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undermining the national security of both the United States and Israel 
and deepens the spiral of mistrust that has intensified over the past 
several years. It is crucial to examine how and why the U.S.-Israeli 
bilateral relationship is changing and to assess frameworks for 
cooperation that could strengthen the interests of both Israel and the 
United States. More Israelis than Americans acknowledge that 
change is under way, but the ideas debated in both countries fall 
short. Some advocate a U.S.-Israeli defense pact, usually as part of a 
comprehensive regional agreement. Others argue for the United 
States to extend a nuclear deterrent to Israel in an effort to reassure 
Israelis and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Israel's security. 
These options might provide short-term relief for Israeli security, but 
they ultimately reinforce Israel's deep dependency on the United 
States. That dependency fuels Israeli anxiety over the extent and 
sustainability of U.S. cooperation and assistance, generating more 
bilateral tension and misunderstanding. What is needed, instead, is a 
relationship that treats Israel less as a dependent and that contains 
clearer commitments of what each side will do for the other-with an 
implicit understanding that there are limits to those commitments. 
U.S. military aid to Israel also needs to be rethought, emphasizing 
Israel's role as it grows from being a dependent to a more equal 
partner. Israel faces multiple challenges, yet it is no longer the weak 
and vulnerable state it was at its founding, and it is no longer the state 
it was 20 years ago. The United States and the key constituencies 
within it that are driving U.S.-Israeli ties are also different from what 
they were a generation ago. The bilateral relationship needs to reflect 
these realities. Restoring true partnership in the bilateral relationship 
will be difficult but not impossible. To that end, Israel and the United 
States must work to rediscover the sense of common mission that 
bound the two allies in the past. That mission must transcend mutual 
threats and find a common strategy for advancing U.S. and Israeli 
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22 
interests in the region through promoting regional stability and 
Israeli-Palestinian peace. Most important, Israelis and Americans 
must recognize that the future will be different from the past. Both 
should prepare for a time when the historic rationale for strong U.S.-
Israeli ties may be less significant and when the politics in both 
countries may change the parameters of U.S.-Israeli cooperation. The 
U.S.-Israeli relationship is deep, but the challenges to it now are more 
profound than at any time in history. More honest assessments of the 
bilateral relationship are both urgent and vital. 
Key findings and recommendations 
This study has sought to understand how and why the U.S.-Israeli 
partnership is drifting. In the process it addresses difficult issues that 
many in both countries would rather leave unspoken. The importance 
of the partnership to U.S. interests in the Middle East and Israel's 
security, however, requires a critical assessment of why the 
partnership is changing and what lies ahead. Popular revolts in the 
Middle East signal an era of heightened instability for the foreseeable 
future and make addressing U.S.-Israeli differences more urgent. 
Those events have served as a reminder that change is inevitable and 
what may seem like given certainties today can quickly erode 
tomorrow. 
It would be convenient to dismiss the crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations 
that unfolded in 2009-2010 as the inevitable clash between a 
progressive U.S. administration and nationalist Israeli government. 
Many supporters on both sides prefer to interpret the current 
differences as mere turbulence in the midst of a fundamentally 
durable relationship. But the differences are deeper than personalities 
and chemistry between Israeli and U.S. leaders. Social and political 
trends in the United States and Israel are reshaping the politics of 
both societies. What is especially alarming is the erosion of the 
intangible elements of support, most importantly the ideal of shared 
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23 
values that had been the glue of the partnership long before the 
strategic alliance took shape. Israeli society today is very different 
from the Israel most Americans think they know. The rightward shift 
in Israeli politics, influenced in part by the expansion of ultra-
Orthodox and Russian Israelis into public life and the retreat of 
Israel's secular liberal elite, is changing the values and priorities of 
Israeli society. These social and demographic shifts are, in turn, 
driving and shaping Israeli politics that are increasingly at odds with 
the politics of many U.S. supporters of Israel as well as long-standing 
U.S. policies. Israel's politics, which have been driven in part by 
leaders trying to survive rather than charting a long-term course that 
addresses the country's deeper challenges, have reinforced these 
political trends. In the United States, meanwhile, Israel has become a 
complicated domestic political issue. Unconditional support for Israel 
is becoming manipulated as a political tool in Washington's growing 
partisan divide, threatening to undermine the bipartisan support that 
has been a core element of the partnership. At the same time, liberal 
segments of the American Jewish community, especially among the 
younger generations, are feeling increasingly estranged from Israel. 
