EFTA00076815

306 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
t 
In short, the issue now before the Court 
has arisen only because Donziger unjustifi-
ably has refused to comply with his discov-
ery obligations. Had he done so — i.e., had 
he produced responsive documents as to 
which there was no colorable claim of priv-
ilege, submitted a privilege log as to re-
sponsive documents as to which there was 
such a colorable claim, and submitted any 
disputes for judicial resolution - there 
would be no need to examine his ESI. But 
he has not. And the Court thus must take 
appropriate action. His arguments to the 
contrary are meritless. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court 
has entered the protocol for imaging and 
forensic examination of Donziger's elec-
tronic devices and media. 
SO ORDERED. 
the six months between being served with 
the document requests and the Court's 
eventual ruling, on October I8, 2018, that 
Donziger had waived any applicable privi-
lege. 
Third, Donziger disregards the fact that 
when he belatedly produced a "privilege 
log" in the prior litigation it was about 
2,000 pages long and scheduled over 8,652 
supposedly privileged 
documents. 
The 
"privilege log," however, contained not 
even one communication between Donziger 
and his putative clients. It claimed privilege 
as to more than 2,500 documents "sent or 
disclosed to a public relations person, the 
founder of the Amazon Defense Front ..., 
Amazon Watch, and a host of newspapers 
and magazines" none of which could have 
been privileged if only because they were 
not confidential lawyer-client communica-
tions. In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 
at 184. Thus, the privilege log tardily sub-
mitted in the prior case was not a good 
faith attempt to make only colorable claims 
of privilege as distinguished from an at-
tempt to stall discovery. See id. at 184-85. 
UNITED STATES of America, 
Government, 
v. 
Jeffrey EPSTEIN, Defendant 
19 CR. 490 (RMB) 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Signed July 18, 2019 
Background: 
Defendant was charged 
with sex trafficking and sex trafficking 
conspiracy. Defendant moved for pretrial 
release. 
Holdings: The District Court, Richard M. 
Berman, Senior District Judge, held that: 
(1) defendant posed danger to others and 
to community; 
So too here in the sense that Donziger has 
made no good faith effort to comply with 
his obligations concerning claims of privi-
lege. 
Fourth, Donziger's behavior here regarding 
privilege claims, just as in the related prior 
case, has been undertaken for tactical ad-
vantage. He never posted a supersedeas 
bond, which would have stayed enforce-
ment of the money judgment as of right, 
nor sought a stay of its enforcement on any 
other basis. And while he did seek a stay 
from this Court of certain discovery from a 
non-party witness and a broader protective 
order and has appealed from the order de-
nying his motion, see DI 2045. he never has 
sought a stay or injunction pending appeal 
from the Circuit in the more than three 
months since this Court ruled. It appears 
that his obdurate refusal to comply with 
discovery obligations and court orders is an 
attempt to obtain by self help the stay of 
discovery that this Court denied and that he 
has not sought from the Circuit. 
41. DI 2108 8 1. 
EFTA00076815

U.S. v. EPSTEiN 
Cute as 425 F.Supp.ld 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
(2) defendant was serious risk of flight and 
conditions could not be set that reason-
ably would assure his appearance at 
trial; and 
(3) defendant's proposed bail package did 
not weigh in favor of pretrial release. 
Motion denied. 
1. Bail €=49(4) 
In most federal cases the rebuttable 
presumption that applies favors pretrial 
release, not remand. 
2. Bail er49(5) 
Sex trafficking victims are entitled to 
be heard in court, including on the ques-
tion of whether the defendant is to be 
released or remanded. 
18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3142, 3771. 
3. Bail cr>49(3.1) 
Under the Bail Reform Act, a finding 
of a defendant's dangerousness must be 
supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 18 U.S.CA.* 3142. 
4. Bail €=.42 
Under the Bail Reform Act, where 
there is a strong probability that a person 
will commit additional crimes if released, 
the need to protect the community be-
comes sufficiently compelling that deten-
tion is, on balance, appropriate. 
18 
U.S.CA. § 3142. 
5. Bail e=:073.1(1) 
Under the Bail Reform Act, even a 
single incident of witness tampering may 
be sufficient to revoke bail. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3142. 
307 
6. Bail e=49(3.1) 
To order detention under the Bail Re-
form Act based upon risk of flight, a court 
must find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that no conditions could reasonably 
assure the defendant's presence at trial. 
18 U.S.CA.* 3142. 
7. Bail G=.42 
The constitutional limits on a deten-
tion period under the Bail Reform Act 
based on dangerousness to the community 
may be looser than the limits on a deten-
tion period based solely on risk of flight; in 
the former case, release risks injury to 
others, while in the latter case, release 
risks only the loss of a conviction, and 
therefore a bail package that may reason-
ably assure the appearance of the defen-
dant at trial will not necessarily assure the 
safety of the community. 
18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3142. 
8. Bail €=.49(5) 
Under the Bail Reform Act, the 
weight afforded to each factor to be con-
sidered in the release-remand analysis is 
within the special province of the district 
court. 18 U.S.CA.* 3142. 
9. Bail 049(5) 
A district court is afforded wide dis-
cretion regarding the scope of a release-
remand hearing under the Bail Reform 
Act. 18 U.S.CA. § 3142(f)(2). 
10. Bail C=.49(4) 
The government retains the ultimate 
burden of persuasion under the Bail Re-
form Act in a case involving sexual victim-
ization of a minor that a defendant pres-
ents a danger to the community by clear 
and convincing evidence and that the de-
fendant presents a risk of flight by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; even if rebut-
tal evidence is presented, the presumption 
favoring detention does not disappear en-
tirely and it remains a factor to be consid-
EFTA00076816

308 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
ered among those weighed by the district 
court. 18 U.S.C.A. H 1591, 3142(e)(3)(E). 
11. Bail tz=.42 
Defendant charged with sex traffick-
ing and sex trafficking conspiracy posed 
danger to others and to community, weigh-
ing against pretrial release under Bail Re-
form Act, where defendant was alleged to 
have committed sex crimes with minor 
girls and tampered with potential wit-
nesses, victims feared for their safety if he 
were released, he posed threat to addition-
al young girls if he was released, and 
compliance with his legal obligations as 
registered sex offender was lacking. 18 
U.S.CA. 0 1591, 3142. 
12. Bail e=49(4) 
Under the Bail Reform Act, if the 
defendant in a case involving sexual victim-
ization of a minor comes forward with 
evidence that he will not endanger the 
community or flee the jurisdiction, the pre-
sumption of remand is not erased; rather, 
the presumption remains in the case as an 
evidentiary finding militating against re-
lease, to be weighted along with other 
evidence. 18 U.S.CA. §§ 1591, 3142. 
13. Bail e=42 
Defendant charged with sex traffick-
ing and sex trafficking conspiracy was ser-
ious risk of flight and conditions could not 
be set that reasonably would assure his 
appearance at trial, weighing against pre-
trial release under Bail Reform Act, where 
defendant had limited family ties to United 
States, he had unexplained assets, and he 
had incentive, motive, and wherewithal to 
flee, given his residence in Paris, his ex-
tensive overseas travel, his significant 
wealth and his substantial resources, in-
cluding private planes, and potential 45 
year term of imprisonment that could be 
imposed if he was convicted. 18 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 1591, 3142. 
14. Bail tz=.42 
A finding of either danger to the com-
munity or risk of flight will be sufficient 
under the Bail Reform Act to detain the 
defendant pending trial. 
18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3142. 
15. Bail er42 
The factors to be considered under 
the Bail Reform Act in analyzing risk of 
flight are the same factors that apply when 
analyzing dangerousness. 
18 U.S.CA 
§ 3142(g). 
16. Bail e="49(5) 
Under the Bail Reform Act, the 
weight afforded to each factor to be con-
sidered in analyzing risk of flight is within 
the special province of the district court. 
18 U.S.CA. § 3142(g). 
17. Bail e=.49(2, 3.1) 
Proposed bail package of defendant 
charged with sex trafficking and sex traf-
ficking conspiracy did not weigh in favor of 
pretrial release under Bail Reform Act, 
since package was not accompanied or sup-
ported by audited or certified financial 
statements, including details of income and 
expenses and debt obligations, defendant 
did not provide affidavit of his financial 
condition, he could make millions or tens of 
millions of dollars per year outside of Unit-
ed States, package proposed excessive in-
volvement of court in routine aspects of 
defendant's proposed home confinement 
which was not court's function, and defen-
dant's proposal to give advance consent to 
extradition and waiver of extradition rights 
was 
empty 
gesture. 
18 
U.S.C.A. 
3142(b), 3142(f)(2). 
18. Bail e=49(2) 
Under the Bail Reform Act, each bail 
package in each case is considered and 
evaluated on its individual merits by the 
court. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142. 
EFTA00076817

