EFTA00103758

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
x 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
v. 
GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 
Defendant. 
 x 
S2 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) 
OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL 
IN SUPPORT OF HER SUPPLEMENTAL PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
RELATING TO THE S2 SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT 
Christian R. Everdell 
COHEN & GRESSER LLP 
800 Third Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
Phone: 
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca 
Laura A. Menninger 
HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN P.C. 
150 East 10th Avenue 
Denver, Colorado 80203 
Phone: 
Bobbi C. Stemheim 
Law Offices of Bobbi C. Stemheim 
33 West 19th Street - 4th Floor 
New York, NY 10011 
Phone: 
Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell 
EFTA00103758

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
SUMMARY OF NEW ALLEGATIONS IN THE S2 INDICTMENT 
4 
ARGUMENT 
5 
I. 
The NPA Bars Ms. Maxwell's Prosecution on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. 
5 
A. 
Counts Five and Six Allege the Same Offenses that Were Part of the Florida 
Investigation and Are Covered by the Plain Terms of the NPA 
6 
B. 
The NPA Binds the Southern District of New York as to Counts Five and 
Six. 
 11 
C. 
Counts One and Three Must Also Be Dismissed 
 17 
II. 
Prosecuting Ms. Maxwell on Counts Five and Six Would Violate Her Rights Under 
the Double Jeopardy Clause 
 18 
III. 
Counts Five and Six Are Time-Barred. 
20 
IV. 
The Court Should Dismiss Count Five and Either Count One or Count Three as 
Multiplicitous 
21 
V. 
The Court Should Dismiss the S2 Indictment for Pre-Indictment Delay. 
22 
VI. 
The Court Should Order a Bill of Particulars as to Counts Five and Six. 
22 
VII. 
The Court Should Order the Government to Produce Accuser-4's Prior Statements 
as Brady Material 
24 
VIII. 
Ms. Maxwell Incorporates All of the Arguments Raised in Her Initial Pretrial 
Motions and Reasserts Them as to the S2 Indictment. 
26 
CONCLUSION 
26 
EFTA00103759

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Clemmons v. Delo, 
124 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1997) 
25 
Jones v. Jago, 
575 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1978) 
25 
Ex Parte Lange, 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) 
18 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711 (1969)  
18 
United States v. Annabi, 
771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) 
United States v. Bortnovsky, 
passim 
820 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1987) 
22, 23 
United States v. Brown, 
No. 99-1230(L), 2002 WL 34244994 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002) 
16 
United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 
609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979) 
20 
United States v. Carter, 
454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 
17 
United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 
714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) 
21 
United States v. Gebbie, 
294 F.3d 540 (3rd Cir. 2002) 
14, 15, 16, 17 
United States v. Gonzalez, 
93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 
14, 16 
United States v. Harvey, 
791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) 
15 
United States v. Korfant, 
771 F.2d 660 (2d Cir.1985) 
19 
EFTA00103760

United States v. Lopez, 
356 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2004) 
18, 19, 20 
United States v. Rooney, 
37 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1994) 
17, 18 
United States v. Salameh, 
152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 
14, 16 
United States v. Torres, 
719 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1983) 
25 
United States v. Van Thournout, 
100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996) 
15 
White v. Helling, 
194 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 1999) 
25 
Statutes 
18 U.S.C. § 371 
21 
18 U.S.C. § 1591 
18 U.S.C. § 2422 
passim 
4 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) 
4 
18 U.S.C. § 3282 
20 
18 U.S.C. § 3283 
20, 21 
Other Authorities 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f) 
22 
U.S. Const., Amend. V 
18 
iii 
EFTA00103761