These dynamics amplify political disagreements and raise doubts 
about the values and reliability of each ally. Demographic and social 
trends in both countries suggest these political dynamics will 
continue in the years ahead. On a strategic level those changes create 
greater uncertainty about how the United States and Israel cooperate 
to secure their interests and confront common challenges. More often 
than in the past, Israelis and Americans see both the politics and 
policies of the other undermining their strategic interests. These 
trends erode mutual trust, deepening America's doubts of Israel's 
strategic value while reinforcing Israeli fears about U.S. 
commitments to its security. Distrust creates uncertainty, causing 
each side to act more unpredictably in order to secure its own 
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24 
interests. The depth of strategic challenges facing both allies raises 
the stakes, further highlighting the diverging ways in which most 
Americans and Israelis see the world amid the tectonic changes 
occurring in the Middle East. Ignoring these perceptions only creates 
more friction and unpredictability, pointing to more turbulent times 
ahead. 
Israelis and Americans Seek Different Outcomes and Solutions to 
Their Challenges 
More than in the past, Israeli and U.S. threat assessments, 
understandings of the Middle East, and strategies for addressing 
threats diverge. Full convergence has never existed, and no two allies 
share identical perceptions and strategies. Yet these sharp 
divergences emerge during a period of significant regional change 
that will affect the interests of both allies in different ways. Whereas 
the United States sees a historic opportunity to fundamentally change 
the authoritarian foundation of Arab governance, Israel sees a direct 
threat to stability that could be exploited by radical forces. These 
differences reflect more concrete threats as well. Historically, Israel 
has mostly aimed to manage its security challenges in the absence of 
any promising means to more permanently resolve them; yet now, in 
the face of a perceived existential threat from Iran, it searches for an 
enduring solution. It sees Iran behind its most pressing security 
challenges-from a nuclear challenge to support for Hamas and 
Hezbollah. The United States, in contrast, has continued managing 
the Iranian threat as it seeks to resolve the Palestinian issue in the 
belief that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement could fundamentally 
improve the regional political and security landscape. Israelis argue 
that attempting to resolve the Palestinian issue while Hamas remains 
the dominant Palestinian political actor is not only untenable but 
dangerous. The differences reflect different assessments and priorities 
as well as different policies for addressing the challenges. Israel 
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believes urgent action against Iran is necessary and wants the United 
States to use force or at least the threat of force to persuade Iran to 
stop its nuclear weapons program. While Israel might have the 
military capability to delay Iran's nuclear enrichment program 
through military action for a limited period, Israelis widely believe 
that only the United States has the combined political and military 
assets to mount a broader military campaign against Iran's nuclear 
program. To Israelis, stopping Iran's development of nuclear weapons 
is the test of U.S. power and commitment in the region. Israelis fear 
that the United States will fail the test, leaving Israel to face its 
threats alone. Instead of threatening military force to stop Iran's 
nuclear program, Israelis hear talk of engagement, deterrence, and 
containment. For Israel the message is clear: the United States seeks 
to manage the Iranian threat, not resolve it conclusively. Many 
Israelis interpret the U.S. unwillingness to threaten Iran with military 
force as not only strengthening Iran's resolve but making a nuclear-
armed Iran inevitable. Meanwhile the U.S. government has declared 
resolving the Palestinian issue as a national security interest. After 
raising the Palestinian issue so high on its agenda, the Obama 
administration remains committed to seeking a diplomatic 
breakthrough. The administration believes that the Israeli government 
continues undermining opportunities for progress, which ultimately 
hurts both Israeli and U.S. interests. In the years ahead the diplomatic 
challenges will likely intensify and spark additional U.S.-Israeli 
friction. Having lost faith in the ability of the United States to secure 
statehood, the Palestinian leadership seeks to leverage growing 
international sympathy to force a showdown in the United Nations 
and through international recognition of an independent state. The 
United States may well continue to use its veto in the UN Security 
Council, as it did in February 2011, to prevent resolutions 
condemning Israel or deemed to threaten Israeli interests. Doing so, 
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26 
however, will increase the international diplomatic costs in terms of 
U.S. credibility at a time when the United States is moving to rely 
more on multilateral support on a range of international and regional 
efforts, and will further strain U.S.-Israeli ties. If U.S.-Israeli 
relations continue to hinge on progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement or decisive resolution of the Iranian nuclear threat, both 
sides will remain frustrated and U.S.-Israeli ties will undoubtedly 
suffer. Much of the frustration will come as political and strategic 
shifts fuel Israeli uncertainty about U.S. power. Israelis believe the 
United States is projecting weakness in a region that has no mercy for 
the weak. The Israeli elite do not doubt U.S. power and military 
capabilities, but they do question the ways in which the United States 
will use its power in the Middle East to help promote stability and 
secure Israeli interests. Many Israelis across the political spectrum 
fear that Israel can no longer take America's projection of power for 
granted in an increasingly multipolar world. They see regional 
powers like China, Russia, and Turkey increasingly challenging U.S. 
