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The 
Shimon Post 
17 Se tember, 2011 
The Economist 
America in the middle between Israel, Turkey, Egypt 
and Palestine  
The Christian Science Monitor 
An Israel in trouble makes a peace deal more urgent 
John Hughes 
Foreign Policy 
Will Congress make the Israel Mess Worse? 
James Traub 
NYT 
Ten Reasons for a European 'Yes' 
Martti Ahtisaari and Javier Solana 
Article 1. 
Article 2. 
Article 3. 
Article 4. 
Presidential Press Bulletin 
Article 5. 
Article 6. 
Wall Street Journal 
Optimists Were Wrong About the Arab Spring 
Josef Joffe 
CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies 
The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership 
Haim Malka 
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The Economist 
America in the middle between Israel, 
Turkey, Egypt and Palestine 
Sep 17th 2011 -- WHEN is anything going to go right for Barack 
Obama in the Middle East? The president came to office hoping to 
deliver a two-state solution in Palestine, and wasted a lot of political 
capital failing to do so. He wanted dearly to put America on the right 
side of the Arab spring, though this entailed joining a war in one 
Arab country (Libya) while looking on helplessly while another 
(Syria) slaughtered its own citizens. Now he has been drawn into a 
tangle of quarrels between America's best friends in the eastern 
Mediterranean, from which there may be no exit. 
Only yesterday, or so it seems, the eastern Mediterranean was a 
tranquil lake, policed congenially by the American sixth fleet. Israel, 
Egypt and Turkey were all friends not only of the United States but 
also of one another. Over the years, it is true, the peace between 
Israel and Egypt grew cold. After the 2008 Gaza war between Israel 
and Hamas a frost settled on relations between Israel and Turkey as 
well. Behind the scenes, however, the governments (and armed 
forces) of the three countries seemed happy to stick to their strategic 
understandings, leading policymakers in America to hope that this 
might be at least one virtuous triangle in the otherwise vicious 
geometry of the Middle East. No longer. On September 10th Mr 
Obama and his defence secretary, Leon Panetta, found themselves in 
frantic phone calls with Israel's prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, 
and Field-Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, the chairman of 
Egypt's governing council, striving to save Israel's staff in Cairo 
from a mob that had invaded its embassy. Egyptian soldiers rescued 
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the trapped Israelis. But the spectacle of Israel's ambassador being 
plucked from the jaws of the Arab spring to the safety of Jerusalem 
was a signal of what the Arab democratic awakening might mean for 
the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, Jimmy Carter's proudest 
achievement and the foundation on which America's Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy has stood for more than 30 years. 
At the same time, America has been struggling without success to 
repair the breach between Israel and Turkey that followed Israel's 
killing of eight Turks and a Turkish-American on board the Mavi 
Marmara when it tried to break the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza 
Strip in May last year. An elaborate plan to patch up the quarrel 
collapsed when Mr Netanyahu's prideful coalition partners refused to 
let him go beyond expressing regret and offer a formal apology. 
Turkey's own response has now gone into rhetorical overdrive: on 
top of booting out Israel's ambassador, suspending defence ties and 
threatening legal action, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, 
appeared at one point to hint that Turkish warships might escort 
future aid convoys to Gaza. 
As in the case of the growing tensions between Israel and Egypt, the 
rupture between Israel and Turkey leaves America helplessly in the 
middle. Turkey is a NATO partner; Israel is America's special friend. 
The State Department says forlornly that it would like to see "these 
two strong allies of the United States" work together in search of 
regional stability. That will not happen any time soon. A UN report 
finding Israel's naval blockade legal, even if its use of force was 
"excessive", makes it even harder for Mr Netanyahu to give Mr 
Erdogan his apology. Mr Erdogan, likening Israel to a "spoiled 
child", has meanwhile gone on the warpath. He was in Cairo this 
week, at the beginning of a tour of the Arab world, winning the 
admiration of rapturous Egyptian crowds for his belligerent blasts 
against Israel. 