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Omnibus Memorandum in Support of her 
Supplemental Pretrial Motions Related to the S2 Superseding Indictment ("Motion"). For the 
reasons set forth below, Ms. Maxwell moves the Court to: 
I. Dismiss Counts One, Three, Five and Six for breach of the Non-Prosecution 
Agreement; 
2. Dismiss Counts Five and Six for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause; 
3. Dismiss Counts Five and Six as time-barred under the statute of limitations; 
4. Dismiss Count Five and Either Count One or Count Three as multiplicitous; 
5. Dismiss the S2 Indictment for pre-indictment delay; 
6. Order a Bill of Particulars as to Counts Five and Six; 
7. Order the government to produce Accuser-4's prior statements as Brady material. 
The S2 Superseding Indictment ("S2 Indictment") demonstrates just how far the 
government is willing to go to "get" Ms. Maxwell and disingenuously blame her for the crimes 
of Jeffrey Epstein. No longer content to charge a 25-year-old case based on purported conduct in 
the 1990s, the government now sweeps in the 2000s through the allegations of one person—
Accuser-4.1 But Accuser-4 is not a new witness; she first levied her accusations more than a 
decade ago. The Palm Beach FBI and the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern 
District of Florida ("USAO-SDFL") interviewed Accuser-4 in or around 2007 during their three-
year investigation of Epstein's alleged sexual abuse (the "Florida Investigation"). And 
remarkably, although interviewed just a few years after she claims any misconduct occurred, 
Accuser-4 never implicated Ms. Maxwell. Instead, she reported that Epstein's primary assistant 
Accuser-4 is identified in the S2 Indictment as Minor Victim-4. 
EFTA00103762

at the time, Sarah Kellen, facilitated her sexual abuse, and it was Kellen or Epstein himself—not 
Ms. Maxwell—who purportedly called her to schedule massage appointments, sent her gifts, and 
encouraged her to recruit other young females to provide massages to Epstein. Indeed, even 
after interviewing Accuser-4, the USAO-SDFL never found "any specific evidence against" Ms. 
Maxwell related to the subject of their investigation and thus determined she was not a target of 
the Florida Investigation.2
Epstein, himself, was never charged with federal crimes in connection with the Florida 
Investigation; nor was Kellen. Instead, Epstein entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement 
("NPA") in order to "resolve globally" his own criminal exposure and to immunize Kellen and 
any other "potential co-conspirators.s3 As part of the NPA, Epstein agreed to plead guilty to 
state prostitution offenses and register as a federal sex offender. He also agreed, in a novel 
arrangement, to pay for attorneys to represent his victims in civil lawsuits against him and to 
waive his right to contest damages up to an agreed-upon settlement amount. Accuser-4 took full 
advantage of the NPA; she received both the benefit of experienced counsel and $446,000 to 
resolve her claims against Epstein and his "potential co-conspirators." 
Now, over 13 years later, Accuser-4 has surfaced again, except this time with apparently 
brand-new allegations against Ms. Maxwell. Seemingly unconcerned with the gaping 
inconsistency in Accuser-4's prior (and near contemporaneous) recollections, the government 
has added two new counts charging Ms. Maxwell with sex trafficking offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 
1591 (Counts Five and Six) and has dramatically expanded the timeframe of the Mann Act 
2 Ex. A (Dep't of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the 
Southern District of Florida's Resolution of its 2006-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its 
Interactions with Victims during the Investigation, November 2020) ("OPR Report") at 167 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
3 A copy of the NPA is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
2 
EFTA00103763

conspiracies (Counts One and Three) to 2004 based entirely on Accuser-4's allegations. But 
these offenses are the exact same offenses that were the subject of the Florida Investigation and 
resolved by the NPA, which covers "any potential co-conspirators of Epstein," including Ms. 
Maxwell. 
The Court ruled unequivocally that the NPA covers "any involvement of [Ms.] Maxwell 
in offenses committed by Epstein from 2001 to 2007, other offenses that were the subject of the 
FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office investigation, and any offenses that arose from the related grand 
jury investigation." (Dkt. 207 at 7). Yet Counts Five and Six fall squarely within all three 
categories of offenses for which the NPA immunizes Ms. Maxwell: 
• 
The allegations of Accuser-4 fall within the 2001-2007 timeframe and the new 
counts charge violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, a statute specifically 
enumerated in the NPA. 
• 
The Palm Beach FBI and the USAO-SDFL thoroughly investigated Accuser-
4's allegations as part of the Florida Investigation. 
• 
Accuser-4's allegations were presented to the grand jury in that District and 
formed the basis for a conspiracy charge and a sex trafficking charge in a 
proposed 60-count federal indictment of Epstein that was dropped pursuant to 
the terms of the NPA. 
Because Counts Five and Six are based on the exact same evidence investigated and presented to 
the SDFL grand jury in 2008, and are the exact same crimes included in the proposed SDFL 
indictment against Epstein later abandoned pursuant to the NPA, the government cannot now 
charge Ms. Maxwell with these offenses. 
Further, the NPA binds the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
New York ("USAO-SDNY") as to the newly-indicted counts. We understand that the Court 
previously ruled that under United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1985) and its progeny, 
the language and drafting history of the NPA does not "affirmatively appear" to bind this District 
3 
EFTA00103764

