PM, "Roy Black" < 
mailto: 
wrote: 
Marie I was not calling you about the correspondence so don't worry about that. I called you to discuss the plaintiff's 
replies filed as dockets 310 and 311. We think there are serious misstatements by them in these pleadings. So I just 
wanted to let you know what our suggested responses are. I have decided to summarize them here because it is easier 
than going through it on the phone and I assume you need to discuss this with dexter. JD 3 is willing to sign any affidavit 
put before her and it is hard to stomach. Whenever they have a problem they just have her file a new affidavit. I admit I 
am steamed and biased about this because of the trashing of alan's reputation. This makes me sick. I don't mind 
defending almost any accusation but gratuitously destroying a man like alan is going beyond any ethical boundaries. 
How about if I call you at 2 tomorrow? 
1. 
The CVRA case is a Complaint about whether certain statutory rights were violated by the Govt. The Govt not JE is 
the defendant. Whether JD 3 or JD 4 are or are not victims is not the test of whether they are proper petitioners: they 
also must allege a basis for the allegations that their rights to consultation and notification were violated. JD 4 was not 
even known to the Govt: by definition how could she have been notified or consulted? JD 3 informed the Govt in 2007 
that she did not want to be contacted or "bothered" again, DKT 304.1. The FBI case agent participated in the 
conversation. The FBI provided JD 3 with their contact information. She did not contact the FBI or L./SAO again seeking 
to assert her rights as a crime victim until 4 years later. Again, by definition, she rejected rights to consultation and 
notification in this conversation with the Government and in her subsequent decision to avoid any involvement with the 
FBI until she was again interviewed in 2011; 
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2. 
JD 3 was not a minor during the critical time periods. She was 23 when interviewed by the FBI in 2007. She was 25 
when she received a specific notification in September of 2008 (Dkt 290-1) that the federal investigation of JE had 
concluded with a state plea and sentence (this was only 2 months after the sentence and the beginning of state 
incarceration). Rather than contesting the resolution that the USAO reached with JE in a timely manner, she exploited it 
by suing JE as Jane Doe 102 and reaching a favorable financial settlement by taking advantage of the attorney 
representative and the waiver of liability provisions of the NPA. By the time of her lawsuit in early 2009, the NPA had 
been unsealed, was in the possession of her counsel, was mentioned in her lawsuit, and yet she did nothing for 5 years 
(other than receiving a monetary settlement) to pursue her alleged grievances in court; 
3. 
The Complaint by JD 3 (then Jane Doe 102 as stipulated to by her counsel in Dkt 311 at 4) made all of the same 
factual allegations as she makes in 2014 and, importantly, in par 32, states that following an investigation by the FBI and 
USAO JE pled guilty to state offenses. . She had all the information available to her in early 2009 that she needed to 
contest the NPA and pleas of guilty if she so chose; 
4. 
Judge Marra himself said "there is no logical reason to treat anon-prosecution agreement' which the government 
employs to dispose of contemplated federal charges any different from a 'plea agreement' employed to dispose of 
charged offenses in interpreting remedies available under the CVRA. Where the statute expressly contemplates that a 
'plea' may be set aside if entered in violation of CVRA conferral rights, it necessary contemplates that a 'non• 
prosecution' agreement may be set aside if entered in violation of the government's conferral obligations", Dkt 189 at 9. 
In short, the law of the case dictates that the test for whether the Motion to Join is timely is the test that would apply to 
efforts to rescind a plea and sentence. 
5. 
The proper test of the timing of the Motion to Join (or any later Complaint) is found within 18 USC 3771(d)(5) styled 
"Limitation of Relief" where a crime victim may make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if "the victim has 
asserted the right to be heard before or during the proceeding at issue ..". This provision is enacted to prevent delay 
and its concomitant prejudice to a defendant who is serving a sentence that the "victim" wishes to re-open or challenge. 