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Not content with standing on Turkey's own national honour, Mr 
Erdogan is also intent on making Turkey a champion of the 
Palestinians. Having felt personally slighted when Israel launched its 
Gaza war just when he was trying to mediate between Israel and 
Syria, he has now thrown Turkey's support behind the Palestinians' 
plan to give up on the interminable "peace process" and take their 
quest for statehood directly to the United Nations later this month. 
"Let's raise the flag of Palestine to the sky and let it be a symbol of 
justice and peace in the Middle East," he told a meeting of Arab 
League foreign ministers in Cairo. 
The Americans, who are the chief sponsor of the interminable peace 
process, are appalled by this idea. However strong an advocate he 
may be of a Palestinian state, Mr Obama says that trying to create one 
via a UN resolution, without a negotiated agreement, will be a 
"distraction". It could be much worse than that. Israel and its friends 
in Congress are considering dire retaliation, including cutting off 
financial aid and tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority. Security 
co-operation between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank 
might collapse, sparking a new intifada. So unless the Palestinians 
thoroughly dilute their planned resolution, Mr Obama will almost 
certainly veto it if it reaches the Security Council. That would give 
his pro-Israel credentials a needed pre-election boost, but might 
shatter all his strenuous efforts to improve America's standing with 
the Arabs. 
Paying the Israel premium 
American officials sped to the region this week, hoping, with 
European help, to avert a collision at the UN. But even if they 
succeed, America's Middle East diplomacy will be a mess. Though 
Egypt's present rulers might not welcome a rupture with Israel, the 
forces unleashed by its revolution will continue to push for one. Mr 
Erdogan's Israel-bashing will continue as well, because it is driven 
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not just by a grievance but also by a strategic decision to put Turkey 
on the right side of the Arab spring after Mr Erdogan spent too long 
ignoring the massacres in neighbouring Syria. That may seem hard 
on Israel, but the Jewish state is paying what some call a "Netanyahu 
premium" for its prime minister's intransigence towards the 
Palestinians. And America, whose president also wanted so much to 
get on the right side of the Arab spring, will pay a growing premium 
for its friendship with Israel. 
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o 
The Christian Science Monitor 
An Israel in trouble makes a peace deal 
more urgent 
John Hughes 
September 16, 2011 -- If the dramatic upheaval taking place 
throughout the Arab world is to have a constructive outcome, a 
critical necessity is peace between Arabs and Israelis. On this issue, 
the world is now at crunch time. 
The choice is clear: New descent into the senseless antagonism and 
violence that has bedeviled the Arab- Israeli relationship for decades, 
or a two-state agreement providing security for Israel and a sovereign 
homeland for Palestinians. 
The prospects are not great. As one Arab nation after another is 
wrestling with the emergence from dictatorship into freedom, Israel, 
the most democratic country in the region, is confronted by an 
unenviable series of developments: 
1. Egypt after Hosni Mubarak is seeing a surge of anti-Israel clamor, 
in which mobs have sacked the Israeli Embassy in Cairo and sent its 
diplomats fleeing. 
2. Hamas, the extremist Palestinian organization that already holds 
sway in Gaza, has been making inroads in the West Bank, run by the 
more moderate Fatah. 
3. The United States, Israel's staunchest ally, risks Arab isolation 
because of its opposition to the Palestinian push for statehood at the 
United Nations. The US says it will veto any attempt for full 
recognition of Palestine through the UN Security Council. 
Washington also objects to a possible vote by the UN General 
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Assembly, which would likely approve a nonvoting "observer" status 
for Palestine. 
4. Syria, whose negotiation over the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights 
would be a critical part of any peace agreement, is in turmoil and its 
leadership is in question. It can hardly, at present, be seen as a 
responsible participant in discussions with Israel. 
5. Turkey, which has sought a more influential role in the Middle 
East, is taking a significantly more aggressive attitude toward Israel. 
It once brokered negotiations between Syria and Israel; now it 
threatens to use its warships to challenge Israel's blockade of Gaza, 
with which Israel seeks to prevent arms reaching Hamas. The Turks 
have expelled the Israeli ambassador. 
