EFTA00178967

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. FGJ 07-103(WPB)/No. OLY-64 
IN RE: 
Grand Jury Subpoena. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
William L. Richey, P.A., hereby enters its appearance on behalf of William Riley 
and Riley Kiraly, in the above-captioned matter and requests that it be notified of all 
hearing dates herein and that any and all motions, petitions, applications, requests, 
demands, memoranda, briefs, notices, orders, opinions, and all such similar papers of 
any nature or description, made or filed by anyone pertaining to any party herein or 
pertaining in any way to the case, be served upon it at the address set forth below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM L. RICHEY, P.A. 
201 South Biscayne Boulevard 
34th Floor, Miami Center 
Miami, Flori 
Telephon 
Facsim.
E-Mail: 
ILL AM L. RICH 
Fla. Bar No. 
EFTA00179067

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. 
mail and facsimile this 
da of July, 2007 to 4 
Assistant US 
Attorney, 500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400, West Palm Beach, Florida 33401. 
, 
liam'L. Richey 
EFTA00179068

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
FILED UNDER SEAL - GRAND JURY 
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA ) 
DUCES TECUM ISSUED TO 
WILLIAM RILEY AND RILEY 
KIRALY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 ) 
FGJ 07-103 (WPB)/No. OLY -64 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that ROY BLACK of the law firm of BLACK, 
SREBNICK, KORNSPAN & STUMPF, P.A., hereby appears as counsel for 
Jeffrey Epstein in the above-entitled cause. 
DATED at Miami, Florida, this  /7  day of July, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BLACK, SREBNICK, KORNSPAN' 
& STUMPF, P.A. 
201 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300 
Miami, Florida 33131 
Ph. (305) 3 -1421 - Fa 
E-mail 
By: 
ROY BLA 
Florida Bar o. 
Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein 
Black. SrebnIck. Kornspan & Slum 
201 S. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33131. Phone: 
• Fax 
• www.RoyBlack.com 
EFTA00179069

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on July  17  , 2007, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was furnished by facsimile 
MI Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, 500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400, 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401. 
By: 
- 2 - 
and U.S. mail to: 
ROY BLACK/ESQ. 
Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein 
Black, Srebnick. Kornspan & Stumpf 
2015. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami, Florida 33131. Phone: -• 
Fax: 
• www.RoyBlack.com 
EFTA00179070

•••gC •• • 4 
(Re.. 06"2005)Scaled Document nuking Fonn 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
Southern District of Florida 
Case Number: 
FGJ 07-103 (WPB) OLY•63 & OLY-64 
IN RE GRAND JURY 
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
ISSUED TO WILLIAM RILEY 
Plaintiff 
Defendant 
Parry Filing Matter Under Seal 
Address: 201 S BISCAYNE BLVD. STE 1300. MIAMI. FL 33131 
Telephone: SIM 
On behalf of (select one): 7eCCrey erste ;71 K Plaintiff 
K Defendant 
SEALED DOCUMENT TRACKING FORM 
Name: ROY BLACK, ESQ. 
Date sealed document filed: 
8/7/2007 
If sealed pursuant to statute, cite statute: GRAND JURY PROCEEDING 
If sealed pursuant to previously entered protective order, date of order and docket entry number: 
The matter should remain sealed until: 
0 
Conclusion of Trial 
K Arrest of First Defendant 
K Case Closing 
K Conclusion of Direct Appeal 
P3 Other: 
GRAND JURY MATTER IS CONCLUDED 
K Permanently. Specify the authorizing law, rule, court order: 
The moving party requests that when the sealing period expires, the filed matter should be (select one): 
K Unsealed and placed in the public portion of the court file 
K Destroyed 
Returned to the party or counsel for the party, as identified above 
aliketa Kir) 
t- '&41 33 
Attorney for: Teirciey Erste C'n 
Black. SrebnIck. Kornspan & Stumpf 
EFTA00179071

