This is an FBI investigation document from the Epstein Files collection (FBI VOL00009). Text has been machine-extracted from the original PDF file. Search more documents →
FBI VOL00009
EFTA00074500
90 pages
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Counts Two, Four, and Six: Aiding and Abetting In connection with the substantive crimes charged in Counts Two, Four, and Six, the defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting the commission of those crimes. Aiding and abetting liability is its own theory of criminal liability. In effect, it is a theory of liability that permits a defendant to be convicted of a specified crime if the defendant, while not herself committing the crime, assisted another person or persons in committing the crime. As to Counts Two, Four, and Six, therefore, the defendant can be convicted either if she committed the crime herself, or if another person committed the crime and the defendant aided and abetted that person to commit that crime. Under the federal aiding and abetting statute, whoever "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures" the commission of an offense is punishable as a principal. You should give those worse their ordinary meaning. In other words, it is not necessary for the Government to show that the defendant herself physically committed the crime charged in order for you to find her guilty. This is because a person who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures the commission of a crime is just as guilty of that offense as if she committed it herself. Accordingly, you may find the defendant guilty of the offenses charged in Counts Two, Four, and Six if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government has proven that another person actually committed the offense with which the defendant is charged, and that the defendant aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced or procured that person to commit the crime. As you can see, the first requirement is that another person has committed the crime charged. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal acts of another if no crime was committed by the other person. But if you do find that a crime was committed, then you must consider whether the defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime. 37 EFTA00074540
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To aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the Government prove that the defendant willfully and knowingly associated herself in some way with the crime committed by the other person and willfully and knowingly sought by some act to help the crime succeed. However, let me caution you that the mere presence of the defendant where a crime is being committed, even when coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to make the defendant guilty under this approach of aiding and abetting. Such a defendant would be guilty under this approach of aiding and abetting only if, in addition to knowing of the criminal activity, she actually took actions intended to help it succeed. An aider and abettor must know that the crime is being committed and act in a way that is intended to bring about the success of the criminal venture. To determine whether a defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime with which she is charged, ask yourself these questions: 1. Did the defendant participate in the crime charged as something she wished to bring about? 2. Did the defendant knowingly and willfully associate herself with the criminal venture? 3. Did the defendant seek by her actions to make the criminal venture succeed? If she did, then the defendant is an aider and abettor, and therefore guilty of the offense. If, on the other hand, your answer to any of these questions is "no," then the defendant is not an aider and abettor, and you must find her not guilty under that theory. Adapted from Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 11-2; 18 U.S.C. § 2; the charge given by the Hon. Alison J. Nathan 38 EFTA00074541
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in United States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 553 (AIN) and in United States v. Pizarro, 17 Cr. 151 (AIN); and the charge given by the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). 39 EFTA00074542
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Counts One and Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Laws— The Statute The relevant statute for Counts One, Three, and Five is Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, which provides that "if two or more people conspire [J to commit any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy," each person is guilty of a federal crime. 40 EFTA00074543
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Counts One and Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Laws— Conspiracy and
Substantive Counts
Counts One, Three, and Five of the Indictment each charge the defendant with
participating in a "conspiracy." As I will explain, a conspiracy is a kind of criminal
partnership—an agreement of two or more people to join together to accomplish some unlawful
purpose. The crime of conspiracy to violate federal law is an independent offense from the
actual violation of any specific federal law. Indeed, you may find the defendant guilty of
conspiring to violate federal law even if you find that the crime which was the object of the
conspiracy was never actually committed.
As I will explain, each of the three different conspiracy counts here alleges a different
purpose: the purpose of the conspiracy charged in Count One is to commit the enticement of
minors offense I described for Count Two; the purpose of the conspiracy charged in Count
Three is to commit the transportation of minors offense I described for Count Four; and the
purpose of the conspiracy charged in Count Five is to commit the sex trafficking offense I
described for Count Six.
The crime of conspiracy — or agreement — to violate a federal law is an independent
offense. It is separate and distinct from the actual violation of any specific federal laws, which
the law refers to as "substantive crimes." You may find a defendant guilty of the crime of
conspiracy—in other words, agreeing to violate federal law—even if you find that the
substantive crime which was the object of the conspiracy was never actually committed.
Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr.
19-2; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v.
Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M.