6. As if all this negative news for Israel were not enough, Iran seems 
on faster course to acquiring a nuclear weapon or weapons. Could 
Iran, which has blustered about "obliterating" Israel, be irrational 
enough to threaten Israel with a nuclear missile if it produces one? 
The danger is that Israel, which has its own nuclear arsenal, might not 
wait long enough to find out. Although Iran is not an Arab nation, it 
is Islamic, and such a nuclear confrontation would wreak havoc in the 
Middle East as Arab friends and foes of Iran and Israel respectively 
took sides, even — especially in the case of Saudi Arabia — to the 
point of developing their own nuclear arsenals. 
The most immediate of these problems demanding solution is the 
Palestinians' determination to press for statehood recognition at the 
UN. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas claims this 
move stems from deep frustration over the lack of any positive 
negotiation on an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, and that 
statehood would put Palestine on equal footing with Israel for further 
talks. 
The US argues that there is no shortcut to statehood, and a UN move 
by the Palestinians only complicates negotiations. The US Congress, 
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largely pro-Israel, might well cut off aid to the Palestinians if the UN 
moves favorably on statehood. 
As long as a festering Israeli-Palestinian relationship, in which the 
US appears to favor Israel, continues, it will undermine the Obama 
administration's efforts to improve US relations with the Arab world. 
The US has enormous stakes in seeing that an edgy Israel and the 
Palestinians, who have a legitimate claim to a homeland of their own, 
achieve the accord that has so far eluded them. 
The crux of any agreement would be that Israel and Palestine should 
be independent states, living side by side with guarantees of security 
for each. There are difficult details to be worked out, political issues 
concerning borders, and immensely sensitive religious issues over the 
future of Jerusalem. Nobody suggests this is easy. 
But the consequences of failure are unthinkable. 
John Hughes, a former editor of the Monitor, writes a biweekly 
column. 
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Foreign Policy 
Will Congress make the Israel Mess 
Worse? 
James Traub 
September 16, 2011 -- With barely a week to go before the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks a vote on statehood at the United 
Nations, members of U.S. Congress have begun to stage a lively 
competition for the most elaborately punitive legislative response. 
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
has prepared a bill that would withhold funds "from any UN agency 
or program that upgrades the status of the PLO/Palestinian observer 
mission," a measure that cleverly kills two abhorred birds -- the 
United Nations and the Palestinians -- with one stone. Rep. Steve 
Israel, a New York Democrat, did her one better with a measure that 
would eliminate bilateral military assistance for any country that 
voted for statehood, thus punishing dozens of America's allies for 
expressing a difference of opinion. But Rep. Joe Walsh, a right-wing 
Republican from Illinois, took the cake with a resolution endorsing 
Israel's right to annex the West Bank should the PA go ahead with the 
vote, thus putting an end to a two-state solution. Walsh has proudly 
noted that he is copying a radical right-wing bill introduced into the 
Knesset. 
This cynical bidding war demonstrates that blind partnership for 
Israel crosses both partisan and confessional lines: Anti-Semitic 
conspiracy theorists should note that Christians, not Jews, have 
sponsored much of this legislative blackmail. Fortunately, none of it 
has a chance of becoming law; the Senate is unlikely even to take up 
any of these measures. But there is one bill that sounds just sane 
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enough to pose a genuine threat: a House subcommittee has inserted 
language into an appropriations bill that would cut U.S. budgetary 
support to the PA should the Palestinians go ahead with the U.N. 
vote. Compared with all the loony bills, says Jeremy Ben-Ami, head 
of J Street, the liberal Israel lobbying group, "only cutting Palestinian 
aid begins to look like a compromise position." 
Some compromise. Right now, the United States provides slightly 
more than $500 million a year to the Palestinian Authority. Of that, 
$200 million goes straight into the Palestinian budget. It is these 
"Economic Support Funds" that the House measure targets. That's 
only about 15 percent of the PA's $1.3 billion budget; but the 
Palestinians already have a $600 million deficit and stopped paying 
public salaries last month. Unless the Saudis or other Gulf Arabs 
make up the difference -- and it's their failure to make promised 
payments that has created the shortfall -- the enormous progress that 
the PA has made in building a state could grind to a halt. It's possible, 
though unlikely, that an additional $200 million shortfall could lead 
the PA to collapse. But it's nearly certain that the government's 
legitimacy will suffer -- and that United States will be blamed. 
