EFTA01116468

Filing # 33747975 E-Filed 10/27/2015 04:45:57 PM 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: CACE 15-000072 
BRADLEY J. EDWARDS and 
PAUL G. CASSELL, 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants, 
vs. 
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff. 
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIM PLAINTIFF ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ'S 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS' 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO COMPEL 
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ ("Dershowitz"), through 
counsel, hereby files his Reply to the Response filed by Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants' 
BRADLEY J. EDWARDS ("Edwards") and PAUL G. CASSELL ("Cassell") (together, 
"Plaintiffs") in opposition to Dershowitz's Motion to Compel Production of Documents and 
Complete Responses to Interrogatories (the "Motion to Compel" ),I
INTRODUCTION 
At the outset of their Response, Plaintiffs spend several pages attempting to document at 
At issue are Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants' discovery responses and objections in 
Dershowitz's Motion to Compel, as well as Edwards's Objection to Request No. 2 in Response 
to Dershowitz's Second Set of Document Requests and Cassell's Objection to Request No. 2 in 
Response to Dershowitz's Third Set of Document Requests, per Dershowitz's Amended Notice 
of Hearing dated September 10, 2015. Plaintiffs served these additional discovery responses 
after Dershowitz's Motion to Compel had been filed with the Court but maintain, in part, the 
same objections. Dershowitz therefore added them on to the presently scheduled hearing for 
purposes of efficiency, as opposed to preparing an entirely new amended motion. 
EFTA01116468

length their discovery efforts. It is undisputed that Edwards and Cassell have filed responses to 
Dershowitz's discovery requests and commenced their production of documents. However, 
Edwards and Cassell are not the triers of fact who have authority to decide what is relevant, 
permissible, and proper discovery, through their own self-serving definition of "responsiveness." 
As set forth in Dershowitz's Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs' interrogatory responses and document 
production are incomplete, with no date certain as to when they will be completed. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs have asserted objections that have been waived or lack a sufficient basis in law or fact. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Attorney-Client Privilege Has Been Waived.2 Plaintiffs argue in their 
Response that they have properly asserted the attorney-client privilege in response to 
Dershowitz's discovery requests and that Dershowitz's reliance on the "at issue" waiver doctrine 
is misplaced. See Response, pp. 3-9. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs contend that they (as 
counsel) cannot waive a privilege that belongs to their client, 
f/k/a Jane Doe 
No. 3 (1=.
3 This argument fails for several reasons. First, 
herself has waived the 
privilege by making repeated and voluntary statements about her allegations about being a "sex 
2 Plaintiffs filed a privilege log in this lawsuit that broadly and only categorically asserts the 
attorney-client and work product privileges. A copy of Plaintiffs' First Privilege Log is attached 
as Exhibit A. Until Plaintiffs produce an itemized privilege log, Dershowitz cannot determine 
which particular documents are being withheld, let alone other relevant information about the 
withheld documents (e.g., date, author, subject matter). Because Dershowitz is not in a position 
to tailor his arguments to specific assertions of privilege, Dershowitz addresses the asserted 
privileges both broadly and categorically, as Plaintiffs have done. Dershowitz also filed with the 
Court a Motion for Finding of Waiver Based on Plaintiffs' Failure to Provide a Privilege Log or, 
in the alternative, to Compel Plaintiffs to Provide an Itemized Privilege Log, which remains 
pending. If the Court were to grant said Motion first, the Court's ruling may moot the subject 
Motion to Compel, in full or in part, with regard to privilege objections — at least, for the time 
being. 
At a recent public deposition in this case, 
'yen name was used on multiple occasions 
in the presence of her counsel, who did not raise any o jection. 
has waived any 
purported "privacy interest" in proceeding anonymously. 
2 
EFTA01116469

