EFTA01099901

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CIV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
INCLUDING SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned 
counsel, seeks summary judgment determining that under the undisputed material facts, 
(1) the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time 
during which EPSTEIN's alleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 
2's claim brought pursuant to §2255 in Count III of the Second Amended Complaint 
P.E. 56]; (2) Plaintiff has failed to and cannot establish a predicate act — under 18 
U.S.C. §2422 as plead in her complaint, in order to state a cause of action pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. §2255 (2005); and (3) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the 
predicate acts allegedly were committed allow only "minors" to file suit. 
Rule 56, 
Fed.R.Civ.P. (2010); Local Gen. Rules 7.1, and 7.5 (S.D. Fla. 2010). In support of his 
motion, Defendant states: 
Introduction 
Defendant, without waiving any affirmative defense or grounds which may entitle 
him to summary judgment in this action or in any other actions brought by other plaintiffs 
EFTA01099901

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 2 
in multiple civil actions asserting §2255 and other claims against EPSTEIN, seeks 
summary judgment regarding the proper application of 18 U.S.C. §2255. Based on the 
undisputed material facts and applicable law relevant to the summary judgment sought, 
Defendant is entitled as a matter of law to the entry of summary judgment determining 
that (1) the version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, effective 1999 to Jul. 26, 2006, the period of time 
during which EPSTEIN's alleged conduct occurred, applies to Plaintiff's claim brought 
pursuant to §2255; (2) Plaintiff has not and cannot establish the requisite elements to 
state a claim under 18 U.S.C. §2255, which she attempts to assert in Count III of her 
Second Amended Complaint [D.E. 56]. In particular, the undisputed material facts show 
that Plaintiff has failed to and cannot establish a predicate act — under 18 U.S.C. §2422 as 
plead in her complaint, in order to state a cause of action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 
(2005); and (3) the version of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 in effect when the predicate acts 
allegedly were committed allow only "minors" to file suit. The pleadings and the 
discovery materials on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
establishing that EPSTEIN is entitled as a matter of law to the summary judgments 
sought. 
Statement of Material Facts in Support of Summary Judzment, Loc.Gen.Rule 
Statement of the Case 
I. Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 2's Second Amended Complaint [D.E. 56], dated 
February 27, 2009, attempts to assert three causes of action. Count I and Count II, 
respectively, attempt to allege state law claims under Florida law for "Sexual Assault and 
Battery," and "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress." Count 111, which is the 
subject of this motion, is entitled "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in 
EFTA01099902

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 3 
Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422," and attempts to assert a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§2255. (Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 2 shall be referred to as "JD2" or "Jane" or "Jane 
Doe." Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint shall be referred to as "2d Am Comp," and 
is attached hereto as Exhibit A.). 
2. According to the allegations - "In or about 2004-2005, Jane Doe, then 
approximately 16 years old, fell into Epstein's trap and became one of his victims." [2d 
Am Comp, in Plaintiff further alleges that — 
..., Jane Doe was recruited to give Epstein a massage for monetary 
compensation. Jane was brought to Ep 'n' 
on in Palm Beach. Once 
at the mansion, Jane was introduced to 
, who led her up a flight 
of stairs to the room with the massage table. In this room, Epstein told Jane 
to take off her clothes and give him a massage. Jane kept her panties and bra 
on and complied with Epstein's instructions. Epstein wore only a towel 
around his waist. After a short period of time, Epstein removed the towel and 
rolled over exposing his penis. Epstein began to masturbate and he sexually 
assaulted Jane. [2d Am Comp, 112]. 
After Epstein had completed the assault, Jane was then able to get dressed, 
leave the room and go back down the stairs. Jane was paid $200 by Epstein. 
The young girl who recruited Jane was paid $100 by Epstein for bringing 
Jane to him. [2d Am Comp, 113]. 
3. Material to this motion, in attempting to assert a claim in Count III pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. §2255, Plaintiff alleges in material part that —
29. Epstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly 
persuade, induce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 
18 years, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense. 
30. 
On June 30, 2008, Epstein entered a plea of guilty to violations of 
Florida §§796.07 and 796.03, in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for 
Palm Beach County (Case Nos. ...), for conduct involving the same 
plan or scheme as alleged herein. 
31. 
As to Plaintiff Jane Doe, Epstein could have been charged with 
criminal 
violations 
of 
Florida 
Statute 
§796.07(2)(including 
EFTA01099903

