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21 December, 2011
Article 1. Weekly Standard
Blaming the Jews—Again
Elliott Abrams
Article 2. The National Interest
A New Hamas in the Making?
Bilal Y. Saab
Article 3. NYT
The End, for Now
Thomas L. Friedman
Article 4. The Washington Post
In Iraq, a return to old enmities
Editorial
Article 5. New York Review of Books
Egypt on the Edge
Yasmine El Rashidi
Article 6. INEGMA
Syrian Uprising: Its Impact on Iran and Possibility of
Civil War
Riad Kahwaji
Article 7. Foreign Policy
Bashar al-Assad Is Every Bit His Father's Son
Jerrold M. Post, Ruthie Pertsis
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Article 1.
Weekly Standard
Blaming the Jews—Again
Elliott Abrams
December 20, 2011 -- If you were an anti-Semite dedicated to
spreading your hatred of Jews, what charges exactly would you make
in 21st century America?
You would avoid the blood libel—too medieval to write of
sacrificing Christian children to make Passover matzo. That kind of
stuff circulates in Arab lands or Pakistan, but won't sell in suburban
America. And the "Christ-killer" material is also dated, what with
Vatican II, Evangelical support for Israel, and the like.
There are two charges you would make. First, the rich Jews control
our government. Second, those Jews are trying to push America into
war so your sons will have to fight for Israel.
In the last week that is exactly what we have seen. First came the
Thomas Friedman column in the New York Times: "I sure hope that
Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, understands that the
standing ovation he got in Congress this year was not for his politics.
That ovation was bought and paid for by the Israel lobby." Perhaps it
was jealousy from seeing Walt and Mearsheimer sell all those books
with this line, but Friedman here tips right into the swamps.
And now we have Joe Klein, in Time magazine, in a section
accurately entitled "Swampland": "Iowa Republicans are not
neoconservatives. Ron Paul has gained ground after a debate in
which his refusal to join the Iran warhawks was front and center.
Indeed, in my travels around the country, I don't meet many
neoconservatives outside of Washington and New York. It's one
thing to just adore Israel, as the evangelical Christians do; it's another
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thing entirely to send American kids off to war, yet again, to fight for
Israel's national security."
Now, Klein has chosen his medium well: Time has a history of anti-
Semitism, illustrated by its famous 1977 story about Israel's prime
minister that began "Menachem Begin (rhymes with Fagin)." But
Klein's thoughts are about as ugly as ever appear outside of Pat
Buchanan's publications. "There are only two groups that are beating
the drums for war in the Middle East-the Israeli Defense Ministry and
its amen corner in the United States," Buchanan said in 1990.
How different is that from what Klein just wrote? After all, Klein is
saying (1) neoconservatives are Jews, and Jews are neoconservatives;
(2) Evangelicals like Israel but they are real Americans who put their
own country first, unlike Jews; (3) and what those
Jews/neoconservatives really want is to send American boys off to
fight Israel's wars, sparing Israeli kids and of course their own kids,
who are apparently not "American kids" and anyway do not fight for
their country. Of course Klein simply ignores the possibility that
concern about the Iranian nuclear program does not make one a
warmongering neoconservative, and actually extends even to
Christians. Yesterday Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, "The
United States does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. That's
a red line for us and that's a red line, obviously, for the Israelis. If we
have to do it we will deal with it....If they proceed and we get
intelligence that they are proceeding with developing a nuclear
weapon then we will take whatever steps necessary to stop it."
Bought and paid for? Sending American kids off to fight for Israel's
security?
These two recent statements are as vicious as it gets in the
mainstream media, and here we have two Jews—Friedman and Klein—
spreading the two major themes of contemporary American anti-
Semitism. Why? Why now?
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Why does it matter? Perhaps it is their hatred of Israel's right of
center government, or of modern Israel, or of the rise of Orthodoxy in
Israel and in the American Jewish community. Let us not descend
into such analyses when what matters is not abnormal psychology but
the bounds of public discourse. Once upon a time, William F.
