EFTA01098984

admissible evidence. Otherwise, every deposition that turned out to be a false alarm would lead 
to an "abuse of process" claim. Moreover, the rules of discovery themselves provide that a 
deposition need only be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the discovery that Edwards pursued has to be considered against the backdrop 
of Epstein's obstructionist tactics. As the Court is aware, in both this case and all other cases 
filed against him, Epstein has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than answer any 
substantive questions. Epstein has also helped secure attorneys for his other household staff who 
assisted in the process of recruiting the minor girls, who in turn also asserted their Fifth 
Amendment rights rather than explain what happened behind closed doors in Epstein's mansion 
in West Palm Beach. See Statement of Undisputed Facts. It is against this backdrop that 
Edwards followed up on one of the only remaining lines of inquiry open to him: discovery aimed 
at Epstein's friends who might have been in a position to corroborate the fact that Epstein was 
sexually abusing young girls. 
In the context of the sexual assault cases that Edwards had filed against Epstein, any act 
of sexual abuse had undeniable relevance to the case — even acts of abuse Epstein committed 
against minor girls other than 
M., or Jane Doe. Both federal and state evidence rules 
make acts of child abuse against other girls admissible in the plaintiff's case in chief as proof of 
"modus operandi" or "motive" or "common scheme or plan." See Fed. R. Evid. 415 (evidence of 
other acts of sexual abuse automatically admissible in a civil case); Fla. Stat. Ann. 90.404(b) 
(evidence of common scheme admissible); Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959) (other 
acts of potential sexual misconduct admissible). 
15 
EFTA01099064

A second reason exists for making discovery of Epstein's acts of abuse of other minor 
girls admissible. Juries considering punitive damages issues are plainly entitled to consider "the 
existence and frequency of similar past conduct." TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28 (1993). This is because the Supreme Court recognizes "that a 
recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender . . . [because) repeated misconduct 
is more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance." BMW of North America, Inc. 
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996) (supporting citations omitted). In addition, juries can consider 
other similar acts evidence as part of the deterrence calculation in awarding punitive damages, 
because "evidence that a defendant has repeatedly engaged in prohibited conduct while knowing 
. . . that it was unlawful would provide relevant support for an argument that strong medicine is 
required to cure the defendant's disrespect for the law." Id. at 576-77. In the cases Edwards 
filed against Epstein, his clients were entitled to attempt to prove that Epstein "repeatedly 
engaged in prohibited conduct" — i.e., because he was a predatory pedophile, he sexually 
assaulted dozens and dozens of minor girls. The discovery of Epstein's friends who might have 
had direct or circumstantial evidence of other acts of sexual assault was accordingly entirely 
proper. Edwards is therefore entitled summary judgment to the extent his claim is based on 
efforts by Edwards to obtain discovery of Epstein's friends. 
HI. 
EPSTEIN'S LAWSUIT MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE OF HIS REFUSAL TO 
PARTICIPATE IN REASONABLE DISCOVERY. 
As is readily apparent from the facts of this case, Epstein has filed a lawsuit but then 
refused to allow any real discovery about the merits of his case. Instead, when asked hard 
questions about whether he has any legitimate claim at all, Epstein has hidden behind the Fifth 
16 
EFTA01099065

Amendment. As a result, under the "sword and shield doctrine" widely recognized in Florida 
caselaw, his suit must be dismissed. 
"[T]he law is well settled that a plaintiff is not entitled to both his silence and his 
lawsuit." Boys & Girls Clubs of Marion County, Inc. v. ,I.A., 22 So.3d 855, 856 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009) (Griffin, J., concurring specially). Thus, "a person may not seek affirmative 
relief in a civil action and then invoke the fifth amendment to avoid giving discovery, using the 
fifth amendment as both a `sword and a shield.'" DePalma v. DePahna, 538 So.2d 1290, 1290 
(Fla. 4'h Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting DeLisi v. Bankers Insurance Co., 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4'h
Dist. Ct. App. 1983)). Put another way, "[a] civil litigant's fifth amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination may be used as a shield but not a sword. This means that a plaintiff seeking 
affirmative relief in a civil action may not invoke the fifth amendment and refuse to comply with 
the defendant's discovery requests, thereby thwarting the defendant's defenses." Rollins Burdick 
Hunter of New York Inc. v. Euroclassic Limited, Inc., 502 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Court App. 
1983). 
Here, Epstein is trying to do precisely what the "well settled" law forbids. Specifically, 
he is trying to obtain "affirmative relief' — i.e., forcing Edwards to pay money damages — while 
simultaneously precluding Edwards from obtaining legitimate discovery at the heart of the 
allegations that form the basis for the relief Epstein is seeking. As recounted more fully in the 
statement of undisputed facts, Epstein has refused to answer such basic questions about his 
lawsuit as: 
• 
"Specifically what are the allegations against you which you contend Mr. 
Edwards ginned up?" 
• "Well, which of Mr. Edwards' cases do you contend were fabricated?" 
17 
EFTA01099066