policy and constraining its ability to protect Israeli security. 
Failure to Address Political and Strategic Shifts Will Erode the 
Quality of U.S. - Israeli Ties 
The threat is that political and strategic tension will gradually erode 
the quality of U.S.-Israeli cooperation and, at some point in the 
future, either by design or as a consequence of unforeseen 
circumstances, will lead to a deeper rift that will be difficult to repair. 
The need to rebuild trust between the United States and Israel is 
urgent because the lack of trust makes addressing common 
challenges more complicated and difficult. Ignoring these troubling 
dynamics threatens to undermine the national security of both Israel 
and the United States and risks deepening the spiral of mistrust at a 
moment when the United States needs the full cooperation of its 
allies and Israel faces serious challenges to its international standing 
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27 
and security. For Israelis the stakes are high: as they see U.S. power 
and commitment declining, they foresee a parallel decline in their 
own power. For decades, Israel's partnership with the United States 
has been a force multiplier for its own deterrent. Yet, if the United 
States fails to shape the Middle East strategic environment, then 
Israel is more vulnerable. Those fears create deep uncertainty for 
Israeli policymakers, making decisive action to protect Israeli 
security and interests more urgent. If Israel perceives that the United 
States is passive or indecisive as Iran approaches nuclear breakout, 
Israel's impulse to take unilateral action will increase, making Israeli 
decision-making less predictable and posing significant challenges 
for U.S. management of the Middle East. Whatever Israel's unease 
about U.S. strategy, however, there is simply no substitute for U.S. 
leadership in the Middle East in the foreseeable future. Israel has few 
options for steering a different course. It will continue trying to 
influence the shape of U.S. Middle East policies, but its ability will 
remain limited especially if Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy stays 
frozen. Rather than expect that the United States will neutralize the 
Iranian threat, Israel will have to adapt and work within a broader 
U.S. containment security architecture, regardless of the drawbacks 
of such a framework. Even though many Israelis and Israel's 
supporters would like to believe that U.S. military power can solve 
Israel's most pressing problems if properly applied, ultimately the 
United States can only help Israel manage its threats and challenges; 
it cannot provide solutions. 
