EFTA00175521

Case 9:08-cv-8uo04-KAM 
Document 
Entered ..i FLSD Docket 09115L . J8 
Page 7 of 8 
SERVICE LIST 
Doe 
Epstein, et. al. 
CASE NO: 08-80804-Civ-MARIUUJOHNSON 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Robert Critton, Esq. 
Burman, Critton, Luttier & Coleman, LLP 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Counsel for Jeffley Epstein 
Served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Guy Alan Lewis Es . 
Email: 
Lewis Tein 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove, FL 33133 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein 
Served via CM/ECF 
Bruce E. Reinhart, Esq. 
Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Counsel fo 
Served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Michael R. Tein Es . 
Email: 
Lewis Tein 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove, FL 33133 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Counsel for Jeffrey Epstein 
Served via CM/ECF 
7 
EFTA00175541

Case 9:08-cv-80ou4-KAM 
Document 
Entered 'I.— FLSD Docket 09/15/2 
d 
Page 8 of 8 
Douglas M. McIntosh, Esq. 
Jason A. McGrath, Esq. 
McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz & Cartaya, P.A. 
Centurion Tower, Suite 1110 
1601 Forum Place 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Phone: 
Fax: 
Counsel for 
Served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
8 
EFTA00175542

Case 9:08-cv-8t.44-KAM 
Document 
Entered'... FLSD Docket 09105/L 
Page 1 of 14 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-C1V-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE, a/k/a 
JANE DOE NO. 1, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
, and 
OPPOSITION TO REMAND MOTION 
Because this case was properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), remand is 
unwarranted. In response to plaintiff's motion under § 1447(c) for remand and attorneys' fees, 
defendants Jeffrey Epstein andrespectfully 
state as follows: 
Introduction 
The plaintiff suggests she is insulated from any fraudulent-joinder challenge so long as 
she has "at least a possibility" of "recover[ing] against Defendant 
under Florida law for 
each of the counts in the amended complaint." (DE 11 at 5.) However superficially appealing 
from a plaintiff's perspective, this argument ignores the corollary that "[t]he potential for legal 
liability [under State law] `must be reasonable, not merely theoretical!" Legg l. Wyeth, 428 
F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Great Plains Trust Co.l. Morgan Stanley Dean 
Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). See also id. at 1325 
(observing that "[t]he removal process was created by Congress to protect defendants," adding 
that "Congress `did not extend such protection with one hand, and with the other give plaintiffs a 
EFTA00175543

Case 9:08-ov-80°04-KAM 
Document -. 
Entered 
FLSD Docket 09/05ft-A 
Page 2 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CiV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
bag of tricks to overcome it.' (quoting McKinney'. Bd. of Trustees of Maryland Cmty. Colt, 
955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992))). 
Essentially, the remand motion merely re-states the complaint's allegations against 
. This is not enough to rebut fraudulent joinder. Cf. Ghiglionel Discover Prop. & Cas. 
Co., No. C-06-1276 SC, 2006 WL 1095855, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2006) (denying motion to 
remand where plaintiffs, instead of properly analyzing their alleged cause of action, resorted to 
"quoting from Witkin's California Procedure a passage that merely repeated the essence of [the 
governing jurisdictional statute)") (emphasis added). 
Even in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations are insufficient to 
establish a cause of action under Florida law against 
. 
As a result, after 
discounting this fraudulently joined defendant, there is complete diversity of citizenship, hence, 
original jurisdiction in this Court. 
Discussion 
A. Diversity of Citizenship 
Based on a published newspaper report, our removal petition suggested that Jane Doe, 
despite her allegations of being a citizen of Florida (DE 1 at 62), might actually be a (diverse) 
citizen of Georgia (DE 1 at 7-8 n.6). If so, the case would be removable, regardless of any 
claims against defendant 
The plaintiff ignored this point. Instead, the plaintiff claimed 
that "there is a question of whether Defendant Epstein is actually a citizen of Florida because he 
is now incarcerated in a Florida jail." (DE 11 at 2 n.2.) 
This statement, besides being 
nonresponsive,' is devoid of merit under binding Eleventh Circuit law, which the plaintiff did not 
Plaintiff seized upon this non sequitur as an opportunity to attach the "Epstein Sentence" (DE 
11 at 2 n.2), an unmarked composite exhibit comprising, among other things, the terms, 
2 
EFTA00175544