as to the SI Indictment counts. However, Annabi, by its own terms, is inapposite to the 
circumstances of this case, where one federal district has agreed that "the United States" will 
abandon certain offenses as part of a negotiated agreement and then a second federal district later 
seeks to charge those very same offenses based on the exact same conduct. Counts Five and Six 
of the S2 Indictment are therefore barred by the NPA. The Court must dismiss these counts, as 
well as the expanded Mann Act conspiracies charged in Counts One and Three, which 
incorporate the same conduct charged in Counts Five and Six for which Ms. Maxwell has 
immunity. 
In addition, because the USAO-SDNY is seeking duplicative punishment for the same 
offenses that were resolved by the NPA, prosecuting Ms. Maxwell on Counts Five and Six 
violates her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court should also grant the other 
relief Ms. Maxwell seeks for the reasons set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF NEW ALLEGATIONS IN THE S2 INDICTMENT 
Like the S1 Indictment, Counts One and Three of the S2 Indictment allege that Ms. 
Maxwell conspired to violate two separate provisions of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 
2423(a). Count One alleges that Ms. Maxwell conspired to entice "one and more individuals" to 
travel in interstate and foreign commerce to engage in "sexual activity for which a person can be 
charged with a criminal offense" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. (S2 Indictment q¶ 11-13). 
Count Three alleges that Ms. Maxwell conspired to transport "an individual" in interstate and 
foreign commerce to engage in "sexual activity for which a person can be charged with a 
criminal offense" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). (Id. ¶¶ 16-19). In the SI Indictment, these 
counts were based on conduct that occurred at unspecified times between 1994 and 1997. The 
S2 Indictment expands the date range of these conspiracies into the 2000s based on the 
4 
EFTA00103765

allegations of Accuser-4, alleging conduct that occurred "[f]rom at least in or about 1994, up to 
and including in or about 2004." (Id. ¶¶ II, 17). 
The S2 Indictment also adds two new counts—Counts Five and Six—alleging that Ms. 
Maxwell violated and conspired to violate the federal sex trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 
Count Five alleges that Ms. Maxwell conspired with Epstein and others to recruit "a person" 
knowing that the person "had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). (Id. ¶¶ 23-24). Count Six charges Ms. 
Maxwell with a substantive violation of § 1591(a), claiming she "did recruit, entice, harbor, 
transport, provide, and obtain by any means" individuals who were under the age of 18, 
including Accuser-4, "who were then caused to engage in at least one commercial sex act with 
Jeffrey Epstein." (Id.1 27). Both counts are based on the allegations of Accuser-4 and allege 
conduct that purportedly occurred "[f]rom at least in or about 2001, up to and including in or 
about 2004." (Id. ¶¶ 23, 27). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The NPA Bars Ms. Maxwell's Prosecution on Counts One, Three, Five, and Six. 
The NPA bars any prosecution of Ms. Maxwell for the offenses charged in Counts One, 
Three, Five, and Six of the S2 Indictment. The Court has already concluded that the NPA bars 
prosecution for "three specific categories of offenses" deriving from the Florida Investigation: 
'the offenses set out on pages 1 and 2' of the NPA; namely, `any offenses 
that may have been committed by Epstein against the United States from 
in or around 2001 through in or around September 2007' including five 
enumerated offenses; 
(2) 
'any other offenses that have been the subject of the joint investigation by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Attorney's 
Office'; and 
(3) 
'any offenses that arose from the Federal Grand Jury investigation.' 
5 
EFTA00103766