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
Cite u423 F.Supp.34 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
Pro Hac Vice, 
United States Attorney's Office, New 
York, NY, Gloria Rachel Allred, Allred, 
Maroko & Goldberg, Los Angeles, CA, for 
Government. 
James L. Brochin, Michael Campion 
Miller, Michael Gerard Scavelli, Reid 
Weingarten, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, 
Marc Allan Fernich, Law Office of Marc 
Fernich, New York, NY, Martin Gary 
Weinberg, Martin G. Weinberg, PC, Bos-
ton, MA, for Defendant. 
DECISION & ORDER REMANDING 
DEFENDANT 
RICHARD M. BERMAN, U.S.D.J. 
A. Background 
This ruling follows the Court's bail hear-
ing held on July 15, 2019. The issue before 
the Court is whether the Defendant should 
continue to be remanded (incarcerated) 
pending trial or whether he should be 
granted release while the case proceeds. 
No matter the answer to this question and 
no matter what has been said in Court in 
analyzing the matter, this is a criminal 
case and the Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein, is 
innocent of the Federal charges alleged 
against him now and until such time, if it 
comes, that a jury or the Court fmds (after 
fair and thorough consideration of the 
facts and the law) that he is guilty. See 
Transcript, dated July 8, 2019 ("7/8/19 
Tr."), at 2-3; Transcript, dated July 15, 
2019 ("7/1W19 Tr."), at 40. It should also 
be borne in mind that the Court has not 
(yet) been presented with a motion to dis-
miss the Indictment. 
This is a federal as opposed to a state 
case. We proceed under federal law and 
federal rules. The key federal statute that 
applies here is 18 U.S.C. § 1591 which sets 
forth the crime of sex trafficking with 
which Mr. Epstein is charged. Mr. Epstein 
309 
is also charged with conspiring with others 
to commit sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371. 
[1] With respect to the issue of re-
mand versus release, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 
applies. It sets forth a presumption in 
favor of remand, an exception to the pre-
sumption in most cases which favors pre-
trial release. § 3142 states that: "if there is 
probable cause to believe that the person 
committed ... an offense involving a mi-
nor victim under section . . . 1591," then 
"it shall be presumed that no condition 
or combination of conditions will rea-
sonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required and the safety of the 
community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E) 
(emphasis added); see United States v. 
Martir 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986). 
The Indictment in this case was returned 
by a grand jury thus establishing probable 
cause that the defendant committed the 
crimes of sex trafficking and sex traffick-
ing conspiracy. See United States v. 
Contreras, 776 F2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1985) 
("[A]n indictment returned by a duly con-
stituted grand jury conclusively establishes 
the existence of probable cause for the 
purpose of triggering the rebuttable pre-
sumptions set forth in § 3142(e)"). In most 
federal cases the rebuttable presumption 
that applies favors pretrial release, not 
remand. 
[2] There is another very important 
issue to be considered in this case. It has 
to do with "victims" of the crimes charged 
in the Indictment. Victims refer to the 
"minor" girls who are alleged to have been 
sexually trafficked by the Defendant. Un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 3771, victims are entitled 
to be heard in court, including on the 
question of whether the defendant is to be 
released or remanded. Victims have, 
EFTA00076818

310 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
among other things, been given the oppor-
tunity to testify at the bail hearing. 
B. Counsels' Submissions 
The Government's letter application, 
dated July 8, 2019, requests that the Court 
remand Mr. Epstein. It argues that Mr. 
Epstein "poses [ ] an acute danger to the 
community" and, grounded in past experi-
ence with this Defendant, that "if [Mr. 
Epstein is] allowed to remain out on bail, 
the defendant could attempt to pressure 
and intimidate witnesses and potential wit-
nesses in this case, including victims and 
their families, and otherwise attempt to 
obstruct justice." Dkt. 11, Ex. 1 at 1. The 
Government also contends that "[i]n light 
of the strength of the Government's evi-
dence and the substantial incarceratory 
term the defendant would face upon con-
viction [45 years], there is an extraordi-
nary risk of flight, particularly given the 
defendant's exorbitant wealth, his owner-
ship of and access to private planes capa-
ble of international travel, and his signifi-
cant international ties." Id. 
The Government also provides the fol-
lowing background information: "In or 
about 2005, the defendant was investigated 
by local police in Palm Beach, Florida, in 
connection with allegations that he had 
committed similar sex offenses against mi-
nor girls. The investigation ultimately also 
involved federal authorities, namely the 
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern 
District of Florida and the FBI's Miami 
Office, and included interviews with vic-
tims based in the Palm Beach area, includ-
ing some of the alleged victims relevant to 
Count One of the instant Indictment. In 
the fall of 2007, the Defendant entered into 
a non-prosecution agreement ("NPA") with 
the Southern District of Florida in connec-
tion with the conduct at issue in that inves-
tigation, which the non-prosecution agree-
ment identified as including investigations 
into the defendant's abuse of minor girls in 
the Palm Beach area." Id. at 3. "In June 
2008, the defendant pled guilty in [Florida] 
state court to one count of procuring a 
person under the age of 18 for prostitution, 
a felony, and one count of solicitation of 
prostitution, [also] a felony. As a result, 
the defendant was designated as a sex 
offender with registration requirements 
under the national Sex Offender Registra-
tion and Not
cation Act" Id. 
The Defense moved on July 11, 2019, 
for pretrial release of Mr. Epstein, argu-
ing that "Mr. Epstein's strict compliance 
with the various monitoring requirements 
associated with his sex-offender registra-
tion actually decrease's] any danger that 
he might otherwise pose" and also that 
"Mr. Epstein has never once attempted to 
flee the United States." Dkt. 6 at 1, 12. 
The Defense proposes what they describe 
as "a stringent set of [14] conditions that 
will effectively guarantee [Mr. Epstein's] 
appearance and abate any conceivable 
danger he's claimed to present." Id. at 1. 
The 14 conditions do not include private 
security guards 24/7. The 14 conditions do 
include: (1) "Home detention in Mr. Ep-
stein's Manhattan residence, with permis-
sion to leave only for medical appoint-
ments as approved by Pretrial Services, 
including (at the Court's discretion) the 
installation of surveillance cameras at the 
front and rear entrances to ensure compli-
ance"; (2) "Electronic monitoring with a 
Global Positioning System"; (3) "An agree-
ment not to seek or obtain any new pass-
port during the pendency of this matter"; 
(4) "Consent to U.S. extradition from any 
country and waiver of all rights against 
such [*tradition"; (5) "A substantial [un-
specified] personal recognizance bond in 
an amount set by the Court after review-
ing additional information regarding Mr. 
Epstein's finances...."; (6) "The bond 
shall be secured by a mortgage on the 
Manhattan residence, valued at roughly 
EFTA00076819