• • €211•••1 •.••••••CS 
rage .I I .Z 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
FILED UNDER SEAL 
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA 
) 
) 
FGJ 07-103 (WPB) 
DUCES TECUM ISSUED TO 
) 
OLY-63 & OLY-64 
) 
WILLIAM RILEY 
) 
• 
M.B.D. No. 
) 
REPLY OF JEFFREY EPSTEIN TO UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO HIS MOTION 
TO INTERVENE AND TO QUASH GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS AND CROSS-
MOTION TO COMPEL 
A substantial portion of the government's response consists of rambling generalizations 
about various areas of the law which have little or nothing to do with the issues actually raised by 
Epstein, and those sections of the response require no reply. In other portions, however, the 
government has ignored critical facts, mischaracterized or misunderstood the arguments 
advanced by Epstein, and relied upon case law so markedly distinguishable from the 
circumstances of this case as to he wholly inapplicable. It is to these portions of the response to 
which this reply is directed. 
I. 
The first area which requires reply is the government's assertions that Riley simply 
failed, without notice and without excuse, to appear at the time scheduled for his grand jury 
appearance. See Response at 1, 5, 6 n.6. This is simply untrue. Riley's appearance date had 
previously been continued from July 10, 2007, until July 17, 2007, by agreement of the parties. 
On July 16, 2007, counsel for Epstein were informed by Deputy Chief 
that Riley 
did not have to appear physically before the grand jury if a motion to quash the subpoena was 
filed by Epstein before the end of the day on July 17, 2007, and the motion was so filed. Based 
7N c tfler. 
117"/I 
Black. Srebnick. Kornspan & Stumpf 
_ 
. 
EFTA00179072

,9e JP - 
upon this understanding, Riley. did not appear. Thus, Riley did not flout the subpoena, as the 
government wishes the Court to believe. In agreeing to excuse Riley's appearance, the 
government knew that Epstein, and not Riley, was the real party in interest and that the important 
legal issues at stake were those surrounding Epstein's privacy rights in the contents of the 
computers. See Sections II, III, infra. 
Next, it is important to point out an erroneous locus which appears throughout the 
government's response. The government refers again and again to the subpoena's command for 
the production of computers, as if all it wanted was possession of the physical items themselves. 
For example, the government wishes the "Court to proceed on the manifestly erroneous 
assumption that the subpoenas are "narrowly tailored" to seek only the "physical computers 
removed from Epstein's residence." Response at S. See also Response at 38 (government 
contends that the subpoenas are sufficiently particularized because they specifically describe the 
three computers). They are not. Those assertions may reflect the literal wording of the 
subpoenas, but simple possession of the physical containers is not the government's real object 
here. What the government actually wants is unfettered access to the entire contents of Epstein's 
computers — every personal and business document, every email, every item of correspondence. 
in sum. every item on the hard drives, regardless of their relevance to the matters under 
investigation, a request little different than had it commanded that Epstein produce every 
document in his house, regardless of subject matter. Critically, nowhere in the government's 
response does it disavow this intention (or argue that the subpoenas contain any limitation on its 
ability to rummage through the contents of the computers at will). 
- n - 
Black. Srcbnick. Kornspan & Stumpf 
20i S. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite lino • Miami 
7ne »I
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EFTA00179073

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In his motion, Epstein argued at length, supported by considerable contemporary case law 
(and by the discussion in the United States Attorneys Manual regarding the need to particularize 
computer files to be seized), that the government cannot, consistently with the Fourth 
Amendment, whether by subpoena or warrant, be permitted to search at will and without 
limitation through the contents of the computers. See Motion at 19-26. The govenunent has not 
responded to Epstein's Fourth Amendment particularity contentions. ft has neither sought to 
provide legal justification for its obvious intention, if the subpoenas are enforced as written, to 
conduct a fishing expedition through the contents of the computers nor has it proposed suitable 
limitations on the scope of its search — such as targeted search terms — to ensure that the search 
of the contents of the computers does not extend beYand • items relevant to the grand jury's 
investigation.' Rather than respond to the unassailable merit of Epstein's arguments, the 
government has chosen to take refuge in an utterly unsupported — and erroneous — argument that 
an intervenor may not challenge a subpoena as unreasonable and oppressive. See Section Ill, 
infra. 
Contrary to the government's argument, challenges to grand jury subpoenas are not 
limited to claims of privilege. See Response at 6, 36-37. "It is well-established that a litigant may 
have sufficiently important, legally-cognizable interests in the materials or testimony sought by a 
grand jury subpoena issued to another person to give the litigant standing to challenge the 
validity of that subpoena." In re Grand Jury, Ill F.3d 1066, 1073 (3d Cir. 1997)(collecting 
On page 38 of its Response, the government finally admits what it is looking for: evidence of sexual 
exploitation of minors, including surveillance camera footage, "computer printouts showing electronic messages for 
`appointments' with the minors; and printouts showing payments made to girls." This description readily illustrates 
the ease with which the subpoenas could have been appropriately particularized. The subpoenas, however, make not 
the slightest nod to limiting the government's search of the computers to such materials. Nor for that matter, has the 
covernment presented the slightest evidence that what it seeks is to be found on these computers at all. 
- 3 - 
alack.Srcbnick. Kornspan & Stumpf 
120I S. BiSCavne Boulevard cute WWI .114i2mi Clnriel, 77171 . 
,nr -D-r. en. 
EFTA00179074