By delaying her attempt to re-open the NPA (which is not only analogous to a "plea and sentence" but expressly 
incorporates the imperative of JE pleading guilty in state court) JD 3 waived her right to contest the NPA; 
6. 
JD 3 seeks to rescind the NPA (See Dkt 311 at 7). She therefore seeks to rescind the plea and state sentence. These 
were fully served during the very time she sought monetary benefits by delaying joining the ongoing CVRA case. Judge 
Marra found that the delay in proceeding on an expedited basis as to JD 1 and 2 was attributable to their prioritizing 
their monetary lawsuit, DKT 189 at 5 (finding that for 18 months the CVRA stalled as the petitioners pursued their 
collateral lawsuits against JE). These delays also contradicted a second statutory mandate - that district courts "decide 
any motion asserting a victim's rights forthwith" with a limit on continuances of 5 days and a short period to appeal 
adverse decisions, 18 USC 3771(d)(3). The entire statutory scheme is to avoid delay in part to vindicate claimed rights, in 
part to prevent a rescission or re-opening after the defendant has suffered the full prejudice of serving his sentence as JE 
has here. (See DKT 290 at 2-4) 
7. 
The SOL is not the test for whether the Govt and JE has been prejudiced by delay. SOL are procedural which is why 
they can be extended after the date when the alleged offense occurred (if they were substantive, such an extension 
would constitute an ex post facto violation of a defendant's rights). If civil procedure is being used for purposes of 
broadening discovery (See Dkt 310 at 5), then the civil SOL should apply. The criminal SOL has nothing to do with the 
CVRA. Under the Petitioners theory, Jane Doe 3 could wait until she is 60 or 70 years old to bring the CVRA complaint 
(Dkt 311 at 9). 
2 
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8. 
Jane Doe 3's residing in 
did not prevent her from joining the CVRA case. The case was widely reported in 
the media as was the NPA (DKT 290 at 7 fn 7 where Govt identifies an internet search that would have disclosed the 
CVRA as of July of 2008). She herself gave media interviews as early as 2011. She was not too frightened to go on the 
offensive with 
. She was never threatened. She could easily have asked to join the CVRA complaint as a 
"victim" living' 
' but chose not to. (Dkt 311 at 11) 
9. 
Jane Doe 3 claims she did not learn the specifics of the CVRA until 2014 (Dkt 311 at 11) but she knew about the NPA 
- which was made public and discussed by the media and was the basis of her 2009 lawsuit, she knew by her receipt of a 
letter from the USAO dated 9-3-08 that JE had pled guilty and was sentenced and that the USAO had "agreed to defer 
federal prosecution in favor of this state plea and sentence", Dkt 290 at 4, Dkt 290-1, she knew as of 9.3.08 that there 
was ongoing litigation involving two other victims (Dkt 290.1, Dkt 311 at 12), and she was making herself publicly 
available by giving interviews to the 
and to Edwards and Scarola in 2011. She was an adult in 2008 (25) and 
2011 (28). She has a responsibility to join the lawsuit prior to the completion of JE sentence. Principles of !aches should 
estop this long delayed effort to rescind the very agreement that she benefited from via her earlier 2255 lawsuit. 
From: 
. (USAFIS) (mailto 
Sent: Tuesday, February 10, 2015 3:37 PM 
To: Roy Black 
Subject: Your phone call 
Hi Roy - I have been trying again to get an answer to your question from weeks ago about the correspondence before I 
called you back. I still do not have an answer. Why don't we set up a time tomorrow to talk, and hopefully I will have an 
answer by then. 
I am free any time before 4:30. 
Thanks. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
3 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 1 of 21 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 9:08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson 
JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 
UNITED STATES 
JANE DOE NO. 1 AND JANE DOE NO. 2'S PROTECTIVE MOTION PURSUANT TO 
RULE 15 TO AMEND THEIR PETITION TO CONFORM TO EXISTING EVIDENCE 
AND TO ADD JANE DOE NO. 3 AND JANE DOE NO. 4 AS PETITIONERS 
COME NOW Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2 (the "current victims"), by and through 
undersigned counsel, to file this protective motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
I 5(aX2) to amend the petition that they have filed in this case. The amendment would (I) 
conform their petition to the evidence in the case and (2) add Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 
(the "new victims") as petitioners. 