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 4 
subsections (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) thereof), and other criminal 
offenses including violations of Florida Statutes §§798.02 and 800.04 
(including subsections (5), (6) and (7) thereof). 
32. 
Epstein's acts and conduct are in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422. 
33. As a result of Epstein's violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422, Plaintiff has 
suffered personal injury, including mental, psychological and 
emotional damages. 
4. In the "WHEREFORE" clause of Count III, Plaintiff "demands judgment against 
Jeffery Epstein for all damages available under 18 U.S.C. §2255(a), 
." See 2d Am 
Comp, Count III, Exhibit A hereto. 
5. In trying to assert a violation of the federal criminal statute 18 U.S.C. 2422 as the 
requisite predicate act for a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255(a)', Plaintiff generally 
tracks the language of subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. 2422 (2004, 2005), which states in 
relevant part — 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not 
attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined 
under this title and imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. 
(The amended version of §2422 increases the term of imprisonment.) 
(See endnote 1 hereto for full text of 18 U.S.C. §2255, the version that applied in 2004 
and 2005, and the amended version effective July 27, 2006.) 
6. Epstein never, using a facility or means of interstate commerce, knowingly 
persuaded, induced or enticed JD2, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in 
prostitution or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempted to do so. Deposition Testimony of JD2, taken March 3, 2010, pp. 
EFTA01099904

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 5 
212-14. A copy of the referenced pages is attached hereto as Exhibit B. See endnote 2 
for fall text of 18 U.S.C. §2422.2
7. JD had only one encounter with EPSTEIN in December of 2004 at his house in 
Palm Beach, Florida. (JD2 Deposition, p. 40, lines 18-25; p. 41, lines 1-9). According to 
JD2's complaint allegations and testimony, she was brought by another minor girl (Jane 
Doe No. 3) to EPSTEIN's Palm Beach home the one time in December of 2004. Jane 
Doe No. 3 picked up JD2 in her car and brought JD2 home afterward. (2d Am Comp, 
1110, 12-13; M2 Deposition, 4446). Jane Doe 3 was not a close personal friend of JD2; 
she was just someone JD2 went to school with. (Deposition, p. 37, lines 13-23). Jane 
Doe No. 3 passed a note JD2 while in high school class together, and Jane Doe No. 3 
"wrote to me in class about what she, how she wanted me to go and give just old guys a 
massage and you get like $200. ... ." "...it's in a place where there's a bunch of old guys 
and there's young girls. You don't need experience, and you just give them a massage 
and they pay good money just to have you massage them." (JD2 Deposition, p. 64, lines 
5-25; p. 65, lines 1-16). 
8. JD2 never had any communications with EPSTEIN via the telephone, cell-phone, 
computer, e-mails, or texting. (JD2 Deposition, p. 212-13). There is no testimony or 
complaint allegations that J132 ever travelled anywhere with EPSTEIN. 
9. JD2 was 22 years old at the time of her deposition taken on March 3, 2010. (M2 
Deposition, p. 31, lines 22-23). The original Complaint in this matter was filed on 
February 6, 2008. Thus, .1132 was 20 years old (or at the very least 19) at the time this 
suit was filed. 
EFTA01099905