cases). In that case, the Court concluded that intervenors had standing to challenge a subpoena 
issued to an individual who had privately wiretapped conversations with the intervenors in 
violation of Title III to prevent her from turning over the tapes of the conversations to the grand 
jury. Importantly, the Court reasoned that lbjecause it is Doe 1 and Doe 2 whose privacy has 
been violated and would again be violated by compliance with the subpoena, and since Doe 3 is 
the perpetrator of the unlawful recordings, it is the intervenors and not the witness herself who 
are best suited to assert the Title III claims." Id. at 1072 (emphasis added). See also United 
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 954 (9th Cir. 2006)(Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(noting that district court permitted major league 
baseball players' association to intervene to challenge grand—jury subpoena directed to 
laboratories based on its interest in protecting the privacy rights of its members whose samples 
and test results were sought); In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2002)(considering 
merits of intervenor's claim that grand jury subpoena to his counsel in a civil case was 
unreasonable or oppressive under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) because the subpoenaed documents 
were subject to a protective order in the civil case); el: Warshak v. United States, 2007 WL 
1730094 (6th Cir. June 18, 2007)(plaintiff had standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenges to 
I8 U.S.C. §2703 orders issued to third-party internet service providers). 
Here, in addition to the attorney-client/work product and Fifth Amendment privileges 
asserted by Epstein, which the government concedes that he has standing to raise, Epstein also 
asserts important Fourth Amendment and privacy rights in opposition to enforcement of the 
subpoena.' These are rights personal to Epstein, and the government would no doubt be the first 
2 
Lanebrd v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 513 F.3d 1121 (2d Cir. 1975), on which the government relies. 
Response at 37, concerned a motion to quash a trial subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendant for records of the 
plaintiffs expert witness. At issue in United Stales v. Wells, 2006 WL 3203905 (E.D. Mich. November 3. 2006). 
-4 
Black. Srebnick. tCornspan & Stumpf 
2015. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami Flruirla iWL . Pknna.
crn . 
,ne +re. -onne 
EFTA00179075