• "Is there anything in M.'s Complaint that was filed against you in September of 
2008. which you contend to be false?" 
• "I would like to know whether you ever had any physical contact with the person 
referred to as Jane Doe in that [federal] complaint?" 
• "Did you ever have any physical contact with M. 
• "What is the actual value that you contend the claim of M. against you has?" 
The matters addressed in these questions are the central focus of Epstein's claims against 
Edwards. Epstein's refusal to answer these and literally every other substantive question put to 
him in discovery has deprived Edwards of even a basic understanding of the evidence alleged to 
support claims against him. Moreover, by not offering any explanation of his allegations, 
Epstein is depriving Edwards of any opportunity to conduct third party discovery and 
opportunity to challenge Epstein's allegations. 
It is the clear law that "the chief purpose of our discovery rules is to assist the truth-
finding function of our justice system and to avoid trial by surprise or ambush," Scipio v. State, 
928 So.2d 1138 (Fla.2006), and "full and fair discovery is essential to these important goals," 
McFadden v. State, 15 So.3d 755, 757 (Fla. 4'h Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Accordingly, it is important 
for the Court to insure "not only compliance with the technical provisions of the discovery rules, 
but also adherence to the purpose and spirit of those rules in both the criminal and civil context." 
McFadden, 15 So.3d at 757. Epstein has repeatedly blocked "full and fair discovery," requiring 
dismissal of his claim against Edwards. 
18 
EFTA01099067

IV. 
EDWARDS IS ENTITLED TO ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM 
EPSTEIN'S INVOCATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND 
THEREFORE TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON EPSTEIN'S CLAIM. 
Edwards is entitled to summary judgment on the claim against him for a second and 
entirely independent reason: Epstein's repeated invocations of the Fifth Amendment raise 
adverse inferences against him that leave no possibility that a reasonable factfuider could reach a 
verdict in his favor. 
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must fulfill a 
"gatekeeping function" and should ask whether "a reasonable trier of fact could possibly" reach 
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Willingham v. City of Orlando, 929 So.2d 43, 48 (Fla. 5th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). Given all of the inferences that are to be drawn against 
Epstein, no reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Epstein was somehow the victim of 
improper civil lawsuits filed against him. Instead, a reasonable fmder of fact could only find that 
Epstein was a serial molester of children who was being held accountable through legitimate 
suits brought by Edwards and others on behalf of the minor girls that Epstein victimized. 
"[I]t is well-settled that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against 
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered 
against them." Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); accord Vasquez v. State, 777 
So.2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. App. 2001). The reason for this rule "is both logical and utilitarian. A 
party may not trample upon the rights of others and then escape the consequences by invoking a 
constitutional privilege — at least not in a civil setting." Fraser v. Security and Inv. Coip., 615 
So.2d 841, 842 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). And, in the proper circumstances, "'Silence is 
often evidence of the most persuasive character."' Fraser v. Security and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 
19 
EFTA01099068