This motion is a "protective" motion because it may be unnecessary. With regard to 
amending to conform to the evidence, the current victims believe that their existing petition is 
broad enough to cover the developing evidence in this case. But the petition was filed on July 7. 
2008, before the Government had even disclosed the existence of the non-prosecution agreement 
(NPA) in this case. The petition, accordingly, does not specifically discuss the Government's 
concealment of the NPA. To conform to that important fact in this case, it appears desirable to 
amend the petition to address the NPA. 
With regard to amending to add new victims, the Government has argued that Rule 15 
(addressing amending pleadings) rather than Rule 21 (addressing joinder of parties) is the 
applicable rule. While the victims have contested that view in their concurrently-filed Rule 21 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 2 of 21 
reply brief, out of an abundance of caution, they explain here why a Rule IS motion to amend 
should be granted. In addition. Rule 15(c)(I) allows an amended pleading to "relate back" to the 
date of an initial pleading, provided that the amendment asserts a claim "that arose out of the 
conduct, transaction or occurrence set out . . . in the original pleading." Because the original 
petition in this case alleged that the Government violated the rights of all the girls who were 
Jeffrey Epstein's victims, the proposed amendment in this case would relate back to the date the 
petition was filed: July 7, 2008. This relation back eliminates any statute of limitations or other 
timelessness concerns. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On July 7. 2008, Jane Doe No. I filed a petition under the Crime Victims' Rights Act 
(CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. See DE I. She sought to enforce both her CVRA rights — and the 
rights of other victims. As the Court is aware, when Jane Doe No. I filed her initial petition in 
this action, it was unclear whether the Government had even reached a plea arrangement with 
Jeffrey Epstein and, if so, what crimes were covered. Accordingly, the petition generally alleged 
that. "[u]pon infomiation and belief, [Epstein] is engaged in plea negotiations with the Office of 
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida concerning federal crimes he is 
alleged to have committed against minor children, including Petitioner." DE I at 1-2 (emphasis 
added).' Jane Doe No. l's petition went on to quite specifically allege that the Government was 
violating not only her rights but the rights of other similarly-situated victims: "On information 
and belief, roughly the same crimes were committed [by Epstein] against several other young 
females. These victims, too, are in danger of losing their right to colter under the CVRA." DE 
I at 7 n.2 (emphasis added). 
I Obviously, at that point Jane Doe No. 1 did not know that the Government and Epstein 
had secretly concluded a non-prosecution deal some nine months earlier, in about October 2007. 
2 
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The Government filed a response to the petition, and then Jane Doc No. I filed a reply in 
support of her petition. By this time, counsel for Jane Doe No. I had heard about the NPA, but 
had not seen the agreement. Once again. Jane Doe No. 1's pleading very directly mentioned 
other victims, alleging: "This deferred prosecution agreement was reached without conferral with 
[Jane Doe No. 1] — or, indeed, with the many other young victims of [Epstein's] crimes." DE 9 
at I (emphasis added). The reply went on to explain that the agreement "remarkably allowed the 
defendant — a billionaire with extraordinary political connections — to escape all federal 
prosecutions for dozens of serious federal sex of enses against minors." Id. at 1-2. The reply 
explained the relief sought, specifically that "[t]he Court should therefore declare the proposed 
non-prosecution agreement an illegal one, since it was reached in violation of the CVRA, and 
order the Government to confer with Petitioner and the other victims in this matter before 
reaching any disposition in this case." Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The reply asked the Court to 
"hold that [Jane Doe No. 1] and the other victims in this case had the right to confer with the 
Government before it reached its non-prosecution agreement." Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see 
also id. (the Government kept Jane Doe No. I "and the many other victims of [Epstein's] federal 
sex offenses . . . in the dark about the fact that the Government was planning to reach a deal ... 