rage W12 
to argue that Riley and Riley Kiraly could not raise these issues because they assert Epstein's 
rights, not their own.3 The fact of' the matter is that Riley/Riley Kiraly are nothing more than 
bailees of the computers' and the real party in interest is Epstein. It is his Fourth Amendment 
and privacy rights which will he irrevocably trampled by the government's obtaining unfettered 
access to the contents of his computers, an object which the government does not even now 
deny. 
TV. 
Leaving aside for the moment Epstein's argument based on Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616 (1986), see Motion at 28, the Fifth Amendment right asserted by Epstein relates not to 
the content of the materials contained in the computers but to the testimonial ccimmunications 
inherent in the act of producing the computers and, concomitantly and inseparably, their 
contents. See Motion at 9-16. Thus, the government's discussion at pages 13-15 is wholly beside 
the point.5
was a narrowly targeted subpoena to a bank for records pertaining to a single mortgage application, sought by the 
United States as an aid in collecting a default judgment. In neither of these cases did the movants assert interests 
remotely comparable to the important Fourth Amendment and privacy interests asserted by Epstein. 
If the Court were to sustain the government's standing objection as to Epstein. Riley and Riley Kirsh 
would file a-motion to quash the subpoenas 
As stated in his original motion, at 3 n.1, Epstein does not concede the existence of any such computers —
and cannot without waiving his Fifth Amendment act of production privilege — but, for purposes of this Reply, 
refers herein to "computers" as if one or more of the computers referenced in the subpoenas do exist. 
United States v. Davis. 636 F.2d 1028, 1039 (5th Cir. 1981), on which the government relies, Response at 
14, presented the opposite scenario to this case — attorneys seeking to assert the Fifth Amendment rights of their 
client. In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), also relied on by the government, the taxpayer asserted a 
Fifth Amendment privilege as to the subpoenaed materials themselves; there was no act-of-production privilege 
claimed. The same was wue in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien. Inc.. 467 U.S. 735 (1984). In United Stares v. Ghidoni, 732 
F.2d 814, 818.19 (11th Cir. 1984), quite unlike this case, the authorization which the target was required to sign did 
not admit the existence of the bank accounts or that he controlled them, nor did it in any way serve to authenticate 
any bank records which might be produced. 
Black. Srebnick. Kornspan & Stumpf 
•-• 
EFTA00179076

vvatma k.ornez 
rage Fits 
Epstein does not contend that the computers or their contents (leaving aside his Boyd 
argument) are themselves protected from compelled disclosure by the 
Fifth Amendment.°
Instead, as addressed in his Motion at 9-12, the Fifth Amendment protection which Epstein 
asserts is the act of production privilege, as production of the computers in response to the 
subpoena would be both testimonial and potentially incriminating. The government's assertion 
that the act of authenticating documents is incriminating only if the documents themselves are 
incriminating, Response at 28, is incorrect. What the act of production privilege protects against 
is the government's ability to use against the individual the compelled testimonial 
communication that the item produced is the item called for in the subpoena which is inherent in 
the act of production of the item in response to subpoena: There is no requirement that theternoWl 
„ asserting the privilege demonstrate that the documents sought are incriminating, and the.
government has cited no authority for such a requirement-The government's assertion that 
Epstein has failed to show that the contents of the computers are incriminating, Response at 28, 
is more than a little curious, as the government would have no basis for subpoenaing the 
computers (or seizing them pursuant to a search warrant) if it did not think that it had reason to 
believe that the computers contained evidence of the alleged offenses. under investigation).?
6 
As a review of his motion will quickly demonstrate, Epstein has not asserted a blanket Fifth Amendment 
privilege as to every document on every computer and all of the records requested from Riley/Riley Kiraly. See 
Response at 12. With respect to the Riley Kiraly records, Epstein has not asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege at 
all. 
The government also argues that the computers are not testimonial for purpoies of the Fifth Amendment. 
see Response at 22.24, but Epstein has never suggested that they are. But, as previously stressed, it is not the 
computers in which the government is interested — it wants access to the contents of the hard drive. This argument 
is but another iteration of the government's repeated references to "computers" as if the physical equipment were all 
it was concerned with and all that was at issue here. See, e.g., Response at 5, 7, 14, 16,18, 20, 22, 23,26, 27, 38. The 
government's insistent focus on "the computers" rather than their contents serves only to obfuscate the real issues 
before the Court. 
- 6 - 
Black, Srebnick. Kornspan & Stumpf 
201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300. Miami. Florida 33131 • Phone- 30S-17I-647i. re.. 
EFTA00179077