Case 9:08-cv-80ou4-KAM 
Document "L . 
Entered L. FLED Docket 09/05/i...d 
Page 3 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CrV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
cite. See Mitchell'. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(noting as an undisputed point that someone retains their pre-incarceration domicile for 
purposes of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)) (citations omitted); see also Polakoff 
HendersOn, 370 P. Supp. 690, 693 (ND. Ga. 1973), off d, 488 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1974) ("A 
prisoner does not acquire a new domicile in the place of his imprisonment, but retains the 
domicile he had prior to incarceration.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added), cited with approval 
in Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1314. 
conditions, and sensitive protocols concerning the fact of Epstein's previously disclosed 
incarceration. See DE 24 in Jane Doe No. 2 I. Epstein, Case No. 9:08-CV-80119-KAM (S.D. 
Fla. filed Feb. 6, 2Q08) (disclosing fact of Epstein's criminal sentence and incarceration); DE 19 
in Jane Doe No. 31 E tein, No. 08-CV-80232-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 5, 2008) (same); DE 
30 in Jane Doe No. 4 I. Epsjein, No. 08-CV-80380-ICAM (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 14, 2008) (same); 
DE 28 in Jane Doe No. 5 I. Epstein, No. 08-80381-CV-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Apr. 14, 2008) 
(same). 
Being entirely irrelevant to this proceeding, the above exhibit serves only to 
complement the improper extrajudicial Internet postings by plaintiff's counsel. Compare 
Ricci—Leopold Home Page, http:// www.riccilaw.com (click on "Breaking News," then access 
the hyperlink entitled, 03/13/08 — Consumer Justice Attorney Ted Leopold Files Case to aid Jane 
Doe in seeking justice against sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein and his associates) (characterizing 
Epstein as a "sexual predator," then using terms like "'West"' and "'lurid" to describe Epstein's 
alleged conduct (quoting "Ted Leopold, managing partner of the•Palm Beach Gardens law finn 
of Ricci—Leopold")) (emphasis added) (web site last visited Sept. 3, 2008), with S.D. Fla. Local 
Rule 77.2(7) (providing that "[a] lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not 
during its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, 
other than a quotation from or reference to public records, which a reasonable person would 
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that such dissemination will interfere with a fair trial and which relates (a) [e]vidence regarding 
the occurrence or transaction involved[;) (b) [t]he character ... of a party . . . 4; or] (d) [t]he 
lawyer's opinion as to the merits of the claims ....") (emphasis added). 
• 
3 
EFTA00175545

Case 9:08-cv-80a04-KAM 
Document .. 
Entered 
FLSD Docket 09/05/2, sd 
Page 4 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-NIARRA/JOHNSON 
B. Fraudulent Joinder 
Even if the plaintiff is a citizen of Florida (after all), there is still complete diversity given 
that "[a] non-diverse defendant who is fraudulently joined does not defeat diversity." Shenkarl. 
Money Warehouse, Inc., No. 07-20634-CIV, 2007 WL 3023531, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2007) 
(Moreno, J.) (citing Riley'. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1337 
(11th Cir. 2002)); accord, e.g., Tedder 
F.M.C. Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(denying motion to remand where two resident defendants were joined for the fraudulent purpose 
of defeating federal jurisdiction).2 To say it another way, there is no cause of action here against 
and without 
there is complete diversity. 
This plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit in this court. See Doe' Epstein, No. 08-CV-
80069-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Jan. 24, 2008). After she was deposed in the state criminal case,3
she dismissed this suit, switched lawyers, and re-filed her claims in state court (DE 1-2 at 62-
70), adding 
62).4 After Ms. 
as a nondiverse defendant in an attempt to prevent removal (DE 1-2 at 
moved to quash service of process in state court (DE 1-2 at 92-96), the 
2 
In Bonner'. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en bane), the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit 
rendered prior to October 1, 1981. 
On February 20, 2008, the plaintiff was deposed in State of Florida'. Jeffrey Epstein, 
502006CF009454 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. filed July 19, 2006). During that deposition, she made 
numerous admissions that completely undermined the allegations in her complaint. Two days 
later, she filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. See Doe'. Epstein, Case No. 
08-CV-80069-KAM, DE 9. 
' 
The plaintiff, appare 
her untenable theories of indirect tort liabilySed 
another new defendant, 
(DE 1-2 at 62.) In naming 
and MIE as 
defendants, the plaintiff tried to distinguish this case from a series of effectively identical 
lawsuits brought in federal court against Epstein: Jane Doe No. 2'. Epstein, Case No. 9:08-
CV-80119-KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Feb. 6, 2008); Jane Doe No. 3I. Epstein, No. 08-CV-80232-
KAM (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 5, 2008); Jane Doe No. 41 Epstein, No. 08-CV-80380-KAM (S.D. 
4 
EFTA00175546