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
ale as 425 F.Supp-3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
$77 million. Mr. Epstein's private jet can 
be pledged as further collateral"; (7) "Mr. 
Epstein's brother Mark will serve as a co-
surety of the bond, which shall be further 
secured by a mortgage on Mark's home in 
West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Epstein's 
friend David Mitchell will also serve as a 
co-surety and pledge his investment inter-
ests in two properties to secure the bond"; 
(8) "Mr. Epstein shall deregister or other-
wise ground his private jet"; (9) Mr. Ep-
stein "shall demobilize, ground, and/or 
deregister all vehicles or any other means 
of transportation in the New York area, 
providing particularized information as to 
each vehicle's location;" (10) "Mr. Epstein 
will provide Pretrial Services and/or the 
government random access to his resi-
dence"; (11) "No person shall enter the 
residence, other than Mr. Epstein and his 
attorneys, without prior approval from 
Pretrial Services and/or the Court"; (12) 
"Mr. Epstein will report daily by tele-
phone to Pretrial Services (or on any oth-
er schedule the Court deems appropri-
ate)"; (13) "A Trustee or Trustees will be 
appointed to live in Mr. Epstein's resi-
dence and report any violation to Pretrial 
Services and/or the Court"; (14) "Any oth-
er condition the Court deems necessary to 
reasonably assure Mr. Epstein's appear-
ance." Id. at 3.4. The Defense also propos-
es as a "fallback" "round-the-clock, pri-
vately funded security guards [which] will 
virtually guarantee - not just reasonably 
assure - Mr. Epstein's presence in the 
circumstances of this case." Id. at 10. The 
bail package originally was not accompa-
nied by a financial statement reflecting 
Mr. Epstein's finances. However, on July 
12, 2019, the Defense filed a one-page doc-
ument which includes five groups of assets 
owned 
by 
Mr. 
Epstein 
totaling 
$559,120,954. Dkt. 14 at 18. 
The Government responded to the De-
fense motion on July 12, 2019, arguing, 
among other things, that Mr. Epstein "has 
311 
a history of obstruction and manipulation 
of witnesses, including ... as recently as 
within the past year, when media reports 
about his conduct [in Florida] reemerged." 
Dkt. 11 at 1. The Government filing was 
made against a "backdrop of significant—
and rapidly-expanding—evidence, serious 
charges, and the prospect of a lengthy 
prison sentence." Id. It contends that the 
defendant's proposed conditions of release 
are "woefully inadequate." Id. 
The Court also received a letter from 
the Government, dated July 16, 2019, pro-
viding, among other things, details about 
allegedly suspicious payments made by the 
Defendant in 2018; a Palm Beach, Florida 
police report; Mr. Epstein's expired Aus-
trian passport in another name but with 
Mr. Epstein's photo; and a pile of cash and 
diamonds found in Mr. Epstein's safe. For 
example, the Government says: "[R]ecorcls 
from Institution-1 show that on or about 
November 30, 2018, or two days after the 
series in the Miami Herald began, the 
defendant wired $100,000 from a trust ac-
count he controlled to . . ., an individual 
named as a potential co-conspirator." Dkt. 
23 at 1. And, "on or about December 3, 
2018, the defendant wired $250,000 from 
the same trust account to ..., [an individ-
ual] who was also named as a potential co-
conspirator." Id. at 1.2. According to the 
Government, the second individual "is also 
one of the employees identified in the In-
dictment, which alleges that she and two 
other identified employees facilitated the 
defendant's trafficking of minors by, 
among other things, contacting victims and 
scheduling their sexual encounters with 
the defendant at his residences in Manhat-
tan and Palm Beach, Florida." Id. at 2. 
By letter, dated July 16, 2019, Defense 
counsel states, among other things, that 
the Court should reject the idea that 
"there's literally nothing a person of Ep-
stein's means could say, do or pledge to 
EFTA00076820

312 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
rebut the operative presumption and make 
himself eligible for release." Dkt. 24 at 2. 
"Epstein contends that * 1591 and the 
concomitant remand presumption do not 
contemplate or cover the core conduct at 
issue here: performing sexual massages 
for money." Id. at 1.2 n.1. Defense counsel 
also states that "Epstein certainly recog-
nizes the Court's request for further trans-
parency and is committed to providing a 
complete and accurate disclosure. Accord-
ingly, we propose that the Court prelimi-
narily accept the initial [financial] disclo-
sure proffered last Friday and, if intending 
to rant bail, include a release condition 
directing Epstein to tender a comprehen-
sive forensic accounting of his finances as 
expeditiously as practicable." Id. at 4. By 
letters, dated July 16 and July 17, 2019, 
Defense counsel also submitted informa-
tion regarding Epstein's New Mexico sex 
offender registration status. Defense coun-
sel also stated that Epstein traveled exten-
sively over the last eight months and "in-
variably returned to the to the United 
States. That inescapable reality emphati-
cally proves he won't flee and entitles him 
to release - on any and all conditions the 
Court deems appropriate." Id. at 8. 
C. Indictment 
A grand jury voted to indict Mr. Epstein 
on or about July 2, 2019. The Indictment 
charges Mr. Epstein with two felonies in-
volving minor girls some as young as 14. 
Count I includes conspiracy to commit sex 
trafficking of minor girls, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371, and Count II includes sex 
trafficking of minor girls, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1591. It states: "[F]rom at least in 
or about 2002, up to and including at least 
in or about 2005, Jeffrey Epstein, ... en-
ticed and recruited, and caused to be en-
ticed and recruited, minor girls to visit his 
mansion in Manhattan, New York ... and 
his estate in Palm Beach, Florida, ... to 
engage in sex acts with him, after which he 
would give the victims hundreds of dollars 
in cash." Indictment, dated July 2, 2019 
("Indictment"), 'I 2. "Moreover, and in or-
der to maintain, and increase his supply of 
victims, Epstein also paid certain of his 
victims to recruit additional girls to be 
similarly abused by Epstein. In this way, 
Epstein created a vast network of under-
age victims for him to sexually exploit in 
locations including New York and Palm 
Beach." Id. 
The Indictment also charges that "the 
victims .. . were as young as 14 years old 
at the time they were abused by [Mr. 
Epstein] .. . and were, for various rea-
sons, often particularly vulnerable to ex-
ploitation." Id. II 3. "Mr. Epstein intention-
ally sought out minors and knew that 
many of his victims were in fact under the 
age of 18, [] because, in some instances, 
minor victims expressly told him their 
age." Id. 
Following his arrest, on Monday, July 8, 
2019, Mr. Epstein was arraigned and pre-
sented with the Indictment by Magistrate 
Judge Henry Pittman. 
D. Legal Principles Governing 
Release Venus Remand 
[3-5] Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3142, a Court can order a defen-
dant's detention if it determines that the 
defendant is either (1) a danger to the 
community or (2) a risk of flight, 18 U.S.C. 
* 3142(e). A Court does not need to find 
both bases are proven to order a defen-
dant's detention. See id.; United States v. 
Blanco, 570 F. App'x 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2014). 
Dangerousness means that the defendant 
is a "danger to the safety of any other 
person or the community." 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142. A finding of dangerousness must 
be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence. See, e.g., United States v. Ferranti, 
66 F.3d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1995). "Where 
there is a strong probability that a person 
will commit additional crimes if released, 
EFTA00076821

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
ale as 423 F.Supp-3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
the need to protect the community be-
comes sufficiently compelling that deten-
tion is, on balance, appropriate." United 
States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 403 
(2d Cir. 1985). "[E]ven a single incident of 
witness tampering ... [may be] sufficient 
to revoke bail." LaFontaine, 210 F.3d at 
134. 
[6,7] To order detention based upon 
risk of flight, the Court must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that "that 
no conditions could reasonably assure the 
defendant's presence at trial." See, e.g., 
United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d 
Cir. 1987); 18 U.S.C. § 3142. "[The consti-
tutional limits on a detention period based 
on dangerousness to the community may 
be looser than the limits on a detention 
period based solely on risk of flight. In the 
former case, release risks injury to others, 
while in the latter case, release risks only 
the loss of a conviction." United States v 
Milan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1048 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting United States v. Orena, 986 F2d 
628, 631 (2d Cir. 1993)). A bail package 
that "may reasonably assure the appear-
ance of [the defendant] at trial will not 
[necessarily] assure the safety of the com-
munity." United States v. Rodriguez, 950 
F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1991). 
[8] The Bail Reform Act sets forth the 
following four• factors to be considered in 
the release/remand analysis: (1) the nature 
and circumstances of the crime(s) charged; 
(2) the weight of the evidence against the 
person; (3) the history and characteristics 
of the defendant, including the person's 
character and financial resources; and (4) 
the seriousness of the danger posed by the 
defendant's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
"The weight afforded to each factor under 
section 3142(g) is within the 'special prov-
ince of the district court." United States v. 
Paulin, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 610 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting United States v. 
Shaker, 817 F.2d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
313 
[9] "The rules concerning admissibility 
of evidence in criminal trials do not apply 
to the presentation and consideration of 
information at the [release/remand] hear-
ing." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2) (emphasis 
added). For example, the Government is 
entitled to present evidence supporting 
remand by way of proffer, among other 
means. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0(2); see also 
United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3cl 
125, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) ("bail hearings are 
typically informal affairs, not substitutes 
for trial or even for discovery"). 18 U.S.C. 
3142(O(2)(B) expressly states that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply 
at bail hearings; thus, courts often base 
detention decisions on hearsay evidence. 
United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 
321 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004) "District courts [are 
afforded] wide discretion regarding the 
scope of such hearings...." United 
States v. Bartok, 472 F. App./. 25, 27 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
E. The Presumption of Remand 
in 18 U.S.C. * 1591 Cases 
[10] A 18 U.S.C. § 1591 case involving 
sexual victimization of a minor is unusual 
in that it includes a presumption in favor 
of pretrial detention, reflecting the signifi-
cant harm caused by such a crime. 18 
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). The presumption is 
that no condition or combination of condi-
tions will reasonably assure against flight 
or danger to the community. United 
States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d 
Cir. 
2011) 
(quoting 
18 
U.S.C. 
3142(e)(3XE)). Mr. Epstein may rebut 
the presumption by "coming forward with 
evidence that he does not pose a danger to 
the community or a risk of flight." United 
States v. Mercedes, 254 F2d 433, 436 (2d 
Cir. 2001). The Government retains the 
"ultimate burden of persuasion" that Mr. 
Epstein presents a danger to the commu-
nity (by clear and convincing evidence) 
EFTA00076822