Israel and the United States Should Restore a Sense of 
Partnership and Common Mission 
It is unrealistic to expect U.S. and Israeli interests to be completely 
aligned. As a small country in a constant state of war, Israel's 
perceptions, threat assessments, and strategies for pursuing its 
interests naturally differ from those of a global superpower. Yet, 
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28 
common cause and understandings on key issues are vital for a 
healthy alliance. Without a common mission and purpose to guide the 
U.S.-Israeli partnership, the relationship will continue drifting, and 
disagreements on key strategic challenges will threaten the interests 
of both allies. Today not only is there no common vision and 
strategy, but Israeli and U.S. policies seem to be working at cross-
purposes on key issues. Israeli and U.S. policymakers at the highest 
levels should outline a common vision to ensure a lasting partnership 
that effectively addresses their most important challenges. This has to 
start with a commitment by leaders on both sides. Formulating a 
common mission is a shared project. Yet the burden is largely on 
Israel to adapt to new strategic and political realities because Israel 
has the most at stake in the partnership as well as the most to lose 
from its deterioration. As former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy has 
written, "in order to become a valuable ally, Israel has had to seek 
and nurture assets and capabilities of its own, of such caliber as to 
impress upon Washington that not only was the State of Israel here to 
stay, but that its activities and influence would stand the U.S. in good 
stead." To 11 successive U.S. presidents, Israel's leadership has 
successfully articulated a strategy and vision that both complemented 
broader U.S. goals and made Israel a vital component of pursuing 
those objectives. Israel's leadership needs to urgently restore that vital 
link and connection. The goal is all the more important because the 
United States has been struggling to articulate a coherent set of 
policies to address the tectonic shifts under way in the Middle East 
since the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011. To preserve 
the vitality of the U.S.-Israeli partnership, Israel should adapt and 
make itself indispensable in helping pursue U.S. objectives in an 
evolving Middle East strategic environment. Without a clearer Israeli 
strategy of how Israel fits into the U.S. vision of the Middle East, the 
partnership will continue to drift, with unforeseen consequences for 
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29 
both the United States and Israel. Of utmost importance for 
strengthening the sense of U.S.-Israeli partnership is a practical 
strategy to address the Palestinian issue. It is difficult to see how 
U.S.-Israeli ties can improve without fundamental Israeli 
commitments toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Reaching an agreement with the Palestinians will neither transform 
the Middle East nor solve a host of challenges facing the United 
States and Israel, including extremism, terrorism, and nuclear 
proliferation. An Israeli-Palestinian agreement would, however, 
relieve one set of grievances out of many in the region. It would also 
remove a key issue of contention that has complicated U.S. 
management of the Middle East, which will only become more 
complicated as populations in the region demand greater 
representation and an end to authoritarian rule. The problem is that 
the prospect of reaching an agreement under the current 
circumstances is low. This poses a significant dilemma for both the 
United States and Israel, because without resolving the problem or at 
least making some progress, U.S.-Israeli ties will likely suffer and the 
international drive to delegitimize Israel will intensify. Although the 
Palestinian issue remains a source of bilateral tension with few signs 
of progress, an Israeli-Syrian political agreement could significantly 
alter the current course of U.S.-Israeli dynamics and strengthen 
strategic cooperation. Past discussions of an Israeli-Syrian agreement 
included concrete U.S. security guarantees, which would likely be 
required for any future agreement. Many obstacles remain to such an 
agreement, including domestic upheaval against the Assad regime in 
Syria and Israeli opposition, but an Israeli-Syrian agreement could 
have a dramatic impact on the Middle East strategic environment, 
giving the U.S.-Israeli partnership a new sense of purpose. As Middle 
Eastern regimes adjust to demands for greater representation, 
maintaining regional stability will become more challenging. Israel's 
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30 
place in these broader regional changes is important, not because it is 
at the center of Arab public discourse, but because the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict will continue plaguing U.S. efforts to manage a 
range of tasks in the Middle East. Future Arab governments will be 
more attuned to public perceptions, and Arab pressure groups are 
unlikely to remain as accommodating of Israel as they have been, as 
Egypt's decision to broker a fragile Hamas-Fatah agreement and open 
the Gaza border after a nearly five-year closure clearly demonstrates. 
Israel and the United States Should Clarify Commitments and 
Responsibilities of the Partnership 
As part of a broader effort to rebuild trust, the United States and 
Israel should use the U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue to discuss frankly 
each ally's commitments and responsibilities in order to address the 
deep uncertainties on both sides. Today the depth of U.S.-Israeli 
military-to-military cooperation is unprecedented. Yet in the current 
political and strategic climate, vague verbal declarations about 
America's "commitment to Israel's security" have become slogans 
rather than a formula for practical security arrangements. U.S. 
politicians and government officials will continue using such mottoes 
for political gain, but overusing them may exacerbate Israeli anxiety 
because their vagueness is subject to such wide interpretation. 