(Dkt. 207 at 6 (quoting NPA)). The Court has further concluded that the NPA's co-conspirator 
provision covers "any involvement of [Ms.] Maxwell" in any of these same three categories of 
offenses. (Id. at 7). There can be no serious dispute that the sex trafficking offenses charged in 
Counts Five and Six were investigated as part of the Florida Investigation and fall squarely 
within the three categories of immunized offenses that are covered by the NPA. Moreover, 
because Counts Five and Six are based on the exact same allegations from the vet); same accuser 
that were previously investigated and presented to the grand jury as part of the Florida 
Investigation, Annabi and its progeny do not apply and the NPA is binding on the USA0-SDNY 
as to these offenses. Accordingly, Counts Five and Six must be dismissed. Moreover, because 
Counts One and Three incorporate the same conduct from Counts Five and Six for which Ms. 
Maxwell cannot be prosecuted under the NPA, they must also be dismissed. 
A. 
Counts Five and Six Allege the Same Offenses that Were Part of the Florida 
Investigation and Are Covered by the Plain Terms of the NPA. 
The plain terms of the NPA preclude Ms. Maxwell's prosecution on Counts Five and Six 
because they allege conduct that falls within the date range specified in the NPA and charge 
specifically enumerated offenses that were part of the Florida Investigation. Count Five alleges 
that "[f]rom at least in or about 2001 up to and including in or about 2004," Ms. Maxwell 
conspired with Epstein to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), the law prohibiting sex trafficking of 
minors. (S2 Indictment ¶¶ 22-25). Count Six alleges that during the same time period, Ms. 
Maxwell committed a substantive violation of the same statute. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). The NPA bars 
prosecution for Ms. Maxwell's involvement in "any offenses that may have been committed by 
Epstein against the United States from in or around 2001 through in or around September 2007 
including five enumerated offenses." (Dkt. 207 at 6 (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 
7 (NPA covers, among other things, "any involvement of Maxwell in offenses committed by 
6 
EFTA00103767

Epstein from 2001 to 2007")). Thus, the time period alleged in both Counts Five and Six falls 
squarely within the date range covered by the NPA for which Ms. Maxwell is immunized. 
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) is one of the five enumerated offenses in the NPA. (Ex. B at 2 of 
7). As such, Counts Five and Six are clearly offenses covered by the NPA. 
Ms. Maxwell also cannot be prosecuted on Counts Five and Six because they are based 
on the exact same allegations that were already thoroughly investigated by the Palm Beach FBI 
and USAO-SDFL and were presented to a grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in 
connection with the Florida Investigation. The allegations underlying Counts Five and Six (and 
the expanded date range for Counts One and Three) come from a single accuser—Accuser-4—
who alleges that Epstein sexually abused her from approximately 2001-2004 and that Ms. 
Maxwell allegedly facilitated that abuse. (S2 Indictment¶¶ 9d, 22-27). Based on our review of 
the prior statements of non-testifying witnesses, which the government only recently produced to 
the defense on April 13, 2021, we know that FBI Special Agent Elizabeth Nesbitt Kuyrkendall 
interviewed the person we believe to be Accuser-4 in connection with the Florida Investigation. 
(Ex. C at 22:1-17).4 We also know that Special Agent Kuyrkendall presented her allegations—
the very same allegations that form the basis for Counts Five and Six—to the grand jury in the 
Southern District of Florida in support of a proposed 60-count federal indictment of Jeffrey 
Epstein and Sarah Kellen. (Id. at 22:17-31:6). The indictment included a conspiracy count and a 
substantive count alleging a sex trafficking offense involving Accuser-4. (Id. at 28:3-15 
(Accuser-4's allegations formed the basis for "Overt Acts One through 18" and Count Two of 
the proposed indictment charging Epstein and Sarah Kellen with "procur[ing] [Accuser-4] to 
Exhibit C is a transcript of the March 18, 2008 grand jury testimony of Special Agent Kuyrlcendall, the lead case 
agent in charge of the Florida Investigation, in which she summarizes her interview of Accuser-4 and other related 
evidence. 
7 
EFTA00103768