Buckley banned Pat Buchanan from the pages of National Review
and in essence drummed him out of the conservative movement for
such accusations. Today, where are the Anti-Defamation League, and
the American Jewish Committee, and all the Jewish "defense"
organizations? Where are all the Jewish groups which have given
Klein and Friedman awards, demanding them back? Where are
Jewish Democrats in Congress, who have no doubt wined and dined
both Klein and Friedman in a thousand dinner parties,
and Congressional leaders from Nancy Pelosi to Harry Reid? And
what about our other supposed moral leaders, religious, intellectual,
or political?
It isn't a small matter, because as we have learned the hard way with
Walt and Mearsheimer, once the infection of anti-Semitism enters the
mass media and the academy, it grows and grows. What begins as a
"controversial statement" ends up on every reading list. Klein and
Friedman, whatever their personal motivations for these statements,
are helping popularize and make acceptable anti-Semitism in
America. Their own publications will no doubt reward them for their
advanced thinking. Will the rest of our society?
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Ankle 2.
The National Interest
A New Hamas in the Making?
Bilal Y. Saab
December 20, 2011 -- Jane's, an internationally respected British
security and defense risk-analysis firm, has recently reported that
Hamas, the Palestinian militant group, is on "the brink of renouncing
armed resistance and moving to a policy of nonviolent resistance to
Israel." Jane's, with which I have been a monthly writer to three of its
publications since 2007, has several hard-to-ignore quotes in its
report of Hamas leaders saying that the move was not "tactical" but
"strategic." Also interviewed are Palestinian Authority intelligence
officers who said that Hamas's strategy was "gradual and nuanced,"
with one senior officer telling Jane's that Hamas "intends to keep its
military and security units to control the situation in Gaza, not
necessarily to fight the Israelis." The interviewees' names were not
mentioned for obvious security reasons.
I urge every subscriber to Jane's to read that groundbreaking piece of
reporting because, even if it is not publicly confirmed yet by Hamas's
leadership, it has all the makings of a fascinating story which I am
positive will generate an intense debate not only in the Arab world
and Israel but also in Washington and other Western capitals. The
story is starting to get serious attention in the international press with
the Financial Times, Sydney Herald Tribune and other media outlets
covering it.
The report, written by my friend and colleague David Hartwell,
Jane's Middle East and Islamic affairs editor, argues that the
springboard for this new strategic approach by Hamas is the Arab
uprising. More directly, Egypt, Qatar and Turkey reportedly played a
key role in convincing Hamas to reconcile with its historical rival
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Fatah and end armed resistance against Israel. Hartwell writes that
Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, in a meeting on November 24 in Cairo
with Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, accepted "in writing
with a signature" the need to embrace peaceful activism. And if this
is not controversial enough, echoing Syrian opposition leader Burhan
Ghalioun, Hamas's leadership also told Jane's that it will be
"downgrading its ties with Syria and Iran and forge new relationships
with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey."
In some ways, perhaps, this development could have been foreseen.
Even the most ideological and stubborn actors in the Middle East
have been forced to adjust to the new political realities created by the
Arab uprising. Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, has been feeling
increasingly vulnerable and isolated lately because of the escalating
civil conflict in Syria and the threat that poses to its ally, the Syrian
regime. Hezbollah recently made significant concessions at home,
including its approval of funding for the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon—an entity that Hezbollah's leadership for years had viewed
as a tool used by Israel and the United States to defeat it. Other signs
of Hezbollah's contemplation of life after Syrian president Bashar
Assad include its decision to move most of its military hardware that
has been stored in Syria back to areas under its control inside
Lebanon, including the South and the Bekaa.
Yet despite its evident tactical adjustments, Hezbollah hasn't
suggested any intent to disarm, forge new strategic alliances or end its
military struggle against Israel. In fact, in a rare public appearance
this month, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah declared that his party
will remain defiant, side with Assad's Syria and never relinquish its
arms. If Hamas, an ally of Hezbollah, Syria and Iran (the so-called
Resistance Axis), truly intends to reinvent itself, that would be a
historic development with massive political and security implications
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not just for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also for the whole of
Middle East politics.