r 39e *II 
The government argues that the act of production privilege is inapplicable because the 
existence and location of the computers are a "foregone conclusion," Response at 27, but that is 
plainly not the case - if the government knows, as it contends it does, that Riley has the 
computers, why then did it issue a subpoena to a prior investigator for the production of the 
computers? Nothing in 
affidavits which were filed with the response establishes that 
the computers exist, that they are in Riley's custody or control, or that there is an independent 
basis to authenticate them. This information is precisely what the act of production would 
communicate: that three computers were once in Epstein's house and that the three computers 
produced in response to the subpoena were those specific computers — facts that are not, in the 
absence of the testimonial communications inherent in the act of production, "foregone 
conclusions." These are the testimonial communications inherent in the act of production, and it 
is to these communications which Epstein's Fifth Amendment privilege claim is directed. 
Moreover, once again, the government's argument is directed only to the computers 
themselves. The act of production privilege applies not just to the computers themselves, but also 
to the documents contained within the computers, which would be identified as having been in 
Epstein's home and implicitly authenticated by the act of production. These are also grotccted 
testimonial communications. The government certainly has not shown that particular documents 
or other items are known to exist within the specific computers at issue or that there is an 
independent basis for the authentication of the documents within the computers. 
Finally, it bears repeating that for purposes of invoking the act of production privilege 
(and for purposes of the attorney-client privilege), Riley stands in the same relationship to 
Epstein as counsel himself and, in turn, stands in the shoes of his client. Epstein, therefore. 
- 7 - 
Black. Srebnick. Kornspan & Stum 
201 S. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33131 • Phone: 
• Fax: 
• vasmcgovalack.com 
EFTA00179078

JDO.VIJI.L 
Wanda G00102 
Per 9/12 
retains the same right to assert the act of production privilege he would have if the subpoenas 
had been served on him. See Motion at 11-12, and cases cited therein. 
V. 
The government's argument at pages 18-22 of its Response completely confuses 
Epstein's arguments. Epstein did not and does not contend that the removal of the computers 
from Epstein's house constituted the "selection and compilation of documents" that would 
disclose counsel's "thought processes." Response at 20. Instead, the work product argument to 
which the government appears to be responding was made with respect to paragraph 3 of' the 
subpoenas, which demands production of an array of information that impermissibly intrudes 
into the defense function by seeking information which would reveal the defense investigation, 
strategy, and tactics. See Motion at' 13-16. 
In an effort to undercut this argument that Epstein has not made, the government relies on 
cases in which an attorney or an investigator knowingly removed inculpatory evidence from its 
original location. See Response at 21-22 & n.14. Such cases could not be more divorced from the 
circumstances of this case \UnlikeTa murder ikenatkon:Olbini robbery 
s,
it% not themsehaaideiteektallkistif The cases on which the government relies are wholly 
inapposite. At issue in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2000), see Response at 
21-22, was simply a claim of privilege with respect to the client's identity. United States v. 
Hunter, 1995 WI, 12513 (N.D.111. January 6, 1995), does not, as the government would have it. 
"contain[] facts similar to the ones, at bar." Response at 21 n.14. In Hunter, attorneys removed 
a 
The government relies on an affidavit from Dec. 
and on 
affidavit in support of an 
application for a warrant to search Epstein's house, but neither of those documents demonstrates reason to believe 
M.
that evidence of the alleged offenses would be found on the computers at issue. 
affidavit indicates only 
that two years before the search of Epstein's house the security cameras automanca y ownloaded images on to a 
personal computer identified only as being in 
s office. 
scald, warrant affidavit does not so • 
much as mention computers outside the list o items to c seized. 
8 
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EFTA00179079

vvanaa ta01110Z 
Page 10112 
hank robbery proceeds from the defendant's home and later told the government about them 
during the defendant's proffer session. Defendant argued that the government was precluded by 
the attorney-client privilege from introducing at trial either the money or evidence regarding its 
removal from his residence. Hunter stands for no more than the proposition that "[w]hen defense - 
counsel or a member of the defense team removes incriminating evidence, the government may 
introduce testimony establishing the original location and condition of the evidence." Id. at *3. 
The theory underlying Hunter and the cases on which it relied9 was, in essence, that the attorney-
client privilege will not be applied to deprive the government of trial evidence regarding an 
incriminating physical item and its original location, where counsel acted wrongfully in 
removing obviously incriminatine evidence from its original location. Nothing in Hunter speaks 
to the issues actual])' raised by Epstein or supports the enforcement of the government's 
subpoenas, either the paragraphs demanding the production of the computers or the paragraph 
seeking Riley Kiraly documents relatin to Epstein. 
Contrary to the government's repeated assertions, Epstein has not contended that the 
computers themselves are protected by the attorney-client privilege or that the attorney-client 
privilege precludes production of the computers in response to the subpoenas, but only that they 
contain information and materials protected by the attorney-client privilege. Motion at 26-28. 
1 h:ere:tore, even were the computers "incriminating evidence" — which they manifestly are not t-
Hunter in no way Undermines Epstein's challenges to—theiNip
E Nor has Epstein contended 
9 
Hunter relied on Clucheue v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Or. 1985), and People p. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 
(Cal. 1981), on which thegovemment also relies. In Cuchette, the investigator the defendant's wife — obtained 
and carried away highly inculpatory receipts from an automobile upholstery shop which showed that defendant had 
had his car reupholstered in close proximity to a murder which an eyewitness said had been committed in the car. 
Like the defendant in Hunter, the defendant argued that the anomey-client privilege precluded admission of the 
receipts against him at trial. Similarly, in Meredith, the defense investigator found the murder victim's wallet based 
on information obtained from the defendant and turned it over to defendant's attorney, who in turn, gave it to the 
police. 
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Black. Srebnick. Komspan & Stumpf 
Rms. Biscayne st.
R 
Ievard Cwt.- iinO • Miami rInriria 44111 . ()knee. WIC )71 (.411 . r-... arle lco -inn, 
EFTA00179080