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 6 
10. Interestingly, JD3 (who went to JE's home four times; was with JE only one time, 
but took JD2 and J.L., and drove 3D4 one time) herself asserts in her testimony that 
despite her purportedly shocking experience with EPSTEIN that one occasion, she was 
willing to expose her friend, JD2, to this same "shocking, disturbing experience" she had 
had. (JD3 Deposition, p. 175). 
Summary Judgment Standard 
Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Ciy.P, when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Celotex v. Catren, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
Pursuant to Rule 56(b), "a party against whom relief is sought may move, with or without 
supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim." 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) 
... summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." In our view, the plain language of 
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a 
situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a 
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 
"entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has 
failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with 
respect to which she has the burden of proof. 
Discussion of Law as Applied to Undisputed Material Facts Showing 
that EPSTEIN Is Entitled to Summary Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
EFTA01099906

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 7 
I. The version of 18 U.S.C. 82255 in effect at the time the purported conduct took 
place applies to the Plaintiff's 42255 claim against EPSTEIN, not the version as 
amended and effective July 27, 2006. 
The applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides - 
PART I-CRIMES 
CHAFFER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 
2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers 
personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United 
States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains and 
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in 
the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than 
$50,000 in value. 
(See endnote 1 for complete statutory text, pre and post amendment.) 
By its own terms, 18 U S C. 2255(a) creates a cause of action for "a minor who is 
a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 
2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such 
violation ... ." See generally, Smith v. Husband, 428 F.Supp.2d 432 (E.D. Va. 2006); 
Smith v. Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F.Supp.2d 
742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The referenced statutes are all federal criminal statues 
contained in Title 18 of the United States Code. Thus, in order to sustain a cause of 
action under §2255, a plaintiff is required to prove all the elements of one of the statutory 
enumerated criminal predicate acts. See Gray v. Darby, 2009 WL 805435 (ED. Pa. Mar. 
25, 2005), requiring evidence to establish predicate act under 18 U.S.C. §2255 to state 
cause of action. 
L A. The statute in effect during the time the alleged conduct occurred applies to 
each of the Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 — not the amended 
EFTA01099907

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 8 
version which became effective on July 27, 2006. See endnote 1 for complete statutory 
text in effect prior to July 27, 2006 and as amended. 
Plaintiff in her complaint asserts that the alleged conduct by EPSTEIN occurred 
prior to the amended version of §2255 taking effect. JD alleges `in or about 2004-2005, 
Jane Doe, then approximately 16 years old," as the period of time during which the 
conduct at issue occurred. Based on 1D2's deposition testimony, she had one encounter 
with EPSTEIN in December — 2004. Thus, it is undisputed Epstein's conduct occurred 
prior to §2255's amendment, effective July 27, 2006. 
Under applicable law, the statute in effect at the time of the alleged conduct 
applies. See U.S. v. Scheidt, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 144837, fn. 1 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 11, 2010); 
U.S. v. Renga, 2009 WL 2579103, fn. 1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. v. Ferenci, 2009 
WI, 2579102, fn. 1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009); U.S. v. Monk, 2009 WL 2567831, fn. 1 
(ED. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009); U.S. v. Zane 2009 WI, 2567832, fn.1 (ED. Cal. Aug. 18 
2009). In each of these cases, the referenced footnote states — 
Prior to July 27, 2006, the last sentence in Section §2255(a) read "Any 
person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have 
sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value." Under the civil statute, 
the minimum restitution amount for any violation of Section 2252 (the 
predicate act at issue) is $150,000 for violations occurring after July 27, 2006 
and $50,000 for violations occurring prior to $50,000. 
Even with the typo (the extra "$50,000") at the end of the quoted sentence, it is 
clear that the Court applied the statute in effect at the time of the alleged criminal conduct 
constituting one of the statutorily enumerated predicate acts, which is consistent with 
applicable law discussed more fully below herein. 
EFTA01099908