engage in commercial sex acts knowing that [Accuser-4] was under 18")).5 Pursuant to the 
terms of the NPA, the proposed indictment was never returned, and the USAO-SDFL did not 
pursue it further, once Epstein pled guilty on June 30, 2008 to Florida state law charges of 
solicitation of prostitution and procurement of minors to engage in prostitution. (Ex. A, OPR 
Report at i-ii). 
The similarity of the allegations presented to the SDFL grand jury and those alleged in 
Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment is striking and self-evident. The same overt acts, 
including the allegations that form the basis for jurisdiction in SDNY over the crimes charged in 
Counts Five and Six, were presented to both grand juries. Furthermore, the proof offered to 
corroborate Accuser-4's allegations—e.g., cell phone records, FedEx records, message pad 
notes, etc.—was identical. (See Ex. C at 56:21-57:10). The chart below highlights these 
similarities: 
S2 Indictment 
SDFL Grand Jury Testimony 
Sexual Massages 
Sexual Massages 
"On multiple occasions between approximately 
2001-2004, [Accuser-4] provided nude 
massages to Epstein at the Palm Beach 
Residence, during which Epstein engaged in 
multiple sex acts with [Accuser-4]." (S2 
Indictment ¶ 9d; see also id. at ¶ 25a). 
"[F]rom 2001 to 2004, [Accuser-4] provided 
Mr. Epstein with ... over 100 massages and all 
but three of the massages were sexual[] in 
nature." (Ex. C at 23:19-22). 
The massages took place in Epstein's Palm 
Beach residence and Accuser-4 was either nude 
or partially nude. (Ex. C at 22:20-24:6). 
Payment 
Payment 
"Epstein or one of his employees ... paid 
[Accuser-4] hundreds of dollars in cash" for 
each massage. (S2 Indictment ¶ 9d; see also id. 
"[Accuser-4] was paid between $200 and 
$400" for each massage. (Ex. C at 23:25-
24:10). 
5 The government previously denied Ms. Maxwell's request that it produce copies of the proposed 60-count SDFL 
indictment and the related 82-page prosecution memo to the defense. To resolve any ambiguity about the charges in 
the proposed SDFL indictment and the evidence underlying the counts related to Accuser-4, Ms. Maxwell requests 
the Court to order the government to produce both of these documents to the defense. 
8 
EFTA00103769

at ¶ 25a). 
Recruiting Others 
"Epstein ... encouraged [Accuser-4] to recruit 
other young females to provide sexualized 
massages[.]" (S2 Indictment ¶ 9d; see also id. 
at ¶ 25b). 
Recruiting Others 
"Mr. Epstein asked [Accuser-4] if she had any 
friends that would be interested in performing 
these massages ... that she could bring to 
him[.]" (Ex. Cat 26:12-16). 
Gifts to Accuser-4 
"On multiple occasions between approximately 
2001 and 2004, Epstein's employees ... sent 
[Accuser-4] gifts, including lingerie, from an 
address in Manhattan, New York to [Accuser-
4's] residence in Florida." (S2 Indictment ¶ 9d; 
see also id. at' 25c). 
Gifts to Accuser-4 
"Mr. Epstein provided [gifts] to [Accuser-4].... 
Epstein would provide her with lingerie.... He 
would also send her [gifts] via FedEx packages 
to her residence." (Ex. C at 28:20-29:10) 
(describing subpoenaed FedEx records). 
Scheduling Massage Appointments 
"Epstein's employees ... called [Accuser-4], 
including from New York, to schedule 
appointments for [Accuser-4] to massage 
Epstein." (S2 Indictment ¶ 9d; see also id. at ¶ 
25d). 
"For example, in or about April of 2004 and 
May of 2004 another employee of Epstein's 
called [Accuser-4] to schedule such 
appointments." (S2 Indictment ¶ 25d). 
Scheduling Massage Appointments 
"[S]ometimes Sarah [Kellen] would be ... in 
New York and scheduled [Accuser-4] to come 
and work, but Sarah Kellen's primary role was 
to schedule ... [Accuser-4] to come and 
perform the massages." (Ex. C at 25:2-6). 
"[O]n or about April 23th, 2004, Defendant 
Sarah Kellen placed a telephone call to a 
telephone used by [Accuser-4]." (Ex. C at 
17:18-19:4; see also id. at 56:24-25 
(subpoenaed cell phone records "indicate 
telephonic contact with Sarah Kellen")). 
The one critical difference between the a legations in the S2 Indictment and the 
allegations presented to the SDFL grand jury is this: Accuser-4 never implicated Ms. Maxwell in 
the Florida Investigation. Ms. Maxwell is not mentioned even once in the grand jury testimony 
concerning Accuser-4. Instead, the grand jury testimony reflects that Accuser-4 implicated 
Epstein himself and Sarah Kellen, who was Epstein's primary assistant during the 2001-2004 
timeframe charged in Counts Five and Six. According to Accuser-4, it was Kellen, not Ms. 
9 
EFTA00103770