314 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
and that Mr. Epstein presents a risk of 
flight (by a preponderance of the evi-
dence). Id. Even if rebuttal evidence is 
presented, "the presumption favoring de-
tention does not disappear entirely." Id. at 
436. "[It] remains a factor to be consid-
ered among those weighed by the district 
court." Id. 
F. Mr. Epstein Poses a Danger To 
Others And To the Community 
[11] The Court begins with "danger-
ousness" because that concept is at the 
heart of this case. It fords that the Govern-
ment has shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that Mr. Epstein threatens the 
safety of another person and of the com-
munity, as follows on pages 10-21: 
• 
Victims Have Advised The Court 
That They Would Fear For Their 
Safety If Mr. Epstein Were Re-
leased 
Victims have "specifically conveyed" to 
the Government that any form of release 
of the Defendant, including home deten-
tion with full-time private guards, could 
"result in [their] harassment and abuse." 
Did. 11 at 4. At the bail hearing on July 
15, 2019, two victims movingly testified 
about their past sexual encounters with 
Mr. Epstein when they were minors aged 
14 and 16, respectively. 7/1W19 Tr. at 72; 
see also S. REP. 108-191 ("CVRA Legisla-
tive History"), at 22 (In enacting the 
CVRA, Congress stated that "[V]ictims de-
serve the right to be heard at specific 
points in the criminal justice process," in-
cluding bail hearings. "Giving victims a 
voice not only improves the quality of the 
process but can also be expected to often 
benefits to victims."). 
Ms 
Its introduced by her 
counsel, David Boies, and stated that she 
was 16 years old when she "had the mis-
fortune of meeting Jeffrey Epstein [in] 
New York." 7/15/19 Tr. at 72. Ms. Farmer 
said that Mr. Epstein "flew [her] to New 
Mexico" and was "inappropriate" with her. 
Id. She was reluctant to go into details 
about her experience with Mr. Epstein. Id. 
at 73. Ms. Fanner opposes Mr. Epstein's 
pretrial release because she believes other 
Epstein victims would "continu[e] to be 
victimized" and that Mr. Epstein's wealth 
and privilege and notoriety would make it 
difficult for "[other] victims to come for-
ward." Id. at 72. 
Ms 
was introduced by 
her counsel, Brad Edwards, and said she 
was "sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein 
starting at the age of 14." Id. at 73-74. She 
asked the Court to "keep [Mr. Epstein] in 
detention [] for the safety of any other 
girls out there that are going through what 
[she's] going through." Id. at 74. Ms. Wild 
said that Mr. Epstein is a "scary person to 
have walking the streets." Id. 
• 
Mr. Epstein Poses A Threat to Ad-
ditional Young Girls If He Is Re-
leased 
At the remand/release hearing on Mon-
day, July 15, 2019, as noted, the Court 
heard poignant testimony from two of Mr. 
Epstein's alleged victims about their fears 
and anxiety over his potential release, even 
if under strict conditions of home confine-
ment. The Court is also concerned for new 
victims. 
Mr. Epstein's alleged excessive attrac-
tion to sexual conduct with or in the pres-
ence of minor girls — which is said to 
include his soliciting and receiving massag-
es from young girls and young women 
perhaps as many as four times a day -
appears likely to be uncontrollable. See 
United States v. Minnici, 128 F. Appix 827, 
829-30 (2d Cir. 2005) (defendant's alleged 
sex crimes were "of an addictive sexual 
nature that cannot be suppressed simply 
by a restrictive set of bail conditions"). 
EFTA00076823

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
ale as 423 F.Suppld 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
Accordingly, Mr. Epstein's past sexual 
conduct is not likely to have abated or 
been successfully suppressed by fierce de-
termination, as his Defense Counsel sug-
gests. Defense Counsel contends that. 
"[H]e wasn't a predator that couldn't con-
trol his conduct. He disciplined himself." 
7/15/19 Tr. at 31-32. Defense Counsel also 
argues that "appreciating the gravity of 
these charges .. . putting aside the age of 
these witnesses and putting the consent 
issue aside, it's not like [Epstein is] an out-
of-control rapist." 7/15/19 'Pr. at 36. It 
seems fair to say that Mr. Epstein's future 
behavior will be consistent with past be-
havior, including the trove of "lewd photo-
graphs of young-looking women or girls," 
which were recently uncovered during the 
July 6-7, 2019, search of Mr. Epstein's 
East 71st Street mansion. See Dkt. 11, Ex. 
1 at 9. The search results suggest the 
"possibility that defendant could target an-
other vulnerable victim." See United 
States v. Baker, 349 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1135 
(D.N.M. 2018) (where the defendant was 
alleged to specifically target "vulnerable 
women" and where he attempted to con-
tact an alleged victim, the court was pet 
suaded that the defendant "would be a 
danger to society if released"). 
Despite having been convicted of the 
above mentioned (two) Florida sex crimes 
(in 2008) involving an underage girl, Mr. 
Epstein, as noted, maintained at his New 
York residence a "vast trove" of sexually 
suggestive photographs of nude underage 
and adult girls. Dkt. 11, Ex. 1 at 9. That is, 
during the July 6.7, 2019 authorized search 
of Mr. Epstein's NYC residence, the FBI 
found a "substantial collection of photo-
graphic trophies of his victims and other 
young females." Dkt. 11 at 10. This evi-
dence includes compact discs labeled 
"Young [Redacted Name] + [Redacted 
Name]," "Misc nudes 1," and Girl pies 
nude." Id. The Government contends that 
this evidence includes hundreds or perhaps 
315 
thousands of "sexually suggestive photo-
graphs" of nude underage girls and wom-
en, and that it is corroborative in nature. 
Id. And, it is consistent with victim recol-
lections of the inside of Mr. Epstein's resi-
dence. Dkt. 11, Ex. 1 at 9. This newly 
discovered evidence also suggests that Mr. 
Epstein poses "ongoing and forward-look-
ing danger." See Dkt. 11 at 10; see also 
Baker, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 1135; United 
States v. Goodwin, 2015 WL 6386568, at *3 
(W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2015). 
• 
The § 1591 Presumption Of Pre-
trial Remand Reflects The Seri-
ousness Of Mr. Epstein's Alleged 
Crimes 
The significant harms and dangers of 
sex crimes involving minors "animated 
Congress to create the statutory presump-
tion of detention." United States v. Hardy, 
2019 WL 2211210, at *10 (D.D.C. May 22, 
2019). The presumption of remand "re-
flects Congress's substantive judgment 
that particular classes of offenders should 
ordinarily be detained prior to trial." Unit-
ed States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th 
Cir. 2010). Other serious offenses that are 
accompanied by the presumption of re-
mand are: Kidnapping (18 U.S.C. § 1201); 
Aggravated Sexual Abuse (18 U.S.C. 
§ 2241); Sexual Abuse (18 U.S.C. § 2242); 
Offenses Resulting in Death (18 U.S.C. 
§ 2245); Sexual Exploitation of Children 
(18 U.S.C. § 2251); Selling or Buying of 
Children (18 U.S.C. § 2251); Production of 
Sexually Explicit Depictions of a Minor for 
importation into the United States (18 
U.S.C. § 2260); Coercion and Enticement 
(18 U.S.C. § 2422); Transport of Minors 
(18 U.S.C. § 2423); Use of Interstate Facil-
ities to Transmit Information About a Mi-
nor (18 U.S.C. § 2425). 18 U.S.C. 
3142(e)(3XE). 
(121 The presumption of remand does 
not disappear even when rebutted. Martir, 
EFTA00076824