."); id. at 10 (the Government did not use "its `best efforts' to protect the rights of [Jane Doe No. 
I] (and the other victims) in this case when it failed to confer with her about the non-prosecution 
agreement"). Jane Doe No. I asked for the "obvious remedy" that would involve all the victims 
— i.e., that the court "declare the non-prosecution agreement illegal and direct that the 
Government proceed to negotiate a new agreement . . . in a process that respects [Jane Doc No. 
I's] (and the other victims) rights." Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 4 of 21 
The Court rapidly held a hearing. During that hearing, the Government agreed to add 
Jane Doe No. 2 into the case as a second petitioner. Counsel for Jane Doe No. I and No. 2 also 
began learning about broad outlines of the NPA the hearing. See DE 15 (tr. July 11, 2008) at 24 
(court notes that victims' counsel "learned today . . . that the agreement was signed . . . in 
October"). 
As the case proceeded in the following months, the Court ordered the Government to 
produce the NPA to the victims (DE 26) and to attempt to reach a stipulated set of facts. Over 
the next several years, the Government took conflicting positions on whether it would stipulate 
to facts, ultimately refusing to stipulate to anything. See generally DE 225-I at 2-4. Unable to 
obtain any stipulations. Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 filed a detailed summary judgment 
motion (DE 48). This motion relied in large measure on the Government's and Epstein's joint 
decision to conceal the NPA from the victims. See, e.g., DE 48 at 10 (noting that "the U.S. 
Attorney's Office put itself in a position that conferring with the crime victims (including Jane 
Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) about the non-prosecution agreement would violate the terms of the 
agreement"). In addition to discussing the situation of the two petitioners, the motion also raised 
very specific allegations about Jane Doe No. 3, i.e., that "Jeffrey Epstein flew at least one 
underage girl on his private jet for the purpose of forcing her to have sex with him and others. 
Epstein forced this underage girl to be sexually exploited by his adult male peers, including 
royalty, politicians, businessmen, and professional and personal acquaintances." DE 48 at 4 
(citing complaint filed on behalf of Jane Doe No. 3, identified as "Jane Doe No. 102"). 
The Court ultimately denied the victims' motion for judgment on the pleadings, but 
allowed the case to move forward. DE 99. The victims then filed discovery requests. As the 
4 
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Court is aware, discovery issues arc currently pending before the Court. The Government has 
not yet fully answered the victims' discovery requests. 
On December 30, 2014, two new victims filed a motion to join this case, pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 21. DE 280. The Government objected to this motion. DE 290. One of the 
arguments that the Government made in its response was that the proper vehicle for adding new 
parties into this case is not a motion for joinder, but rather a motion to amend pleadings under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. IS. DE 290 at 2.2 The Government then argued that the Court should deny the 
current victims leave to amend. Id. 
In a concurrently-filed reply brief regarding the Rule 21 motion, the victims have replied 
to Government, arguing that Rule 21 is the proper vehicle for adding new panics to this case. 
But because of the Government's assertion that Rule 15 is the proper vehicle for adding parties, 
the current victims have filed this protective motion to amend under Rule 15.3
I. 
JANE DOE NO. I AND JANE DOE NO. 2 SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO AMEND 
THEIR CVRA ENFORCEMENT PETITION TO CONFORM TO THE 
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. 
Given the way this case has proceeded, the current petition before the Court does not 
conform to the evidence that has developed. Indeed, the current petition does not even mention 
the NPA — which is central to this case — for the simple reason that the Government (and Epstein) 
had concealed the existence of the NPA at the time the petition was drafted. 
2 Although he has not yet been allowed to intervene, putative intervenor Alan Dershowitz 
also has argued that Rule 15 is appropriate vehicle for the new victims to seek to join the CVRA 
case. See DE 282 at 2. 
