EFTA00095067

Block, 16 Cr. 595 (JPO), 2017 WL 1608905, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2017) (denying request 
for bill of particulars as to alleged fraud and unindicted co-conspirators where indictment 
sufficiently advised defendant of nature of charges against him and described with specificity acts 
he allegedly committed, nature of conspiracy, and explained in language closely tracking statute 
crimes alleged); United States v. Monserrate, 10 Cr. 965 (CM), 2011 WL 3480957, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2011) (denying request for bill of particulars where discovery and indictment 
was "sufficient to apprise the defendant of the charge" and to allow him to prepare for trial); United 
States v. Trippe, 171 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying bill of particulars request in 
stock fraud case where indictment was fifteen pages long and substantial discovery had been 
provided). 
Although the Government cannot provide "mountains of documents to defense counsel" 
as a substitute for a bill of particulars where one would otherwise be required, see Bortnovsky, 820 
F.2d at 575, the provision of voluminous discovery in combination with some guidance about what 
is most relevant can vitiate a need for further particulars, see, e.g., United States v. Mandell, 710 
F. Supp. 2d 368, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying request for particularization of alleged 
misrepresentations where the indictment was thirty-four pages long and Government had provided 
voluminous, organized discovery). In no event should volume of discovery alone warrant a bill of 
particulars; "[w]hile [a] [c]ourt may sympathize with counsel's task of reviewing a large quantity 
of materials that continue to be produced," that concern is addressed by granting the defense 
sufficient time in which to conduct the review in advance of trial. See United States v. Levy, II 
Cr. 62 (PAC), 2013 WL 664712, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2013). 
A bill of particulars would undoubtedly be helpful to the defense in any case. But "the law 
does not impose upon the Government an obligation to preview its case or expose its legal 
175 
EFTA00095267

theories," United States v. Leonelli, 428 F. Supp. 880, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and therefore "[t]he 
ultimate test must be whether the information sought is necessary, not whether it is helpful." 
United States v. Mitlof 165 F. Supp. 2d 558, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (emphasis added); Mahabub, 
2014 WL 4243657, at *2 ("The purpose of a bill of particulars is to ensure that a defendant has the 
information necessary to prepare a defense, not to turn over all information that would aid the 
defendant."); United States v. Rittweger, 259 F. Supp. 2d 275, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying 
bill of particulars request as "'an impermissible attempt to compel the Government to provide the 
evidentiary details of its case" (quoting United States v. Biaggi, 675 F. Supp. 790, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987)). 
A bill of particulars should not be misused to compel the Government to disclose "the 
manner in which it will attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the defendant 
committed the crime charged, or a preview of the Government's evidence or legal theories." 
Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569; see also Torres, 901 F.2d at 234 ("Acquisition of evidentiary detail 
is not the function of the bill of particulars.' (quoting Hemphill v. United States, 392 F.2d 45, 49 
(8th Cir. 1968))). The "wheres, whens and with whores"' are "beyond the scope of a bill of 
particulars." Mitlof, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (citing Tomes, 901 F.2d at 233-34; Jimenez, 824 F. 
Supp. 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); see also, e.g., United States v. D'Amico, 734 F. Supp. 2d 321, 
335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("A bill of particulars is not a general investigative tool, a discovery device 
or a means to compel the government to disclose evidence or witnesses to be offered prior to trial.' 
(quoting United States v. Gibson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))); United States v. 
Bellomo, 263 F. Supp. 2d 561, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("A bill of particulars is not designed to: 
obtain the government's evidence; restrict the government's evidence prior to trial; assist the 
defendant's investigation; obtain the precise way in which the government intends to prove its 
176 
EFTA00095268

