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Page 17 of 20 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
(Cite as: 908 F.Supp. 1265) 
one, and therefore his assertion cannot be a lie or a 
breach of the Agreement. Ilowever, Hoffenberg 
misled the Government about specific facts relevant 
to his role at DCC. Each misleading statement, 
omission, and lie was itself a breach, apart from his 
general assertion that he did not "control" DCC. 
That the Government did not specifically ask about 
DCC at additional meetings prior to January 1994 
is no excuse for Hoffenberg's failure to provide the 
information, and correct the prior misleading state-
ments he had already made. See United States v. 
Wood. 780 F.2d at 930 (defendant's failure to dis-
close information about a drug deal in Jacksonville, 
although only questioned about drug dealing in 
Tampa, was a material breach of the obligation to 
truthfully disclose all information about drug deal-
ing). 
When confronted by Nardello on December 22, 
1993, Hoffenberg acknowledged that he had lied to 
the Government about even contemplating particip-
ation in Stratford. Although this caused concern, 
the Government, in its discretion, did not end the 
Agreement based on that lie alone. What followed, 
and what the Government later learned, was that 
Hoffenberg misled the Government about his in-
terest and participation in Stratford, the cash pay-
ments to Stratford, and, of course, that he had viol-
ated his promise to Nardello pursuant to the Agree-
ment not to get involved in Stratford. 
[5] Hoffenberg argues, however, that he cured this 
breach by admitting his lies. Although the 
"opportunity to cure" doctrine applies comfortably 
to contracts for the delivery of goods, it does not 
apply to cooperation agreements. As the Second 
Circuit has stated, Icjomparing a criminal defend-
ant to a merchant in the marketplace is an inappro-
priate analogy that we have rejected." Innes v. 
Dalsheitn, 864 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir.1988), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 809, 110 S.Ct. 50, 107 L.Ed.2d 19 
(1989). See United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 
1105 (2d Cir.1990) ("We recognize, of course, that 
criminal sentencing proceedings are not the same as 
civil contract disputes."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 
Page 16 
969, III S.Ct. 1606, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991). 
While the differences between contracts in the civil 
and 
criminal 
contexts 
often 
focus 
on 
the 
"meticulous standards [which must be] ... met by 
the prosecutors ...," U.S. v. Mozer, 828 F.Supp. 
208, 215-216 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (citations omitted), 
the differences apply to the defendants as well. The 
very purpose of a cooperation agreement is to ob-
tain full and truthful information from a cooperator 
on each and every topic about which the Govern-
ment inquires. While the Government gave Hoffen-
berg opportunities to be truthful, it was not incum-
bent on the Government to continue to extend to 
Hoffenberg such an opportunity. *1278 When the 
Government determined in February that Hoffen-
berg had not been truthful, as required in the 
Agreement, it was within its right to declare the 
breach. 
[6] Although Hoffenberg could not " cure" the fact 
that he lied to and misled the Government in viola-
tion of the Agreement, he was given ample oppor-
tunity to confront the allegations and provide an in-
nocent explanation. Such an opportunity is all that 
is required. In United States v. Cranford, 20 F.3d at 
936, for example, a defendant told the Government 
one version of a fraud, implicating a co-defendant, 
and told others that he was solely responsible. It 
was sufficient that he was asked for names of 
people who could corroborate the version of events 
he had given. 
Hoffenberg was given numerous opportunities to 
show the Government that he had not breached the 
Agreement. Rather than terminate the Agreement 
once the Government had serious concerns, the 
Government met with Hoffcnberg on January 27 
and February 14, 1994, to enable Hoffenberg to ad-
dress the issues and to assert an innocent explana-
tion for the allegations. With respect to Stratford, 
Hoffenberg admitted that he had lied to and misled 
the Government and intentionally violated the 
Agreement with Nardello. 