Wood in United States v. Abnonte, 16 Cr. 670 (ICMW); and the
charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18
Cr. 081 (DLC). See also United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 21
(2d Cir. 1990) ("Since the essence of conspiracy is the agreement
and not the commission of the substantive offense that is its
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objective, the offense of conspiracy may be established even if the collaborators do not reach their goal."). 42 EFTA00074545
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Counts One, Three and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — The Elements To prove the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following three elements: First, that two or more persons entered the unlawful agreement charged in the Indictment; Second, that the defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy; and Third, that one of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Now let us separately consider each of these elements. Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 19-3; the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). 43 EFTA00074546
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Counts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — First Element Starting with the first element, what is a conspiracy? A conspiracy is an agreement or an understanding, between two or more persons, to accomplish by joint action a criminal or unlawful purpose. The essence of the crime of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement between two or more people to violate the law. As I mentioned earlier, the ultimate success of the conspiracy, meaning the actual commission of the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, is not an element of the crime of conspiracy. In order to show that a conspiracy existed, the evidence must show that two or more people, in some way or manner, through any contrivance, explicitly or implicitly (that is, spoken or unspoken), came to a mutual understanding to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan. Express language or specific words are not required to indicate assent or attachment to a conspiracy. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more persons came to an understanding, express or implied, to violate the law and to accomplish an unlawful plan, then the Government will have sustained its burden of proof as to this element. To satisfy this element of a conspiracy—namely, to show that the conspiracy existed— the Government is not required to show that two or more people sat around a table and entered into a solemn pact, orally or in writing, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the law and spelling out all of the details. Common sense tells you that when people, in fact, agree to enter into a criminal conspiracy, much is left to the unexpressed understanding. It is rare that a conspiracy can be proven by direct evidence of an explicit agreement. Conspirators do not usually reduce their agreements to writing or acknowledge them before a notary public, nor do they publicly broadcast their plans. In determining whether such an agreement existed, you may consider direct as well as 44 EFTA00074547
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circumstantial evidence. The old adage, "Actions speak louder than words," applies here. Often, the only evidence that is available with respect to the existence of a conspiracy is that of disconnected acts and conduct on the part of the alleged individual co-conspirators. When taken altogether and considered as whole, however, these acts and conduct may warrant the inference that a conspiracy existed as conclusively as would direct proof, such as evidence of an express agreement. On this question, you should refer back to my earlier instructions on direct and circumstantial evidence and inferences. So, in considering the first element of the crime of conspiracy as charged in Counts One, Three, and Five—whether the conspiracy actually existed—you should consider all the evidence that has been admitted with respect to the acts, conduct, and statements of each alleged coconspirator, and any inferences that may be reasonably drawn from them. It is sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy, as I've already said, if, from the proof of all the relevant facts and circumstances, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of at least two alleged co-conspirators met in an understanding to accomplish, by the means alleged, the object of the conspiracy. In short, as far as the first element of the conspiracy is concerned, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at least two alleged conspirators came to a mutual understanding, either spoken or unspoken, to violate the law in the manner charged in Counts One, Three, and Five of the Indictment. Liability for Acts and Declarations of Co-Conspirators You will recall that I have admitted into evidence against the defendant the acts and statements of others because these acts and statements were committed or made by persons who, the Government charges, were also confederates or co-conspirators of the defendant. 45 EFTA00074548
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The reason for allowing this evidence to be received against the defendant has to do in part with the nature of the crime of conspiracy. A conspiracy is often referred to as a partnership in crime: as in other types of partnerships, when people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, each and every member becomes an agent for the other conspirators in carrying out the conspiracy. Therefore, the reasonably foreseeable acts, statements, and omissions of any member of the conspiracy, committed in furtherance of the common purpose of the conspiracy, are deemed under the law to be the acts of all of the members, and all of the members are responsible for such acts, statements, or omissions. If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment, then any acts done or statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy by a person also found by you to have been a member of the same conspiracy may be considered against that defendant. This is so even if such acts were committed or such statements were made in that defendant's absence, and without the defendant's knowledge. However, before you may consider the acts or statements of a co-conspirator in deciding the guilt of the defendant, you must first determine that the acts were committed or statements were made during the existence, and in furtherance, of the unlawful scheme. If the acts were done or the statements were made by someone whom you do not find to have been a member of the conspiracy, or if they were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, they may not be considered by you in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instrs. 19-4, 19-9; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AJN) and in United States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (MN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 46 EFTA00074549
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(DLC). See also United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir.
1992) ("In order to prove conspiracy, the government need not
present evidence of an explicit agreement; proof of a tacit
understanding will suffice. The coconspirators need not have
agreed on the details of the conspiracy, so long as they have agreed
on the essential nature of the plan, and their goals need not be
congruent, so long as they are not at cross-purposes." (citations
omitted)).