case; interpret its evidence for the defendant, or disclose its legal theory."); United States v. Henry, 
861 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("This instrument should not function to disclose 
evidence, witnesses, and legal theories to be offered by the Government at trial or as a general 
investigative tool for the defense."). 
There are good reasons why bills of particulars are warranted only where the allegations in 
the indictment, as supplemented by discovery and other disclosures, are so general as to render it 
impossible to prepare a defense. Because "a bill of particulars confines the Government's proof 
to particulars furnished," it can "restrict unduly the Government's ability to present its case." 
Henry, 861 F. Supp. at 1197; see also Mitlof, 2014 WL 4243657, at *2 (recognizing that "care 
must be taken" because "[t]he government's presentation of evidence at trial is limited to the 
particulars contained in the bill"); United States v. Samsonov, 07 Cr. 1198 (CM), 2009 WL 176721, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2009) ("The vehicle of a bill of particulars serves to inform a defendant 
of the nature of the charge, when he is otherwise insufficiently informed, and must not be misused 
to compel disclosure of how much the Government can prove, nor to foreclose the Government 
from using proof it may develop as the trial approaches."). Moreover, the Government's provision 
of particulars tantamount to an itemized preview of its proof creates the very real danger that a 
defendant will "tailor her testimony to explain away the Government's case." Henry, 861 F. Supp. 
at 1197. These concerns animate the rule that "if the defendant has been given adequate notice of 
the charges against her and can prepare fully for trial with reasonably diligent efforts, the 
Government cannot be required to disclose additional details about its case." Id. 
2. 
Discussion 
There is no basis for a bill of particulars in this case. The charges against the defendant 
are clear from the face of the Indictment, which provides significant detail regarding the charged 
177 
EFTA00095269

crimes. As is apparent from the 18-page Indictment, the charges concern the defendant's 
participation in conspiracies to transport and entice minor girls to travel with the intent that they 
engage in illegal sex acts with Jeffrey Epstein from 1994 through 1997, and the defendant's attempt 
to cover up that conduct during her civil deposition testimony in 2016. Specifically, the Indictment 
makes plain that the defendant is charged with engaging in a conspiracy to transport minor girls 
with intent that they engage in sexual activity with Epstein, engaging in a conspiracy to entice 
minor girls to travel with the intent that they engage in sexual activity with Epstein, aiding and 
abetting the transportation and enticement of a particular minor girl interstate for the purpose of 
engaging in sex acts with Epstein, and lying about those same crimes during her 2016 civil 
deposition testimony. The charged time periods are made plain in each count, as is the statute she 
is accused of violating. 
The speaking Indictment in this case goes above and beyond a mere recitation of the 
elements of each offense by detailing the defendant's specific role in the crimes charged. Among 
other things, it specifies three minor victims in particular and describes the steps the defendant 
took with respect to each as part of the charged crimes. See, e.g., Indictment ¶ 7. Additionally, 
the Indictment details the types of sex acts that Epstein committed with the minor victims as part 
of the charged crimes and the locations where those acts occurred. See, e.g., id.1 5-6. In this way, 
the Indictment makes clear the Government's theory that the defendant groomed three minor girls 
to engage in sex acts in Florida, New Mexico, New York, and London with Epstein between 1994 
and 1997. The Indictment further specifies during which portion of that period each of those three 
victims interacted with the defendant and Epstein as minors. See id. 17. Additionally, the 
Indictment identifies the precise answers that the Government alleges constituted perjury, and 
alleges facts, in the earlier portions of the Indictment, that indicate how and why the Government 
178 
EFTA00095270

will seek to prove the answers were false. Compare id. ¶¶ 21, 23 with id. ¶¶ 1-11. 
Simply put, 
this is not a case in which the allegations in the Indictment "are so general that they do not advise 
the defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused." Walsh, 194 F.3d at 47 (internal quotation 
mark omitted) (quoting Torres, 901 F.2d at 234). Thus, the Indictment itself provides a sufficient 
basis to deny the defendant's motion in its entirety. See, e.g., United States v. Bonventre, 646 F 
App'x 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2016) (m[E]videntiary detail is not the function of the bill of particulars.' 
Particulars are necessary only where indictment charges are `so general that they do not advise the 
defendant of the specific acts of which he is accused.'" (internal citation omitted) (quoting Torres, 
901 F.2d at 234; United States v. Chen, 378 F.3d 151, 163 (2d Cir. 2004))); United States v. Wedd, 
15 Cr. 616 (KBF), 2016 WL 1055737, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (denying motion for bill of 
particulars where "the Indictment is a `speaking' Indictment that provides a significant amount of 
detail as to the Government's theory of the case and the nature of the proof that will underlie the 
charges at trial"). 
Additional particularity relating to the details of the counts in the Indictment might be 
helpful for the defendant, but that is both true in every case and not the appropriate standard. 
Instead, the inquiry is properly focused on whether the information already available to her is so 
general that a bill of particulars is necessary to the preparation of her defense. Plainly it is not. In 
addition to the speaking Indictment, the defendant has received over 2.7 million pages of discovery 
in this case. Although that is a high volume of discovery, it is clear from the defense's own motion, 
the defense has apparently already reviewed that material (at least in significant part), identified 
relevant materials therein, and is aware of their relevance to the allegations in the Indictment. (See, 
e.g., Def. Mot. 10 at 6). Indeed, much of the discovery is text searchable, and the time period that 
each document relates to is readily ascertainable. 
179 
EFTA00095271