On the issue of cure, this case can be distinguished 
from that in United States v. Brechner, 93 Cr. 626, 
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Page 18 of 20 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
(Cite as: 908 F.Supp. 1265) 
Memorandum of Decision and Order, October 19, 
1995 (E.D.N.Y.). In Brechner, a defendant subjec-
ted to a similar truthfulness obligation was asked in 
a debriefing session whether or not he had received 
unreported cash from several individuals. The de-
fendant, Brechner, said that he had not. Brechner's 
lawyer apparently asked to speak to Brechner, and 
after doing that, Brechner admitted that he had re-
ceived such payments. After "coming clean," the 
Government "advised Brechner that he was giving 
him a 'fresh start' and expected him to answer 
questions concerning unreported cash truthfully...." 
The Court found that after this statement, the gov-
ernment asked another hours' worth of questions 
and that Brechner made full and truthful disclosures 
of the subject schemes. When five months later the 
Government refused to move for a downward de-
parture, the Court found that this was done in bad 
faith. 
In this case, no such promises were made to Hof-
fenberg at or after the February 14 session. The 
Government informed Hoffenberg three days later 
on February 17 that it was not going to move for a 
downward departure. The Government had not 
promised that it would go forward with the SKI 
term of the Agreement, nor is there any indication 
that it used these sessions to get additional informa-
tion, thus behaving as thought the Agreement was 
in full force. In fact, there is no indication that the 
Government is attempting to use affirmatively any 
of the information gained in those sessions against 
Hoffenberg. The sessions confirmed suspected lies 
that he had told earlier and as a result the Govern-
ment is choosing not to make a SKI motion on his 
behalf. 
The Agreement Allows the Government to Con-
shier Truthfulness When it Determines Whether to 
Make a SKI Motion 
[7] When a cooperation agreement allows for a sub-
stantial assistance motion contingent upon the Gov-
ernment's evaluation of a defendant's cooperation, 
the Government has wide discretion in determining 
Page 17 
whether to make such a motion. United States v. 
Hon, 17 F.3d at 25; see United States v. Khan, 920 
F.2d at 1105 ("where a contract is conditioned on 
the satisfaction of the obligor, the condition is not 
met 'if the obligor is honestly, even though unreas-
onably, dissatisfied' "); United States v. Knights, 
968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir.I992) (Government's 
performance in cooperation agreement is condi-
tioned on its satisfaction with the defendant's ef-
forts). 
[8] Where the Government declines to make a sub-
stantial assistance motion pursuant to a cooperation 
agreement, the district court may review the de-
cision only to determine whether the Government 
based its decision on impermissible criteria, such as 
race or religion, or whether the Government acted 
in bad faith. United States v. Kaye, 65 F.3d 240, 
243 (2d Cir.I995); United States y Non, 17 F.3d at 
25; *1279United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d at 
1487; United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63, 67 (2d 
Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 
2279, 119 L.Ed.2d 205 (1992); see United States v. 
Khan, 920 E.2d at 1104 ("the prosecutor's discre-
tion is generally the sole determinant of whether the 
defendant's conduct warrants making the motion"); 
United States v. Rexach 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d 
Cir.) (prosecutorial discretion limited only by sub-
jective good faith standard), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
969, III S.Ct. 433, 112 L.Ed.2d 417 (1990). 
[91[10] The Government may not refuse to make a 
substantial assistance motion by relying on facts 
which it knew at the time it entered into the agree-
ment. Such a decision would amount to fraudu-
lently inducing a defendant's plea with a promise 
that the Government already knew it would not 
keep. See United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d at 
1488; United States v. Leonard, 50 F.3d at I I58. 
However, where as here, the Government enters in-
to an agreement in good faith, believing the defend-
ant's representations, and the Government sub-
sequently learns that the defendant has lied and 
breached the terms of the agreement, the Govern-
ment's dissatisfaction with the defendant's perform-
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Page 19 of 20 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
(Cite as: 908 F.Supp. 1265) 
ante is justified. 
[1I] When a defendant claims that the Government 
has acted in bad faith in refusing to move for down-
ward departure, the Government may then rebut the 
allegation, explaining its reasons for refining to so 
move. United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d at 1487. 