316 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
782 F.2d at 1144. If the defendant comes 
forward with evidence that he will not 
endanger the community or flee the juris-
diction, the presumption "is not erased." 
See United States v. Dominguez, 783 F2d 
702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986). "Rather, the pre-
sumption remains in the case as an eviden-
tiary finding militating against release, to 
be weighted along with other evidence." 
United States v. Hir, 517 F.3cl 1081, 1086 
(9th Cir. 2008); see also Martir, 782 F2d at 
1144 ("The concern underlying the pre-
sumption applies to the general class of 
defendants charged with one of the speci-
fied offenses—not merely to defendants 
who fail to produce rebuttal evidence. 
Were the presumption ... to vanish upon 
any showing ..., courts would be giving 
too little deference to Congress' findings 
regarding this class) (emphasis in original). 
• 
The US. Pretrial Services Depart-
ment Recommends To The Court 
That Mr. Epstein Continue to Be 
Remanded 
The Pretrial Services report, dated July 
8, 2019, concludes, following Pretrial Ser-
vices' interview of Mr. Epstein, that 
"[t]here is no condition or combination of 
conditions that [can] reasonably assure ... 
the safety of the community" if Mr. Ep-
stein is released. Pretrial Services Report, 
dated July 8, 2019, at 4. Pretrial Services 
also concluded that Mr. Epstein is a flight 
risk and recommends that he be detained 
for that reason as well. Id. 
In support of its assessment of Mr. Ep-
stein's dangerousness, Pretrial Services 
cites the following: the "Nature of [Mr. 
Epstein's currently charged] Instant Of-
fence," i.e., sex trafficking and conspiracy 
involving minor girls; Mr. Epstein's "Prior 
I. Mr. Epstein is reported to have remarked 
that: "I'm not a 'sexual predator,' I'm an 
'offender' ... Its the difference between a 
murderer and a person who steals a bagel." 
Arrests," ems., in Florida in 2006; Mr. Ep-
stein's "History [and] Conviction Involving 
[a] Sex [Offense]," which principally refers 
to Defendant's 2008 conviction(s) for pro-
curing a person under the age of 18 for 
prostitution (a felony) and for solicitation 
of prostitution (also a felony); Mr. Ep-
stein's status as a registered sex offender 
in New York, Florida and the Virgin Is-
lands; and Mr. Epstein's "Pattern of Simi-
lar Criminal Activity History." Id. 
• 
The Seriousness Of The Crimes 
That 
Mr. 
Epstein 
Has 
Been 
Charged With Is Also Reflected In 
The Fact That The Crimes Involve 
Minor Children 
Mr. Epstein is said by the Government 
to be "a serial sexual predator" who alleg-
edly victimized dozens (or more) of minor 
girls, including a 14 year• old.' He was 
involved in and undertook the alleged sex-
ual activity in several locations, including, 
his mansion in Manhattan and his estate in 
Palm Beach, Florida. Indictment tl 2. By 
"actively encourage[ing] certain of his [mi-
nor] victims to recruit additional girls to be 
similarly sexually abused," Mr. Epstein is 
said to have "created a vast network of 
underage victims for him to exploit" Dkt. 
11, Ex. 1 at 2. 
The Government alleges that Mr. Ep-
stein "intentionally sought out—and knew 
that he was abusing—minors. Indeed, in 
some instances, his victims expressly told 
him they were underage before or during 
the period in which he abused them." Id. 
The crimes with which Mr. Epstein is 
charged carry a maximum sentence of 45 
years of incarceration. Id. at 5. "[T]he 
deprivation of liberty imposed by impris-
onment makes that penalty the best indi-
Amber Southerland, Billionaire Jeffrey Ep-
stein: I'm a sex offender, not a predator, New 
York Post. Feb. 25. 2011. 
EFTA00076825

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
Chess425 F.Supp.34 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
cator of whether the legislature considered 
an offense to be .. . `serious." United 
States v. Dugan, 667 F.3d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Lewis v. United States, 518 
U.S. 322, 326, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed2d 
590 (1996)). 
And, the crimes Mr. Epstein has been 
charged with are among the most heinous 
in the law principally, in the Court's view, 
because they involve minor girls. 18 
U.S.C. § 3142 (e)(3)(E); see also Roger 
Przybylski, Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender 
Recidivism, Sex Offender Management 
Assessment 
and 
Planning 
Initiative 
("[R]esearchers widely agree that ob-
served recidivism rates are underesti-
mates of the true reoffense rates of sex 
offenders. Hidden offending presents sig-
nificant challenges for• professionals work-
ing in sex offender management as it is 
difficult to know whether offenders who 
appear to be nonrecidivists based on offi-
cial records are truly offense free.") (em-
phasis in original). 
• 
Mr. Epstein Or His Representa-
tives Have Intimidated, Threat-
ened, And/Or Made Payments To 
Potential Witnesses 
The Government's evidence includes: (i) 
Florida police reports describing harass-
ment and intimidation of witnesses in-
volved in the Florida state criminal investi-
gation of Mr. Epstein in 2006, and (ii) 
emails, dated September 13, 2007 and Sep-
tember 19, 2007 (attached hereto), from 
Mr. Epstein's former counsel to Federal 
prosecutors in Florida discussing the "op-
tion" of Mr. Epstein pleading guilty to 
witness tampering, harassment, and/or ob-
struction of justice. 
A Palm Beach Police Incident Report, 
dated July 19, 2006, states that one of Mr. 
Epstein's victims reported that Mr. Ep-
stein's representative said to her: "Those 
who help [Mr. Epstein] will be compen-
317 
sated and those who hurt [Mr. Epstein] 
will be dealt with." Dkt. 11, Ex. 3 at 2 
(emphasis added.) The Report also states: 
"[Mr. Epstein's representative] assured 
[the victim that] she would receive mone-
tary compensation for her assistance in not 
cooperating with law enforcement." Id. An-
other (undated) Palm Beach Police Inci-
dent Report states that the parent of one 
of Mr. Epstein's alleged victims contacted 
the Palm Beach Police to report that Mr. 
Epstein's private investigator had aggres-
sively driven the parent's car off the road. 
Dkt. 11, Ex 2 at 1. This same Report 
states that the parent of another victim 
reported being "followed aggressively" by 
Mr. Epstein's private investigator. Id. 
The Government contends that these re-
ports together "suggest that an associate 
of Epstein's was offering to buy victims' 
silence during the course of the prior in-
vestigation," and demonstrate Mr. Ep-
stein's "willingness to use intimidation and 
aggressive tactics in connection with a 
criminal investigation." Dkt. 11 at 11. 
The Government also submits e-mail ev-
idence (attached to this Order as Exhibit 
1) of plea discussions in 2007 between 
Florida federal prosecutors and Mr. Ep-
stein's attorneys that confirm that Mr. Ep-
stein considered pleading guilty to witness 
tampering, harassment and/or obstruction 
of justice in a case involving alleged sex 
crimes with minor girls. On September 13, 
2007, prosecutors wrote to Mr. Epstein's 
counsel that they have been "spending 
some quality time ... looking for misde-
meanors [that Mr. Epstein could plead 
guilty to]," including 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d), a 
Federal witness tampering statute (a felo-
ny) and 18 U.S.C. § 403, a Federal statute 
criminalizing the violation of the privacy 
protection of child victims and child wit-
nesses (a misdemeanor). Doe v. United 
States, 08 Civ. 80756, (S.D. Fla.), Dkt. 361-
11. Epstein's counsel replied: "Already 
EFTA00076826

318 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
thinking about the same statutes." Id. On 
September 18, 2007, a Federal prosecutor 
told Mr. Epstein's counsel that if Mr. Ep-
stein pled guilty to obstruction of justice, 
the factual proffer "could rely on the inci-
dent where Mr. Epstein's private investi-
gators followed [a victim's] father, forcing 
[him] off the road." Id., Dkt. 361-10; see 
also supra p. 15. On September 19, 2007, 
Mr. Epstein's counsel proposed that Mr. 
Epstein admit that he verbally harassed 
victims or the family of victims in connec-
tion with his "attempt to delay their volun-
tary receipt of process" in a civil action 
against Mr. Epstein, in violation of a Fed-
eral witness tampering statute. Doe Dkt. 
361-9. 
And, the Government has recently con-
tended that, on November 28, 2018 and on 
December 3, 2018 - very soon after the 
publication of a 3-part investigative report 
in the Miami Herald (authored by Julie K. 
Brown) relating to Mr. Epstein's Florida 
Non-Prosecution Agreement dated Sep-
tember 24, 2007 - Mr. Epstein paid 
$100,000 to "a company founded and run 
by [Individual 1]," and he paid $250,000 to 
[Individual II]. Dkt. 23 at 1. The Govern-
ment states that Individual I was "a poten-
tial coconspirator—[ for whom Epstein 
obtained protection in [] the NPA." Id. 
Individual I was named and featured 
prominently in the Miami Herald. See•
Julie K. Brown, "Even From Jail, Sex 
Abuser Manipulated The System. His Vic-
tims Were Kept in The Dark, Miami Her-
ald, Nov. 28, 2018. 
The Government states that Individual 
II was also "a potential co-conspirator—[ ] 
for whom Epstein also obtained protection 
in [ the NPA." Dkt. 23 at 2. She is "one of 
the employees identified in the Indictment, 
which alleges that she and two other iden-
tified employees facilitated the defendant's 
trafficking of minors by, among other 
things, contacting victims and scheduling 
their sexual encounters with the defendant 
at his residences in Manhattan and Palm 
Beach, Florida." Id. at 2. Individual II was 
also named and featured prominently in 
the Miami Herald report. 
The Government states there is good 
reason to infer that Mr. Epstein was at-
tempting to "influence [these two] individ-
uals who were close to him during the time 
period charged in this case and who might 
be witnesses against him at a trial." Dkt. 
11 at 11. "Neither of these payments ap-
pears to be recurring or repeating during 
the approximately five years of bank rec-
ords presently available to the Govern-
ment. This course of action, and in particu-
lar its timing, suggests the defendant was 
attempting to further influence co-conspir-
ators who might provide information 
against him in light of the recently re-
emerging allegations." Id. 
A court may order detention if there is a 
serious risk that the defendant will at-
tempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate a 
prospective witness or juror. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(f)(2)(B). Even a single incident of 
witness tampering has been a "traditional 
ground for pretrial detention by the 
courts." LaFontaine 210 FM at 132-34 
(affirming then-U.S. District Judge Mi-
chael B. Mukasejs denial of bail to a 
defendant who had met with a prospective 
witness in an effort to persuade the wit-
ness to give untruthful testimony and 
where there was "no evidence of influence, 
harassment or intimidation"); see also 
United States v. Singh, 2012 WL 3260232, 
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2012). 
• 
Mr. Epstein Has Not Always Been 
Compliant With His Legal Obli-
gations As A Registered Sex Of-
fender 
Defense counsel has contended that Mr. 
Epstein has been "scrupulously fulfilling] 
his obligations in every jurisdiction in 
EFTA00076827