There are numerous questions surrounding Hamas's reported
decision, the most obvious being why it could have possibly adopted
such a stance. It is one thing to say that Hamas felt motivated and/or
pressured by Turkey, Egypt and Qatar to renounce violence. But it
takes much more for an organization to abandon everything it has
stood for and create for itself a new identity. After all, Saudi Arabia
and Egypt have tried countless times in the past to shape Hamas and
lure it, with financial and political rewards, to leave the pro-Iran-
Syria-Hezbollah camp and give up armed struggle. The strategy did
not work simply because Hamas felt it had much more to lose than
gain. The Resistance Axis was always on the rise, especially after the
2003 Iraq war as Iran and Syria gained influence in the region at the
expense of their rivals.
No more. Today, with Iran feeling more cornered by the international
community (minus Russia and China) than ever because of its
controversial nuclear program and with Syria's regime fighting an
existential battle against its own people, the balance of power is
shifting in the Middle East, and this has not gone unnoticed by
Hamas. It is foolish to deny that Hamas's decisions and behavior
have been partly driven by ideological convictions and motivations,
but it is also wrong to argue the organization has not acted rationally,
based on material interest. The decision it reportedly has currently
taken may be further proof of that.
While it is important to remember that Hamas's leadership has not
gone public with its decision, it is worth noting that the majority of
its external political staff has already evacuated Damascus, where it
has a key office managed by Meshal. Their next destination is likely
to be Cairo and Doha, where leaders there have committed to
sponsoring the movement politically and financially. Unlike
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Hezbollah, Hamas has refused to say publicly that it is siding with the
Syrian regime, a move that has angered not only the Syrian leadership
but also the mullahs in Tehran—causing them, according to Jane's
and other sources, to stop providing financial assistance. With money
drying up and winds of change rocking the region, it is no wonder
Hamas was fed up with Syria and Iran. One also cannot exclude the
sectarian underpinnings of Hamas's decision. While llamas never
allowed its religious identity—Sunni—to prevent it from forming
necessary and strategic alliances with Shiite Iran and Hezbollah, the
party is pragmatic enough to realize that positioning itself against the
Sunni Islamist tide that is currently sweeping the region (in Egypt,
Libya, Tunisia, possibly Syria and elsewhere) is against its long-term
interests. Having operated in the Iranian strategic orbit in the past,
Hamas might now wish to embrace its old identity as a branch of the
Sunni Muslim Brotherhood.
Hamas's decision, if real, will take time to implement. Since its
founding in 1987, the organization's bread-and-butter stance has
been armed resistance coupled with terrorist activity. Should Hamas's
leadership publicly state its new strategy, the first thing it will have to
do is come up with a new charter as evidence to the world that its
move is not propaganda. The organization will also need substantial
help from Arab countries and others interested in such a
development. The world, including the United States, will not accept
Hamas's transformation if it is half-hearted. In other words, Hamas
will have to integrate its military into the security forces of the
Palestinian Authority in order to get the attention and support it
desires.
The implications of such a Hamas decision could be huge.
Theoretically, it will create a united Palestinian front. In other words,
there would be few divisions within Palestinian society to inhibit
progress in negotiations with the Israelis, a major boost for the
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Palestinian cause. Two things remain unclear, however: how Hamas's
constituency and Israel would deal with this massive shift. It is not
unreasonable to assume that Hamas would not make such a dramatic
move without testing the waters and feeling the mood in the
Palestinian street. Hamas knows its constituency well enough to
realize that the costs it might suffer as a result of such a decision are
likely to be tolerable. Furthermore, Hamas's support base is not
necessarily ideological. Many credible polls suggest that those who
have voted for Hamas over the past few years have done so out of
pragmatic reasons and anger toward Fatah for its governmental
failures. As far as Israel is concerned, the suspicion is that moderates
and those truly committed to peace and a two-state solution will be
supportive of Hamas's transformation. The hard-liners will remain
critical and will always find an excuse to object. Marking its twenty-
fourth anniversary this week, Hamas leaders did not even hint that
they may switch strategy. They insisted instead that they will never
recognize Israel. For Israeli hard-liners, this is reason enough to
remain skeptical of any move by Hamas.
If Hamas actually seeks to pursue such a decision, the United States
will be confronted with a crucial choice. It can lend its verbal and
material support for the move and cite its concerns and reservations.
Or it can stand against it and endorse whatever the Israeli government
says and does on the matter. Hence, a large onus likely will rest on
Washington as well as on Hamas.