841, 842 (Fla. 4'h Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 
149, 153-154 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). 
In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable finder of fact would have "evidence of the 
most persuasive character" from Epstein's repeated refusal to answer questions propounded to 
him. To provide but a few examples, here are questions that Epstein refused to answer and the 
reasonable inference that a reasonable finder of fact would draw: 
• Question not answered: "Specifically what are the allegations against you which 
you contend Mr. Edwards ginned up?" Reasonable inference: No allegations 
against Epstein were ginned up. 
• Question not answered: "Well, which of Mr. Edwards' cases do you contend 
were fabricated?" Reasonable inference: No cases filed by Edwards against 
Epstein were fabricated. 
• Question not answered: "Did sexual assaults ever take place on a private airplane 
on which you were a passenger?" Reasonable inference: Epstein was on a private 
airplane while sexual assaults were taking place. 
• Question not answered: "How many minors have you procured for prostitution?" 
Reasonable inference: Epstein has procured multiple minors for prostitution. 
• Question not answered: "Is there anything in M's Complaint that was filed 
against you in September of 2008 which you contend to be false?" Reasonable 
inference: Nothin in 
's complaint filed in September of 2008 was false —
i.e., as alleged in 
's complaint, Epstein repeatedly sexually assaulted her 
while she was a minor and she was entitled to substantial compensatory and 
punitive damages as a result. 
• Question not answered: "I would like to know whether you ever had any physical 
contact with the person referred to as Jane Doe in that [federal] complaint?" 
Reasonable inference: Epstein had physical contact with minor Jane Doe as 
alleged in her federal complaint. 
• Question not answered: "Did you ever have any physical contact with 
Reasonable inference: Epstein had physical contact with minor ■. as alleged in 
her complaint. 
• Question not answered: "What is the actual value that you contend the claim of 
20 
EFTA01099069

M. against you has?" Reasonable inference: M.'s claim against Epstein had 
substantial actual value. 
Without repeating each and every invocation of the Fifth Amendment that Epstein has 
made and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those invocations of privilege, the big 
picture is unmistakably clear: No reasonable finder of fact could rule in Epstein's favor on his 
claims against Edwards. Accordingly, Edwards is entitled to summary judgment based on the 
Fifth Amendment inferences that the jury would draw. 
The inferences against Epstein are not limited to those arising from his privilege 
assertions. Epstein's guilt is also reasonably inferred from his harassment of, intimidation of, 
efforts to exercise control over, and limitation of access to witnesses who might testify against 
him. 
Epstein's efforts to intimidate his victims support the inference that Epstein knew that 
they were going to provide compelling testimony against him. The evidence that Epstein 
tampered with witnesses (later designated as his accomplices and co-conspirators) will be 
admissible to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. "[fit is precisely because of the egregious 
nature of such conduct that the law expressly permits the jury to make adverse inferences from a 
party's efforts to intimidate witnesses . . ." Jost v. Ahmad, 730 So.2d 708, 711 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). 
To be clear, Epstein's attempt to tamper with 
witnesses is "not simply admissible as impeachment evidence of the tampering party's 
credibility. The opposing party is entitled to introduce facts regarding efforts to intimidate a 
witness as substantive evidence." Id. at 711 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). 
This substantive evidence of Epstein's witness intimidation provides yet another reason why no 
reasonable jury could find in favor of his claims against Edwards. 
21 
EFTA01099070

V. 
EDWARDS IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS 
OF HIS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF PRIVILEGE 
Absolute immunity must be afforded any act occurring during course of judicial 
proceeding, regardless of whether act involves defamatory statement or other tortious behavior, 
such as tortious interference with business relationship, so long as act has some relationship to 
proceeding. See Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. 
Co., 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994). The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of 
a judicial proceeding extends not only to the parties in a proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and 
counsel as well. Id. The litigation privilege applies in all causes of action, whether for common-
law torts or statutory violations. See Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 
950 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 2007). Defamatory statements made by lawyer while interviewing a 
witness in preparation for and connected to pending litigation are covered by the absolute 
immunity conferred by the litigation privilege. See DelMonico v. Traynor, 50 So. 3d 4 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2010), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010). The privilege extends to 
statements in judicial proceedings or those "necessarily preliminary thereto. See Stewart v. Sun 
Sentinel Co., 695 So.2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(an attorney's delivery of a copy of a notice of 
claim to a reporter, which notice was a required filing prior to instituting suit, was protected by 
absolute immunity). 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, defendant, the Court should grant defendant Bradley J. 
Edwards, Esq., summary judgment in his favor on the only remaining claim filed against him by 
plaintiff Jeffrey Epstein, and any other relief that the Court deems just and proper. 
22 
EFTA01099071