In this vein, the defendant has received Nam 
Epstein's private plane spanning 
the 
inn  
tment,'c
 hundreds of private flights Epstein took 
during thilleg 
flights with their fiant and flights to the locations identified in the 
Indialt. 61 ag
ureflect insir 
when one of the minor victims identified in the 
Indictment traa,fhe 
pillt rplane duAlrffie period alleged in the Indictment. Business 
records from ameeducational institution reflect instances when Epstein and the defendant 
were present at a si 
camp that same minor victim attended, which line up with flight records 
confirming they were in the vicinity of that camp the same summer the victim attended the camp 
in 1994. Diary entries identify the period when a different minor victim identified in the 
Indictment first met Epstein, and customs records indicate times in 1994 when ad 
the 
defendant traveled internationally consistent aka 
discovery also includes contempommighotograpMEIMINIMINIMINNIMIAMEMMI
t frotant 
and the Government has provided the defense with the 
birth month and year of each minor victim.62
In other words, as the Government has previously indicated, the discovery provides the 
defendant with more than sufficient information about the three minor victims to permit her to 
prepare for trial. The discovery also provides the defense the ability to identify specific private 
plane flights that are relevant to the Indictment. Any remaining detail regarding the specifics of 
abuse, particular interactions, and additional trips will come from witness testimony. As is to be 
61 Records of commercial flights were unavailable by the time the Government opened its 
investigation in this case. Accordingly, the Government has no records of commercial flights that 
the defendant, Epstein, or any victims may have taken during the relevant period. 
62 In this memorandum, the Government has also clarified that Minor Victim-3 was 17 years old 
at the time of the events described in the Indictment involving her. See Section VIII, supra. 
180 
EFTA00095272

expected when describing events more than two decades in the past, that testimony will provide 
approximate time periods when events occurred, rather than specific dates. Given the information 
the defendant already has from the discovery, the Indictment, and the Government's court filings 
(including this memorandum), any additional detail would essentially serve as early Jencks Act 
production, allowing the defendant to tailor any testimony to the Government's case. The 
discovery gives the defense ample information to assist in its investigation, and given the defense's 
apparent ability to understand who the three victims are from the productions, there is no real 
concern that the defense will waste efforts conducting any such investigation before receiving 
Jencks Act material 63
Moreover, with respect to the perjury counts, to the extent there could plausibly be any 
remaining ambiguity about the nature of the charges, the Government has addressed and resolved 
such ambiguity in responding to the instant motions. In this memorandum, the Government has 
summarized how the defendant's false statements during her deposition were material to the 
pending civil litigation. See Section V, supra. Perhaps more importantly, the defendant personally 
participated in that civil litigation, and she is undoubtedly quite familiar with it. 
Together, the discovery productions, briefing in which the Government has described 
aspects of its evidence and theory (see, e.g., Government Memorandum in Opposition to Renewed 
Bail Motion, Dec. 18, 2020, Dkt. No.100, at 8-12), the contents of this memorandum, and the 
details contained in the Indictment more than adequately inform the defendant of the charges 
against her. This is simply not a case where the "relevance of key events [are] shrouded in 
63 Although the victims' identities are clear form the discovery, and the defendant's motion makes 
clear that she strongly suspects their identities, there is no basis to require the Government to turn 
over the names of its witnesses, including its victim-witnesses in advance of its Jencks Act 
production, which is customary in this District. See Section XI, infra. 
181 
EFTA00095273