Nita Lowey, a New York Democrat and the ranking member on the 
House committee overseeing foreign aid, has been a leading 
supporter of the move to threaten the cut in funding. Unlike Walsh, 
who has said, "There is no such thing as a two-state solution" and 
believes that peace will come through "Israel having sovereignty over 
the whole land," Lowey has been a strong supporter of the PA's state-
building process and the U.S. funding that has helped make it 
possible. I asked why she was prepared to put all that in jeopardy to 
punish the Palestinians for seeking a vote on statehood. "There has to 
be a line in the sand," she said. The unilateral bid for statehood 
undermines the peace process. "The Palestinians," Lowey said, "will 
have to deal with the consequences." 
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But it's not just the Palestinians who will bear the consequences. 
Anything that jeopardizes the authority of the PA -- and by extension 
the moderate Fatah faction -- opens the door to its rival, Hamas, 
which of course would truly bring the peace process to a halt. And 
anger over an American decision to not only obstruct the Palestinian 
bid for statehood but punish its citizens will prove costly for the 
United States in a new Middle East where public opinion -- and 
people power -- increasingly matters. 
I asked Lowey whether she worried about these consequences. "I 
worry," she said, "about the Palestinian Authority going to the U.N." 
She wasn't thinking about the consequences; that was the 
Palestinians' job. At moments like this, I can't help feeling that 
Congress should not be allowed to make foreign policy. 
Lowey said that she still hoped that the Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas would sheer off before she and her colleagues had 
to deploy their doomsday device. "I am an optimist," she kept 
repeating, pointing to the U.S. team, led by White House official 
Dennis Ross, that has been dispatched to the Middle East to gain 
Israeli and Palestinian agreement on a new framework of negotiations 
to be held under the aegis of the so-called Quartet, thus derailing the 
bid for statehood. But these discussions are in fact a shadow play; it 
is widely understood that Abbas cannot afford to abort the effort 
unless Israel makes the kind of concessions that it plainly is not 
prepared to make. Indeed, Abbas just delivered a speech rejecting the 
diplomatic bid and vowing to seek statehood at the U.N. Security 
Council. 
Lowey and her colleagues are threatening the Palestinians with doom 
for refusing to engage with a peace process that is self-evidently 
dead. Palestinian leaders have been quite open about the fact that they 
chose the U.N. path only after they concluded that Washington could 
not or would not push Israel into making meaningful concessions. 
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"We know there is no escape from negotiations," a Palestinian 
official is quoted as saying in a recent report by the International 
Crisis Group. "We have no options because the process' sponsor has 
checked out." The U.N. statehood bid, then, is more a gesture of 
despair than an act of calculated diplomacy. 
Kay Granger, chairman of Lowey's subcommittee and author of the 
legislative language terminating aid, recently described the upcoming 
vote as a "train wreck" -- which it may well be. Granger was of 
course blaming the Palestinians, who are driving the train. But this 
looming calamity has less to do with Palestinian stubbornness than 
with Israeli intransigence and American paralysis, both conditioned 
in part by the pro-Israel (right or wrong) crowd in Congress. In their 
despair, the Palestinians really may do something genuinely self-
destructive. Abbas is fully aware that the United States would veto an 
attempt to gain statehood in the Security Council. That would be a 
train wreck, bringing terrible harm both to U.S. standing in the Arab 
world and to the Palestinians' standing in the United States. It's the 
one thing that might make Senate action on an aid cutoff 
unavoidable, thus turning Granger's metaphor into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
President Barack Obama's administration is now trying to line up 
enough votes at the Security Council to make a veto unnecessary and 
then persuade the Palestinians to go instead to the General Assembly, 
which could not grant statehood but could upgrade their status to that 
of "nonmember observer state," like the Vatican. Of course, the 
United States would oppose this too; and the Obama administration is 
hoping to reduce the Palestinians' expected margin of victory in the 
General Assembly by peeling off key European allies. That, 
according to a senior congressional aide, a U.S. diplomat, and an 
expert in the region, is the real purpose of the administration's 
eleventh-hour dash to the Middle East: to devise language 
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sufficiently acceptable to EU countries that they would agree to vote 
against the Palestinians in the Security Council or the General 
Assembly. 