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12 
that any removal of computers from his home was protected by the work product privilege: he 
has not, therefore, made arguments "identical" to those raised in Hunter. Response at 22 n.14. 
The government's Hunter-based arguments are, therefore, a complete non sequitur. 
VI. 
The government critiques Epstein's failure to supply a privilege log. Response at 
Epstein's overarching contention is that the subpoenas should be quashed in their entiretfriffit 
-A has, however, through his. mullet 0ffericid' t0 'supply a Privilege log if ihe tOirddeieirnAirsivar 
\ the subpoenas should. be thforeedlo preyed Privileged 
ftourfallingintotuthen*Mit 
the government, and he smutty tit:Stiffer:The C6tut should not entforostkie.6*petecOr**, 
affording.cOunsel an opportunity to exallidePriviletechiliititbiltlittehnhetprOOPPO6nt 
With respect to the Riley Kiraly records, the government has not responded to Epstein's 
contention that paragraph 3 of the subpoenas directly requests information regarding the work 
which Riley was performing for Attorney Black on behalf of Epstein's defense. 
The 
government's response goes on at length regarding types of items which case law has held not to 
be privileged, Response at 29-34, but completely ignores the fact that its subpoena is not so 
limited. Quite the contrary: it broadly demands "fain documents and information related to the 
nature of the relationship between Mr. William Riley and/or Riley/Kiraly and Mr. Jeffiey 
Epstein, including hut nor limited to" (emphasis added) a list of documents, many of which 
themselves contain information protected by the attorney-client or work product privileges, such 
as billing statements which describe activities undertaken on behalf of Epstein's defense and 
telephone logs and appointment calendars which would reveal the identities of persons contacted 
as part of the defense investigation. The government has made no effort to particularize the 
Contrary to the government's assertions, Response at 7.8, Epstein has not made a blanket assertion of the 
attorney-client and work product privileges as to the entirety of the computers' contents. See Motion at 26-28. 
- 10 - 
Black. Srebnick. Kornspan & Slump( 
2015. Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33111• Phone- int171_447i 
7C11 
••I 
EFTA00179081

vvaiicia avORMIZ 
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t
subpoena so as to avoid calling for the production of.plainly privileged information, and. if 
paragraph 3 of the subpoena is to be enforced at all, it must be narrowed to eliminate any and all 
information encompassed within the attorney-client or work product privileges. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BLACK, SREBNICK, KORNSPAN & STUMPF, PA. 
201 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300 
Miami Florida 33131 
Ph.: 
-- Fax: 
E-Mail: 
• 
itOY BLACK, Ea
u
Florida Bar No.: 
Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 7, 2007, a true and correct copy of the forging 
motion was furnished by facsimile 
and U.S. mail to: 
Esq., U.S. 
Attorney's Office, 500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400, West-Palm Beach, FL 33401. 
gC: 44 
OS 
ROY BLACK, ESQ. 
Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein 
?tit 
Ile...LeneA 
nein 
Black srcbmck. Kornsparl & Stumpf 
EFTA00179082