slave" who was sexually trafficked by Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein") to his purported associates. 
Second, Florida law is clear that an attorney's actions can result in a waiver of the client's 
privilege, even where those actions are not authorized by the client. As set forth in the Motion 
to Compel, Plaintiffs have waived the attorney-client privilege for their communications with 
y filing this defamation action and placing at issue the veracity oi
llegations 
against Dershowitz and their investigation into same. Plaintiffs' own discovery responses and 
testimony have confirmed that they will rely on their communications wiao 
attempt to 
prevail on their claims and defeat Dershowitz's affirmative defenses, meaning that such 
communications are inextricably merged with this lawsuit. Upholding Plaintiffs' assertion of the 
attorney-client privilege in these circumstances would result in nothing more than the 
concealment of the truth. Plaintiffs' objections on the basis of the attorney-client privilege 
should be overruled. 
2. 
Plaintiffs Have Waived Their Right To Rely On The Work Product Doctrine, 
And Herskowitz Has In Any Event Established A Need For The Withheld Infinmation.4
Plaintiffs argue that Dershowitz has cited no authority and has not met his burden to show that 
Plaintiffs' assertion of the work product doctrine should be overcome. Plaintiffs are again 
mistaken. Dershowitz has identified specific work product that he needs to defend this case and 
that cannot be obtained from another source. Moreover, Plaintiffs (the holders of the protection) 
have also waived their right to rely on the work product doctrine. Dershowitz is therefore 
entitled to the requested discovery. 
3. 
Plaintiffs' Remaining Objections Must Be Overruled. Plaintiffs represent that 
they have produced what they deem to be relevant and admissible discovery and have withheld 
4 See supra, fn. 2. 
3 
EFTA01116470

what they contend is irrelevant, inadmissible, and/or privileged discovery. Again, Plaintiffs are 
in error. First, it is clear from a review of Plaintiffs' production as well as Plaintiffs' actions in 
conducting discovery that their production is incomplete and unfinished. Second, Plaintiffs' 
general and broad references to thousands of pages of public litigation documents (including 
non-substantive documents like notices of hearing, notices of deposition, etc.) in response to 
Dershowitz's very specific discovery requests are insufficient. 
Plaintiffs cannot compel 
Dershowitz to go on a fishing expedition. Third, discovery requests directed at Plaintiffs' and 
bias, intent, motivation, and credibility seek information that is directly relevant and 
subject to production. For these reasons and as set forth in Dershowitz's Motion to Compel, 
Plaintiffs' arguments fail. 
4. 
In sum, the Court should (a) overrule Plaintiffs' objections to the discovery 
requests, including in particular, those asserted on the basis of attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine; (b) compel Plaintiffs to provide better answers to interrogatories and produce 
all responsive documents in a timely manner; and (c) order Plaintiffs, upon completion of their 
document production, to state that they have, in fact, completed production. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. 
Communications between Plaintiffs and l
nor to the formation of the 
attorney-client relationship in March 20T, are not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. 
t
As an initial matter, any communications between Plaintiffs 
an'
 
hat pre-date the 
formation of the attorney-client relationship in March 2014 are not privileged. In their privilege 
log — which Plaintiffs served on Dershowitz after the filing of the Motion to Compel — Plaintiffs 
indicate that they began representing= 
March 2014. See Ex. A. Plaintiffs' assertion of 
the attorney-client privilege as to communications with 
prior to March 2014 should 
4 
EFTA01116471

therefore be overruled, and Plaintiffs should be compelled to produce same.5
II. 
The attorney-client privilege between Plaintiffs anus 
been waived. 
In their Response, Plaintiffs maintain that the attorney-client privilege has not been 
waived with respect to their communications with n
or two primary reasons: 
(1) Plaintiffs, as counsel, cannot waive the attorney-client privilege, which is owned b 
and (2) the elements of the at issue doctrine have not been established. Both of these arguments 
fail. 
a. IMIvaived 
the attorney-client privilege through her voluntary public 
statements. 
Assuming — contrary to established Florida law, as discussed below — that the attorney-
client privilege can be waived only by the client, 
has clearly waived any privilege for her 
communications with Plaintiffs relating to her experiences as a "sex slave." On December 30, 
2014, Plaintiffs filed a pleading in a federal proceeding titled "Jane Doe #3 and Jane Doe #4's 
Motion Pursuant to Rule 21 for Joinder in Action" (the "Joinder Motion"), on behalf of their 
client-In 
the Joinder Motion, Plaintiffs anc
lleged that "[Jeffrey] Epstein [ ] 
sexually trafficked the then-minor Jane Doe [#3], making her available for sex to politically-
connected and financially-powerful people." In several paragraphs that have since been ordered 
stricken from the record by United States District Judge Kenneth Marra as "lurid" allegations 
that were "unnecessary," "immaterial," and "impertinent," the Joinder Motion alleged that non-
party Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein") require'
 to have sexual relations with Dershowitz in 
5 To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that such communications are protected by a joint defense 
and/or common interest privilege, that privilege has been waived for the reasons discussed in 
Section II. Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiffs contend that such communications are protected 
by the work product doctrine, that protection also has been waived, as set forth in Section III. 
5 
EFTA01116472