This is what U.S. diplomacy on the Middle East has come to. It didn't 
have to be this way. Perhaps if Obama didn't have to worry about the 
political consequences, he would be trying to find the least 
confrontational way of giving the Palestinians the dignity of 
enhanced status at the United Nations. Perhaps administration 
officials would now be trying to draft a General Assembly resolution 
that the Palestinians could accept, and that Israel could almost live 
with. 
But they're not; in fact, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice 
recently felt compelled to squash rumors that the United States was 
doing any such thing, lest the Obama administration be accused of 
accepting an unacceptable reality. Instead, the United States will 
stand fast with its great friends in the Marshall Islands, and perhaps 
some EU members, in opposing an upgrade in Palestinian status at 
the United Nations. Then Congress may punish the Palestinians for 
their effrontery. And the Palestinians may react badly. And then the 
Israelis may react badly. And then the Arab street may react badly. 
Welcome to the train wreck. 
James Traub is a contributing writer for the New York Times 
Magazine and author of most recently, The Freedom Agenda. 
"Terms of Engagement,". 
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NYT 
Ten Reasons for a European 'Yes' 
Martti Ahtisaari and Javier Solana 
September 16, 2011 -- It is not often that Europe has the chance to 
play a pivotal role on the world stage. But as the Palestinians push for 
recognition as a state at the United Nations later this month, the 
European Union is finding itself courted by each side, and therefore 
more influential on the Middle East process than at any time since the 
Oslo Accords. As ever, the biggest challenge facing the E.U.'s 27 
member states is presenting a unified front. There are 10 compelling 
reasons for them to coalesce around a "yes" vote and keep the two-
state approach to Middle East peace alive. The critical vote is likely 
to be in the General Assembly, on a resolution to upgrade the 
Palestinians' status from observer to non-member state. The 
Palestinians are likely to get a majority, but what matters more than 
the outcome of the vote is its size and composition. The Israeli 
government is lobbying hard for a "no," and the P.L.O., unable to 
significantly shape realities on the ground, hopes to at least show 
some diplomatic traction for its continued faith in the two-state 
approach. Europeans find themselves in the unusual position of being 
the key prize in this tussle. 
The first reason why the E.U. 27 should vote "yes" is that the U.N. 
resolution is an attempt to keep the two-state solution alive. This 
solution is under attack from the steady expansion of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories, and from Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu's belief that the conflict should now be 
accepted as "insoluble." As a result this vote is not a meaningless 
distraction, but a reaffirmation that the peace process is meaningful. 
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The second reason for a European "yes" is that the Europeans have 
already invested hugely in the two-state solution that is under 
scrutiny, including the annual £1 billion aid to help build a 
functioning Palestinian state. Again, a "yes" is a reaffirmation that 
the project is worthwhile and can succeed. 
The third reason for a "yes" is simply to respond positively to 
Mahmoud Abbas' state-building achievements. Failing to vote "yes" 
would be to respond to demands for state-building by refusing to 
formally acknowledge where they have got to. 
The fourth reason is about the Arab Spring. Anything other than a 
"yes" would expose Europeans to charges of double standards from 
both post-revolutionary governments and conservative Arab regimes 
(for different reasons) for failing to support rights for Palestinians 
while advocating them elsewhere. 
Usefully, a "yes" also aligns European interests with European values 
(the fifth reason), as it resets regional relationships. Interests —
including preventing jihadist terrorism, containing Iran, security 
energy supplies and retaining markets for our exports — would all be 
damaged by perceived hypocrisy on the Israel/Palestinian conflict. 
Despite concerns from Atlanticists that a "yes" will damage relations 
with the United States, arguably it could also be in Washington's 
interests (the sixth reason). The U.S. is unable to vote "yes" for 
evident domestic reasons, but the E.U. 27 doing so would strengthen 
America's hand when dealing with Israel. In the words of William 
Hague, a healthy trans-Atlantic relationship would be solid rather 
than slavish. 