mystery." See Bortnovsky, 820 F.2d at 574. Accordingly, the Court should deny the motion for a 
bill of particulars. 
A. 
The Defendant's Requests for Early Production of a Witness List and Jencks 
Act Material Should Be Denied 
1. 
Applicable Law 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 "does not require the Government to furnish the 
names and addresses of its witnesses in general." United States v. Bejasa, 904 F.2d 137, 139 (2d 
Cir. 1990). Thus, "Tin the absence of a specific showing that disclosure [of a witness list] [is] 
both material to the preparation of [the] defense and reasonable in light of the circumstances 
surrounding [the] case,' the request for a witness list should be denied." United States v. Russo, 
483 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Bejasa, 904 F.2d at 139-40). "Courts in the 
Second Circuit typically deny motions for the early disclosure of witness lists where, as here, 
Defendants have not made a specific showing of need." United States v. Rivera, 16 Cr. 175 (LGS), 
2017 WL 1843302, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017). The claim that "given the complexity of the 
case, disclosure of the government witness list will level the playing field" amounts to an "abstract 
statement of need" that does not justify provision of a witness list. Russo, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, covers disclosure of statements or reports made by 
Government witnesses, and the rule mandates that such materials not be the subject of discovery 
or inspection "until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case." 18 
U.S.C. § 3500(a); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Jencks 
Act prohibits a District Court from ordering the pretrial disclosure of witness statements."); United 
States v. Thompson, 13 Cr. 378 (AJN), 2013 WL 6246489, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) (denying 
request for early production of Jencks Act material in light of Coppa). 
182 
EFTA00095274

Typically in this District, and as is the case here, the Government confirms that it will 
produce 3500 material and Giglio (or impeachment) material reasonably in advance of trial, and 
will engage in good faith discussions with the defense regarding a schedule for pretrial disclosures. 
See United States v. Sergentakis, 05 Cr. 230 (JFK), 2005 WL 1994014, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
17, 2005) ("18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) calls for production of Government witness statements after the 
witness `has testified on direct examination.' The Government response . . . that Icionsistent with 
the regular practice in this District, the Government intends to make Section 3500 material 
available to the defense at the same time as impeachment material, [and that] in order to avoid any 
delay in the trial, the Government will produce such material sufficiently in advance of each 
Government witness's testimony' ... is more than adequate."); United States v. Gallo, No. 98 Cr. 
338 (JGK), 1999 WL 9848, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999) ("[T]he Government has indicated that 
it is aware of its obligations under Giglio .. . and the Jencks Act and that it will provide the required 
information to the defendants in accordance with its responsibilities under Giglio and the Jencks 
Act sufficiently in advance of each witness's testimony to allow adequate time to prepare for cross-
examination. These representations are sufficient."). 
2. 
Discussion 
Trial is still more than four months away. The degree of complexity to this case, and the 
volume of discovery, is on par with other recent trials in this District, and in those cases witnesses 
have typically been disclosed approximately three to four weeks before trial. E.g., Gatto, 17 Cr. 
686 (LAK); Blaszczak, 17 Cr. 357 (LAK); Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW); Levin, 15 Cr. 101 (KBF); 
Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC); Ulbricht, 14 Cr. 68 (KBF). As the Government has noted for some time 
now, the Government intends to match or even go above and beyond that practice in this case. 
Specifically, the Government has offered repeatedly to provide non-testifying witness statements 
183 
EFTA00095275

to the defense as much as eight weeks before trial, thereby allowing extra time for the defense to 
determine whether it wishes to call any of the witnesses the Government does not intend to present 
at trial, and to provide testifying witness statements and Giglio material as much as four weeks in 
advance of trial. Given that the defense has already been able to initiate its investigation of the 
charges, and given that the discovery makes clear who the three minor victims are, eight weeks 
should be ample time to review non-testifying witness statements, and four weeks is more than 
enough time to review the statements of testifying witnesses. The Government remains open to 
engaging in good faith discussions with the defense to mutually agree on a schedule for reciprocal 
pretrial disclosures." Accordingly, the motion for a witness list and early production of Jencks 
Act material should be denied. 
A. 
The Defendant's Additional Requests for Disclosure Should Be Denied 
The defendant also makes a variety of motions seeking disclosures to which she is not 
entitled, all of which should be denied. 
First, the defendant requests 
dentifietaill 
.atellnliail
l-rillearSsponse 
to a 
motion to quash subpoell , which the defense attached to their motion as Exhibit B. (Def. Mot. 
10 at 7-8). The defense assumes that because at 
specifically mention 
dendant, then_ 
s mu 
interview_ 
thereby, according to the defense, rendering any record of 
those interviews exculpatory. But that defense theory rests on a faulty premise. The Government 
has reviewed the document memorializing 
and 
" The Government has requested reciprocal discovery from the defendant and, to date, she has 
produced nothing. 
184 
EFTA00095276