certain specific locations, among other allegations of criminal conduct by Dershowitz.6
subsequently submitted multiple sworn affidavits repeating the allegations against Dershowitz, 
which likewise have been stricken from the record by Judge Marra as being "unnecessary," 
"immaterial," and "impertinent." 
Although the Joinder Motion marked the first time that Plaintiffs and 
publicly 
accused Dershowitz of sexual misconduct. 
reviously made repeated and voluntary 
public statements regarding her allegations of sexual misconduct involving Epstein. 
In 
particular: 
• Interviews 
with the Press. On March 5, 2011 (almost four years prior to 
the Joinder Motion), 
gave an interview to the Daily Mail, a British tabloid 
publication, in which she described in detail how she was purportedly recruited by 
Epstein for sexual exploitation. See Daily Mail Article dated March 5, 2011, attached 
as Exhibit B. According to the Daily Mail, 
was exceptionally descriptive in 
the interview; the tabloid noted that "for reasons of taste, not all of the details 
[provided by Jane Doe No. 3] can be included here." See Ex. B. 
• anterviews 
with Counsel. On April 7, 2011awas 
interviewed by 
Edwards and Plaintiffs' counsel of record in this case, Jack Scarola ("Scarola"). See 
Transcript of Interview of 
dated April 7, 2011, attached as Exhibit C. The 
interview focused on 
account of being purportedly sexually abused and 
sexually trafficked by Epstein, including to Epstein's friends. Id. Neither Edwards 
nor Scarola were 
counsel at the time. See id., pp. 1, 7; see also Ex. A, 
In light of Judge Marra's order, Dershowitz does not attach hereto any of the documents that 
contain or reference the stricken allegations. A motion for leave to file the relevant documents 
under seal will be filed separately. 
6 
EFTA01116473

Privilege Log (asserting that the attorney-client relationship between Plaintiffs and 
began in March 2014). In a portion of one of her affidavits in the federal 
proceeding that has since been stricken from the record by Judge Marra, 
cited 
this interview with Scarola and Edwards in support of her request to join that lawsuit 
as a plaintiff.' 
M
• 
iary Released to the Press. 
On January 13, 2015, Radar Online 
published excerpts froa 
personal diary that purportedly recount 
experiences meeting Epstein in September 1998 and then being one of Epstein's "sex 
slaves" for several subsequent years. See Daily Mail Article dated January 15, 2015, 
attached as Exhibit D.8 The published excerpts — which presumably were released by 
=the 
online publication, either directly or indirectly — depict explicit instances 
of purported sexual misconduct. See Ex. D. 
• statements 
to Numerous Other Third Parties. =also 
has publicly 
discussed her allegations of sexual abuse and sexual trafficking by Epstein and his 
purported associates on numerous occasions with third parties who are not her 
attorneys, including but not limited to former boyfriends (Anthony Figueroa and Philip 
Guderyon), the FBI, and additional journalists. See, e.g., Ex. C, pp. 17-18, 21; 
January 8, 2015 Inside Edition Report by Deborah Norville, interviewing Mr. Figuroa, 
the unverified transcript of which is attached as Exhibit E ("Q: Did she ever mention 
to you the lawyer Alan Dershowitz?; A 
had never mentioned anything about 
' As discussed below, Edwards also disclosed a redacted version of the transcript of the interview 
with 
in the civil litigation styled Epstein v. Edwards. 
8 Dershowitz states "purportedly" since excerpts of the diary are imaged in media articles, but the 
diary has not been produced by Plaintiffs in this case. 
7 
EFTA01116474