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 9 
It is an axiom of law that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen 488 
U.S., at 208, 109 S.Q., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994): 
... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our 
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. 
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an 
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled 
expectations should not be lightly disrupted.PH18 For that reason, the "principle that the 
legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed 
when the conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser, 494 U.S., 
at 855, 110 5.a., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, 
creativity in both commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that 
gives people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions. 
FN18. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 
1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of 
unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because 
it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions"); 
[Further citations omitted]. 
It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression 
in several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits 
retroactive application of penal legislation.rm9 Article I, § 10, cl. I, prohibits States 
from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws "impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts." The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other 
government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for 
a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation." The prohibitions on "Bills of 
Attainder" in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons 
and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e.g., United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1719-1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The 
Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be 
compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's 
prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive 
application. limy v. Turner Elkhorn Arming Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 5.O. 2882, 2893, 
49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). 
FN19. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9, 
cl. 3), the other to the States (§ 10, cl. 1). We have construed the Clauses as 
applicable only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dail. 386, 390-391, 1 
L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The 
Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly 
and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a 
risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution 
EFTA01099909

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 10 
against unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for 
'41498 the Court in Weaver v. Graham. 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 
(1981), the Ex Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have "fair 
warning" about the effect of criminal statutes, but also "restricts governmental 
power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 
101 S.Ct., at 963-964 (citations omitted). n42°
FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Crown Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706, 
732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that 
promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against 
the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern 
about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of 
private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is 
best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create 
the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been committed") 
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James v. United 
States, 366 U.S. 213, 247, n. 3, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1052, n. 3, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961) 
(retroactive punitive measures may reflect "a purpose not to prevent dangerous 
conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or 
classes of persons"). 
These well entrenched constitutional protections and presumptions against 
retroactive application of legislation establish that 18 U.S.C. §2255 in effect at the time 
of the alleged conduct applies to the instant action, and not the amended version. See 
endnote 1 hereto. 
I. B. Not only is there no clear express intent stating that the statute is to apply 
retroactively, but applying the current version of the statute, as amended in 2006, would 
be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as it 
would be applied to events occurring before its enactment and would increase the penalty 
or punishment for the alleged crime. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. 1. U.S. v. 
Seigel 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); and 
generally, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390,1 LEd. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798). 
The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex 
post facto Law shall be passed" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it " 'appli[es] to events occurring before its 
enactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the 
EFTA01099910

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 11 
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." 
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.O. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting 
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). 
U.S. v. Siege1,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (1la Cir. 1998). 
§2255 is contained in Title 18 of the United States Codes - "Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure, Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children." 
18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005), is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and imposes a 
presumptive minimum of damages in the amount of $50,000, should Plaintiff prove any 
violation of the specified criminal statutes and that she suffered personal injury with 
actual damages sustained. Thus, the effect of the 2006 amendments, effective July 27, 
2006, would be to triple the amount of the statutory minimum previously in effect during 
the time of the alleged acts. 
The statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application 
is to be retroactive. Thus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply 
retroactively, and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct 
is to apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 1493, ("A statement that a statute 
will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any 
application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date."). See fit 1 herein. 
This statute was enacted as part of the Federal Criminal Statutes targeting sexual 
predators and sex crimes against children. H.R. 3494, "Child Protection and Sexual 
Predator Punishment Act of 1998;" House Report No. 105-557, 11, 1998 U.S.C.A.N. 
678, 679 (1998). Quoting from the "Background and Need For Legislation" portion of 
the House Report No. 105-557, 11-16, H.R. 3494, of which 18 U.S.C. §2255 is included, 
is described as "the most comprehensive package of new crimes and increased penalties 
EFTA01099911

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 12 
ever developed in response to crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by 
computers." 
Further showing that §2255 was enacted as a criminal penalty or 
punishment, "Title II — Punishing Sexual Predators," Sec. 206, from House Report No. 
105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an 
additional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and 
punishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation 
of the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against 
those who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-
02. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as "penalties." Id. 
The cases of U.S. v. Siegel supra (11th Cir. 1998), and U.S. v. Edwards, supra (3d 
Cir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18 
U.S.C. §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred application of the Mandatory 
Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct 
occurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(f)(1 XA), even though 
the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute. 
On July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 U.S.C. 
§371 and §1956(aX1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, and 
laundering of money instruments; and money laundering). He was sentenced on March 
7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution 
under the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA required that the district court 
must order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss without consideration of the 
EFTA01099912