Clarifying contingencies that may require U.S. intervention or 
coordinated military action, most importantly regarding Iran, is 
highly sensitive but could add an important element of certainty to 
the relationship. Some Americans have argued that extending a U.S. 
nuclear deterrent to Israel would relieve Israeli anxiety of a nuclear 
Iran. Others have suggested a bilateral defense treaty. Neither, 
however, provides solutions to Israel's strategic challenges, which are 
a daunting mixture of hard security threats from states and nonstate 
actors combined with the psychological and diplomatic threat of 
growing international isolation. The U.S. government can address 
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31 
Israeli anxiety and uncertainty, to at least some extent, by clarifying 
the meaning of existing U.S. security guarantees, including a deeper 
discussion about how Israel's conventional capabilities match its 
threats. Israel's responsibilities as an ally require clarification as well. 
For the sake of the United States and its own interests, the Israeli 
government should identify and articulate how its policies and 
actions contribute to U.S. interests in the Middle East and globally, 
beyond military and counterterrorism cooperation. Those elements of 
cooperation remain important, but Israel should demonstrate to the 
United States that it is a net asset in other ways as well. Most 
important, it should seek to ensure that it is a force for stability in the 
region by working toward an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, 
calibrating its use of force, and striving to improve its ties with other 
U.S. allies such as Turkey and Gulf Arab states. Progress toward 
these aims requires not only internal deliberations in Israel and the 
United States but a frank bilateral dialogue. For all of the high-level 
interactions, visiting official delegations, and close consultation on 
key issues, the quality of dialogue on sensitive issues affecting the 
partnership has deteriorated significantly. Most politically sensitive 
issues are either deferred or addressed only superficially. As close 
partners, Israel and the United States should strengthen the current 
U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue framework to address both the 
immediate and the long-range issues that confront the partnership. A 
more transparent and honest discussion of future constraints and 
commitments could ease some doubt and rebuild trust. 
Israel and the United States Should Prepare for a Different 
Future Changes under way in Israel, the United States, and the 
Middle East ensure that the future will be different from the past. 
U.S. assistance and support for Israel over the decades have helped 
transform Israel into a powerful regional force and helped the United 
States promote regional stability for decades. Yet looking forward 
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32 
there is no guarantee that the United States will be able or willing to 
maintain the current level of support indefinitely. In the overall U.S. 
budget picture and U.S. expenditures in the Middle East, the amount 
of aid Israel receives seems inconsequential. Yet, in a fiscal 
environment where the U.S. government is debating cutting $4 
trillion in spending over the next decade, and even the U.S. military 
is not immune to budget cuts, it is shortsighted for Israel to expect 
current aid levels to remain untouched over the long term. Although 
U.S. military aid is reassuring, especially given the unprecedented 
threats Israel faces, many Israelis, inside and outside of government, 
question whether the current level of assistance is sustainable in the 
long term. U.S. aid was crucial for transforming Israel several 
decades ago, yet today it has become a symbol of Israeli dependence. 
Some level of interdependency is unavoidable and even mutually 
beneficial. U.S. military aid strengthens Israel's deterrence against 
regional armies. Strong military ties and aid also lower the risk that 
the Israel Defense Forces will take unilateral actions that undermine 
U.S. interests. Yet under shifting political and geopolitical 
circumstances, U.S. military and political assistance ultimately 
undermines Israel's long-term autonomy and ability to manage its 
own defense needs. The challenge is to maintain a degree of 
interdependence that is mutually beneficial rather than a partnership 
that reinforces Israel's dependence on the United States. There is an 
important opportunity to have the sensitive conversation over 
rethinking aid at a time when the foundation of the partnership 
remains solid and cooperation robust. The U.S. and Israeli 
governments should begin discussing gradually phasing out aid after 
the expiration of the current aid agreement, in exchange for greater 
cooperation in joint research and development as well as providing 
Israel access to a wider range of military technology. Such a trade-off 
could benefit both countries. More important is that Israel could 
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33 
advance to a new, more mature strategic partnership with the United 
States on a level with other U.S. allies such as Australia or Great 
Britain. A gradual process of phasing out U.S. aid could also provide 
Israel an opportunity to strengthen its military and economic base and 
breathe new life into its founding principles of self-sufficiency. These 
discussions should focus on maintaining Israel's QME, while relying 
more on its own procurement abilities. Overall, this process should 
include frank, high-level discussions through the U.S.-Israel Strategic 
Dialogue and the Joint Political-Military Group but must also include 
congressional leaders and pro-Israel lobbying organizations that 
promote U.S. military aid to Israel. The objective should be to 
identify areas to enhance cooperation that will help ease that gradual 
transition and over time create more durable ties and a secure Israel. 