them having sex or brought up anything like that."); Daily Mail Article dated March 2, 
2015, attached as Exhibit F. 
ublic Suit Against Ghislaine Maxwell. Most recently, on September 21,
sM' 
2015
ommenced an action against Ghislaine Maxwell ("Maxwell") in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
See 
Roberts/Maxwell Complaint dated September 21, 2015, attached as Exhibit G (the 
"Maxwell Action"). In her complaint in the Maxwell ActionMalleges that she 
was sexually abused and sexually trafficked by Epstein and Maxwell between 1999 
and 2002 and that Maxwell defamed her by disputinallegations. 
See id. 
In sum 
is — as an adult — voluntarily and repeatedly discussed her alleged experiences 
as one of Epstein's "sex slaves," including her purported experiences being trafficked to 
Epstein's associates. In that regards 
also publicly disclosed and relied upon her 
conversation with Edwards and Scarola to support when she first came forward with her 
allegations of being a "sex slave." In making these voluntary disclosures,■ has waived her 
right to assert the attorney-client privilege as to matters concerning the same subject matter, i.e., 
her experiences as a "sex slave" who was trafficked to Epstein's associates. See Hoyas v. State, 
456 So.2d 1225, 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (as a matter of fairness, a client's voluntary and self-
serving testimony as to a specific communication with an attorney results in a waiver as to all 
other communications to the attorney on the same subject matter). Thus, even if Plaintiffs were 
correct that only the client can waive the attorney-client privilege (which they are not= 
herself has waived the privilege on multiple occasions. 
b. Plaintiffs waived the attorney-client privilege 
' 
• i'i t this defamation 
action and placing at issue the veracity of 
allegations against 
8 
EFTA01116475

Dershowitz and their investigation into those allegations. 
i. Plaintiffs, as counsel, can waiv 
attorney-client privilege. 
Plaintiffs are incorrect in arguing th 
s the privilege holder, is the only person 
who can waive the attorney-client privilege. Florida law recognizes that — although the client 
owns the privilege — an attorney's purposeful actions can also result in a waiver of the client's 
privilege, even where (unlike here) the attorney's actions were unauthorized. See, e.g., Hamilton 
v. Hamilton Steel Corp., 409 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (where the attorney who 
represented multiple defendants publicly announced the details of a settlement at a court hearing, 
the attorney-client privilege had been waived as to all matters relating to the negotiation of the 
settlement, even though some of the attorney's clients later attempted to invoke privilege); 
Stevenson v. Stevenson, 661 So. 2d 367, 369-70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995 (wife could not claim 
privilege where her attorney's secretary had waived the privilege by voluntarily disclosing 
certain information to the husband's attorney). Cf. Abarnar Hous. & Dev., Inc. v. Lisa Daly Lady 
Decor, Inc., 698 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (outlining the circumstances in which 
counsel's inadvertent production of documents can result in a waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege). Plaintiffs' own actions in filing the Joinder Motion and bringing this defamation 
action are therefore sufficient to give rise to a finding of waiver because, as discussed below, 
their actions have placed their communications with-directly 
at issue. 
ii. Plaintiffs waived the attorney-client privilege by placing the privileged 
matters "at issue," as inextricably merged with and directly relevant to 
this lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs incorrectly claim in their Response that Dershowitz has not met the elements of 
at issue waiver doctrine. The tri-part test for determining whether the at issue waiver doctrine 
applies is: 
9 
EFTA01116476

(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing 
suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put 
the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) 
application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to 
information vital to his defense. 
Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 447 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 
F.R.D. 574, 581 (ED. Wash. 1975)) (emphasis added); see also Savino v. Luciano, 92 So. 2d 
817, 819 (Fla. 1957) ("[W]hen a party has filed a claim, based upon a matter ordinarily 
privileged, the proof of which will necessarily require that the privileged matter be offered in 
evidence, [the Florida Supreme Court has held] that he has waived his right to insist, in pretrial 
discovery proceedings, that the matter is privileged."). As the court in Hearn put it: 
In an ordinary case the obstruction is not likely to be great, for attorney-client 
communications are usually incidental to the lawsuit, notwithstanding their 
possible relevance, and other means of proof are normally available. In this case, 
however, the content of defendant's communications with their attorney is 
inextricably merged with the elements of plaintiff's case and defendants' 
affirmative defense. These communications are not incidental to the case; they 
inhere in the controversy itself, and to deny access to them would preclude the 
court from a fair and just determination of the issues. To allow assertion of the 
privilege in this manner would pervert its essential purpose and transform it into a 
potential tool for concealment of unconstitutional conduct behind a veil of 
confidentiality. Under these circumstances, the benefit to be gained from 
disclosure far outweighs the resulting injury to the attorney-client relationship. 
The privilege should not apply. 
Heart, 68 F.R.D. at 582 (emphasis added); see also Pitney-Bowes, 86 F.R.D. at 447-48 
(applying the Hearn test to hold that, by engaging in the affirmative act of filing suit, the plaintiff 
injected into "the very soul of this litigation" the attorney-client communications he sought to 
withhold and thus "waived the right to assert the attorney-client privilege with regard to these 
documents"). 
Here, the three elements of the at issue doctrine have all been satisfied. First, Plaintiffs' 
assertion of privilege is the direct result of their affirmative act in filing this action and alleging 
10 
EFTA01116477