The seventh and eighth reasons concern Israel. The Israelis' 
objections to the vote — that it is unilateral and violates previous 
agreements — do not hold water, and are no reason for Europe not to 
vote "yes." Although the vote would open up negotiating options for 
Palestine that are currently closed, overall it might even help Israel. 
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Moves toward recognition of Palestinian statehood within 1967 
borders would reinforce the legitimacy of Israel's own existence. 
Despite Israeli fears, it would not necessarily open an easier path for 
Palestinian recourse to the International Criminal Court, and might 
give Europe a position from which it could pursue a quiet 
understanding with the Palestinians that they would not pursue I.C.C. 
jurisdiction for a significant period, drawing the sting from this 
troubling issue. 
The ninth reason for a European "yes" is that it would not make 
Palestinian violence more likely. Indeed, a combination of perceived 
failure and the influence of the Arab Spring could touch off a "third 
intifada." Squeezed between Israel and the invigorating sight of 
televised uprisings, the Palestinian authorities need a sign of progress 
if they are to prevent frustrations turning to violence. European 
endorsement of their statehood would be a powerful public signal that 
progress is possible. 
Finally, a "yes" at the U.N. does not entail bilateral recognition of 
Palestine. The vote is for upgrading representation at the U.N., and 
only individual states can bestow recognition on Palestine. 
There is of course an 11th reason for a unified European "yes" vote. 
The world already has enough examples of European inability to play 
an effective international role. Optimists will hope that Europeans 
will, this time, surprise us all by doing the right thing and securing 
themselves a much-needed diplomatic success in the process. 
Martti Ahtisaari, a former president of Finland and U.N. mediator, 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2008. Javier Solana is a 
distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings 
Institution, and served as secretary general of NATO and E. U. high 
representative for common foreign and security policy. 
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Wall Street Journal 
Optimists Were Wrong About the Arab 
Spring 
Josef Joffe 
September 16, 2011 -- I wasn't alone, but the mea culpa is all mine. 
Like many, I thought that dawn was finally breaking over the Arab 
world when those nice, middle-class crowds thronged Cairo's Tahrir 
Square chanting "freedom" and "democracy" without burning 
American and Israeli flags. What a miracle, I mused: The dogs of 
hate are not barking. And what a wondrous moment of 
transcendence! Free the people, and they will free themselves from 
the obsession of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism their overlords 
had implanted to distract them from misery and oppression. 
It was a false dawn—and not only because of the sacking of the 
Israeli embassy in Cairo last week. On my desk sits a Reuters photo 
dated May 13; the caption reads: "People burn an Israeli flag during a 
demonstration on Tahrir Square." There were no such symbols of 
"Arab rage" when the protests erupted in late January. 
The demons of yore are back, and presumably, they have never left. 
The Friday demonstration on Tahrir Square was at first standard 
fare—yet another protest against the military regime. But at the end, 
several thousands armed with Palestinian flags, crowbars and 
hammers marched off to the Israeli embassy for a bit of 
deconstructionist work. 
But there is more. For six hours, desperate Israeli leaders tried to 
contact the junta; its leader Field Marshall Tantawi refused to speak 
with either the prime minister or his defense minister. It took another 
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seven before Egyptian security forces rescued the last Israeli—
perhaps only because Washington had interceded in the meantime. 
The moral of this tale is simple. The revolution isn't going anywhere, 
and life is as miserable as always. So how about a little pogrom? It 
wasn't the junta that invented this stratagem, but our good friend 
Hosni Mubarak now fighting for his life in a Cairo courtroom. How 
do despots stay in power amid poverty, hopelessness and repression? 
By feeding the people the heady brew of hatred against the "Other." 