A defendant must then make some showing of bad 
faith to trigger a hearing on the issue. After a full-
blown hearing in this case, Hoffenberg has failed to 
establish any bad faith on the part of the Govern-
ment. 
112] The clause of the Agreement regarding the 
5K1 states that: 
In addition, if it is determined by the Offices that 
Steven Hoffenberg has provided substantial assist-
ance in an investigation or prosecution, and if 
Steven lloffenberg has otherwise complied with the 
terms of this Agreement, the Offices will file a mo-
tion, pursuant to Section 5K1.I of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, advising the sentencing judge of all rel-
evant facts pertaining to that determination and re-
questing the Court to sentence Steven Hoffenberg 
in light of the factors set forth in Section 
5K I. I (a)(1)-(5). (emphasis added). 
The Government was obligated to move for a de-
parture if Hoffenberg provided substantial assist-
ance and if he "othenvise complied with the terms 
of [the] Agreement." The Court of Appeals has 
stated that parties to a plea Agreement could estab-
lish terms of the Agreement which were other than 
standard and to which they would be bound. See 
United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d 
Cir.1990) ("... a defendant might negotiate an 
agreement which, by its terms, would define a dif-
ferent standard for evaluation. Should such a co-
operation agreement specify ... [a more stringent 
standard], then we would, of course, employ [that 
standard].") In this case the filing of the 5K1 mo-
tion was contingent on both substantial assistance 
and compliance with the terms of the Agreement. 
The parties were bound to the term as it was writ-
ten. Hoffenberg did not othenvise comply with all 
Page 18 
the terms of the Agreement. The Agreement, 
quoted above, required truthfulness. Hoffenberg 
was not truthful. 
[13][14] Even if the Court were to consider the 
"substantial cooperation" clause in isolation of the 
rest of the conditions, there has not been a showing 
of bad faith.Esi It would not be enough for Hof-
fenberg to prove his substantial assistance, since "a 
claim that a defendant merely provided substantial 
assistance will not entitle a defendant to a rem-
edy...." Wade v. U.S., 504 U.S. 181, 186, 112 S.Ct. 
1840, 1844, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992). It is reason-
able and appropriate for the Government to con-
sider Hoffenberg's truthfulness in evaluating his as-
sistance. It is significant that Hoffenberg repeatedly 
corrected and changed his story and helped suborn 
perjury. It was not bad faith to believe that the in-
formation Hoffenberg provided was not entirely 
useful. See, eg., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 
1483, 1488 (2d Cir.1992). 
MI. In evaluating the Government's SKI 
motion, the Court is instructed by the 
Guidelines to consider the "truthfulness, 
completeness and reliability" of any in-
formation 
or 
testimony 
provided, 
See 
Guidelines § 5KI.1(a)(2). 
*1280 The Court of Appeals' admonition in 
Knights, is not relevant in this case. In Knights, the 
Court of Appeals reminded us that while the Gov-
ernment "has wide latitude in evaluating a defend-
ant's cooperation, [t]hat latitude ... does not permit 
it to ignore a defendant's efforts at cooperation 
simply because the defendant is providing informa-
tion that the government does not want to hear." M 
In this case it is the veracity of the cooperation and 
not the content of the cooperation that is at issue. 
The Agreement was vitiated only after the Govern-
ment determined, after a thorough investigation, 
that Hoffenberg was lying about DCC, as well as 
about Stratford, that he encouraged the perjury of 
Hughes and Lowy, and only after Hoffenberg was 
given ample opportunity to provide an innocent ex-
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Page 20 of 20 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
(Cite as: 908 F.Supp. 1265) 
planation. Hoffenberg cannot now claim that the 
Government acted in bad faith by accepting and be-
lieving his false portrayal of his role at DCC, and 
entering the Agreement in reliance on that. 