Maxwell, who called Accuser-4 from New York to schedule massage appointments. (Ex. C at 
17:18-22, 25:1-6). It was Epstein, not Ms. Maxwell, who encouraged Accuser-2 to recruit her 
friends to give him massages. (Id. at 25:25-26:18). And it was Epstein, not Ms. Maxwell, who 
provided lingerie and other gifts to Accuser-4 and sent FedEx packages to her residence. (Id. at 
28:19-29:10). Furthermore, Accuser-4 alleged that Kellen led Accuser-4 upstairs to Epstein's 
bedroom the first time she gave him a massage by herself (id. at 25:7-15) and that Kellen paid 
Accuser-4 $500 to take nude photographs of her at the Palm Beach residence at Epstein's request 
(id. at 27:1-10). 
Ultimately, the proposed SDFL indictment sought to charge Epstein and Kellen, not Ms. 
Maxwell, with a sex trafficking offense involving Accuser-4. (Id. at 28:11-14 (the evidence 
relating to Accuser-4 formed "the basis for the allegation [in Count Two of the proposed SDFL 
indictment] that Jeffrey Epstein and Sarah Kellen procured [Accuser-4] to engage in commercial 
sex acts knowing that she was under 18")). This is entirely consistent with the language of the 
NPA, which names Kellen, and not Ms. Maxwell, as one of the four named "potential co-
conspirators." (Ex. B at 5 of 7). In fact, the USAO-SDFL conceded that it never found "any 
specific evidence against" Ms. Maxwell related to the subject of their investigation. (See Ex. A, 
OPR Report at 167 (internal quotations omitted)). 
Hence, it would not only be impermissible under the NPA to prosecute Ms. Maxwell for 
the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment because they were "the subject 
of the Florida Investigation and "the related grand jury investigation." (Dkt. 207 at 7). It would 
also be entirely unjust to base a prosecution in this District on the same offenses related to the 
same accuser who never mentioned Ms. Maxwell—and instead implicated Sarah Kellen—when 
she first reported the allegations that form the basis of Counts Five and Six over thirteen years 
10 
EFTA00103771

ago when the events were still recent.6 Accordingly, because the USAO-SDNY is bound by the 
terms of the NPA as to the offenses charged in Counts Five and Six for the reasons discussed 
below, Ms. Maxwell cannot be prosecuted for those counts. 
B. 
The NPA Binds the Southern District of New York as to Counts Five and Six. 
Although the Court ruled that the NPA does not bind the USAO-SDNY as to the charges 
in the S 1 Indictment (Dkt. 207 at 4-6), the NPA does bind the USAO-SDNY as to the sex 
trafficking offenses charged in Counts Five and Six that were added to the S2 Indictment. 
United States v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670 (1985) and its progeny, which the Court relied upon in its 
earlier ruling, do not mandate a different result. In its prior ruling, the Court noted that Annabi 
established "something akin to a clear statement rule" that a plea agreement binds only the U.S. 
Attorney's Office for the district in which the plea is entered "unless it affirmatively appears that 
the agreement contemplates a broader restriction." (Dkt. 207 at 4 (quoting Annabi, 771 F.2d at 
672). That interpretive rule, however, only applies in situations where the district bringing the 
second prosecution charges offenses different from the offenses resolved by the plea agreement 
in the first prosecution. Annabi itself specifically noted that it was not addressing a situation 
where the charges in the follow-on prosecution are "identical to the dismissed charges." Annabi, 
771 F.2d at 672. Accordingly, the Court is not bound by the rule in Annabi because Counts Five 
and Six are identical to the charges presented to the SDFL grand jury that were resolved by the 
NPA. When examined without the overlay of Annabi, the terms and the drafting history of the 
NPA indicate that the agreement should be read to preclude other districts, including the USAO-
6 Accuser-4's statements to the FBI, and any other prior statements in which she did not mention Ms. Maxwell, are 
exculpatory Brady material that the government should immediately produce to the defense. (See Section VII infra). 
11 
EFTA00103772