Bilal Y. Saab is Visiting Fellow at the James Martin Centerf or
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies.
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Article 3.
NYT
The End, for Now
Thomas L. Friedman
December 20, 2011 -- With the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops
from Iraq, we're finally going to get the answer to the core question
about that country: Was Iraq the way Iraq was because Saddam was
the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because
Iraq is the way Iraq is — a collection of sects and tribes unable to live
together except under an iron fist. Now we're going to get the answer
because both the internal iron fist that held Iraq together (Saddam
Hussein) and the external iron fist (the U.S. armed forces) have been
removed. Now we will see whether Iraqis can govern themselves in a
decent manner that will enable their society to progress — or end up
with a new iron fist. You have to hope for the best because so much
is riding on it, but the early signs are worrying.
Iraq was always a war of choice. As I never bought the argument that
Saddam had nukes that had to be taken out, the decision to go to war
stemmed, for me, from a different choice: Could we collaborate with
the people of Iraq to change the political trajectory of this pivotal
state in the heart of the Arab world and help tilt it and the region onto
a democratizing track? After 9/11, the idea of helping to change the
context of Arab politics and address the root causes of Arab state
dysfunction and Islamist terrorism — which were identified in the
2002 Arab Human Development Report as a deficit of freedom, a
deficit of knowledge and a deficit of women's empowerment —
seemed to me to be a legitimate strategic choice. But was it a wise
choice?
My answer is twofold: "No" and "Maybe, sort of, we'll see."
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I say "no" because whatever happens in Iraq, even if it becomes
Switzerland, we overpaid for it. And, for that, I have nothing but
regrets. We overpaid in lives, in the wounded, in tarnished values, in
dollars and in the lost focus on America's development. Iraqis, of
course, paid dearly as well.
One reason the costs were so high is because the project was so
difficult. Another was the incompetence of George W. Bush's team in
prosecuting the war. The other reason, though, was the nature of the
enemy. Iran, the Arab dictators and, most of all, Al Qaeda did not
want a democracy in the heart of the Arab world, and they tried
everything they could — in Al Qaeda's case, hundreds of suicide
bombers financed by Arab oil money — to sow enough fear and
sectarian discord to make this democracy project fail.
So no matter the original reasons for the war, in the end, it came
down to this: Were America and its Iraqi allies going to defeat Al
Qaeda and its allies in the heart of the Arab world or were Al Qaeda
and its allies going to defeat them? Thanks to the Sunni Awakening
movement in Iraq, and the surge, America and its allies defeated them
and laid the groundwork for the most important product of the Iraq
war: the first ever voluntary social contract between Sunnis, Kurds
and Shiites for how to share power and resources in an Arab country
and to govern themselves in a democratic fashion. America helped to
midwife that contract in Iraq, and now every other Arab democracy
movement is trying to replicate it — without an American midwife.
You see how hard it is.
Which leads to the "maybe, sort of, we'll see." It is possible to
overpay for something that is still transformational. Iraq had its
strategic benefits: the removal of a genocidal dictator; the defeat of
Al Qaeda there, which diminished its capacity to attack us; the
intimidation of Libya, which prompted its dictator to surrender his
nuclear program (and helped expose the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear
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network); the birth in Kurdistan of an island of civility and free
markets and the birth in Iraq of a diverse free press. But Iraq will only
be transformational if it truly becomes a model where Shiites, Sunnis
and Kurds, the secular and religious, Muslims and non-Muslims, can
live together and share power.
As you can see in Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, this is the
issue that will determine the fate of all the Arab awakenings. Can the
Arab world develop pluralistic, consensual politics, with regular
rotations in power, where people can live as citizens and not feel that
their tribe, sect or party has to rule or die? This will not happen
overnight in Iraq, but if it happens over time it would be
transformational, because it is the necessary condition for democracy
to take root in that region. Without it, the Arab world will be a
dangerous boiling pot for a long, long time.
The best-case scenario for Iraq is that it will be another Russia — an
imperfect, corrupt, oil democracy that still holds together long
enough so that the real agent of change — a new generation, which
takes nine months and 21 years to develop — comes of age in a much
more open, pluralistic society. The current Iraqi leaders are holdovers
from the old era, just like Vladimir Putin in Russia. They will always
be weighed down by the past. But as Putin is discovering — some 21
years after Russia's democratic awakening began — that new
generation thinks differently. I don't know if Iraq will make it. The
odds are really long, but creating this opportunity was an important
endeavor, and I have nothing but respect for the Americans, Brits and
Iraqis who paid the price to make it possible.