Because Nardello called Hoffenberg to testify in the 
grand jury on January 14, 1994, at a time when 
there were problems with Hoffenberg's cooperation 
and when the Government knew of his misrepres-
entations, Hoffenberg claims that Nardello improp-
erly "sandbagged" Hoffenberg, and thus, acted in 
bad faith. As Nardello testified, it had been his in-
tention for Hoffenberg to testify in the grand jury 
since the signing of the Agreement. In fact, in 
November 1993, Hoffenberg testified before the 
grand jury in the Northern District of Illinois. 
As of January 14, 1994, no decision had been made 
to terminate Hoffenberg's cooperation agreement. 
Indeed, the Government did not begin to seriously 
consider terminating the Agreement until January 
18, 1994, when Hoffenberg admitted that he had 
disregarded Nardello's specific 
instructions of 
December 22, 1993, regarding Stratford. As of the 
grand jury testimony on January 14, 1994, the only 
breach of which Nardello had personal knowledge 
was Hoffenberg's failure to mention Stratford when 
asked about businesses he might be considering en-
tering into at the December 22, 1993 meeting. 
Hoffenbcrg places great emphasis on the fact that 
both Lowy and Hughes had already met with a 
Government investigator prior to January 14, 1994, 
and had made allegations that Hoffenberg suborned 
perjury. Nardello, however, did not meet with 
Lowy until January 24, 1994, and with Hughes until 
January 25, 1994. In large part what Nardello knew 
when is irrelevant to the determination of good 
faith on the issue of whether or not the Government 
must make the substantial assistance, SKI motion. 
The Government has not vitiated the other portions 
of the plea agreement. It has simply notified Hof-
fenberg that no 5IC I letter will be forthcoming. 
[15][16] In the end, it is proper for the Government 
to consider the truthfulness of a defendant in evalu-
Page 19 
ating the degree of his cooperation. When a cooper-
ator enters into an agreement with the government 
which includes a provision for a SKI motion, that 
defendant must be honest if he hopes to achieve the 
benefit of the bargain. The government may permit 
a defendant to cure his dishonesty, but it is not re-
quired to do so and certainly need not do so con-
tinuously. Even if the untruths are not central to the 
cooperation, if the lies are deemed material to the 
evaluation of the truthfulness, the Government, ab-
sent unconstitutional or bad faith motivation, is free 
not to move for the departure. Hoffenberg's re-
peated deceptions rendered him untrustworthy as a 
cooperator. The Government is justified in its ac-
tions. There has been no showing of bad faith. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons described above, Hoffenberg's mo-
tion for specific performance of the Agreement is 
denied. 
It is so ordered. 
S.D.N.Y.,1995. 
U.S. v. Hoffenberg 
908 F.Supp. 1265 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Page I of 9 
Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for ATKINSON,KAREN 
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EFTA00182832

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 1 of 11 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
JANE DOE NO. 3, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
JANE DOE NO. 4, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80232-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOHNSON 
EFTA00182833

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 2 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 5, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
JANE DOE NO. 6. 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
JANE DOE NO. 7, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80381-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80994-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80993-MARRA/JOHNSON 
2 
EFTA00182834

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 3 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80811-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
JANE DOE, 
CASE NO. 08-CV-80893-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, et al. 
Defendant. 
DOE II, 
CASE NO: 09-CV-80469-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, et al. 
Defendants. 
3 
EFTA00182835

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 4 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 101, 
CASE NO: 09-CV-80591-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
JANE DOE NO. 102, 
CASE NO: 09-CV-80656-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO STRIKE CASE 
FROM CURRENT TRIAL DOCKET 
COMES NOW plaintiff Jane Doe, by and through her undersigned counsel, to file 
this response in opposition to defendant Jeffrey Epstein's motion to strike her trial date 
from the current trial docket. Epstein argues that a few discovery disputes require 
striking the trial date. But these disputes can be resolved before the discovery deadline 
expires — particularly given that there are nearly four months remaining until the 
discovery cutoff. Moreover, Jane Doe will be gravely harmed by any delay in this matter 
because it will give Epstein the opportunity to finish hiding his assets. 