SDNY, from prosecuting Epstein's "potential co-conspirators" for the offenses covered by the 
NPA.' 
In Annabi, the defendants were arrested at Kennedy Airport on November 23, 1982, in 
possession of four kilograms of heroin and were charged in a three-count indictment in the 
Eastern District of New York with (I) conspiracy to import heroin into the United States, (2) a 
substantive offense of importing heroin, and (3) possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Id. 
at 671. All three charges arose out of the defendants' arrest and the charged conduct was limited 
to November 23, 1982. Id. The defendants agreed to plead guilty to the substantive importation 
charge (Count Two) to resolve the case. Id. At the time of the plea, the prosecutor stated on the 
record that "the only agreement that exists between the defendants and the Government is that at 
the time of the imposition of sentence on Count Two, the Government would move to dismiss 
the two open remaining counts as to each defendant." Id. Counts One and Three were dismissed 
at sentencing. Id. 
Approximately two-and-a-half years later, the defendants were charged in the Southern 
District of New York in a multi-count indictment that included one count of conspiracy to 
distribute heroin (Count One) and one count of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 
(Count Three). Id. Both counts alleged a broader period of criminal conduct occurring from 
October 1982 until March 15, 1985. Id. The defendants argued that their plea agreement with 
the Eastern District of New York barred their prosecution on Counts One and Three of the 
7 As argued in our initial motion, Ms. Maxwell maintains that, even if the Court applies Annaba, the NPA precludes 
the USAO-SDNY from prosecuting Ms. Maxwell for any offense she allegedly committed with Epstein. (See Dkt. 
142 at 18.25; Dkt. 223 at 7-13). We preserve that argument and reassert it with respect to Counts One through Six 
of the S2 Indictment. However, in light of the Court's prior ruling that the NPA does not bind the USAO•SDNY as 
to the charges in the SI Indictment, we argue here that the Court need not, and should not, apply Annabi to 
determine whether the NPA bars the USAO-SDNY from charging the offenses in Counts Five and Six of the S2 
Indictment. 
12 
EFTA00103773