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Ankle 4.
The Washington Post
In Iraq, a return to old enmities
Editorial
December 21 -- PRESIDENT OBAMA struck a "mission
accomplished" tone when he greeted Nouri al-Maliki at the White
House last week, heaping praise on the Iraqi prime minister and
declaring that he "leads Iraq's most inclusive government yet." It
didn't take long for those words to boomerang. No sooner had Mr.
Maliki returned to Baghdad than he launched what looks like an
attempted coup against the country's top Sunni leaders. Though the
outcome is still in doubt, Iraq's fragile political order appears in
danger of crumbling just days after the departure of U.S. troops.
Mr. Maliki's strike took the form of criminal charges against Vice
President Tariq al-Hashimi, a Sunni known for his attempts to find
accord with Shiite leaders. Three security guards arrested last week
were paraded on state television Monday, where they confessed to
acts of terrorism and alleged that Mr. Hashimi had directed them. Mr.
Maliki, meanwhile, asked parliament for a no-confidence vote against
Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq, another Sunni. Sunni members
of parliament and cabinet ministers responded by suspending their
work — threatening a governmental collapse.
We haven't seen enough to judge the charges against Mr. Hashemi,
and few Sunni or Shiite leaders are free of any link to the violence
that has wracked Iraq since 2003. But both the timing and the
televised form of Mr. Maliki's charges against the vice president were
blatantly political. They followed what has been a mounting
campaign by the prime minister, a Shiite with close ties to Iran,
against perceived Sunni enemies. Hundreds of former members of
Saddam Hussein's Baath party have been arrested in recent weeks.
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Security forces controlled by Mr. Maliki have surrounded the
compounds of Sunni leaders in Baghdad.
The Obama administration appears blindsided by the crisis. It
shouldn't be so surprised. It risked just such a breakdown when it
disregarded the recommendation of its military commanders that
some U.S. forces remain in Iraq to help guarantee against a return to
sectarian conflict. Sunni and Kurdish leaders also urged U.S. officials
to broker a deal for a stay-on force with Mr. Maliki; now they say
their worst fears may be coming to pass. "The Americans pulled out
without completing the job they should have finished," Iyad Allawi,
the leader of the secular political bloc supported by most Sunnis, told
the Reuters news agency Tuesday.
The U.S. withdrawal was forced in part by a deal struck by the Bush
administration, as well as domestic pressure on Mr. Maliki from
Iran's proxies. But White House aides who argued that no stay-on
force was necessary will now see their argument tested. U.S.
diplomats in Baghdad are trying to help Iraq's Kurdish president and
foreign minister defuse the incipient conflict; Vice President Biden
was on the phone Tuesday to Mr. Maliki and the Sunni speaker of
parliament. Washington's leverage includes the promised sale to Mr.
Maliki's government of F-16 warplanes and training for Iraqi pilots.
Mr. Maliki has said he wishes to maintain a strategic partnership with
the United States. If that's true, Mr. Obama might still rescue the
situation by delivering the message he failed to communicate in
public last week: Such an alliance cannot be maintained with an Iraqi
government that pursues a sectarian agenda or seeks authoritarian
power.
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Article 5.
New York Review of Books
Egypt on the Edge
Yasmine El Rashidi
January 12, 2012 -- It has been almost one year since Hosni Mubarak
gave up power, and in the months since then, the future of a newly
democratic Egypt has been uncertain. The political transition all but
stalled this past summer, as tensions between Muslims and Copts
erupted, street violence flared, and the various post-Mubarak political
factions repeatedly disagreed on the form the new Egypt should have.
This fall, the military council now ruling the country—the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—was itself drawn into violent
conflict with protesters, leading to more than forty deaths in a single
week. Many wondered, amid all this, if a democratically elected
civilian government would ever take office.