4 
EFTA00182836

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 5 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Background 
Defendant Epstein has filed a boilerplate motion to strike Jane Doe's trial date —
and numerous other consolidated cases involving similar allegations of his sexual abuse 
of minors - for an unspecified period of time, delaying what is currently set as a 
February 22, 2010, trial date until some later and unspecified date. On May 28, 2009, 
the court granted the motion to strike the trial date as to plaintiffs Jane Does 2-7 — who 
had agreed to the delay for their own reasons. The court set a new trial date of June 1, 
2010, for these cases. The court, however, reserved ruling on the motion to continue 
Jane Doe's case (and one other plaintiff, MI). 
In recounting the procedural history of this case, Epstein does not disclose that in 
this particular case, he has been the one responsible for numerous delays. Indeed, a 
quick review of the docket sheet shows the following requests for extensions by 
defendant Epstein: 
DE 10 (defendant's motion for extension of time to respond to complaint) 
(10/1/08) 
DE21 (defendant's motion for extension of time to file motions to compel) (3/4/09) 
DE39 (defendant's motion extension of time to file reply as to response to 
opposition to motion to stay) (4/22/09) 
DE41 (defendant's motion for extension of time to file reply as to response in 
opposition to motion to compel tax records) (4/27/09) 
DE42 (defendant's motion for extension of time to file reply as to response in 
opposition to motion to compel on first interrogatories) (4/27/09) 
5 
EFTA00182837

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 6 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
DE44 (defendant's motion for extension of time to file response as to motion to 
strike reference to non-prosecution agreement) (4/29/09) 
DE52 (defendant's motion for extension to time to file response as to amended 
complaint) (5/05/09) 
DE60 (motion for extension of time to file response to plaintiff's first amended 
complaint) (5/18/09) 
It should be noted that Jane Doe, as a matter of civility, has not objected to a 
single one of these requests for an extension from defendant Epstein. In none of these 
conferences regarding these requests for extension did defense counsel indicate that 
he was concerned that the trial date might need to be continued because of any delay in 
this case. 
Jane Doe has yet to request a single extension of time for any reason. 
It may also be relevant to note that Epstein has "taken the Fifth" with regard to 
essentially all discovery that Jane Doe has propounded to him in this case. 
Epstein Has Failed to Provide any "Exceptional Circumstances" 
to Continue the Trial Date 
This court, of course, has discretion to continue the trial date. The rules of this 
court, however, make clear that "[a] continue of any trial . . will be granted only on 
exceptional circumstances." Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added). All defendant Epstein 
has shown is a few, run of the mill, discovery disputes — that have arisen months in 
advance of the discovery deadline. (The deadline in this case is October 1, 2009 - 
roughly four months away.) At the very least, any motion to continue is premature. 
6 
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 7 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Defendant Epstein has failed to provide any good reason for delaying trial in 
Jane Doe's case. Most of his pleading focuses on discovery disputes that have arisen 
with regard to Jane Does 2-7 or 
. These disputes have absolutely no bearing on 
whether Jane Doe's case can be ready for trial by February 22, 2010. 
In an effort to provide some sort of "good cause" for rescheduling the trial date, 
Epstein's defense counsel has provided an affidavit asserting generally that it will not be 
possible to complete discovery in a timely fashion in this case. That same affidavit, 
however, acknowledges that some of the discovery disputes that have arisen in other 
cases have not arisen in this case. In particular, the affidavit spends a great deal of 
time explaining how an objection to disclosing the true names of the plaintiffs in other 
cases has (allegedly) made it impossible for Epstein to serve subpoenas and thus 
obtain meaningful discovery about other plaintiffs. See Affidavit of Michael J. Pike at 4-
5, Exhibit 1 to Epstein's Motion to Strike Cases from Current Trial Docket. The affidavit 
concedes, however, that this objection does not apply to Jane Doe's case. See id. at 5 
("As stated in the motion to strike, Brad Edwards [counsel for Jane Doe] has agreed to 
such a procedure relative to third party subpoenas?). 
In addition, Jane Doe will be gravely prejudiced if a delay of any sort is 
sanctioned in this case. 