A special working group within the Joint Political-Military Group, 
comprising defense officials and industry representatives on both 
sides, could identify appropriate defense technologies for joint 
research and development as well as specific U.S. and Israeli 
companies to undertake such projects. This would include a 
monitoring and oversight mechanism to ensure compliance with U.S. 
defense export regulations and prevent unauthorized technology 
transfer. More broadly, the United States and Israel should continue 
close military-to-military cooperation that emphasizes 
interoperability, missile defense, and deterrence, yet relies more on 
joint funding. On another level, the United States could help Israel 
expand its global emergency and humanitarian response capabilities, 
which were on display after the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Israel could also revive its efforts to 
promote technological innovation and progress in the developing 
world; this was a strong component of Israel's foreign relations in the 
1950s and 1960s, and it generated tremendous goodwill and strategic 
benefit for Israel. A more strategic approach to harnessing Israeli 
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34 
humanitarian relief and emergency response capabilities could help 
Israel combat its international isolation and rebuild its credibility as a 
force for stability. Strengthening Israel's self-sufficiency and easing 
its dependency will not solve the Iranian threat nor its other 
challenges. But relying more on its own capabilities and assets 
instead of on the United States is the best long-term guarantee of 
Israel's security. Moreover, a more transparent and honest discussion 
of future constraints and commitments could ease long-term tension 
and doubts. It is in the mutual interest of the United States and Israel 
to ensure that the partnership evolves to meet the needs of the future. 
Both should begin preparing for a time when unforeseen constraints 
will affect the nature and extent of U.S. support for Israel. 
Looking Forward 
During the last six decades, the U.S.-Israeli relationship has 
overcome many obstacles. In the months and years ahead, managing 
U.S.-Israeli relations will become more complex. The governments 
of both countries have made an effort to move beyond their 
differences and cooperate. But the mistrust runs deep. To overcome 
the current challenges and ensure more durable ties, the U.S.-Israeli 
partnership needs to adapt to changing strategic and political 
environments. The relationship should continue to strengthen Israel's 
long-term viability and security through its QME and U.S. political 
support. In return, Israel should help the United States promote 
regional stability by working more closely within America's broader 
Middle East policies, which must include Israeli efforts to resolve the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict. The challenges of addressing these 
changes are historic. Most Israelis are keenly aware that their 
relationship with the United States is changing in unforeseen ways. 
Many understand that Israel needs a strategic vision to help repair ties 
with the United States. Yet Israel's deep political divisions and 
complicated governing system make articulating such a vital strategic 
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35 
vision a monumental task. Israelis see change ahead and are 
contemplating how strategic and political shifts under way in the 
United States and in their own country may transform the partnership 
down the road. Yet they are unsure about the contours of a future 
relationship or how they might help shape that future. The strength 
and durability of the U.S.-Israeli partnership throughout the last six 
decades has been the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The 
foresight to adapt was driven by bold leaders taking difficult 
decisions. The danger ahead is that leaders on both sides will choose 
ambivalence over decisiveness. Neither path is preordained. 
Whatever the future holds, the role of creative and courageous leaders 
will shape the contours of the U.S.-Israeli partnership that will 
emerge in the decades ahead. 
Haim Malka is deputy director and senior fellow in the Middle East 
Program at CSIS. His principal areas of research include violent 
nonstate actors, the Arab-Israeli conflict, North Africa, and political 
Islam. Before joining CSIS in 2005, he was a research analyst at the 
Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, 
where he concentrated on Israeli-Palestinian issues and U.S. Middle 
East foreign policy. 
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