that Dershowitz defamed them in his public responses to the false accusations of sexual 
misconduct leveled by Plaintiffs on 
'ehalf in the Joinder Motion. See Compl. I 17 
(emphasis added). But for the filing of this defamation lawsuit, Dershowitz would not have 
propounded the discovery requests in response to which Plaintiffs asserted the attorney-client 
privilege. The first prong in the tri-part test is satisfied. See Pitney-Bowes, 86 F.R.D. at 447. 
Second, through Plaintiffs' affirmative act of filing this defamation action, Plaintiffs put 
the purportedly protected information "at issue" by making it directly relevant to the case. 
Plaintiffs allege that Dershowitz defamed them by "initiat[ing] a massive public media assault on 
the reputation and character of [Edwards] and [Cassell] accusing them of intentionally lying in 
their filing, of having leveled knowingly false accusations against [Dershowitz] without ever 
conducting any investigation of the credibility of the accusations, and of having acted unethically 
..." — even though Dershowitz "knew [the filing in the Federal Action containing the allegations 
about Dershowitz] to be an entirely proper and well-founded pleading." See Compl. I 17 
(emphasis added). To prevail in this action, Plaintiffs must substantiate their allegations by 
(i) establishing that they conducted an investigation regarding the credibility of 
allegations against Dershowitz, and show to what extent; and (ii) establishing that the allegations 
asserted against Dershowitz b 
1d Plaintiffs in the Joinder Motion were, in fact, "well-
founded," such that they acted ethically in filing the Joinder Motion. 
Plaintiffs have already demonstrated that they will necessarily rely on their 
communications with
a attempt to prevail on their defamation claim and defeat 
Dershowitz's affirmative defenses. 
For example, in their responses to Dershowitz's 
interrogatories, Plaintiffs answered that "with regard to when Maas 
provided information 
related to [allegations against Dershowitz] to [Plaintiffs], 
provided such information in 
11 
EFTA01116478

telephone calls with Brad Edwards beginning in 2011." See Exhibit H. Similarly, at Cassell's 
recent deposition where he was questioned about the factual basis for including 
allegations against Dershowitz in the Joinder Motion, Cassell testified about a very small number 
of phone calls he had with 
well as his review of the transcript oi
2011 
interview with Scarola and Edwards. See Deposition Transcript Excerpt of Paul Cassell, Volume 
I, dated October 16, 2015, at 103:21-24, attached as Exhibit I. Thus, Plaintiffs' own testimony 
shows that the communications they contend are privileged are not merely relevant, but actually 
go to the heart of, and are inextricably merged with, the elements of Plaintiffs' claims and 
Dershowitz's defenses. See Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 582. Dershowitz has met the second prong. 
Third, application of the privilege would deny Dershowitz access to information that is 
vital to his defense — the third prong in the tri-part test. To date, Plaintiffs have hidden behind 
the attorney-client privilege to selectively produce evidence regarding their conversations, 
emails, and/or interviews withMAs 
noted above, Plaintiffs have already relied on the 
2011 interview of=y 
Scarola and Edwards as well as other telephone calls and meetings 
support their claims, but contend that the details and content of these other 
communications 
communications that could support Dershowitz's defenses) 
are properly withheld as privileged. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to invoke privilege to 
preclude discovery and then later rely on the element of surprise when they pick and choose at 
trial which privileged evidence they wish to rely upon. 
Dershowitz is entitled to access 
information that is vital to his defense now, and the third prong has been met. See Pitney-Bowes, 
86 F.R.D. at 447. 
In sum, Dershowitz has met each and every element of the tri-part test for establishing an 
at issue waiver. 
The communications and exchange of information between 
and 
12 
EFTA01116479