confirmed that it inculpates the defendant and contains nothing exculpatory. The Government has 
also reviewed 
ent me 
5 interview 
and 
confirmed that it also inculpates the defendant. The Government has, however, identified a single 
line in 
that could arguably be considered helpful to 
the defense.65 With the possible exception of that one line, there is nothing exculpatory contained 
in 
Accordingly, the records of 
these interviews constitute witness statements covered by the Jencks Act and are not subject to 
disclosure by statute until after each witness has completed direct examination at trial. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3500. As noted above, however, the Government fully intends to provide all Jencks Act 
material of both testifying and non-testifying witnesses, which will of course include the records 
relating to these interviews, to the defense multiple weeks in advance of trial. The Government 
respectfully submits that is sufficient to meet its obligations with respect to these documents, and 
the defendant's motion for their immediate disclosure should be denied. 
Second, the defendant's request for an unredacted copy of the FBI report attached to the 
Defense Motion as Exhibit C should be denied as moot because the Government has already 
produced an unredacted copy of that report to the defense. (Def. Mot. 10 at 8-9). Specifically, the 
document was produced without redactions under bates numbers SDNY_GM_00380550 through 
SDNY_ GM_ 00380554 as part of the Government's discovery production dated November 9, 
2020.66 This motion should accordingly be denied as moot. 
65 In articular, fin page 12 of the notes from this 2006 intery
line indicates tha 
s 
l 
, 
mor is that JE is gay," apparently referring to e 
Epstein's sexual orien ation. 
pt 
Out of an abundance of caution. today the Government has informed defense counsel of this single 
line 
ed defe 
sel wit's 
me of witness "M." 
" Notably, the unredacted report does not contain 
demonstrating that defense counsel's speculation about 
supposed Bna/y material lurking beneath redactions is inaccurate. The redacted copy defense 
any sats
 from either of the witnesses 
185 
EFTA00095277

Third, the defendant's request for unredacted copies of the FBI report regarding 
inia Roberts is based purely on her speculation that the redacted portions 
of those materials contain exculpatory information. (Def. Mot. 10 at 8-9). Once again, the 
Government has reviewed the full report and confirmed that there is nothing exculpatory contained 
therein. To the contrary, the report inculpates the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant is not 
entitled to its immediate disclosure. The Government will produce an unredacted version of this 
document together with all other witness statements in advance of trial 67
Fourth, the defense requests production of pages from a personal diary that is in the custody 
of a civilian third party and is not in the custody or control of the Government. (Def. Mot. 10 at 
10). Leaving aside the fact that the defense cites no authority for the proposition that the 
Government has an obligation to obtain the personal papers of a third party, see United States v. 
Collins, 409 F. Supp. 3d 228, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("The Government's `Brady obligations extend 
only to materials within prosecutors' possession, custody or control or, in appropriate cases, that 
of the Department of Justice, perhaps another part of the Executive Branch, or a comparable state 
authority involved in the federal prosecution.' quoting United States v. Blaszczak, 308 F. Supp. 
3d 736, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2018))), the Government has already represented that it has asked the third 
party at issue about the materials the defendant purports to seek and that no such materials exist. 
In particular, to the extent the defense is concerned with whether there are diary entries 
counsel attached as Exhibit C was recovered during the execution of a search warrant for one of 
Epstein's devices and was produced to defense counsel in the form in which it was recovered from 
the device. In other words, defense counsel has received two copies of this same document: the 
redacted version that Epstein had on one of his devices, and the unredacted version from the FBI's 
files. 
67 As is the case with the other redacted document referenced in this motion, the redacted copy 
defense counsel attached as Exhibit D was recovered during the execution of a search warrant for 
one of Epstein's devices and was produced to defense counsel in the form in which it was 
recovered from the device. 
186 
EFTA00095278