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 13 
defendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the MVRA and under the former 18 
U.S.C. §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.l. No. 
97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to consider, among other factors, the 
defendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution. 
When the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to the 
VWPA "shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing 
proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment 
of this Act [Apr. 24, 1996]." Siegel, supra at 1258. The alleged crimes occurred between 
February, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's position that 1996 
MVRA "should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's restitution order 
because to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution. See U.S. Const. art I, §9, cl. 3." 
The Ex Post Facto analysis made by the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel is applicable to 
this action. In resolving the issue in favor of the defendant, the Court flat considered 
whether a restitution order is a punishment. Id, at 1259. In determining that restitution 
was a punishment, the Court noted that §3663A(aX1) of Title 18 expressly describes 
restitution as a "penalty." In addition, the Court also noted that "[a]lthough not in the 
context of an ex post facto determination, ... restitution is a 'criminal penalty meant to 
have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect.' United States v. Twittv. 107 F.3d 1482, 
1493 n. 12 (1 1 th Cir.1997)." Second, the Court considered "whether the imposition of 
restitution under the MVRA is an increased penalty as prohibited by the Ex Post Facto 
Clause." 
at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVRA would 
indeed run afoul of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the 
EFTA01099913

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 14 
majority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty.' 
"The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering 
the defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an 
amount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court 
must order restitution to each victim in the fa amount." 
at 1260. See also U.S. v. 
Edwards 162 F.2d 87 (3rd Circuit 1998). 
In the instant cases, in answering the first question, it is clear that that imposition 
of a minimum amount of damages, regardless of the amount of actual damages suffered 
by a minor victim, is meant to be a penalty or punishment. See statutory text and House 
Bill Reports, cited above herein, consistently referring to the presumptive minimum 
damages amount under §2255 as "punishment" or "penalties." According to the Ex Post 
Facto doctrine, although §2255 is labeled a "civil remedy," such label is not dispositive; 
"if the effect of the statute is to impose punishment that is criminal in nature, the ex post 
facto clause is implicated." See generally Roman Catholic Bishop of Oakland v. 
Superior Court, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, at 360, citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
360-61 (1997). The effect of applying the 2006 version of §2255 would be to triple the 
amount of the presumptive minimum damages to a minor who proves the elements of her 
§2255 claim. The fact that a plaintiff proceeding under §2255 has to prove a violation of 
a criminal statute and suffer personal injury to recover damages thereunder, further 
supports that the imposition of a minimum amount, regardless of a victim's actual 
The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that "the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose criminal 
conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996," was "persuaded by the majority of districts on this 
issue." "Restitution is a criminal penalty carrying with it characteristics of criminal punishment." 
Siegel, supra at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement with the Second, Third, Eighth, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See U.S. v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289-90 (11' Cir. 2000). 
EFTA01099914