In late November, as Egyptians finally went to the polling stations,
the direction the country would most likely take was at last becoming
clear. If the preliminary results of the parliamentary elections are any
indication, most Egyptians want a country governed by the Islamists,
whom Mubarak and his allies had aggressively tried to suppress. In
the first of a three-stage election process, which began on November
28 and ends on January 10, the Islamist factions emerged with 69.6
percent of the votes. Only nine of Egypt's twenty-seven governorates
voted in the first stage on November 28, and there are several weeks
to go until the rest cast their ballots—there are some 52 million
registered voters in all—but since many of the remaining electoral
districts are ones in which the Islamists are known to have a strong
popular following, it seems likely that their lead will be maintained, if
not strengthened.
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That the country's first free and fair elections will likely result in a
parliament in which the Islamists have a dominant majority is casting
doubt on the promise of the democratic state that many who took part
in the revolution hoped to achieve. When youth protesters first took
to Cairo's Tahrir Square on January 25, they chanted their desire,
among other things, for a state that promised social justice, unity, and
equal rights for all. For eighteen days last winter, that model for a
new and democratic Egypt seemed plausible; it was being lived in
Tahrir. Copts and Muslims, women and men, youth and the elderly,
secular and religious protested and prayed together and shared tents
and meals. The Copts shielded the Muslims against possible attacks
by thugs while they knelt down and prayed, and hundreds of the
youth members of the Muslim Brotherhood surrounded the square as
guardians for all, searching bags, checking IDs, and trying to ensure
that informants or people hoping to disrupt the demonstrations would
be swiftly escorted out.
In the aftermath of the first election results, many are wondering if
the unity that came to typify the Tahrir protests is now a dream of the
past. What is the fate of an Islamist-dominated Egypt? And what does
it mean for the country's liberal minorities—the Coptic Christian
community, the moderate Muslim upper class, the remaining handful
of Jews, and middle-class Muslims who in spite of their adherence to
the rituals of Islam are committed to preserving the cosmopolitan
Egypt they grew up in? The concerns of some of these groups are
largely about the ways they will live. Will women be prevented from
working? Will the veil become compulsory? Will public spaces be
segregated to separate men from women? (Such measures are
supported by the Salafist Al-Nour Party, which has so far received
18.5 percent of the vote.) For the Copts, who make up some 10
percent of the country's 82 million people and who have faced
increasing persecution since Mubarak stepped down on February 11,
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whether they will be left to freely practice their faith is an acute and
daily concern.
Many people are also worried that tourism and the economy might
suffer a ruinous blow if laws are passed to ban bathing suits and
alcohol and to cover pharaonic monuments-as several Islamists
have proposed in recent months. Although the Muslim Brotherhood
in particular has so far expressed its commitment to building a
democratic and moderate society, many fear that once the Islamists
settle into power, their tune might change.
The likelihood of Egypt transforming from a moderate and open
society to one resembling Saudi Arabia or Iran seems highly
improbable, at least in the short or medium term. After 498 members
of the 508-seat "lower parliament" are finally installed on January 14
(the remaining ten members will be appointed by the SCAF), there
will be elections for the parliament's "upper house." This will be a
consultative council of 270 seats-180 of which will be filled by
elections, and 90 by members appointed by the SCAF, a clear sign of
the continuing powers of the military. Once that entire structure is in
place, the parliament's immediate task will be to select a committee
to draft the long-awaited new constitution.
Since the revolution last winter, the subject of the constitution has
proved to be divisive, pitting political factions against one another for
eight months. The Islamists, confident of winning the elections, were
demanding that the newly elected parliament be granted absolute
authority to draft the constitution to its liking. The liberals for their
part wanted a supraconstitutional declaration promising respect for
religious minorities, as well as the broader vision of a democratic
state. To each draft of such a document (proposals were made by both
leaders of the Muslim Al-Azhar University and the interim deputy
prime minister) the various factions have had objections. On
December 7, the SCAF further complicated matters by announcing
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that it would appoint a council to oversee the drafting of the
constitution in order to limit the influence of religious extremism.
The de facto military rulers now seem intent on using the rising threat
of Islamist rule as their excuse for remaining involved in the
country's affairs, and the future power of the army, which has large
economic influence and holdings, remains a central question for
Egyptian politics.