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Counts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — First Element: Object of the Conspiracy Count One charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, from at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 2004, to entice minors to travel to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. The object of the conspiracy charged in Count One of the Indictment is to entice minors to travel to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. I have already reviewed the elements of that offense in connection with Count Two. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person that those elements be done, then the enticement of minors to travel to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense objective would be proved. Count Three charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, from at least in or about 1994, up to and including in or about 2004, to transport minors with the intent to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. The object of the conspiracy charged in Count Three of the Indictment is to transport minors with the intent to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. I have already reviewed the elements of that offense in connection with Count Four. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person that those elements be done, then the transportation of minors with the intent to engage in sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense objective would be proved. Count Five charges the defendant with participating in a conspiracy, from at least in or about 2001, up to and including in or about 2004, to commit sex trafficking of a minor. The object of the conspiracy charged in Count Five of the Indictment is to commit sex trafficking 48 EFTA00074551
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of a minor. I have already reviewed the elements of that offense in connection with Count Six. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant agreed with at least one other person that those elements be done, then the sex trafficking of minors objective would be proved. Adapted from the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW). 49 EFTA00074552
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Counts One, Three, and Five: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — Second Element: Membership in the Conspiracy With respect to each of Counts One, Three and Five, if you conclude that the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant conspiracy existed, and that the conspiracy had the object I just mentioned, then you must next consider the second element: namely, whether the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and in furtherance of its unlawful objectives. In order to satisfy the second element of Counts One, Three, or Five, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully entered into the conspiracy with a criminal intent—that is, with a purpose to violate the law—and that she agreed to take part in the conspiracy to further promote and cooperate in its unlawful objective. "Willfully" and "Knowingly" An act is done "knowingly" and "willfully" if it is done deliberately and purposely—that is, the defendant's actions must have been her conscious objective rather than a product of a mistake or accident, mere negligence, or some other innocent reason. To satisfy its burden of proof that the defendant willfully and knowingly became a member of a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful purpose, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that she was a member of an operation or conspiracy to accomplish that unlawful purpose, and that her action of joining such an operation or conspiracy was not due to carelessness, negligence, or mistake. Now, as I have said, knowledge is a matter of inference from the proven facts. Science has not yet devised a manner of looking into a person's mind and knowing what that person is thinking. However, you do have before you the evidence of certain acts and conversations alleged to have taken place involving the defendant or in her presence. You may consider this 50 EFTA00074553
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evidence in determining whether the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's knowledge of the unlawful purposes of the conspiracy. It is not necessary for the Government to show that a defendant was fully informed as to all the details of the conspiracy in order for you to infer knowledge on her part. To have guilty knowledge, a defendant need not have known the full extent of the conspiracy or all of the activities of all of its participants. It is not even necessary for a defendant to know every other member of the conspiracy. In addition, the duration and extent of the defendant's participation has no bearing on the issue of her guilt. She need not have joined the conspiracy at the outset. The defendant may have joined it for any purpose at any time in its progress, and she will be held responsible for all that was done before she joined and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while she was a member. Each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts and may perform them at different times. Indeed, a single act may be enough to bring one within the membership of the conspiracy, provided that the defendant was aware of the conspiracy and knowingly associated herself with its criminal aims. It does not matter whether the defendant's role in the conspiracy may have been more limited than or different in nature or in length of time from the roles of her co-conspirators, provided she was herself a participant. I want to caution you, however, that the defendant's mere presence at the scene of the alleged crime does not, by itself, make her a member of the conspiracy. Similarly, a person may know, assemble with, or be friendly with, one or more members of a conspiracy, without being a conspirator herself. I also want to caution you that mere knowledge or acquiescence, without participation, in the unlawful plan is not sufficient. In other words, knowledge without agreement and participation is not sufficient. What is necessary is that a defendant participate in the 51 EFTA00074554