U.S. Department 
Justice 
United States Attorney 
Southern District of Florida 
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
VIA FACSIMILE 
Lilly Ann Sanchez, Esq. 
Fowler White Burnett 
1395 Brickell Ave Fl 14 
Miami Florida 33131-3300 
Re: 
Jeffrey Epstein 
99 N.E. 4 Simi 
Ma
lt
Tdepbone 
- Facsimile 
August 3, 2007 
Dear Lilly: 
Thank you for your letter of August 2nd regarding your proposal on how to resolve the 
Epstein matter. 
As we explained at our meeting on July 31, 2007, the Office believes that the federal 
interest will not be vindicated in the absence of a two-year term of state imprisonment for 
Mr. Epstein. That offer was not meant as a starting point for negotiations, it is the minimum 
term of imprisonment that will obviate the need for federal prosecution. The Office has 
never agreed that a state prison sentence is not appropriate for Mr. Epstein. Rather we 
simply stated that if Mr. Epstein preferred to serve his sentence in a federal penetentiary, we 
would be willing to explore a federal conviction that may allow that in lieu of any state 
resolution. Further, as I made clear in our follow up telephone conversation after the 
meeting, a plea to two federal misdemeanors was never extended or meant as an offer. 
We also would reiterate that the agreement to Section 2255 liability applies to all of 
the minor girls identified during the federal investigation, not just the 12 that form the basis 
of an initial planned charging instrument. 
As you know, the ability to engage in flexible plea negotiations is dramatically 
changed upon the return of an indictment. Once an indictment is returned, the Office does 
not intend to file a Superseding Information containing a lesser charge or to dismiss the case 
in favor of state prosecution. 
EFTA00179083

LILLY ANN SANCHEZ, ESQ. 
AUGUST 3, 2007 
PAGE 2 
Please let us know your client's decision by no later than August 17. I have conferred 
with U.S. Attorney Acosta who has asked me to communicate that the two-year term of 
incarceration is a non-negotiable minimum to vindicate a federal interest, and, at this time, 
he is not inclined to meet with counsel for Mr. Epstein. 
Sincerely, 
R. Alexander Acosta 
United States Attorney 
...•••••••
By:  
Chief, Criminal Division 
cc: 
Roy Black 
Gerald B. Lefcourt 
R. Alexander Acosta 
EFTA00179084

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 
DUCES TECUM NUMBERS 
OLY-63 and OLY-64 
FGJ 07-103(WPB) 
UNITED STATES' SURREPLY TO REPLIES FILED BY WITNESS WILLIAM 
RILEY AND INTERVENOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
RE: MOTION TO OUASH GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 
UNDER SEAL 
EFTA00179085

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 
FGJ 07-103(WPB) 
DUCES TECUM NUMBERS 
OLY-63 and OLY-64 
UNDER SEAL 
UNITED STATES' SURREPLY TO REPLIES FILED BY WITNESS WILLIAM 
RILEY AND INTERVENOR JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
RE: MOTION TO OUASII GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 
The United States, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States Attorney, hereby 
files this Surreply to the Replies filed by Witness William Riley and Intervenor Jeffrey Epstein,' and 
notes the following: 
1. 
Both the witness and the intervenor assert that Mr. Riley was excused from appearing 
before the grand jury and that Mr. Riley did not flout the subpoena by failing to appear. AUSA 
agreed with Attorney Mr. Black that Mr. Riley would not have to appear and produce 
the disputed items if a motion to quash all aspects of the subpoenas was filed. Neither party's 
pleading has asserted that the subpoenas should be quashed as to Mr. Riley's testimony. Thus, the 
United States does not contend that Mr. Riley intentionally disobeyed the subpoena, but notes that 
the Motion to Quash does not address all aspects of the subpoenas and, therefore, the subpoena for 
testimony is enforceable. The undersigned has conferred with the office of Mr. Riley's counsel, and 
it has been agreed that Mr. Riley will appear before the grand jury on September 18, 2007. However, 
'Witness William Riley did not file an initial motion to quash the grand jury subpoenas, but 
did file a Reply to the United States' Response to the Intervenor's Motion to Quash. Accordingly, 
the United States has not previously had the opportunity to respond to the issue raised by Mr. Riley. 
EFTA00179086