U.S. v. EPSTEiN 
ale as 425 F.Supp-341 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
which he was required to register [as a sex 
offender]," since his 2008 Florida convic-
tions. Counsel argues that this shows that 
he "is no longer a danger to anyone and 
will faithfully obey all conditions of release 
if ordered." Dkt. 6 at 3. 
The record shows that Mr. Epstein has 
challenged his sex offender "level" in at 
least one jurisdiction since 2008 in an ef-
fort to minimize his reporting obligations. 
And, one recent press account states that 
Epstein is not in compliance in New York 
State. See Elizabeth Rosner, Tina Moore, 
Larry Celona, and Bruce Golding, NYPD 
let convicted pedophile Jeffi•ey Epstein 
skip judge-ordered check-in, New York 
Post, July 10, 2019 ("July 10, 2019 NY 
Post Article") ("Jeffrey Epstein never once 
checked in with City cops in eight-plus 
years since a Manhattan judge ordered 
him to do so every 90 days"). 
Mr. Epstein is a Level III sex offender 
in New York State which is the highest 
category of risk to reoffend. This designa-
tion requires that Mr. Epstein report his 
presence in New York to law enforcement 
authorities every 90 clays. As discussed at 
the July 15, 2019 bail hearing, counsel for 
Mr. Epstein made an application in New 
York State Supreme Court in 2011 to re-
duce Epstein's sex offender registration 
status from Level III to Level I. If grant-
ed, this reduction would have allowed Mr. 
Epstein to avoid his reporting obligations. 
In a Sex Offender Registration Act Hear-
ing on January 11, 2018, held before the 
Honorable Ruth Pickholz, Mr. Epstein's 
application was (firmly) denied, principally 
because it had been established by the 
Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders. See 
People v. Epstein, Indict. # 30129/2010, 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), SORA Hearing Transcript, 
dated Jan. 18, 2011. 
At the hearing, New York County Assis-
tant District Attorney Jennifer Gaffney 
joined in Defense Counsel's appeal to re-
319 
view and overturn the decision of the 
Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders and 
achieve a downward modification of Mr. 
Epstein's sex offender status. Id. at 2-15. 
Judge Pickholz appeared to be stunned by 
the joint Defense Counsel/District Attor-
ney application, stating: "I am just a little 
overwhelmed that the People are making 
this application.... I have done many 
SORAs much less troubling than this one 
where the People would never make a 
downward [adjustment] argument like 
this.... I have never seen the prosecu-
tor's office do this. I have to tell you, I am 
shocked." Id. at 4-5. Judge Pickholz also 
ordered Mr. Epstein to report as a Level 
III sex offender every 90 days in New 
York. Id. at 12. "I am sorry [Mr. Epstein] 
may have to come here every 90 days. He 
can give up his New York home [on East 
71st St.] if he does not want to come every 
90 days." Id. Epstein appealed but Judge 
Pickholz's decision was unanimously af-
firmed, on November 17, 2011, by a panel 
of five judges of the Appellate Division of 
the New York State Supreme Court. Peo-
ple v. Epstein, 89 A.D.3d 570, 933 N.Y.S.2d 
239 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
Notwithstanding Judge Pickholz's order, 
according to a July 10, 2019 investigative 
report by the New York Post, as noted, 
Mr. Epstein has never reported as a sex 
offender to New York law enforcement 
See July 10, 2019 NY Post Article. "The 
NYPD cop assigned to monitor Epstein 
has repeatedly complained to [the New 
York County District Attorney's] Sex 
Crimes Unit that Epstein wasn't in compli-
ance, according to a source familiar with 
the matter." Id. Mr. Epstein's alleged fail-
ure to comply with his New York sex 
offender obligations would appear to un-
dermine defense counsel's premise that 
Mr. Epstein's "perfect compliance" and 
"meticulous obedience," DU. 6 at 1, 5, to 
his sex offender registration obligations 
EFTA00076828

320 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
should lead to his release. See LaFontaine, 
210 F.3d at 135 n.6 (where the Court or-
dered detention noting that the defendant 
"had previously disregarded court or-
ders"). 
The Court has also read the story in the 
July 17, 2019, New York Post in which 
attorney Brad Edwards contends that 
while Epstein was serving his Florida 
state sentence (after pleading guilty to 
procuring a minor under 18 for prostitu-
tion and solicitation of prostitution), Ep-
stein was allowed to leave the jail on work 
release. While on work release "[h]e was 
having .. . female visitors ... and continu-
ing to engage in .. . [sexual] conduct ... 
while he was in jaill." Mr. Edwards is 
counsel to one of Mr. Epstein's victims. 
See Reuven Fenton and Kate Sheehy, Jef-
frey Epstein had sex den while serving 
time: lawyer, New York Post, July 16, 
2019. The Court is also aware of an article 
published by Palm Beach CBS local news 
which reports that the Palm Beach County 
Sherriffs Office "disputes [the] claim that 
Jeffrey Epstein had sex on work release." 
A spokeswoman for the sheriffs office is 
quoted as saying "If he violated any condi-
tions of his release he would have been 
brought back to the Stockade and work 
release would have been terminated." 
Chuck Weber, PBSO disputes claim that 
Jeffrey Epstein had sex on work release, 
CBS 12 News, July 17,2019. 
• 
New Mexico, Florida And The Vir-
gin Islands 
With respect to Mr. Epstein's sex of-
fender status in New Mexico, Defense 
Counsel has submitted a letter, dated Au-
gust 19, 2010, from Regina Chacon, Assis-
tant Bureau Chief, Law Enforcement 
Record Bureau of the New Mexico De-
partment of Public Safety, which states 
that Mr. Epstein "is not required to regis-
ter [as a sex offender] with the State of 
New Mexico at this time for [his] 2008 
Florida conviction of Procuring [a] Person 
Under 18 for Prostitution." Dkt. 25, Ex. 
A. The Court requested from the Defense 
all application materials that Mr. Epstein 
may have submitted to the New Mexico 
Department of Public Safety, believing 
that the Department would not initiate 
the waiver of Mr. Epstein's sex offense 
registration on its own. No such materials 
have been received by the Court as of 
this date. 
The Court understands that Mr. Epstein 
is also registered as a sex offender in the 
Virgin Islands (Level I) and in Florida 
(Level I). It has received no materials 
from the Defense regarding sex offender 
applications or proceedings in those two 
jurisdictions. 
In sum, based upon all of the proffers 
and evidence set forth at pp. 10-21 above, 
the Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that Mr. Epstein poses a danger 
to other persons and to the community. 
G. Mr. Epstein Also Poses 
A Risk Of Flight 
[13,141 In the section that follows, the 
Court considers "risk of flight" even 
though it has already determined that Mr. 
Epstein presents a danger to the commu-
nity. "[A] finding of either danger to the 
community or risk of flight will be suffi-
cient to detain the defendant pending tri-
al." United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 
488 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States 
v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 
1985)). The Court fords that the Govern-
ment has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Mr. Epstein is a flight risk. 
[15,16] The factors to be considered in 
analyzing risk of flight are the same fac-
tors that apply when analyzing dangerous-
ness. They are: (1) the nature and circum-
stances of the crimes charged; (2) the 
weight of the evidence against the defen-
EFTA00076829