Plaintiffs are not incidental to this case, but inhere to the subject controversy itself; to deny 
access to this information would preclude the Court from a fair and just determination of the 
issues. See Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 582. It would also preclude Dershowitz from establishing his 
defenses, including but not limited to proving that his statements about Plaintiffs were all 
constitutionally protected expressions of opinion or truthful factual assertions. 
Upholding 
Plaintiffs' assertion of privilege would also allow Plaintiffs to continue to gather evidence 
months after the filing of the Joinder Motion on December 30, 2014, to attempt to support what 
otherwise was an inadequate investigation and shotgun filing, without Dershowitz being able to 
test the timing of Plaintiffs' receipt and review of that evidence. Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to 
use the attorney-client privilege or, as addressed below, the work product doctrine, as both a 
sword and a shield. Under these circumstances, the benefits to be gained from disclosure far 
outweigh the resulting injury to the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 582-583 ("[D]ue to the 
nature of this suit, which puts the legal advice defendants received directly in issue, the policy 
behind the privilege is outweighed by the necessity of disclosure and the privilege is 
inapplicable."). Plaintiffs' objections should be overruled, and they should be compelled to 
produce all responsive documents. Id. at 583 (the court ordered production of documents in 
addition to answers to interrogatories and depositions questions given waiver of attorney-client 
privilege, and because the documents were "at issue" in the case). 
Plaintiffs' and
aiver of the right to assert the attorney-client privilege requires 
Plaintiffs to produce all responsive documents as well. See Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 583 (the court 
ordered production of documents in addition to answers to interrogatories and depositions 
questions given waiver of attorney-client privilege, and because "at-issue" through affirmative 
defense). 
See Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 583. No work product privilege remains. Nonetheless, 
13 
EFTA01116480

Plaintiffs have on separate grounds waived the asserted work product privilege as well. 
III. 
Plaintiffs have waived their right to rely on the work product doctrine, and 
Dershowitz has in any event established a need for the information he seeks, 
which cannot be obtained from any other source. 
Plaintiffs also maintain that the "at issue" doctrine does not apply to the work product 
doctrine, which is distinct from the attorney-client privilege in that its function is to protect 
counsel's mental impressions. The latter point is not in dispute. However, given the factual 
circumstances and the manner in which Plaintiffs have asserted objections based on the work 
product doctrine, Plaintiffs are otherwise in error. Plaintiffs have waived their right to rely on 
the work product doctrine by voluntarily disclosing and relying on information they contend is 
protected by the work product doctrine. Moreover, the discovery that Dershowitz seeks is 
relevant, in need, and cannot be obtained by Dershowitz from another source. Plaintiffs' work 
product objection should therefore be overruled and production compelled. 
"Work product can be divided into two categories: 'fact' work product (i.e., factual 
information which pertains to the client's case and is prepared or gathered in connection 
therewith), and 'opinion' work product (i.e., the attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or theories concerning his client's case)." State v. Rabin, 495 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (citing In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
Although opinion work product is generally "nearly absolutely privileged," fact work product is 
subject to discovery upon a showing of "need." Id.; see also Ha. R. Civ. P. 1.280 (a party may 
obtain discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial "upon a showing 
that the party seeking discovery has need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means"). 
Here, Dershowitz's discovery requests are narrowly tailored to seek only the factual 
14 
EFTA01116481

information and documentation pertaining to 
allegations against Dershowitz and 
libility (e.g., interview notes anvestigation 
into her credibility, efforts to
vet* her allegations of sexual misconduct and experiences as a "sex slave", etc.). To the 
extent that such information is protected by the work product doctrine, that work product can be 
divided into two broad categories: (1) work product involved with Plaintiffs' representation of 
'ost-March 
2014; and (ii) work product involved with Plaintiffs' representation of 
certain non-parties (or themselves) in other litigation factually related to 
and her 
allegations of sexual misconduct that occurred prior to the formation of the attorney-client 
relationship between Plaintiffs anderch 
2014. 
Plaintiffs — the owner of the work product protection, see, e.g., Rabin, 495 So.2d at 263 — 
have waived their right to rely on the work product doctrine as to both of these categories. As 
noted above, Plaintiffs interviewed = 
April 7, 2011 about her experiences as a "sex 
slave." See Ex. C. Although the transcript of the interview is labeled as "Privileged... and/or 
Work Product," Edwards voluntarily chose to file the transcript in state court in the case of 
Epstein v. Edwards. See Plaintiffs' Notice of Filing dated May 17, 2011, attached hereto as 
Exhibit J. Plaintiffs and So 
disclosed the substance of this interview in a Ortion of 
one o_idavits 
in the federal proceeding that has since been stricken from the record 
by Judge Marra. As a result of these voluntary disclosures, Plaintiffs have waived any right to 
rely on the work product doctrine to withhold documents relating to the subject matter of 
terview. See, e.g., Hoyas, 456 So. 2d at 1229. 
As to documents created after April 2014, Plaintiffs waived their right to rely on the work 
product doctrine through the filing of (i) the Joinder Motion and relatedMffidavits, and 
(ii) this defamation action, which places at issue the credibility of =negations 
and their 
15 
EFTA01116482