Case 9:08-cv-80o04-KAM 
Document 
Entered ts.. FLSD Docket 09/05/2...3 
Page 5 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRABOHNSON 
plaintiff then amended her complaint to assert an additional claim against 
(DE 1-3 at 
101-09), re-using the identical, unmodified general allegations. 
Instead of addressing the fact that 
has "no assets whatever" (DE 1 at 4) and looks 
every bit the sham defendant, the plaintiff maintains that 
a college student, was a "key 
player" in an alleged RICO "scheme" (DE II at 2). 
Resorting to unswom, inadmissible, 
improper double-hearsay, the plaintiff proclaims that 
"has described herself as Heidi 
Fleiss" (DE II at 1), the "notorious Hollywood madam" (DE 11 at 1 n.1) — as though 
sensationalism could convert Ms. 
into an actual defendant. This "argument" has nothing 
to do with the issue of removal, offers incompetent non-evidence in an attempt to prejudice the 
analysis, and fails to establish that the amended complaint contains a single viable cause of 
action against 
1. The plaintiff has not asserted a cause of action against 
for civil 
conspiracy.. 
The plaintiff, citing to Wright 
Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), 
concedes that "there muse [sic] be an `actionable underlying tort or wrong' for an actionable 
conspiracy claim." (DE II at 5.) Yet, the plaintiff still insists that Epstein's "violation of 
Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes" (DE 1-3 at 105) is an adequate the basis for her civil 
conspiracy claim against 
(DE 1-3 at 105-06), "regardless of whether Defendant 
Epstein's violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes also creates a private right of action" 
(DE 11 at 6). This makes no sense. 
As we argued in the removal petition, it is not enough to allege that 
"merely . . . 
'conspired to cause harm"; again, "[u]nder Florida law, '[a]n actionable conspiracy requires an 
Fla. filed Apr. 14, 2008); Jane Doe No. 51 Epstein, No. 08-80381-CV-ICAM (S.D. Fla. filed 
Apr. 14, 2008). 
5 
EFTA00175547

Case 9:08-cv-80w4-KAM 
Document ≥ 
Entered L. .:LSD Docket 09/05/2L 
J 
Page 6 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRABOHNSON 
actionable underlying tort or wrong."' Posner'. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1217-18 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Florida Fern Growers Assn'. Concerned Citizens, 616 So. 2d 562, 565 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1993)). In an effort to dodge this requirement, the plaintiff cites Doe'. Celebrity 
Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 917 (11th Cir. 2004), an admiralty case that has nothing to do with 
Chapter 800, let alone the basic premise (left unaddressed by the plaintiff) that "not every 
statutory violation carries a civil remedy," Am. Home Assurance Co.' Plaza Materials Corp., 
908 So. 2d 360, 374 (Fla. 2005) (citing Villazonl. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 
842, 852 (Fla. 2003)). 
In Celebrity Cruises, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished "sexual battery" from "sexual 
assault" under Florida law. Celebrity Cruises, 394 F.3d at 916-17. The court also cited with 
approval the dissenting opinion in Doe'. Evans, 814 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2002) (Wells, C.J., 
dissenting), where Florida Chief Justice Wells admonished against "the use of broad, indefinite, 
and legally nonspecific language" to establish causes of action under a rubric as expansive as 
"sexual misconduct."' Evans, 814 So. 2d at 379-81 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 
379 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (noting that 'sexual misconduct' is a phrase of inherent vagueness 
and has no meaning in Florida tort law," adding that "[t]orts have defined elements") (emphasis 
added). 
Accordingly, this case serves only to highlight that Florida has never relaxed its 
pleading requirements simply because a plaintiff describes an event as a "sexual assault." To 
plead a legal cause of action, the plaintiff still must allege a real, recognized tort. 
In trying to obfuscate the basis for her civil-conspiracy claim, the plaintiff has only 
confirmed that she is relying on Chapter 800, a statute that does not afford a private right of 
action. Because the statute she expressly pleads provides no civil remedy, the plaintiff cannot 
prevail on her derivative claim for civil conspiracy. 
6 
EFTA00175548