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
ale as 423 F.Supp-3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
dant; (3) the history and characteristics of 
the defendant, including the person's char-
acter and financial resources; and (4) "the 
seriousness of the danger posed by the 
defendant's release." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
"The weight afforded to each factor under 
section 3142(g) is within the `special prov-
ince' of the district court." Paulin, 335 F. 
Supp. 3d at 610. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the 
Pretrial Services Report, dated July 12, 
2019, concludes that: "The defendant poses 
a risk of nonappearance for the following 
reasons: 
1. [Mr. Epstein's] Extensive foreign 
travel and possession of travel docu-
ments 
2. [Mr. Epstein's] Residential and Fi-
nancial Ties outside this District and 
Country 
3. [Mr. Epstein's] Employment ties 
outside this country 
4. [Mr. Epstein's] Unexplained assets 
5. [Mr. Epstein's] Criminal History in-
cluding [his] conviction for a [] sex of-
fense [with minors in Florida in 2008]." 
Pretrial Services Report, dated July 12, 
2019 at 4. 
• 
The Crimes Charged Against Mr. 
Epstein 
Mr. Epstein has been charged with 
among the most serious crimes recognized 
by U.S. Federal law. The Government has 
alleged that Mr. Epstein intentionally 
sought out and sexually abused minor 
girls, including those "particularly vulnera-
ble to exploitation." Dkt. 11, Ex. 1, at 2. He 
did this in multiple locations, including 
New York and Palm Beach. Id. And Mr. 
Epstein allegedly "worked and conspired 
with others, including employees and asso-
ciates who facilitated his [unlawful] con-
duct, by ... contacting victims and sched-
uling their sexual encounters." Indictment 
1 4. These crimes, as already noted, carry 
321 
a maximum sentence of 45 years of incar-
ceration and give rise to a presumption of 
pre-trial remand. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 
3142 
(e)(3)(E); see United States v. Hardy, 2019 
WL 2211210, at *10 (D.D.C. May 22, 2019) 
("The significant harms and dangers of 
these crimes animated the Congress to 
create the statutory presumption of deten-
tion."). The nature and circumstances of 
the crimes charged and the severity of the 
potential punishment support, a finding 
that Defendant poses "a serious flight risk 
and that no conditions can be set to rea-
sonably assure his appearance for trial." 
United States v. Cilins, 2013 WL 3802012, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2013). 
• 
Weight Of The Evidence 
The Government's evidence against Mr. 
Epstein appears strong. The evidence in-
cludes testimony of victims, some of whom 
were minor girls when they were allegedly 
sexually abused by Mr. Epstein; other wit-
nesses, including potential coconspirators; 
physical evidence, including passports re- 
fleeting extensive foreign travel; sexually 
suggestive photographs of nude underage 
girls; plea discussions; and police reports 
describing witness tampering and intimi-
dation. See, e.g., United States v. Fama, 
2013 WL 2467985, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 
2013) ("the Court recognizes the difficulty 
inherent in assessing the Government's 
case before trial, and is mindful not to 
reach any conclusions about [the Defen-
dant's] guilt or innocence. Indeed, some 
courts have described the weight of the 
evidence factor as the `least important' of 
the § 3142(g) factors for these reasons."); 
see also Hir, 517 F.3d at 1090. 
• 
History And Characteristics Of 
The Defendant Including His Fi-
nancial Resources 
Mr. Epstein pled guilty to two state 
felonies involving minor girls in Florida. 
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322 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
He also held plea discussions regarding 
witness tampering in Florida in 2008. He is 
a registered Level III sex offender in New 
York and a registered sex offender in 
Florida (Level I) and the Virgin Islands 
(Level I). Mr. Epstein is 66 and is report-
ed to be a self made multi-millionaire. He 
did not graduate from college. Mr. Ep-
stein's vast wealth, including substantial 
liquid assets, multiple residences, private 
plane(s), a $8,672,823 residence in Paris, 
France, and relatively limited family ties 
to the United States in the sense that he is 
single with no children and his parents are 
deceased. He has a brother who Defense 
counsel asserts has offered to serve as a 
guarantor for Mr. Epstein by pledging his 
home in West Palm Beach, Florida. (The 
Court notes that the Pretrial Services Re-
port, dated July 12, 2019, states that "[tjhe 
defendant stated he maintains minimal 
contact with his brother, Mark Epstein, 
and that his exact location is unknown at 
this time." Pretrial Services Report at 2.) 
Mr. Epstein engages in extensive over-
seas travel often relying on his own 
plane(s). The Government argues persua-
sively that "there is an extraordinary risk 
of flight, particularly given the defendant's 
exorbitant wealth, his ownership of and 
access to private planes capable of interna-
tional travel, and his significant interna-
tional ties. Indeed, the arrest of the defen-
dant occurred when he arrived in the 
United States on his private jet after hav-
ing returned from a multi-week stay 
abroad." Dkt. 11, Ex. 1 at 1. "Wri the past 
18 months alone, the defendant has trav-
eled abroad, via private jet, either into or 
out of the country on approximately more 
than 20 occasions." Id. at 3. 
In a recent search of Defendant's New 
York City home, law enforcement seized 
an expired Austrian passport bearing Mr. 
Epstein's photo but not his name. (The 
passport is in another name.) The Austrian 
passport lists residence in Saudi Arabia. 
According to the Government, Defense 
counsel declined to respond when asked by 
the Government if the "Defendant is cur-
rently, or has been in the past, a citizen or 
legal permanent resident of a country oth-
er than the United States." Dkt. 23 at 2. 
Defense counsel contends that Defen-
dant has one active passport that was sm•-
rendered and that "Mr. Epstein has no 
foreign passports." Dkt. 6 at 3 n. 3. With 
regard to the Austrian passport, the De-
fense explains that "Epstein .. . acquired 
the passport in the 1980s, when hijackings 
were prevalent, in connection to Middle 
East travel. The passport was for personal 
protection in the event of travel to danger-
ous areas, only to be presented to potential 
kidnapers, hijackers or terrorists should 
violent episodes occur." Dkt. 24 at 8. De-
tails about how the passport was procured 
by Mr. Epstein in the name of another 
individual were not provided and are not 
known to the Government See Dkt. 23 at 
2 ("The Government is attempting to ob-
tain additional information about the For-
eign Passport, including how it was ob-
tained and whether the passport is genuine 
or fabricated. But the defendant's posses-
sion of what purports to be a foreign pass-
port issued under an alias gives rise to the 
inference the defendant knows how to ob-
tain false travel documents and/or assume 
other, foreign identities. This adds to the 
serious risk of flight posed by the defen-
dant"). The Government also argues that 
"the passport contains numerous ingress 
and egress stamps, including stamps that 
reflect use of the passport to enter France, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Saudi 
Arabia in the 1980s." Dkt. 30. By submis-
sion dated July 18, 2019, the Defense ex-
plains: "Epstein was given the passport at 
issue by a friend ... He never used the 
document to travel internationally and nev-
er presented it to any immigration or cus-
toms authority. The passport stamps, pre-
EFTA00076831

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
Cute as 423 F.Supp.34 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
dating his receipt of the document, do not 
reflect Mr. Epstein's entries or exits." Dkt. 
31. 
Defense counsel has submitted a one 
page document called "Asset Summary -
June 30, 2019." It indicates that Epstein 
has cash in the amount of $56,547,773; 
fixed income valued at $14,304,679; equi-
ties valued at $112,679,138; hedge funds 
and private equity valued at $194,986,301; 
properties located at 9 East 71st Street, 
NY, NY 10021 valued at $55,931,000, 49 
Zorro Ranch Road, Stanley, New Mexico 
87056 valued at $17,246,208, 358 El Brillo 
Way, Palm Beach, Florida 33480 valued at 
$12,380,209, 22 Avenue Foch, Paris France 
75116 valued at $8,672,823, Great St. 
James Island No. 6A USVI 00802 (parcels 
A, B, and C) valued at $22,498,600 and 
Little St. James Island No. 6B USVI 
00802 (parcels A, B, and C). Dkt. 14 at 18. 
The Court has advised Defense counsel 
that this "cursory" asset statement is in-
sufficient to support a bail package for the 
reasons, among others, that it is not veri-
fied and does not show expenses, indebted-
ness, or liabilities. 
Law enforcement has informed the Gov-
ernment that a safe in the Defendant's 
New York home very recently contained 
"more than $70,000 in cash ... 48 loose 
diamond stones, ranging in size from ap-
proximately 1 carat to 2.38 carats, as well 
as a large diamond ring. The Government 
is currently unaware of whether the De-
fendant maintains similar [amounts] of 
cash and/or jewels at his multiple proper-
ties, or in other locations. Such ready cash 
and loose diamonds are consistent with the 
capability to leave the jurisdiction at a 
moment's notice." Dkt. 23 at 3. 
The Defendant's vast wealth and influ-
ential contacts have provided him with the 
means to pay individuals to assist him in 
unlawful endeavors, including potentially 
fleeing the jurisdiction. In the past, "the 
323 
Defendant worked with others, including 
employees and associates who facilitated 
his exploitation of minors, by among other 
things, contacting victims and scheduling 
their sexual encounters with the defen-
dant, both in New York and in Florida." 
Dkt. 11, Ex 1 at 2. 
David Boies, who, as noted, represents 
identified victims in this case, advised the 
Court that while a civil case was proceed-
ing against the Defendant "we had situa-
tions in which we had witnesses who were 
cooperating with us and then were contact. 
ed by either Mr. Epstein or his lawyers 
and who then stopped cooperating with 
us." 7/15/19 Tr. at 71; see also United 
States v. Boustani, 356 F.Supp.3d 246 
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) ("[T]he combination of De-
fendant's alleged deceptive actions, access 
to substantial financial resources, frequent 
international travel, complete lack of ties 
to the United States, and extensive ties to 
foreign countries without extradition dem-
onstrates Defendant poses a serious risk of 
flight"); United States v. Epstein, 155 
F.Supp2d 323, 326 (E.D. Penn. 2001) 
("The crucial factor, however, is defen-
dant's lack of ties to the United States and 
his extensive ties to Brazil with which no 
extradition treaty exists. In our view, his 
forfeiture of $1 million worth of assets in 
the United States would not deter him 
from flight when in Brazil he has signifi-
cant wealth, a lucrative job, the presence 
of his family, and insulation from ever 
being forced to stand trial."). 
Viewing the totality of the circum-
stances, the Court fords that the Govern-
ment has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that Defendant is a serious risk 
of flight and that no conditions can be set 
that will reasonably assure his appearance 
at trial. "While other judges in this district 
have found that an armed security guard 
may be sufficient to assure a defendant's 
appearance, even when he is a serious risk 
EFTA00076832