3 To be clear, in conformance with Rule I5(a)(2), this motion to amend is technically 
filed by the two current victims — Jane Doe No. I and No. 2. However, Jane Doe No. 3 and No. 
4 have requested the filing of this motion. In that sense, this motion is brought on behalf of all 
four victims. As indicated in their motion for joinder, all four victims (represented by the same 
legal counsel) intend to coordinate efforts and avoid duplicative pleadings. 
5 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 6 of 21 
In such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2 
now seek to amend their petition to conform to the current state of the case. Of course "th 
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I5(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically allows an amendment, providin 
that a party may amend its pleading "with the opposing party's written consent or the court's 
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." (emphasis added). For 
reasons that remain unclear to the current victims, the Government has declined to give its 
consent even to a basic amendment of the petition. Accordingly, the current victims seek leave 
of court to make such an amendment. 
The text of Rule 15 itself reflects a liberal attitude towards amendment, starting with the 
clear direction that the court "should freely give leave when justice so requires." The Supreme 
Court has admonished that "[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff 
may be a proper subject of relief, [she] ought to be afforded an opportunity to test [her] claim on 
the merits." Fomani. M, 
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The policy in favor of amendment "is 
to be applied with extreme liberality." C.F. ex rel. Farnanl. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 654 
F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir.20I1) (emphasis added). 
The Government can have no good reason for opposing a basic amendment. If we 
understand the Government's objection correctly, it does not deny that the proposed amendment 
conforms to the evidence that the victims have developed in this case. Instead, the Government 
apparently believes that the current victims should have filed a motion sooner. But "delay, by 
itself. is insufficient to justify denial of leave to amend." DCD Programs. Ltd.l. Leighton, 833 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 7 of 21 
F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). And the Government has clearly long been on notice that issues 
surrounding the NPA are at the heart of this case. 
District courts "should freely allow an amendment when doing so will aid in presenting 
the merits and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence would prejudice that 
party's action or defense on the merits." Developers Sur. & lndem. Co.'. Bi-Tech Const., Inc., 
979 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2013); see, e.g., Baker. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
793 F.2d 1196 (11th Cir.1986) (Fed.R.Civ.P. I5(b) instructs district courts to grant leave to 
conform the pleadings to the evidence freely, provided no prejudice to the defendant is shown). 
The current victims should be allowed to amend their petition to conform to the way the case has 
proceeded. 
The Government cannot credibly claim that it is unaware that its concealment of the NPA 
is at issue here. For example, as long ago as April 8, 2011, the Government filed a pleading in 
which it defended its decision to conceal the NPA. See DE 62 at 42 (". . . there also was a 
possibility that Epstein would not perform the NPA. A determination was made to cease 
notifications . . . .). And as the Court knows, the parties have briefed at length the issue of 
whether rescission of the NPA is a possible remedy in this case. See DE 119, 127, and 147. In 
rejecting the Government's argument, the Court said ItJhe petitioners in this action seek to 
vacate a 'non-prosecution agreement' ('the agreement') between the United States Attorney's 
Office for the Southern District of Florida . .. and Jeffrey Epstein . . .." DE 189 at I. ,The Court 
went on to rule for the victims on the rescission issue. explaining that "in their petition and 
supplemental pleadings, Jane Doe I and 2 have identified a remedy which is likely to redress the 
injury complained of— the setting aside of the non-prosecution agreement as a prelude to the full 
unfettered exercise of their conferral rights at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those 
7 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 8 of 21 
rights meaningfully." Id. at 8. Clearly, the Government is not harmed from an amendment 
conforming to these rulings. A proposed first amended petition (previously provided to the 
Government) is attached to this pleading.4
II. 
JANE DOE NO. I AND JANE DOE NO. 2 SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO AMEND 
THEIR PETITION TO ADD JANE DOE NO. 3 AND JANE DOE NO. 4 INTO 
THIS CASE. 