Case 9:08-cv-80bv4-KAM 
Document 2. 
Entered L. .:LSD Docket 09/05/21.. 
J 
Page 7 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-ClV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
2. The plaintiff has not asserted a cause of action against 
for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The plaintiff says she agreed to perform an illegal massage "to make some extra money" 
(DE I I at 7), only to "suffer severe mental anguish and pain" (DE 1-3 at 106) when her illegal 
scheme met with an allegedly superseding illegal scheme. To establish a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, however, it is not sufficient to allege that "'the 
defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that [the defendant] has 
intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that [the defendant's] conduct has been 
characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive 
damages for another tort."' Metro. Life Ins. Co.' McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1985) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). Rather, "the conduct as a matter of law 
must be so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency." Southland Corp.'. Bartsch, 522 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Here, 
when it comes to 
, the amended complaint fails to meet these standards.5
Indeed, the plaintiff does not allege that 
committed an assault; or that 
acted forcibly; or that 
acted coercively. Further, the plaintiff says she undressed, and 
presumably remained in Epstein's home, out of "shock, fear, and trepidation" (DE 1-3 at 104), 
not because of anything allegedly done by 
These allegations, to the extent they have to 
do with 
do not allege anything that 
did that is "so extreme in degree as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency." Bartsch, 522 So. 2d at 1056. 
The standard for determining LIED "is a matter of law, not a question of fact."Pontonl. 
Scaifone, 468 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (citation omitted). Even when alleged 
5 
This Response, in focusing only on fraudulent 
not address the plaintiff's claims 
against the diverse defendants, Jeffrey Epstein and 
7 
EFTA00175549

Case 9:08-cv-80o04-KAM 
Document 
Entered t— FLSD Docket 09/05/2, 
Page 8 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
conduct is "condemnable by civilized social standards," it may still "not ascend, or perhaps 
descend, to a level permitting [a court] to say that the benchmarks enunciated [by the Florida 
Supreme Court] . . . have been met." Id. Further, an LIED claim must be evaluated "as 
objectively as is possible" to determine whether the conduct "is 'atrocious, and utterly intolerable 
in a civilized community.'" Id. (quoting McCarron, 467 So. 2d at 278) (emphasis added). 
When it comes to 
the plaintiff talks about being double-crossed. But in 
emphasizing her own response to 
alleged deception (DE 1-3 at 104), and in explaining 
her decision to remain in the massage room (DE 1-3 at 103-04), the plaintiff ignores the basic 
principle that "the subjective response of the person who is the target of the actor's conduct does 
not control the question of whether the tort [of LIED] occurred." Bartsch, 522 So. 2d at 1056 
(citing Patton, 468 So. 2d at 1011) (emphasis added). Here, the plaintiff alleges, at most, that 
coordinated an openly illegal transaction with her (DE 1-3 at 103), but that 
did 
not tell her everything that might happen while she was engaged in her illegal activities. This 
theory of liability, even in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, is far too attenuated to support 
an LIED claim. 
To start with, the plaintiff acknowledges that she intended "to give Epstein a massage for 
monetary compensation" (DE 1-3 at 103), even though she was unlicensed, untrained, and 
unqualified to perfonn this professional service; the plaintiff also acknowledges that she 
pretended to be 18 (DE 1 at 61). Apart from the fact that plaintiff's conduct is flatly proscribed 
by Florida's criminal code, see Fla. Stat. § 480.047, these allegations, when viewed "as 
objectively as is possible," simply do not implicate 
an alleged go-between for plaintiff's 
own criminality, in something "'atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" for 
8 
EFTA00175550