324 
425 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 3d SERIES 
of flight ... this Court does not believe 
that that condition, even coupled with the 
additional conditions proposed, would be 
sufficient" U.S. v.Cilins, 2013 WL 3802012, 
at *3. 
• 
The Danger Posed By The Defen-
dant's Release 
As demonstrated infra, Mr. Epstein's 
dangerousness is considerable and includes 
sex crimes with minor girls and tampering 
with potential witnesses. The discussion at 
pp 10-21 is incorporated here by reference. 
See Minnici, 128 F. App.,: at 829-30 ("the 
alleged activities [we're of an addictive 
sexual nature that cannot be suppressed 
simply by a restrictive set of bail condi-
tions"); see also Milian, 4 F.3d at 1049 
("The protection of the community can be 
assured only by continued detention."). 
The Court has carefully considered the 
issue of Defendant's ability and motivation 
for fleeing U.S. jurisdiction. The Court 
fords that the Government has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, among 
other things, the Defendant's limited fami-
ly ties to the United States, his residence 
in Paris, his extensive overseas travel, his 
significant wealth and his substantial re-
sources (including private planes), and the 
potential 45 year term of imprisonment 
that may be imposed should there be a 
conviction in this case, provide incentive, 
motive and wherewithal to flee. Indeed, 
these factors render him a "classic" flight 
risk. See, e.g., United States v. Abdullahu, 
488 F.Supp.2d 433, 445 (D.N.J. 2007) ("Af-
ter reviewing the totality of the evidence, 
the Court has reached the inescapable con-
clusion that the government has proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence that no 
condition or combination of conditions exist 
that will reasonably assure the defendant's 
appearance at trial. The defendant faces 
serious criminal charges . . . The defen-
dant faces a potential ten year prison sen-
tence and involuntary deportation. The de-
fendant does not have permanent and 
longstanding ties to this area, he has the 
means and incentive to flee and he has 
family ties and a place to live in an over-
seas country that will not extradite him to 
the United States."). 
H. Defendant's Proposed 
Bail Package 
[17] Having determined that Mr. Ep-
stein is a flight risk (and also a danger to 
the community), the Court next examines 
the Defendant's proposed bail package. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)-(f)(2). The Court 
finds that the Defendant's proposed bail 
package is inadequate. Among its deficien-
cies are these: 
(1) The bail package is not accompa-
nied or supported by audited or certified 
fmancial statements, including details of 
income and expenses and debt obligations. 
There is no affidavit from Mr. Epstein. As 
noted, Defense counsel submitted a curso-
ry one page "Asset Summary - June 30, 
2019" on Mr. Epstein's behalf in which he 
discloses several categories of assets total-
ing $559,120,954. The Defense states that 
it "would be impossible for Epstein - giv-
en, among other impediments, his deten-
tion, inability to quickly access pertinent 
records, and inability to quickly make a 
precise valuation of particular assets — to 
provide a sufficient financial statement by 
the Court's 5 pm deadline." Dkt. 23 at 4. 
The absence of accurate and comprehen-
sive financials, sworn to by the Defendant, 
does not allow the Court meaningfully to 
assess Defendants' own proposed bail 
package nor would it enable the Court to 
fashion a bail package on its own. The 
Court would not be able to determine what 
level of bail - in relation to Epstein's fi-
nances - would reasonably assure the De-
fendant's appearance. Defense counsel pro-
posed at the bail hearing on July 15, 2019 
that it would take a few days to prepare 
EFTA00076833

U.S. v. EPSTEIN 
ale as 425 F.Supp-3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 
accurate financials for Mr. Epstein. He 
also suggested that he would do so (only) if 
the Court were agreeable to granting bail. 
This "offer" appears disingenuous for a 
person as wealthy and experienced in fi-
nancial matters as Mr. Epstein. See Tr. 
7/15/19 at 50 (Court: "There needs to be a 
fuller financial picture to know what would 
be appropriate." Defense Counsel: "Let me 
be blunt It was our first effort.. .."). That 
Mr. Epstein does not have a financial 
statement, including liabilities and ex-
penses, readily available is difficult to un-
derstand. 
(2) The defense bail package proposes 
excessive involvement of the Court in rou-
tine aspects of Mr. Epstein's proposed 
home confinement This is not the Court's 
function. See United States v. Zarrab, 2016 
WL 3681423, at 90 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 
2016) ("The (bail package] ... proposed by 
the defense is not reasonable because, in 
too many respects, it substitutes judicial 
oversight and management for (more ap-
propriate) reliance upon trained, experi-
enced, and qualified professionals from the 
U.S. Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Mar-
shals Service."). The Defense package 
components would embroil the Court in 
issues, among others, relating to the level 
of force that may be used to secure the 
Defendant, who may enter the residence, 
daily reporting by Mr. Epstein, and re-
porting by so-called l'rustee(s) designated 
to live with and supervise Mr. Epstein. See 
United States v. Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d 
283, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("The questions 
about the legal authorization for the pri-
vate security firm to use force against 
defendant should he violate the terms of 
his release, and the questions over wheth-
er the guards can or should be armed, 
underscore the legal and practical uncer-
tainties - indeed, the imperfections - of the 
private jail-like concept envisioned by de-
fendant, as compared to the more secure 
option of an actual jail."). 
325 
(3) The Defense proposal to give ad-
vance consent to extradition and waiver of 
extradition rights is, in the Court's view, 
an empty gesture. And, it comes into pay 
only after Mr. Epstein has fled the Court's 
jurisdiction. According to the Government, 
"The Department of Justice's Office of In-
ternational Affairs is unaware of any coun-
try anywhere in the world that would con-
sider an anticipatory extradition waiver 
binding. And, of course, the defendant 
could choose to flee to a jurisdiction with 
which the United States does not have an 
extradition treaty." Dkt. 11 at 7. 
(4) Although the Defense has stated 
that Mr. Epstein would be agreeable to 
putting up "any amount" of collateral or 
signing "any bond" the Court would re-
quire, there has, to date, been no concrete 
pledge of any real assets or any concrete 
proposal to turnover deeds to real proper-
ty, or to provide a specific amount of cash. 
See 7/1W19 Tr. at 50 ("I am authorized to 
say to the Court that whatever bond you 
want Mr. Epstein to sign, whether it's 
$100 million or an amount close to the 
amount of the assets that we have provid-
ed, Mr. Epstein is prepared to sign it."). 
The Court, as noted, has no detailed 
information regarding the extent of the 
Defendant's assets, including the nature, 
value and location of all of his assets. 
There is no mention of any expenses, lia-
bilities, or indebtedness. And, there has 
been no persuasive Defense counter to the 
Government's argument that "even were 
the defendant to sacrifice literally all of his 
current assets, there is every indication 
that he would immediately be able to re-
sume making millions or tens of millions of 
dollars per year outside of the United 
States. 
He 
already 
earns at 
least 
$10,000,000 per year, according to records 
from Institution-1, while living in the U.S. 
Virgin 
Islands, 
traveling 
extensively 
EFTA00076834