Under current rules, for example, the parliament will have limited
powers. The military council that is now running the country will
continue to have overriding authority, which it has used to curb
media freedoms and arbitrarily subject civilians to military trials. It is
expected that the parliamentary majority will try to put pressure on
the military by passing legislation giving itself the absolute right to
appoint a new government and to draft the constitution that will
shape the country's future (already this week the Brotherhood
accused the military of trying to undermine the parliament's authority
and said they would boycott the advisory council being formed by
them to oversee the drafting of the constitution). With the political
balance of the new parliament favoring the Islamists, the liberals
worry about the ideological direction Egypt might take. As such
concerns have increased, many liberals have slowly shifted away
from their previously staunch opposition both to the SCAF and to the
remnants of the former regime—the felool.
The largest liberal coalition, El-Kotla or the Egyptian Bloc, includes
many former MPs who had strong influence under the Mubarak
regime. Liberals now view them as preferable to the Islamists.
Members of the Egyptian Bloc are also now advocating the continued
involvement of the SCAF in the country's affairs so that it can
guarantee that the basic tenets of the constitution remain untouched—
namely, that Egypt remain a democratic, modern state, a commitment
the SCAF has repeatedly made.
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What will happen, then, when the new parliament begins its first
session in March? Most likely we can expect continuing arguments
over the extent of the parliament's authority, the timetable for
transition and the handing over of powers from the military, and what
the new cabinet should look like. In the debate over the constitution
many of the Islamists, in particular those of the Muslim Brotherhood,
will probably try to exert influence not through outright demands that
it be based on Islamic sharia law—already, Article 2 in the current
constitution states that Islam is the religion of the state and the
principle source of legislation is Islamic jurisprudence—but rather
through a subtle play on words and syllables in the Arabic language
that can convey double meanings. They will favor a constitution with
provisions that provide leeway for later reinterpretation. There will
no doubt be fanatical members of the ultra-orthodox Salafis who push
for a constitution that asserts boldly and clearly that Egypt is an
Islamic state—indeed, some Salafis are already supporting this—but
it is doubtful that they will form an overriding majority.
The transitional parliament could be in power for what might be as
little as a one-year term, while a regular term in the previous
Egyptian parliament was five years. The two largest political factions
in the so-called "lower house"—the Muslim Brotherhood
(represented by its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party
(FJP)) and the Salafi Al-Nour Party—are well aware that within that
term, their constituents will expect them to deliver on some of their
promises. Among the failures of both the SCAF and the various
interim cabinets in recent months have been their responses to the
demands of the revolutionaries, which have resulted in large-scale
protests calling for them to step down. Egyptians will expect that the
parliament deliver some tangible and immediate results—a pressure
that will be felt by the liberal MPs as well.
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The Muslim Brotherhood has decades of organizational and
administrative experience. Aside from its expansive nationwide
networks, its services to the needy have included selling meat at
wholesale prices, offering subsidized school supplies, helping with
medical treatment, and providing handouts of fresh produce, sugar,
cooking oil, and other items. These activities have won it popular
followings. The Brotherhood has also long had leading and
instrumental parts in the country's various professional syndicates
and labor unions. The doctors', lawyers', and engineers' syndicates,
for example, have historically been dominated and led by
Brotherhood members. At the journalists' syndicate, reporters say
that some of the board members affiliated with the Brotherhood have
provided the best and most efficient services to the syndicate's
members to date—health care plans, for example.
It is the Brotherhood's strengths in such different spheres of life—
both in municipal welfare and as prominent business owners
themselves—that give rise to hopes that it will be a positive force in
Egypt. Essam el-Erian, deputy head of the Brotherhood's Freedom
and Justice Party and the group's long-time spokesperson, told me
this week: "We are ready for democracy and this parliament will
work to rebuild this country for all Egyptians." The party's secretary-
general, Mohamed el-Beltagy, said something similar, insisting that
the parliament, and his party in particular, would serve as "the
representative of the people": "we have to respect one another and
defend the rights of all Egyptians—of the entire nation and its
people."
The FJP seems to know that it has little choice but to act in a
moderate and strategic manner. Issues of education, the economy, and
rising inflation are of critical concern and need to be tackled
immediately. In both their pre-election campaign rallies and recent
press conferences, the Brotherhood leaders have promoted moderate
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