the Government has already indicated in response to the defendant's second bail 
motion that it is aware of none. (See Dkt. No. 100 at 11 n. 2 (" 
ict 
in her journal about a month after that first rawith 
Epstein,larre no entries 
subsequent trip she took months later taring 
which she met the dei 
victim provided the Government with cop' 
I entries relating to Epstein MN= 
the Government that the remaining e 
al in natthia 
Epstein or the defeat)). 
In other words, the defendant again seeks supposedly exculpatory 
evidence that does not exist. The defendant offers no basis on which to conclude that this 
representation is false or that any such evidence does in fact exist. As such, this motion should be 
denied. 
Fifth, the defendant asks this Court, again without citing any legal authority, to order the 
Government to produce copies of all subpoenas it has issued for the defendant's records as part of 
its investigation in this case. (Def. Mot. 10 at 11). This incredibly broad request is nothing more 
than a fishing expedition inappropriately seeking the details of investigative requests made through 
the grand jury process. The defense has cited no legal basis for the Court to direct the Government 
to provide the defense with copies of the subpoenas themselves (as opposed to records or other 
materials received in response to such subpoenas), let alone every subpoena issued for the 
defendant's records during a multi-year and ongoing grand jury investigation. The types of 
requests issued by the grand jury have no conceivable bearing on the defense or on any motion the 
defense may seek to bring. The Government has already produced to the defense all discoverable 
material that it has received in response to subpoenas issued to date during this investigation. In 
the absence of any legal authority justifying this request, it should be denied. Additionally, for the 
reasons discussed above in Sections I and IV, the defendant is not entitled to discovery or a hearing 
187 
EFTA00095279

relating to her motion to dismiss the Indictment based on the NPA or her motion to suppress 
subpoena returns. 
Sixth, the defendant asks the Court to direct the Government to immediately disclose any 
Brady and Giglio material. (Def. Mot. 10 at 11-13). The motion for disclosure of Brady material 
should be denied as moot because the Government has conducted a search for any such material 
and has already disclosed any potentially exculpatory information in its possession of which it is 
aware, consistent with the Rule 5(f) Brady order previously issued by the Court in this case. See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(f); Dkt. No. 68. The Government recognizes its continuing obligation to 
disclose any Brady material, and to make a diligent search for any relevant material that may be 
in the possession of the prosecution team, including investigating agents and officers. As the 
Government has already emphasized in this case, the Government takes its disclosure obligations 
very seriously and has committed to being transparent with the Court and the defense regarding its 
approach to obtaining and reviewing files, including other agency files, that may be relevant to 
this case. (See Gov't Letter dated October 7, 2020, Dkt. No. 63). Consistent with that 
commitment, the Government has completed an initial review of its files for Brady material and 
Rule 16 material and has produced more than 2.7 million pages of discovery as a result of that 
review. These productions have included specific disclosures of certain witness statements that 
may arguably be exculpatory. The Government also intends to produce all statements and potential 
impeachment material in its possession regarding any potential witness identified during its 
investigation, including those individuals whom the Government does not intend to call at trial. 
As discussed below, the Government is in the process of reviewing all files in its possession for 
potential impeachment material. The Government remains cognizant of its Brady obligations and 
will promptly produce any potentially exculpatory material if any is identified during that review. 
188 
EFTA00095280

The Government is not currently aware of any undisclosed Brady material in its possession, 
but it will certainly provide timely disclosure of any additional Brady material if any such material 
comes to light. Courts in this Circuit routinely deny specific requests for Brady material where, 
as here, the Government has made a good-faith representation to the court and defense counsel 
that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations under Brady. See, e.g., 
Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 ("In light of the Government's 'good-faith representation to 
the court and defense counsel that it recognizes and has complied with its disclosure obligations 
under Brady,' 
defendants' 
request 
for 
immediate 
or 
otherwise early production of Brady materials is denied." (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540, 553 (S.D.N.Y.1996))); Gallo, 1999 WL 9848, at *8 
(denying defendant's motion to compel production of purported Brady material based on 
Government's representations that "it is aware of its obligations under Brady . . . and will produce 
any Brady material to the defense well before trial"); United States v. Campo Flores, 15 Cr. 765 
(PAC), 2016 WL 5946472, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016) ("The Government represents that it 
is aware of its obligation under Brady; that it has complied; and will continue to comply. That is 
sufficient to deny Defendants' motion for Brady relief." (internal citations omitted)). Given the 
Government's extensive efforts to review its files for any material warranting disclosure, and its 
commitment to continue meeting its disclosure obligations, the motion should be denied. 
For similar reasons, the motion for disclosure of Giglio material should be denied as 
premature. The Government is fully aware of its obligation to disclose impeachment material, is 
in the process of reviewing all files in its possession for any such material, and will produce any 
such material several weeks in advance of trial. As noted above, that is consistent with governing 
law in this Circuit, and the defendant cites no authority for the proposition that she is entitled to 
189 
EFTA00095281