As the court is well aware, this case involves serious 
allegations of sexual abuse of minor. Each passing day with the matter unresolved 
adds to the psychological stress that Jane Doe must bear. This is not the kind of case 
that where additional time should be allowed to pass. In general, "The compensation 
and remedy due a civil plaintiff should not be delayed." Gordon v. FDIC, 427 F.2d 578, 
EFTA00182839

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 8 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
580 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Given the sexual abuse allegations at stake here, that general 
admonition applies with even greater force. 
Moreover, Jane Doe will be gravely prejudiced if Epstein is allowed to postpone 
trial in this matter. As explained at greater length in Jane Doe's soon to be filed 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Injunction Restraining Fraudulent Transfer of 
Assets, good cause exists for believing defendant Epstein is currently moving his assets 
overseas in an attempt to defeat the satisfaction of any judgment that Jane Doe might 
obtain in this case. In addition, it is possible that by delaying the trial until June 2010, 
Epstein might be able to escape the supervision of the Florida courts entirely. Epstein 
is currently in jail and will serve a one-year term of community control (house arrest) 
following his release. Conveniently enough for Epstein, it appears that this term of 
community control will expire at around the time of his proposed new trial date. 
For all these reasons, the Court should deny the motion to strike Jane Doe's 
currently-established trial date. 
Dated: June 8,2009. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
Bradley J. Edwards 
ROTHSTEIN ROSENFELDT ADLER 
Las Olas City Centre 
401 East Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1650 
Fort Lauderdale Florida
301 
Telephone 
Facsimile 
Florida Bar No 
8 
EFTA00182840

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 9 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
E-mail: 
and 
Paul G. Cassell 
Pro Hac Vice 
332 S. 1400 E. 
Salt Lake Cit 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
E-Mail: 
9 
EFTA00182841

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 10 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 8, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing 
document is being served this day on all parties on the attached Service List in the 
manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by 
CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those parties wo hare not authorized to 
receive electronically filed Notices of Electronic Filing. 
s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
Bradley J. Edwards 
I0 
EFTA00182842

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 146 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/08/2009 
Page 11 of 11 
CASE NO: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
SERVICE LIST 
Jane Doe v. Jeffrey Epstein 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
Isidro Manual Garcia 
Innle 
'
Katherine Warthen 
ell 
Michael James Pike 
Paul G Cassell 
Richard Horace Willits 
Robert C. Josefsberg 
Adam D. Horowitz 
Stuart S  Mermelstein
William J. Realer 
11 
EFTA00182843

Case 5:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 114 
Entered on FLSD Docket 06/05/2009 
Page 1 of 8 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
Y 
EPSTEIN and 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF, 
'S, MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER REGARDING 
TREATMENT RECORDS FROM PARENT-CHILD CENTER, INC. AND DR. SERGE 
THYS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
, by and through her undersigned attorneys, hereby files her 
Motion For Protective Order Regarding Treatment Records From Parent-Child Center, 
Inc. and Dr. Serge Thys and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, and in support there of 
states as follows: 
1. 
This is an action to recover money damages against Defendant, 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, for acts of sexual abuse and prostitution committed upon the then-
minor, 
2. 
Plaintiff has plead thirty separate counts against EPSTEIN for separate 
incidences of abuse committed by EPSTEIN against Plaintiff pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§2255. 18 U.S.C. §2255, entitled "Civil remedy for personal injuries", creates a private 
right of action for minor children who were the victims of certain enumerated sex 
offenses. 18 U.S.C. §2255 also creates a statutory floor for the amount of damages a 
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vs. Epstein, et al. 
Case No.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order 
victim can recover for a violation of same. Plaintiff has also alleged a single count of 
Sexual Battery against EPSTEIN. 
3. 
There presently exists between the Plaintiff and EPSTEIN a disagreement 
as to whether the statutory damage floor established in 18 U.S.C. §2255 is recoverable 
for each commission of an enumerated sex offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. §2255, or 
whether the statutory damage floor can only be enforced once, regardless of how many 
times a defendant perpetrates an enumerated sex offense against a minor victim. 