Case 9:08-cv-80oU4-KAM 
Document 
Entered'... FLSD Docket 09/05/2. .d 
Page 9 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
purposes of establishing an IIED claim. Ponton, 468 So.2d at 1011 (quoting McCarson, 467 So. 
2d at 278). 
Even if the plaintiff was "shock[ed]" (DE 1-3 at 104) to learn that 
had engineered 
some sort of misdirection, that is still not enough to support an IIED claim against 
Again, it is not "'enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even 
criminal, or that [the defendant] has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that [the 
defendant's] conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would 
entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.'" McCarson, 467 So. 2d at 278 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). 
Here, the amended complaint does not allege that 
knew an alleged assault 
would take place; besides which, the plaintiff says she was assaulted by someone else (DE 1-3 at 
104-05). See Baker'. Fitzgerald, 573 So. 2d 873, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (per curiam) 
("Appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because there was no 
showing of outrageous conduct directed at the appellant herself.") (emphasis added). Further, 
there is nothing in the record to suggest that 
knew the plaintiff would remove her 
clothing, or stay in the massage room, out of "shock, fear and trepidation" (DE 1-3 at 104), when 
the plaintiff was never coerced, by 
, to do anything. Cf. Habelowl Travelers Ins. Co., 
389 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (affirming dismissal of claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress where there were "no allegations . . . indicating that [the plaintiff] was 
particularly sensitive or susceptible to emotional distress, or that [the defendant] had any basis to 
know she was" (citing Steiner & Munach, P. A.'. Williams, 334 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1976))). 
9 
EFTA00175551

Case 9:08-cv-808u4-KAM 
Document 2 
Entered 
LSD Docket 09/05/20, 
Page 10 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-C1V-MARR A/JOHNSON 
For these reasons, the plaintiff has not stated a cause of action against 
for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
3. The plaintiff has not asserted ft cause of action against 
for civil 
RICO. 
The plaintiff, again substituting superficially framed legal standards for actual analysis, 
says she "was directly harmed by the [defendants] scheme." (DE II at 9.) This bare assertion 
completely ignores the RICO discussion presented in the removal petition (DE 1 at 19-21), but 
more important, refuses to acknowledge that section 772.104 allows someone to bring a civil 
RICO claim only if "she has been injured by reason of" any RICO violation. § 772.104, Fla. 
Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). 
Here, the plaintiff clearly alleges that she was injured as a result of "a sexual assault . . . 
in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes" (DE 1-3 at 105), a statute that has nothing to 
do with, and does not constitute a predicate act in furtherance of Florida RICO. Cf § 
772.104, Fla. Stat. (listing predicate acts for Florida RICO). The plaintiff hardly establishes a 
RICO claim merely by reciting that she "was a victim of Defendants' scheme because she was 
one of the underage girls found and delivered to Defendant Epstein by Defendant 
and 
that she endured Epstein's actions as he tried to get her to engage in, and forced upon her, acts of 
prostitution and lewdness." (DE II at 9.) Not just in this passage, but indeed throughout her 
entire amended complaint, the plaintiff uses the term "scheme" as though it were a password for 
gaining access to RICO standing. Cf. Newton'. Tyson Foods, Inc., 207 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 
2000) (observing in the context of indirect and attenuated RICO allegations that "[t]he mere 
recitation of the chain of causation alleged by the plaintiffs is perhaps the best explanation of 
why they do not have standing in this case"). 
10 
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Case 9:08-cv-80bv4-KAM 
Document 2. 
Entered o. 
LSD Docket 09/05/26 
Page 11 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
In sum, the plaintiff has said nothing to rebut what remains obvious: that her entire 
lawsuit, including her RICO claim, rests on an alleged "sexual assault . . . in violation of Chapter 
800 of the Florida Statutes." (DE 1-3 at 105.) Thus, the plaintiff has failed to allege a cause of 
action against 
See Baischl. Gallina, 346 F.3d 366, 373 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A] 
plaintiff does not have standing if [sjhe suffered an injury that was indirectly (and hence not 
proximately) caused by the racketeering activity or RICO predicate acts, even though the injury 
was proximately caused by some non-RICO violations committed by the defendants.") 
(emphasis added); lloatsonl. New York Archdiocese, No. 05 Civ. 10467, 2007 WI. 431098, at 
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2007) (dismissing RICO claim with prejudice where amended complaint 
was "wholly devoid of a single act which constitutes a racketeering activity," even though the 
plaintiff had "'alleged a larger picture" involving, among other things, allegations of sexual 
abuse) (emphasis added). 
By re-writing Florida's RICO statute to encompass Chapter 800, the plaintiff once again 
seeks (hypothetical) damages against 
without any statutory basis. This tactic, 
besides being ineffectual to prevent removal, flouts the fact that "the RICO statute is complex, 
arcane, and difficult to plead." Id. CI id. at **12-16 (imposing sanctions in response to 
baseless RICO claim brought against the backdrop of sexual-abuse allegations, observing that 
"[t]he immediate link between the filing of the complaint and the press conference [held by the 
plaintiff's counsel] support[s] the inference that [there was an] intent[] . . . to injure [the 
defendants' reputation by bringing a RICO claim]'). 
11 
EFTA00175553