such material as much as four months in advance of trial. Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly 
refused to compel disclosure of impeachment or Giglio material well in advance of trial, and the 
defense has provided no particularized basis for even earlier disclosure here. See United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) ("Generally, the need for evidence to impeach witnesses is 
insufficient to require its production in advance of trial."); Campo Flores, 2016 WL 5946472, at 
*II ("The Government has represented that it will make impeachment material relating to its 
anticipated witnesses available . . . ten days before trial. There is no need to depart from the 
customary rule in this district of disclosure shortly before trial."); United States v. Seabrook, 10 
Cr. 87 (DAB), 2010 WL 5174353, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2010) ("The Government represents 
to the Court that it is aware of its Brady, Giglio, Jencks Act, and 404(b) obligations and will 
comply with them in a timely fashion, as appropriate. Based on the Government's representations, 
and on the current posture of this case, the Court expects that the Government will comply timely 
with all of its obligations under Brady, Giglio, the Jencks Act, and Rule 404(b), and does not find 
a need to order compliance at this time." (internal citation omitted)); Russo, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 308 
("Here the government has represented that it intends to produce Giglio material no later than the 
Friday of the week before a witness is scheduled to testify at trial, in accordance with its usual 
practice. To the extent that the government's disclosure in this case proves unusually voluminous 
or complex, 
the 
government 
has 
in 
good-faith 
represented 
that 
it 
intends to 
produce Giglio material sufficiently in advance of their witnesses' testimony so as to avoid any 
delay in trial. At the time of those disclosures, to the extent that Defendants feel that additional 
time is necessary given the volume or complexity of the materials provided, the Court will 
consider applications to continue or recall witnesses. It is unnecessary, however, to 
order early disclosure at this time."); United States v. Canter, 338 F. Supp. 2d 460, 461-62 
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(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying analogous motion and noting that "[i]t has been the practice of this 
Court and of other courts in this district to require that the Government produce these materials a 
few days before the start of trial"). Because the Government has committed to providing the 
defense with Giglio material multiple weeks in advance of trial, which is ample time for the 
defense to prepare its cross-examination of the Government's witnesses, this motion should be 
denied. 
Seventh, the defendant seeks a proffer of all co-conspirator statements that the Government 
intends to offer at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). (Def. Mot. 10 at 13-
14). In making this motion, the defense cites authority confirming that co-conspirator statements 
may be admitted at trial on a conditional basis without the need for any pretrial consideration of 
their admissibility. See United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The decision 
as to whether the four prerequisites have been met, like all other preliminary questions of 
admissibility, is to be made by the court. If the government succeeds in persuading the court that 
the conditionally admitted coconspirator statements were made during and in furtherance of a 
conspiracy of which both the declarant and the defendant were members, the statements are 
allowed to go to the jury. If the court is not so persuaded, it either should instruct the jury to 
disregard the statements, or, if those statements were `so large a proportion of the proof as to render 
a cautionary instruction of doubtful utility,' should declare a mistrial." (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969))). Indeed, the Second 
Circuit has rejected the suggestion that non-exculpatory co-conspirator statements are discoverable 
under Rule 16 or by any means other than the Jencks Act. See In re U.S., 834 F.2d 283, 284-87 
(2d Cir. 1987) (issuing a writ of mandamus reversing District Court's order directing the 
Government "to produce all oral statement made by the defendants and coconspirators that the 
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EFTA00095283