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 15 
damages sustained, is meant and was enacted as additional punishment or penalty for 
violation of criminal sexual exploitation and abuse of minors. 
Accordingly, this Court is required to apply the statute in effect at the time of the 
alleged criminal acts. Not only is there no language in the 2006 statute stating that it is to 
apply retroactively, but further, such application of the 2006 version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 
to acts that occurred prior to its effective date would have a detrimental and punitive 
effect on Defendant by tripling the presumptive minimum of damages available to a 
plaintiff, regardless of the actual damages suffered.2
L C. M discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §2255 was enacted as part of the criminal 
statutory scheme to punish and penalize those who sexually exploit and abuse minors, 
and thus, the Ex Post Fact Clause prohibits a retroactive application of the 2006 amended 
version. Even if one were to argue that the statute is "civil" and the damages thereunder 
are "civil" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in 
Landgraf v. US1 Film Product% 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), pertaining to civil 
statutes, not only is there no express intent by Congress to apply the new statute to past 
conduct, but also, the clear effect of retroactive application of the statute would be to 
increase the potential liability for past conduct from a minimum of $50,000 to $150,000, 
and thus in violation of the constitutional prohibitions against such application. As noted, 
18 U.S.C. §2255 is entitled "Civil remedy for personal injuries." Notwithstanding this 
2 In other filed civil actions attempting to assert §2255 claims against EPSTEIN, some 
plaintiffs also propose that the minimum damage amount is to apply on a per violation basis; the 
absurdity of such position is further magnified when one considers that the presumptive damages 
amount was tripled to $150,000 by the 2006 amendment. Based on some plaintiffs' position, that 
amount would be multiplied even further based on the number of violations (along with injury) 
that she could prove. Clearly, the result is an unconstitutional increase in either a penalty or civil 
liability. 
EFTA01099915

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 16 
label, the statute was enacted as part of the criminal statutory scheme to punish those who 
sexually exploit and abuse minors. Regardless of the actual damages suffered or proven 
by a minor, as long as a minor proves violation of a specified statutory criminal act under 
§2255 and personal injury, the defendant is held liable for the statutory imposed 
minimum. 
Although there does not exist any definitive ruling of whether the damages 
awarded under §2255 are meant as criminal punishment or a civil damages award, 
Defendant is still entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the statute in effect at 
the time of the alleged criminal conduct applies. 
As explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505? 
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the 
court's first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the 
statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to 
resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such 
express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have 
retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he 
acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate 
retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent 
clear congressional intent favoring such a result. 
Here, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to 
conduct occurring well before its enactment. Clearly, however, as discussed in part B 
herein, the presumptive minimum amount of damages of $150,000 was enacted as a 
punishment or penalty upon those who sexually exploit and abuse minors. See discussion 
of House Bill Reports and Congressional background above herein. The amount triples 
In Landgraf, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and refused to apply new provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct occurring before 
the effective date of the Act. The Court determined that statutory text in question, §102, was 
subject to the presumption against statutory retroactivity. 
EFTA01099916

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 17 
the previous amount for which a defendant might be found liable, regardless of the 
amount of actual damages a plaintiff has suffered and proven. The new statute imposes a 
substantial increase in the monetary liability for past conduct. 
As stated in Landgraf, "the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as 
the criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored." Courts have 
consistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to 
conduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landgraf, supra at 284-85. Even if 
plaintiff were to argue that retroactive application of the new statute "would vindicate its 
purpose more fully," even that consideration is not enough to rebut the presumption 
against retroactivity. Id, at 285-86. "The presumption against statutory retroactivity is 
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long 
held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation." Id. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, this Court is required to apply the version of 18 
U.S.C. §2255 (2004) in effect at the time of the alleged conduct by EPSTEIN directed to 
Plaintiff. 
H. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count ID, as under the 
undisputed material facts, Plaintiff has failed to and can not show a violation of 
a reauislte predicate act to sustain a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. $2255. 
As matter of law, Defendant is entitled to the entry of a summary judgment in his 
favor on Count III - entitled "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 
18 U.S.C. §2422." In reality, Count III is an attempt to bring a claim pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. §2255(a), which creates a civil remedy for violations of certain federal criminal 
statutes as discussed herein. The undisputed material facts and applicable law show that 
Plaintiff does not and cannot establish the elements required to prove her §2255 claim. 
EFTA01099917