Case 9:08-cv-80bv4-KAM 
Document 
Entered t,. •LSD Docket 09/05/2i_ 
J 
Page 12 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Although asserting a RICO claim may be part of the plaintiff's media strategy,6 it is 
without legal merit and cannot operate to prevent removal. 
Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, and the plaintiff's failure to address, let alone rebut, the 
fraudulent-joinder arguments presented in the removal petition, neither remand nor attorneys' 
fees are warranted in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEWIS TEIN, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove. Florida 33133 
Tel: 
Fax: 
By: 
/s/ Michael R, Tein 
GUY A. LEWIS 
Fla. Bar No. 623740 
MICHAEL R. TEIN 
Fla. Bar No. 993522 
ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & 
WEISS, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Tel. 
Fax. 
By: 
Jack A. Goldberger 
Fla. Bar No. 262013 
jgoldberger@agwpa.com 
6 
See Ricci—Leopold Home Page, http:// www.riccilaw.com (click on "Breaking News," then 
access the hyperlink entitled, 03/13/08 — Consumer Justice Attorney Ted Leopold Files Case to 
aid Jane Doe in seeking justice against sexual predator Jeffrey Epstein and his associates) 
(highlighting RICO count in first sentence of press release) (last visited on Sept. 3, 2008). 
12 
EFTA00175554

Case 9:08-cv-80bv4-KAM 
Document 2. 
Entered o.. .-LSD Docket 09/05/26 , 
Page 13 of 14 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-C1V-MARRA/JOHNSON 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & 
COLEMAN, LLP 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach. Florida 33401 
Tel. 
Fax. 
By: 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
Fla. Bar No. 224162 
reritton@bc1claw.com 
Michael J. Pike, Esq. 
Fla. Bar No. 617296 
Attorneys for Defendant Jeff Ry Epstein 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1 
Undersigned counsel has conferred in good faith with counsel for the plaintiff, who 
opposes the relief requested in this motion. 
Counsel for co-defendant 
agrees to the positions taken in this 
memorandum. 
Is/Michael R. Tein 
Michael R. Tein 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 5, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of the Court using CMJECF. I also certify that the foregoing document 
is being served this day on counsel of record identified below by U.S. Mail. 
Is/ Michael R. Tein 
Michael R. Tein 
13 
EFTA00175555