Government planned to offer at trial as admissions of a defendant" under Fed. R. Evid. 801). 
Consistent with the Government's intention to produce Jencks Act material several weeks in 
advance of trial, the defense will receive notice of any co-conspirator statements that the 
Government may seek to introduce through witness statements with sufficient time to raise any 
objections with the Court. Accordingly, this motion should be denied 
Finally, the defendant requests early disclosure of Rule 404(b) material that the 
Government may seek to introduce at trial. (Def. Mot. 10 at 17). As is customary in this district, 
the Government will provide notice to the defense of its intent to use any such evidence at least 45 
days in advance of trial, which will leave sufficient time for the defense may file any motions in 
limine to be considered at the final pretrial conference. See Thompson, 2013 WL 6246489 at *9 
("The Government has represented that it will disclose the substance of [the 404(b) evidence it 
intends to introduce at trial] ... in a timely fashion in order to permit the defendants the opportunity 
to challenge admission and to permit the Court to make an appropriate finding. This is all that Rule 
404(b) requires." (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Tranquillo, 
606 F. Supp. 2d 370, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The Government has indicated that it will make the 
required disclosure two weeks prior to trial, a practice that typically comports with Rule 404(b)); 
United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp. 2d 279, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The government has in good 
faith noted its obligations under Rule 404(b), and indicated that it intends to provide notice of the 
404(b) evidence it intends to introduce two weeks before the beginning of trial. There is therefore 
no need to issue the order Defendant seeks."). Accordingly, this motion should be denied. 
XI. 
The Use of a Grand Jury Siting in White Plains Was Entirely Proper 
On June 29, 2020, amidst a global pandemic that suspended grand juries across the country, 
the Government sought and obtained an indictment from a grand jury of the Southern District of 
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New York (the "Southern District" or "SDNY") sitting in White Plains. The defendant now 
challenges the pool from which that grand jury was drawn, alleging that it does not reflect a "fair-
cross section of the community," and moves to dismiss the Indictment under the Sixth 
Amendment. (Def. Mot. 9 at 1). As set forth below, the defendant's arguments rely on faulty 
premises, and at any rate fail to meet the elements of a claim under the Sixth Amendment. 
Therefore, the defendant's motion must be denied. 
A. 
Background 
1. 
The SDNY and Local Rules for the Division of Business 
The defendant's brief repeatedly uses the term "Division" to describe a "White Plains 
Division" and a "Manhattan Division." (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 9 at 2 ("On June 29, 2020, the 
government filed a sealed indictment of Ms. Maxwell in the Manhattan Division of this Court. The 
government has conceded that Ms. Maxwell's indictment was obtained using a grand jury seated 
in White Plains, apparently with jurors drawn exclusively from the White Plains Division.")). Her 
use of the term "division" is imprecise and attributes legal significance where there is none. 
Understanding how that is so requires some background. 
District courts in each state in the United States are prescribed by statute. United States 
district courts in New York State are divided between four districts: Northern, Southern, Eastern 
and Western. 28 U.S.C. § 112. While certain districts in other states are further divided into 
"divisions" by statute, see, e.g., id. § 81 (dividing Alabama into three "districts" and multiple 
"divisions" within each district), the federal districts in New York State are not so divided. That 
is, in the Southern District, no "divisions" have been created by statute. Id. § 112(6). The statute 
provides only that "Court for the Southern District shall be held at New York, White Plains, and 
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in the Middletown-Wallkill area of Orange County or such nearby location as may be deemed 
appropriate." Id. 
In the Southern District, the only authority determining whether particular cases are heard 
in the Manhattan or White Plains courthouse is the SDNY Business Division Rules. These rules 
begin with an important preface: they "shall not be deemed to vest any rights in litigants . 
." 
SDNY Business Division Rules, available at httpsillwww.nysd.uscourts.govisitesidefault/files/ 
local_rules/rules-2018-10-29.pdf. Moreover, the Rules do not describe—much less limit—what 
matters may be heard by what grand jury. Cf. SDNY Business Division Rule 6 (describing 
proceedings after an indictment has been returned). Rather, the Rules provide only that once an 
indictment is returned, "[t]he U.S. attorney designates on the criminal cover sheet that the case is 
to be assigned to White Plains if the crime was allegedly committed in whole or in predominant 
part in the Northern Counties." SDNY Business Division Rule 18(b)). Furthermore, the Rules 
specifically contemplate that cases may be reassigned from one courthouse to another. SDNY 
Business Division Rule 19. Consistent with these Rules, it is common for cases to be indicted by 
grand juries sitting in the White Plains courthouse and tried in the Manhattan courthouse. See, 
e.g., United States v. Israel, 05 Cr. 1039 (CM), Dkt. No. 25; United States v. Cromitie, et at, 09 
Cr. 558 (CM), Dkt. No. 183, 200; United States v. Annabi, 10 Cr. 07 (CM), Dkt. No. 45; United 
States v. Arici, 12 Cr. 24 (LAP), Dkt. No. 115, 117; United States v. Reeves, et al., 16 Cr. 372 
(VEC), Dkt. No. 51; United States v. Guerrier, 18 Cr. 284 (JSR), Dkt. No. 98. 
2. 
The SDNY Jury Plan 
The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (the "JSSA"), 
provides the structure for the selection of juries in federal district courts. The JSSA requires each 
district to "devise and place into operation a written plan for random selection of grand and petit 
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