investigation into same. As described above, the only way for Plaintiffs to meet their evidentiary 
burden here is by using information that might otherwise be protected by the work product 
doctrine — as again, it is all inextricably merged. 
Even putting aside issues of waiver, Dershowitz has met his burden of establishing that 
the work product doctrine should be overcome here, as (a) he has a need for the materials that are 
encompassed by his discovery requests; and (b) such materials cannot be obtained by other 
means. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4). As to the first prong, the materials sought are highly 
relevant and pertinent. Plaintiffs are seeking to protect their conversations with 
and 
related credibility assessments or follow-up investigation materials, if any, in conjunction with 
their pre-March 2014 interviews of her, which were conducted as part of other litigation either 
involving the Plaintiffs themselves or other third parties. Plaintiffs are also seeking to protect 
materials created after March 2014, which likewise are highly pertinent to the sufficiency of 
Plaintiffs' investigation of the credibility of 
allegations and the ethical nature of 
Plaintiffs' actions, among other things. Indeed, Plaintiffs' assertions of irrelevance are belied by 
the questioning that occurred at Dershowitz's recent deposition, where Plaintiffs' counsel 
inquired in detail about the truth of 
= 
egations that she had sex with Dershowitz on 
multiple occasions when she was a minor. 
Dershowitz has no other means of obtaining this discovery. 
and her present 
counsel, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP ("BSF"), are the two most obvious potential sources of 
information relating to the veracity of 
gations against Dershowitz and Plaintiffs' 
investigation into same. However, both of these non-parties have objected to the subpoenas 
issued to them by Dershowitz and have argued that they should be totally immune from 
16 
EFTA01116483