The current victims — Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 — should also be allowed to 
amend their petition to include two new parties as petitioners — Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 
4. The current victims continue to believe that Rule 21 is the proper vehicle for joining new 
parties into the existing CVRA action. To protect their rights, however. Jane Doe No. I and Jane 
Doe No. 2 now file this protective motion for leave to amend to add two new parties under Rule 
I5(a)(2). Leave to amend should be granted because the interests of justice will be served by 
allowing these parallel claims of two additional victims to be litigated on the merits in a single 
action. There has been no undue delay, and the amendment "relates back" to the original filing 
date, obviating any statute of limitations or other timeliness concern. 
A. Leave to Amend to Include New Plaintiffs Should be Freely Given. 
As discussed above, courts freely grant leave to amend, because cases should be tried on 
their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings. See, e.g., Jet, Inc.'. Sewage Aeration 
Sys., 165 F.3d 419. 425 (6th Cir. 1999). This already-liberal policy is applied even more 
generously when the proposed amendment simply adds new plaintiffs, because prejudice to the 
other party is less likely to result from adding additional plaintiffs than from adding new 
4 The proposed amended petition contains nine words in it referring to Jane Doe No. 3 
and Jane Doe No. 4. As argued in the next section of this pleading, Jane Doe No. I and Jane 
Doe No. 2 believe that the two new victims should be added into this case. If the Court disagrees 
with this argument, then it should allow the amended pleading without those nine words in it. 
8 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 9 of 21 
defendants or new claims. See King'. Cessna Aircraft Co.. 2010 WL 5253526, at *10 (S.D. Fla. 
2010). 
Courts have frequently allowed plaintiffs to amend their pleading to add new plaintiffs. 
See. e.g.. Joshlin 
Gannett River States Pub. Corp., 152 F.R.D. 577 (E.D. Ark. 1993) 
(amendment to name all purported class members as plaintiffs); Otto'. Milwaukee C'nty., No. 
07-C-427, 2007 WL 3228118, at '2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2007) (additional plaintiffs allowed); 
Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania' Peters, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (Eleventh 
Circuit Court test satisfied, additional plaintiffs allowed). And the Government appears to 
concede that a proper procedure vehicle for the victims to pursue is a motion to amend. See DE 
290 at 2. 
B. 
There Has Been No "Undue Delay" In Seeking to Amend. 
In their parallel filing under Rule 21, the current victims have provided numerous reasons 
why participation by the new victims is desirable in this case. The Government does not appear 
to contest these reasons. Instead of dealing with the substance of the issue, the Government 
argues the victims have "unduly delayed" filing their motion to amend. Of course, "undue" 
delay requires some reference to some time when the new victims' claims were, in fact, due. As 
discussed in the victims' contemporaneously-filed reply regarding Rule 21. the statute of 
limitations for the crimes against minors at issue here has not yet expired. See 18 U.S.C. § 3283. 
And Congress has not seen fit to set a more restrictive time limit for victims to file CVRA 
enforcement actions, either in the CVRA itself or in civil statutes of limitations. Assessed tinder 
these congressional decisions, the motion to amend has not been unduly delayed. 
Even more important, this Court has not yet set a time limit for adding new parties to this 
case. The Court would ordinarily establish such a limit as part of a Rule 16 Scheduling 
9 
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Conference. See Local Rule 16.1 (a Joint Proposed Scheduling shall contain "[a] limitation of 
the time to join additional parties and to amend the pleadings"). In this case. Jane Doe No. I and 
Jane Doe No. 2 have tried to comply with the civil rules by, for example, providing their initial 
disclosures to the Government pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(aXI). The Government, however, 
has not even taken that limited step to move the case forward. 