But why Israel, a neighbor officially recognized by Cairo and granted 
30 years of peace? An iron law of Arab politics cracks the paradox: 
the better state-to-state relations, the worse the anti-Americanism and 
anti-Semitism within. Jew hatred? Isn't it just righteous anti-Israelism 
fed by the plight of the Palestinians? Go to a bookstore in Cairo, 
Amman or Riyadh—all quasi-allies of Israel—and you will find piles 
of anti-Semitic tracts. They are in Arabic, but a 100% import from 
yesterday's Europe—blood libel, world conquest and all. Ditto the 
TV fare and newspaper cartoons, which depict the Jew as 
bloodsuckers or cannibals. 
Mubarak et al had struck a devil's bargain with their peoples: I'll treat 
with the infidels, and you gorge yourselves on the fantasies that keep 
you in line. The mistake of Arab Spring optimists like me was to 
ignore the stubborn reality behind the well-worn tactic. They should 
have asked: Why would the despots call on those particular demons? 
Because they are an integral part of Arab political culture, hence so 
easy to rouse. The import of European anti-Semitism began in the 
'30s, long before Israel's birth, let alone its conquest of the West 
Bank. 
To invoke "essentialism"—deep and enduring traits—when looking 
at a culture, is a tricky thing. Cultures do change, even profoundly—
look at Germany's breathtaking leap from Nazism into liberal 
democracy. But the sad trajectory of the Egyptian revolution, going 
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toxic only after a few weeks, confirms the depth of the loathing. 
Acceptance of the "Other" who is the Jew (or even a Copt) is not a 
pillar of Islamic culture. But the opposite—abhorrence—is such 
superb cement for societies rent by myriad conflicts: between sects, 
classes, tribes and nationalities, between modernity and tradition, city 
and country, devout and secular. To serve as target and unifier has 
been the fate of Jews in Europe, and it remains their fate in Arabia. 
Nor does it help to apologize, as the hapless effort of the Netanyahu 
government demonstrated when it tried to soothe tempers after five 
Egyptian soldiers were inadvertently killed when Israeli troops were 
pursuing militants along the Sinai border last month. The message of 
the mob in Cairo was: The embassy must go, the peace must go, 
Israel must go. 
Is there no way out? Sure there is. Happy societies don't need the 
barbarians at the gate. But Arab society is not happy, which is why 
the clash within drives the conflict without, spilling over into Europe 
and, on 9/11, into the United States. 
When will it ever end? Not soon. Take Sweden, a nice Protestant 
place. In the 17th century, it was the scourge of Europe, conquering 
about half of the Holy Roman Empire's states. It stopped fighting in 
1814, taking the slow road to development and democracy instead. 
Only in the mid-20th century did it become such admirable model of 
tranquility. Would that history moves a bit faster in this century. 
Mr. Joffe is editor of Die Zeit in Hamburg, a senior fellow of the 
Freeman-Spogli Institute, and a fellow of the Hoover Institution. 
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AniCIC 6. 
CSIS 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Crossroads: The Future of the U.S.-Israel 
Strategic Partnership (Executive Summary + key 
findings and recommendations) 
Haim Malka 
Executive Summary 
Sep 16, 2011 - Profound demographic, social, and political 
transformations are reshaping the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Changes 
under way in both the United States and Israel have eroded traditional 
pillars of the relationship, brought new elements to the fore, and 
contributed to debates in each country about how to defend that 
country's interests in a rapidly changing strategic environment. 
Uncertainty is growing about how the United States and Israel can 
and should cooperate to secure their interests and confront common 
challenges in a region undergoing dramatic shifts. Even more 
profoundly, Americans and Israelis increasingly see each other's 
policy choices as undermining their interests. The trend deepens U.S. 
doubts of Israel's strategic value and reinforces Israeli fears about 
U.S. commitments and guarantees to its security. Many argue that 
rising tensions in the bilateral relationship are transient, the mere by-
products of a left-leaning U.S. president and a right-leaning Israeli 
prime minister. Others suggest the tensions stem from short-term 
policy differences over confronting Iran and resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Yet the real issue is far more profound. The United 
States and Israel have changed and continue to change, but the two 
countries' relationship has not kept pace. For years, the growing 
differences have been papered over, but continuing to do so is both 
unsustainable and counterproductive. Denial of the differences risks 
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