providing any discovery in this case.9 
As to other non-parties who may have information 
relevant tcMI 
allegations and/or Plaintiffs' investigation, Plaintiffs only broadly and 
categorically assert the work product protection and have not identified the names of these 
individuals or any specific documents being withheld on this basis. Dershowitz is therefore 
unable to determine if another source or means is even available. Plaintiffs are the only viable 
source of the discovery that Dershowitz seeks, which is critical for Dershowitz's defenses. 
For each of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' argument fails. Plaintiffs have waived their 
right to rely on the work product doctrine. And, in any event, Dershowitz has met his burden of 
establishing that the work product should be overcome, as the information he seeks is relevant, in 
need, and cannot be obtained by Dershowitz from another source. 
IV. 
Plaintiffs' Remaining Objections Should Be Overruled. 
Plaintiffs have produced what they deem to be relevant and admissible discovery and 
have withheld what they contend is irrelevant, inadmissible, and/or privileged. Plaintiffs are 
attorneys — not the triers of fact. As set forth above and in Dershowitz's Motion to Compel, the 
requested discovery is unquestionably relevant. In supplement, Dershowitz further states: 
First, it is clear from a review of Plaintiffs' production as well as Plaintiffs' actions in 
conducting discovery that their production is incomplete and unfinished. As a few examples: 
• 
BE-000115, Correspondence dated January 23, 2015, attached as Exhibit K: 
Plaintiffs produced an e-mail that makes reference to a "freelance TV producer who 
is "to be included on Jack Scarola's e-mail distribution list for the Dershowitz 
suit." Plaintiffs have not produced any e-mails or other correspondence directed to 
9 As the Court is aware, 
nd BSF filed Motions to Quash or for a Protective Order in 
response to the subpoenas for testimony and/or for documents that Dershowitz served on those 
non-parties. A hearing on those motions is scheduled for November 2, 2015. 
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any "e-mail distribution list" of Scarola's, or e-mails directly from Scarola that can be 
characterized as such. 
• BE-000111, Correspondence dated January 24, 2015, attached as Exhibit L: 
Plaintiffs produced an e-mail that makes reference to "a couple zip files concerning 
travel seen alongside Prince Andrew's engagements." Plaintiffs have not 
produced the zip files or the travel related documents, despite numerous requests by 
Dershowitz.1° There is no basis for asserting that these materials are irrelevant, as 
they go to the credibility o1 
allegations concerning Prince Andrew, which 
she made simultaneously with those concerning Dershowitz. There likewise is no 
basis for asserting that the materials are privileged, as it is apparent that a third party 
reporter was in possession of or created this responsive "zip file[]" which goes. See 
Ex. L. 
• 
BE-00029-31, Correspondence dated January 22, 2015, attached as Exhibit M: 
Plaintiffs produced an e-mail that makes reference to an attachment, which is a .pdf 
titled "The Duke of York". See Ex. M. 
No attachment has been produced. 
Relatedly, Plaintiffs have not produced any attachments to e-mails following the 
production of the e-mail itself." 
• 
"Blake-BBC-Email" dated January 3, 2015, attached as Exhibit N: 
Plaintiffs 
produced an e-mail entitled "Blake-BBC-Email" on August 3, 2015 in supplemental 
response to Dershowitz's production request. See Ex. N. Notably, this e-mail was 
10 For that matter, Plaintiffs have not produced any documents concernin1=purported 
travel alongside Dershowitz. 
ii Of course, some identifiable attachments to emails such as the defamation Complaint, 
Dershowitz reasonably understands are produced elsewhere and of record in this case. 
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only produced after Dershowitz — who was independently aware of its existence 
through a third party member of the media — demanded that Plaintiffs produce it. The 
subject line indicates that the e-mail provided was a "reply" to an e-mail from the 
recipient, Paul Blake; however, the original e-mail has not been produced. See Ex. N. 
It is also generally the case that Plaintiffs' production of e-mails from the Searcy 
Denney firm were printed from the email inbox of Scarola's assistant, Mary Pirrotta, 
and involved her as a sender or recipient. Despite request, Plaintiffs will not confirm 
that all of Scarola's e-mails have been searched and produced. 
Based on the above, it is clear that Plaintiffs' production is incomplete. Plaintiffs also have not 
provided sufficient detail in their discovery responses to allow Dershowitz to know when their 
production will be complete. Counsel for Dershowitz has repeatedly asked Plaintiffs this 
question and to amend their discovery responses to document the same. This has not happened. 
Without identification or advisement, is there ever a known end? Plaintiffs must be compelled to 
complete their production, and when done, advise in their responses of the same. 
Second, Plaintiffs cannot be permitted to rely on general and broad references to 
thousands of pages of public documents of record in other litigation in response to Dershowitz's 
tailored discovery requests. Plaintiffs contend that Dershowitz has equal access to these 
litigation files (which are extensive and span many years), meaning that they have no obligation 
to produce the specific documents that are responsive to Dershowitz's requests. But, one of the 
goals of Dershowitz's discovery requests is to learn which of these documents Plaintiffs actually 
relied upon in their investigation int 
egations against Dershowitz. As it stands now, 
Plaintiffs' responsive documents include notices of hearing, notices of deposition, and discovery 
motion practice, among other things, in unrelated litigation, which are clearly not responsive. 
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Dershowitz is not in a position to know which documents Plaintiffs used/reviewed, nor does he 
have an obligation to guess which documents Plaintiffs relied on. Plaintiffs should not be 
permitted to categorically respond and basically tell Dershowitz to "Go Fish." Plaintiffs must be 
compelled to identify which specific documents from these other lawsuits are responsive to 
Dershowitz's discovery requests. 
Third, discovery directed at Plaintiffs' and 
ias, intent, motivation, and 
credibility are also highly relevant and subject to production. Plaintiffs have injected their 
credibility into this lawsuit through the filing of their defamation action — as they (along with 
are the three primary witnesses to their case. Dershowitz is entitled to cross-examine 
and address their credibility and bias. As set forth in his Motion to Compel, Dershowitz 
therefore is entitled to discovery regarding Plaintiffs' fee agreement(s) wittMlas 
well as 
information relating 
.00k, television, and movie deals, including any amount that 
la
s paid for her media interviews and provision of documents to the media. 
Plaintiffs unmistakably have not produced what is relevant and admissible discovery. 
Plaintiffs are not the triers of fact, and their arguments fail. Dershowitz is entitled to a defense 
and to discover information that may be used to cross-examine Plaintiffs and other key witnesses 
and attack their credibility. 
V. 
Conclusion. 
In conclusion, all three of the individuals involved in this action (Edwards, Cassell, and 
ave waived the attorney-client privilege for their communications. 
has 
voluntarily disclosed details of her purported experience as a "sex slave" in multiple fora, 
including by disclosing and relying on communications she had with Edwards. These voluntary 
f=i
disclosures have resulted in a waiver o 
'vilege as to all communications concerning 
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