The Eleventh Circuit has highlighted the importance of scheduling orders in considering 
motions to amend. It has cautioning against "render[ing] scheduling orders meaningless" by 
granting leave to amend freely after a scheduling order deadline has passed. See. e.g., Soso 
Airprini Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (I 1th Cir. 1998). But the converse must be true as well: 
It would likewise render scheduling orders meaningless if a party was denied a chance to freely 
add additional parties before a scheduling order deadline has passed — particularly where the 
Government has not sought entry of such a scheduling order and has refused to make its initial 
disclosures required by the civil rules. In the absence of any court-imposed time limit to add 
parties. it is hard to understand how the Government can argue that "undue" delay exists. 
In assessing whether delay is or is not "undue," the Court should also consider the state 
to which the case has progressed. Of prime importance is the ability of a party to conduct 
necessary discovery. See, e.g.. °kohl Vill. of Willowbrook 138 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. 
III. 2000) ("The addition of a new party plaintiff can cause undue prejudice . . . where the 
proposed amendment does not afford defendant adequate time for discovery"). Where there is 
no evidence of prejudice due to lack of time for discovery, an amendment adding new parties 
should be freely granted. M. At this juncture. the Government has not yet even produced all of 
the discovery that the Court has ordered it to produce. Moreover, the Government can clearly 
10 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 11 of 21 
pursue whatever discovery it needs to defend its position. (In its pleading, the Government does 
not claim that it needs any discovery). The Government suffers no harm from the amendment. 
In addition. the new victims have not unduly delayed in seeking to join this action. With 
regard to Jane Doe No. 3, the Government's lead argument is the claim that "petitioners' counsel 
have been representing [Jane Doe No. 3] since at least as early as March 2011, yet they have 
waited more than three years to attempt to add her as a party." DE 290 at 8. This unsupported 
allegation is simply false. See Aff. of Jane Doe No. 3 at 7, Exhibit I to Victims' Reply in 
Support of Motion for Joinder (hereinafter "Jane Doe No. 3 Aff.") (responding to Government's 
claim of legal representation and attesting "[t]his is completely untrue, and I think the 
Government knows it is untrue. I was not represented by legal counsel in March 2011"). 
Undersigned counsel began representing Jane Doe No. 3 (pro bono) in around April 2014 and 
then contacted the Government over the summer about possibly adding her into the case. As 
recounted at greater length in an earlier pleading, counsel moved to add Jane Doe No. 3 into this 
case within seven days of receiving the Government's objection to her motion for joinder. See 
DE 291 at 5-6. 
More important, Jane Doe No. 3 had good reason for not seeking to join this case until 
this past summer. As discussed in the Rule 21 reply brief, she was 
specifically in 
from 2002 to 2013. Critically, Jane Doe No. 3 was hiding from Epstein. 
See Jane Doe No. 3 Aft. at 3. Her decision to live away from family and friends was not 
voluntary. Id. And living in 
kept her from learning about how this CVRA action 
worked. Id. at 5-7. Jane Doe No. 3 did not learn about the specifics of this action — and thus the 
ability to enforce her rights — until 2014, see id. at 8, and she acted promptly at that point to 
obtain legal counsel and join this case. 
II 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 12 of 21 
With regard to Jane Doe No. 4. she filed her motion to join the case when she felt it was 
safe and appropriate to do so. Given the fact that sexual assault victims all have different 
reactions to the crimes committed against them. the Court should not conclude that she has 
unduly delayed. 
In crafting its argument about undue delay, the Government relies heavily on a letter sent 
to Jane Doe No. 3 on September 3, 2008. See DE 290-I. As Jane Doe No. 3 explains in her 
affidavit, that letter did not directly say that Epstein's crimes against her were not going to be 
prosecuted. Instead, it said elliptically that "the United States has agreed to defer federal 
prosecution in favor of this state plea and sentence." Jane Doe No. 3 "did not know what that 
meant." Jane Doe No. 3 Aff. at 5. Significantly with regard to this CVRA litigation, the 
Government did not tell her (and other victims) that litigation was underway trying to invalidate 
the NPA. Instead, the Government misleadingly stated that "[t]here has been litigation between 
the United States and two other victims regarding the disclosure of the entire agreement between 
the United States and Mr. Epstein." DE 290-I at 3 (emphasis added). This description of the 
litigation is, in the victims' view, quite deceptive. Of course, the point of the litigation was not 
to obtain the NPA's "disclosure" but rather the NPA's invalidation. Jane Doe No. 3 attests in 
her affidavit that luinderstanding more about that case now, I realize that the letter did not 
explain that the real purpose of that litigation was not to get 'disclosure of the entire agreement' 
but instead to get criminal charges filed against Epstein. I wish that the Government had told me 
that was what was really going on." Jane Doe No. 3 Aff. at 5-6. 