Southern District of New York indictment because they arose out of "the same conspiratorial 
agreement that underlay the charges dismissed in the Eastern District." Id. at 672. 
The Second Circuit rejected this argument finding that, as a general rule, a plea 
agreement only binds the prosecutor's office that entered into the agreement, unless it 
"affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a broader restriction." Id. However, the 
Court highlighted the apparent anomaly of this rule, noting that an agreement with "the 
Government" to dismiss counts of an indictment "might be thought to bar the United States from 
reprosecuting the dismissed charges in any judicial district unless the agreement expressly limits 
the scope of the agreement to the district in which the dismissed charges are initially brought." 
Id. The Court further explained that application of the "affirmative appearance" rule was 
nevertheless appropriate because it had not been presented with a situation where the counts in 
the second prosecution were identical to the dismissed counts. Id. Although the defendants had 
argued that the charges in Counts One and Three of the SDNY indictment "result[ed] from the 
same conspiratorial agreement" as the dismissed counts in the EDNY indictment, the Court 
found that the SDNY charges covered conduct "extending more than two years beyond the date 
of the period covered by the dismissed charges," are were therefore "not the same as the charges 
that were dismissed." Id. As a result, the Court found that the default rule could be applied in 
that case. Id. ("[T]he new charges are sufficiently distinct at least to warrant application of the 
... rule concerning construction of plea agreements."). 
Annabi, therefore, did not hold that the "affirmative appearance" rule of construction 
applies in cases, like this one, where one federal district has agreed that "the United States" will 
abandon certain offenses as part of a negotiated agreement, and then a second federal district 
later seeks to charge those very same offenses based on the exact same conduct. By its own 
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reasoning, Annabi does not apply in these circumstances, nor do subsequent Second Circuit cases 
that applied the Annabi rule. See, e.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 118-20 (2d Cir. 
1998) (defendant pled guilty in EDNY to using the passport of another person to enter the United 
States and later charged in SDNY with related, but distinct terrorism offenses); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 269-70 (2d Cir. 2004) (defendant pled guilty in the District of New 
Mexico to drug conspiracy and later charged in the Western District of New York with related, 
but distinct weapons possession offense). The Court should not apply them here. 
Instead, the Court should follow the Third Circuit's approach in United States v. Gebbie, 
294 F.3d 540 (3nd Cir. 2002), which involved a situation like this one where the charges in the 
second prosecution were identical to the dismissed charges. In Gebbie, the defendants were 
charged in a multi-count indictment in the Southern District of Ohio charging them with various 
offenses related to a scheme to make false statements to the U.S. Postal Service. 294 F.3d at 
542. As part of their plea agreement, the defendants pled guilty to misprision of a felony in 
exchange for dismissal of the counts in the indictment. Id. at 543. The plea agreement further 
provided that the agreement did not protect the defendants from prosecution for "other crimes or 
offenses" which "the United States" discovers by independent investigation. Id. at 545-46. A 
few months after entering their plea, the defendants were charged in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania with "the same crimes and offenses that were at issue" in the Ohio prosecution. Id. 
at 546 (emphasis in original). Because the plea agreement barred "the United States" from 
prosecuting the defendants for the same crimes covered by the agreement, the question for the 
Court was: "who is bound when a plea agreement refers to `the United States' or 'the 
Government'?" Id. In other words, did the use of the term "the United States" in the Ohio plea 
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agreement bind the Western District of Pennsylvania and bar it from charging the same offenses 
in a subsequent prosecution? The Court held that it did: 
We hold, therefore, that when a United States Attorney negotiates 
and contracts on behalf of "the United States" or "the 
Government" in a plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney 
speaks for and binds all of his or her fellow United States 
Attorneys with respect to those same crimes and those same 
defendants. 
Id. at 550 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th 
Cir. 1996) ("Absent an express limitation, any promises made by an Assistant United States 
Attorney in one district will bind an Assistant United States Attorney in another district."); 
United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It is the Government at large—not 
just specific United States Attorneys or United States `Districts'—that is bound by plea 
agreements negotiated by agents of Government."). 
This case presents the exact set of circumstances carved out by Annabi and directly 
addressed in Gebbie. Here, the co-conspirator provision of the NPA provides that if Epstein 
abides by the terms of the agreement, "the United States" will not institute any criminal charges 
"against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein," which immunizes Ms. Maxwell for the 
offenses covered by the NPA. (Ex. B at 5 of 7; see also Dkt. 207 at 7). As set forth above, 
Counts Five and Six of the S2 Indictment are based on the same alleged conduct involving 
Accuser-4 from 2001-2004 that was presented to the SDFL grand jury and formed the basis for 
several overt acts of a conspiracy charge and a substantive sex trafficking offense against Epstein 
in the proposed SDFL indictment. The prosecution of those offenses was abandoned as part of 
the bargain struck in the NPA, which Epstein fully performed and from which Accuser-4 
benefitted. In sum, the USAO-SDNY is trying to prosecute Ms. Maxwell in Counts Five and Six 
for the identical charges that were resolved by the NPA. In these circumstances, Annabi and its 
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progeny do not control.8 The Court should instead follow Gebbie and find that NPA precludes 
the USAO-SDNY from charging Counts Five and Six. 
This result is consistent with the terms and the drafting history of the NPA. As noted in 
our previous motion, the use of the phrase "the United States" in the co-conspirator immunity 
provision of the NPA stands in stark contrast to Epstein's immunity provision, which is 
expressly limited to the SDFL. (Dkt. 223 at 9-10). The broad language of the co-conspirator 
provision reflects Epstein's desire, which his attorneys communicated to the USAO-SDFL, that 
he would be "the only one who takes the blame for what happened" (Ex. A, OPR Report at 167 
(internal quotations omitted)). Furthermore, it is consistent with Epstein's goal "to resolve 
globally his state and federal criminal liability," which is set forth in the factual recitals of the 
NPA. (Ex. B at 2 of 7; see also Ex. D ¶ 5 (declaration of AUSA A. Marie Villafaiia noting that 
Epstein "sought a global resolution of the matter"). Epstein and his counsel were clearly aware 
that the investigation had extended beyond the SDFL and involved New York-based witnesses. 
Indeed, we now know from discovery recently produced by the government that the government 
interviewed at least three New York-based witnesses in connection with the Florida 
Investigation, two of whom implicated other potential co-conspirators of Epstein. (Exs. E-G). 
Hence, these provisions of the NPA reflect Epstein's desire to ensure that he would not become 
embroiled in subsequent prosecutions of his "potential co-conspirators" in any other districts. 
(Dkt. 223 at 11). 
Moreover, this result is consistent with fundamental fairness. Allowing a federal district 
to prosecute a defendant for an offense that is identical to one that was already resolved as part of 
8 For the same reasons, the Court is not bound by subsequent Second Circuit decisions interpreting Annabi, which 
have found that the use of phrases like "the United States" or "the government" in a plea agreement does not create 
an "affirmative appearance" to bind other districts. See Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120; Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x at 270; 
United States v. Brown, No. 99-1230(L), 2002 WL 34244994, at •2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002). 
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