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conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purposes, and with an intent to aid in the accomplishment of its unlawful objectives. It is also not necessary that the defendant receive or even anticipate any financial benefit from participating in the conspiracy as long as she participated in it in the way I have explained. That said, while proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a scheme is not essential, if you find that the defendant had such an interest, that is a factor which you may properly consider in determining whether or not she was a member of a conspiracy charged in the Indictment. Once a conspiracy is formed, it is presumed to continue until either its objective is accomplished or there is some affirmative act of termination by the members. So too, once a person is found to be a member of a conspiracy, she is presumed to continue as a member in the conspiracy until the conspiracy is terminated, unless it is shown by some affirmative proof that the person withdrew and disassociated herself from it. In sum, the defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful nature of the conspiracy, may have intentionally engaged, advised, or assisted in the conspiracy for the purpose of furthering an illegal undertaking. The defendant thereby becomes a knowing and willing participant in the unlawful agreement—that is to say, she becomes a conspirator. Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 19-6; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Jones, 16 Cr. 533 (AJN) and in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (AN); and the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 G. 670 (ICMW). 52 EFTA00074555
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Counts One, Three, and Five Two: Conspiracy to Violate Federal Law — Third Element The third element to establish the offense of conspiracy, is that at least one overt act was knowingly committed by at least one of the conspirators—not necessarily the defendant—in furtherance of the conspiracy. The overt act element requires the Government to show something more than mere agreement; some overt step or action must have been taken by at least one of the conspirators in furtherance of that conspiracy. In other words, the Government must show that the agreement went beyond the mere talking stage. It must show that at least one of the conspirators actually did something in furtherance of the conspiracy. With respect to the overt acts for Count One, the Indictment reads as follows: [The Court is respectfully requested to read the overt acts listed under Count One of the Indictment]. With respect to the overt acts for Count Three, the Indictment reads as follows: [The Court is respectfully requested to read the overt acts listed under Count Three of the Indictment'. With respect to the overt acts for Count Five, the Indictment reads as follows: [The Court is respectfully requested to read the overt acts listed under Count Five of the Indictment]. In order for the Government to satisfy this element, it is not necessary for the Government to prove that any of the specific overt acts alleged was committed. Nor does the Government have to prove that the defendant committed the overt act. It is sufficient for the Government to show that any of the members of the conspiracy knowingly committed some overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Further, the overt act need not be one that is alleged in the Indictment. Rather, it can be any overt act that is substantially similar to those acts alleged in the Indictment, if you are convinced that the act occurred while the conspiracy was still in existence and that it was done in furtherance of the conspiracy as described in the Indictment. In addition, you need not be unanimous as to which overt act you find to have been committed. It 53 EFTA00074556
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is sufficient as long as all of you find that at least one overt act was committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. You should bear in mind that the overt act, standing alone, may be an innocent, lawful act. However, an apparently innocent act sheds its harmless character if it is a step in carrying out, promoting, aiding, or assisting the conspiratorial scheme. You are therefore instructed that the overt act does not have to be an act which in and of itself is criminal or constitutes an objective of the conspiracy. You are further instructed that the overt act need not have been committed at precisely the time alleged in the Indictment. It is sufficient if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that it occurred at or about the time and place stated. Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instrs. 19-7, 19-8; the charge of the Hon. Alison J. Nathan in United States v. Lebedev, 15 Cr. 769 (MN); the charge of the Hon. Kimba M. Wood in United States v. Almonte, 16 Cr. 670 (KMW); and the charge of the Hon. Denise L. Cote in United States v. Purcell, 18 Cr. 081 (DLC). 54 EFTA00074557
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Statute of Limitations There is a limit on how much time the Government has to obtain an indictment. Counts Two, Four, Five, and Six are timely—that is, they are not barred by any statute of limitations. As to Counts One and Three, in order to prove that this prosecution is timely, the Government has to prove that least one of the overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy involved a victim other than Minor Victim-3. Put simply: you may not convict the defendant on Counts One or Three solely on the basis of Minor Victim-3 or an overt act involving Minor Victim-3. Adapted from Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jay Instructions, Instr. 19-7. 55 EFTA00074558
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OTHER INSTRUCTIONS Direct and Circumstantial Evidence There are two types of evidence that you may use in reaching your verdict. One type of evidence is direct evidence. One kind of direct evidence is a witness's testimony about something that the witness knows by virtue of his or her own senses-something that the witness has seen, smelled, touched, or heard. Direct evidence may also be in the form of an exhibit. The other type of evidence is circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends to prove one fact by proof of other facts. There is a simple example of circumstantial evidence that is often used in this courthouse. Assume that when you came into the courthouse this morning the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that there are blinds on the courtroom windows that are drawn and that you cannot look outside. As you are sitting here, someone walks in with an umbrella that is dripping wet. Someone else then walks in with a raincoat that is also dripping wet. Now, you cannot look outside the courtroom and you cannot see whether or not it is raining. So you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of the facts that I have asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that between the time you arrived at the courthouse and the time these people walked in, it had started to rain. That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer based on reason, experience, and common sense from an established fact the existence or the nonexistence of some other fact. Many facts, such as a person's state of mind, can only rarely be proved by direct evidence. Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence. It is a general rule that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that, before convicting each defendant, you, the jury, must be satisfied of each defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in the case. 56 EFTA00074559