Compounding the confusion that the Government created through its letter, in 2011 FBI 
agents traveled to Sydney to interview Jane Doe No. 3. During that interview, they discussed her 
sexual abuse in Florida, giving the impression that criminal charges could still be brought in 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 13 of 21 
Florida. The Government does not contend that it made clear to Jane Doe No. 3 during that 
interview that the NPA barred prosecutions in Florida. And Jane Doe No. 3 has flatly declared 
that "I was not told even at this point [in 2011] that [Epstein] could not be prosecuted for the 
crimes he committed in Florida." Jane Doe No. 3 Aff. at 7. As a result, she left that meeting 
with the entirely reasonable impression that prosecuting Epstein in Florida was a real possibility. 
Id. 
In light of all these facts, Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 did not unduly delay in 
seeking to join this case. But finally, the motion to amend is being filed by Jane Doe No. I and 
Jane Doe No. 2. It was difficult for them to work with Jane Doe No. 3 until her recent return to 
the United States. They did not unduly delay in filing their amendment by waiting until Jane 
Doe No. 3's return to this country. 
C. 
The Amended Pleading is Timely Because It "Relates Back" to the Filing of 
the Initial Pleading in 2008. 
The Government's main objection to any amended pleading containing new panics 
appears to be that it would be "futile." The Government argues that such an amendment is 
barred by the six-year statute of limitations governing tort claims against the Government. See 
DE 290 at 8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 240I(a)). In their contemporaneously-filed pleading on joinder. 
the victims have explained that the Government is simply wrong to assert that the limitation 
found in § 240I(a) applies to this case — specifically because this is not a "civil action" against 
the Government and (with regard to Jane Doe No. 3) the 
tolling provision 
applies! But even if the limitation did apply, that would hardly make the victims' proposed 
3 The victims specifically adopt and incorporate by reference all their arguments against 
applying § 2401(a) to this case into this pleading as well. 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 311 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/06/2015 Page 14 of 21 
amendment futile. The amendment here would "relate back" to the original petition, filed six-
and-a-half years earlier, thereby satisfying any applicable statute of limitations. 
Relation back is a concept specifically adopted in Fed. R. Civ. P. I 5(c)( I )(B). Under that 
rule, an amended pleading "relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the 
amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading ...." Relation back typically refers to 
adding new defendants to a case; nevertheless. the 1966 Amendment to Rule I5(c) confirms that 
relation back also "extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, 
Adv. Comm. Notes, 1966 Amend. According to the Advisory Committee, the new version of 
Rule I5(c) did not include express language about adding plaintiffs because that "problem is 
generally easier" than adding defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 
Circuit Courts have applied varying tests for articulating how to determine when an 
amendment relates back to the filing of the original pleading. In the Eleventh Circuit, the test for 
relation back has been generally understood as requiring the court to consider "(I) whether the 
amended claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original pleading; 
(2) whether the amendment will unduly prejudice the defendant; and (3) whether the original 
(pleading) provided adequate notice of the new plaintiff." See King 
Cessna Aircrctil Co.. 2010 
WL 5253526, at *10 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (magistrate judge recommendation), adopted in relevant 
part, 2010 WL 5173152 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania, 560 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 
1274 (M.D. Fla. 2008). This victims' motion to amend satisfies all three requirements of the 
Eleventh Circuit's test for relation back. 
14 
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