4. 
This disagreement between the parties is properly the subject of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint For Failure to State a Cause 
of Action, and Motion For More Definite Statement; Motion to Strike, and Supporting 
Memorandum of Law (D.E. 47) which is currently pending before this Court. 
5. 
In the event that the Court rules that Plaintiff can recover the statutory 
damage floor established in 18 U.S.C. §2255 for each proven incident of abuse 
committed by EPSTEIN upon her, Plaintiff intends to rely exclusively on the statutory 
damages, rather than those damages which are available at common law. (See D.E. 
113). If however, the Court rules that the statutory floor applies only one time, 
regardless of the number of times EPSTEIN committed an enumerated sexual offense 
against her, Plaintiff will be pursuing all damages available to her at both common law 
and by statute. 
6. 
Given Plaintiffs intent to rely exclusively on the statutory damages 
available to her under 18 U.S.C. §2255 as outline above, Plaintiff will not be presenting 
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Et. vs. Epstein, et al. 
Case No.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRNJOHNSON 
Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order 
any evidence of the extent of her physical, emotional, or pecuniary injuries, beyond 
evidence that she was the victim of sexual contact to which she was legally incapable of 
consenting by virtue of her age (including, pain and suffering, emotional distress, 
psychological trauma, mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, 
loss of dignity, invasion of her privacy, and loss of the capacity to enjoy life). 
Accordingly, any testimony and/or discovery regarding those types of damages would 
not be relevant to any material Issue pending in this case. 
7. 
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant EPSTEIN's Motion to 
Compel Plaintiff C.M.A. to Respond to Defendant's First Request to Produce and 
Answer Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, and to Overrule Objections, and For an 
Award of Defendant's Reasonable Expenses (D.E. 54). EPSTEIN is seeking from 
Plaintiff the production of certain treatment records of hers from the Parent-Child 
Center, Inc. and Dr. Serge Thys, a psychiatrist. 
8. 
Neither the treatment records from the Parent-Child Center, Inc. nor Dr. 
Serge Thys will have any relevance whatsoever in the event that Plaintiff pursues only 
those statutory damages available to her under 18 U.S.C. §2255. To the contrary, the 
production of these confidential and private treatment records would only serve to 
further humiliate, embarrass, and victimize 
9. 
Furthermore, 
.'s treatment records from the Parent-Child Center, 
Inc. and Dr. Serge Thys are protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege pursuant 
to the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee'. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923 
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a
k. vs. Epstein, et al. 
Case No.: 08-CV-80811-CIV-MARRNJOHNSON 
Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order 
(1996)("All agree that a psychotherapist privilege covers confidential communications 
made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists. We have no hesitation in concluding 
in this case that the federal privilege should also extend to confidential communications 
made to licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy.") Ordinarily, a plaintiff 
does not place her mental condition in controversy merely by requesting damages for 
mental anguish or "garden variety" emotional distress. In order to place a party's mental 
condition in controversy the party must allege a specific mental or psychiatric disorder 
or intend to offer expert testimony to support their claim of emotional distress. Turner v 
Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.CaI. 1995). The evidence sought is also protected 
under the substantive privacy rights recognized in Florida Statute §§90.503 and 
90.5035. 
10. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the entry of a protective order 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(c) regarding Plaintiffs treatment records from the 
Parent-Child Center, Inc. and Dr. Serge Thys. More particularly, Plaintiff requests the 
entry of an order precluding the discovery of those records until such time as the Court 
rules on the issue regarding whether the statutory damage floor as contained in 18 
U.S.C. §2255 applies to each proven commission of an enumerated sexual offense by 
EPSTEIN against. 
Should the Court rule that 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides a per 
incident damage floor, the treatment records would have absolutely no relevance 
whatsoever. In the event that the Court rules that the damage floor applies only once, 
the parties can then further brief the Court as to whether 
has placed her mental 
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