Case 9:08-cv-808u4-KAM 
Document 2, 
Entered o,. .-LSD Docket 09/05/20. 
Page 14 of 14 
CASE NO.: 0S-80804-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
SERVICE LIST 
Theodore J. Leopold, Esq. 
Ricci-Leopold, P.A. 
2925 PGA Blvd., Suite 200 
Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 
Fax: 
Counselfor Plaintiff'Jane Doe 
Douglas M. McIntosh, Esq. 
Jason A. McGrath, Esq. 
McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz & Cartaya, P.A. 
Centurion Tower 
1601 Forum Place, Suite 1110 
West Palm Beach Florida 33401 
Fax. 
Counsel for Defendant 
Bruce E. Reinhart, Esq. (U.S. Mail) 
Bruce E. Reinhart, P.A. 
250 South Australian Avenue 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach Florida 33401 
Fax. 
Counsel for Defendant 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-80804-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE, a/k/a, 
JANE DOE NO. I, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
-,and 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO REMAND 
Plaintiff Jane Doe moves the Court to remand this action to state court for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and states as follows: 
1. Although Plaintiff Jane Doe, a Florida citizen, sues 
, also a Florida 
citizen, in this action, Defendants removed the case to federal court on July 21, 
2008, citing diversity of citizenship as the basis for federal subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
2. Defendants claim that 
who has described herself as Heidi Fleiss 
(the Hollywood madam),' has "nothing to do with the plaintiff's case against Mr. 
' See New York Post Oct. 12007 (reporting "Some of the girls, legal documents indicate, 
were recruited by 
now 21, who described herself as `like Heidi Fleiss,' the 
notorious Hollywood madam."); Palm Beach Post, Aug. 14, 2006 (reporting that 
Defendant 
told detectives, `I'm like a Heidi Fleiss.'"). 
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Epstein," (Notice of Removal, DE I, p. 3) and that Plaintiff fraudulently joined 
her in this action to prevent complete diversity.2
3. As demonstrated in Plaintiff's amended complaint, however, Defendant 
was a vital part of the scheme to lure underage girls, including Plaintiff, to 
Epstein's home in order to subject them to sexual abuse and induce them to 
engage in lewd behavior. Defendant 
was a key player in this scheme 
because she was paid by Epstein to recruit the underage girls and take them to 
Epstein's Palm Beach mansion. (Amended Complaint 11 11-15, DE I, pp. 302-
04). Without Defendant 
these girls, including Plaintiff, would not have 
been victimized. 
4. Because the allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint support the causes of 
action against Defendant 
for civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and civil RICO, 
is a proper defendant in this action. 
5. As 
is admittedly a citizen of Florida, (Affidavit of 
, DE 1, 
pp. 230-31) as is Plaintiff Jane Doe,3 (Amended Complaint 1 I, DE I, pp. 301; 
Deposition of Jane Doe, DE 1, pp. 31-32, 5:14-18, 6:6-10) federal diversity 
jurisdiction does not exist in this case. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(aX1) (providing that 
'Defendants also argue that Plaintiff named 
as a defendant to prevent entry of a 
stay in this matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(k). The Court has since denied 
Defendants' motion, holding a stay of this proceeding is not warranted under either the 
statute or the Court's discretion. (Order Denying Motion to Stay, DE 7). 
' Although Jane Does testified in deposition that she is a citizen of Florida, Defendants 
question whether she might actually be a citizen of Georgia because her mother lives in 
Georgia. (Notice of Removal, DE 1, pp. 7-8, n.6). Defendants fail to point out, however, 
that there is a question of whether Defendant Epstein is actually a citizen of Florida 
because he is now incarcerated in a Florida jail under an eighteen month sentence, to be 
followed by twelve months of community control, during which Epstein agreed he will 
be residing in Palm Beach, Florida. (Epstein Sentence, attached). 
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district courts have original jurisdiction over cases in which the matter in 
controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between "citizens of different States"). 
6. Defendants' removal of this action was, therefore, improper. Because the Court 
lacks diversity jurisdiction, or any other form of subject matter jurisdiction, over 
this matter, the Court must remand this action to Florida state court. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the Court remand this action to state court and 
requests Defendants be ordered under 28 U.S.C. §1447(c) to pay costs and attorney fees 
incurred as a result of the removal. 
MEMORANDUM OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
"An action in state court may be removed to federal court when the federal courts 
have diversity or federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § I441(a). When a 
defendant removes a case to federal court on diversity grounds, a court must remand the 
matter back to state court if any of the properly joined parties in interest are citizens of 
the state in which the suit was filed. See Lincoln Prop. Co.'. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 126 
S.Ct. 606, 613, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)). Such a remand is 
the necessary corollary of a federal district court's diversity jurisdiction, which requires 
complete diversity of citizenship." Henderson'. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 
1278, 1281 (1Ith Cir. 2006). 
Federal Courts are obligated to construe removal statutes very strictly, and "all 
doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court." Univ. of 
South Alabama'. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 41I (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Burns'. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994), and Coker'. Amoco Oil 
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Co., 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983)). "A presumption in favor of remand is necessary 
because if a federal court reaches the merits of a pending motion in a removed case where 
subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking it deprives a state court of its right under the 
Constitution to resolve controversies in its own courts." American Tobacco Co., 168 
F.3d at 4I 1. 
Defendants have removed this action even though Plaintiff named 
a citizen of Florida, as a defendant because they claim Plaintiff's joinder of Defendant 
was done fraudulently in order to avoid federal jurisdiction. "In a removal case 
alleging fraudulent joinder, the removing party has the burden of proving that either: (I) 
there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the resident 
defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled jurisdictional facts to bring the 
resident defendant into state court." Crowe'. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 
1989) (citing Cabalceta I. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
"The burden of the removing party is a `heavy one.' Id. (quoting 13., Inc.'. Miller 
Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)). 
"To determine whether the case should be remanded, the district court must 
evaluate the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must 
resolve any uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (citing 
B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549). The Court may not "weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim 
beyond determining whether it is an arguable one under state law." Id. "`If there is even 
a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action 
against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that joinder was 
proper and remand the case to state court." Id. (quoting Coker'. Amoco Oil Co., 709 
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