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Mena-Johnson 
Page 18 
As confirmed by Plaintiff in her deposition testimony, the alleged encounter with 
EPSTEIN took place sometime in December — 2004 at his Palm Beach, Florida mansion. 
The applicable version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 provides — 
PART I-CRIMES 
CHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF 
CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 
2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and 
who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any 
appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages 
such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to 
have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. 
(See endnote 1 for complete statutory text.) 
By its own terms, 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a cause of action for "a minor who is 
a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 
2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such 
violation ... ." See generally, Gray v. Darby. 2009 WL 805435, 6 (E.D.Pa.,2009)(12255 
establishes a civil remedy for personal injuries suffered as a result of the violation of 
specific sections of the Code [U.S.C. Title 18]. Under this section, any minor who is the 
victim of any of those sections may sue in federal court to recover `the actual damages 
such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'); 
Smith v. Husband 428 F.Supp.2d 432 (ED. Va. 2006); Smith v. Husband, 376 
F.Supp.2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe v. Liberatore 478 F.Supp.2d 742, 754 (M.D. Pa. 
2007). The referenced statutes are all federal criminal statues contained in Title 18 of the 
United States Code. In her complaint, Plaintiff partially tracks the language of 18 U.S.C. 
EFTA01099918

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page 19 
§2422(b) and cites generally to §2422 in an attempt to assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. 
§2255. (2d Am Corn, ¶30, 33-34). None of the State of Florida criminal statutes 
referenced by Plaintiff are a requisite predicate act required to prove a claim under 18 
U.S.C. §2255. (See ¶30-31 of 2d Am Comp.). 
Thus, in order to sustain a cause of action under §2255, Plaintiff is required to prove 
all the elements of one of the statutory enumerated predicate acts. See Gray v. Darby, 
2009 WL 805435 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2005), requiring evidence to establish predicate act 
under 18 U.S.C. §2255 to state cause of action. As noted above, Plaintiff is relying on 
§2422 of Title 18, and tracks the language of subsection (b) of that statute. There is no 
evidence whatsoever of EPSTEIN "using the mail or any facility or means of interstate 
or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, ... ." 
In order to show a violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), four elements must be proven: 
(1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or 
coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to engage in any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempting to do so. U.S. v. 
Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 869 (10th
Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Kaye, 451 F.Supp.2d 775, 782-83 (ED. Va. 2006). The undisputed 
material facts show that EPSTEIN and JD2 never communicated at any time on any 
subject via the telephone, intemet, texting, e-mails, or other form of electronic 
communication. JD2 testified that she was brought to EPSTEIN's home by another girl 
EFTA01099919

Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein 
Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marm-Johnson 
Page 20 
(Jane Doe No. 3) that she went to school with in Palm Beach County. There is no 
testimony that JD2 travelled anywhere with EPSTEIN by car or otherwise. The one 
encounter occurred in Palm Beach, Florida at EPSTEIN's mansion. (See Statement of 
Facts, 116, 7, 8). 
There was no (1) use of a facility of interstate commerce; (2) to knowingly 
persuade, induce, entice, or coerce; (3) any individual who is younger than 18; (4) to 
engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempting to do so. See for e.g., U.S. v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 150-51 (2d 
Cir. 2007). In Gagliardi, a defendant was convicted of violating §2422(b) where he 
initiated contact with girl he believed was a minor in an intemet chat room called "I Love 
Older Men," repeatedly made sexual advances toward girl and her "friend," asked them 
for their pictures, steered the conversation toward sexual activities, described the acts that 
he would engage in with them, tried to set up a meeting with both of them, and appeared 
for a meeting with condoms and a Viagra pill in his car. Thus, the Circuit court agreed 
had the requisite intent to violate § 2422(b). The Circuit Court determined that a 
reasonable juror could also have found that the defendant took a substantial step beyond 
mere preparation when he arrived at the meeting place with two condoms and a Viagra 
pill in his car. See also U.S. v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir.2005)(Defendant 
convicted of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual acts by using computer 
connected to the intemet, under §2422(b), where chat room communications included 
defendant asking "girl" about her sexual history, her virginity, her experience wit oral 
sex, and the possibility of making a movie together; defendant further told "girl" about 
his desire to perform oral sex on her.); U.S. v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2009). See 
EFTA01099920