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
171-01-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November '--, , 2011 a copy of the foregoing has been 
served via Fax and U.S. Mail to all those on the attached service list. 
Jack Scarola 
Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley 
By: 
23 
EFTA01099072

SERVICE LIST 
Christopher E. Knight, Esq. 
Joseph L. Ackerman, Esq. 
FOWLER WHITE BURNETT P.A. 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger et al. 
Marc S. Nurik, Esq. 
Law Offices of Marc S. Nurik 
Gary M. Farmer, Jr: 
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, 
Edwards. Fistos & Lehrman P.L. 
24 
EFTA01099073

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND 
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Plaintiff(s), 
VS. 
SCOTT ROTHSTEIN, individually, 
BRADLEY J. EDWARDS, individually, and 
■., individually, 
Defendant(s). 
-COUNTER-PLAINTIFF, EDWARDS' SECOND RENEWED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
ASSERT CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Counter-plaintiff, BRADLEY J. EDWARDS, moves this Honorable Court for entry of an 
Order granting him leave to assert a claim for punitive damages against the Counter-defendant, 
FJEFFREY EPSTEIN, and in support thereof would show that the evidence summarized herein 
satisfies the statutory prerequisites for the assertion of a punitive damage claim. Specifically, the 
evidence establishes that EPSTEIN's Complaint against EDWARDS; 
1. 
was filed in the total absence of evidence to support any allegation of wrongdoing 
on the part of EDWARDS; 
2. 
was filed in the total absence of evidence that EPSTEIN had sustained damage as 
a consequence of any misconduct other than his own well-established criminal 
enterprise; 
3. 
was filed in the absence of any intention to meet his own obligation to provide 
relevant and material discovery; 
EXHIBIT 
EFTA01099074

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
4. 
was filed for the sole purpose of attempting to intimidate both EDWARDS and 
EDWARDS' clients and others into abandoning their legitimate claims against 
EPSTEIN. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
To plead a claim for punitive damages, the claimant must show a "reasonable basis" for 
the recovery of such damages. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.190(0; see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 
658 So.2d 518, 520 (Fla. 1995). The showing required to amend is minimal. As stated in State 
of Wis. Inv. v. Plantation Square Assoc., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1580 (S.D. Fla/1991): 
[T] he court beffeVes-ffniusi Ultimately be a lesser standard than that required for 
summary judgment. Though the burden is on [the plaintiff] to survive a §768.72 
challenge of insufficiency, see Will v. Systems Engineering Consultants, 554 
So.2d 591, 592 (Fla. 3"I DCA 1989), the standard of proof required to assert 
Plaintiffs punitive claim must be lower than that needed to survive a summary 
adjudication on its merits. As the Florida courts have noted, a §768.72 challenge 
more closely resembles a motion to dismiss that additionally requires an 
evidentiary proffer and places the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff Id. In 
considering a motion to dismiss, factual adjudication is inappropriate as all facts 
asserted—or here, reasonably established—by the plaintiff are to be taken as true. 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, at 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, at 101-102, 2 L.Ed. 2d 80, 
1581 at 84. As such, the court has given recognition only to those assertions of 
the defendants which would show Plaintiffs factual bases to be patently false or 
irrelevant, and has paid no heed whatsoever to the defendants' alternative 
evidentiary proffers. 
State of Wis. Inv., 761 F. Supp. At 1580; see also Dolphin Cove Assn. v. Square D. Co., 616 So. 
2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) ("Prejudging the evidence is not a proper vehicle for the court's 
denial of the motion to amend" to assert punitive damages claim). 
2 
EFTA01099075

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
Section 768.72 provides for the amendment of a complaint either through evidence in the 
record or "proffered by the claimant." As the statute suggests, a proffer of evidence in support 
of a punitive damage claim is sufficient and a formal evidentiary hearing is not required. See 
Strasser v. Yalmanchi, 677 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), rev. dismissed, 699 So.2d 1372 
(Fla. 1997); Solis v. Calvo, 689 So.2d 366, 369, n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In fact, a hearing is not 
even required provided the trial court identifies the filings of the parties and indicates that its 
decision to grant the motion is based upon a review of the file and the respective documents 
filed. 
The United States District Court for the Middle-District of Florida has spoken clearly on 
the nature of a proffer in support of a motion to amend to assert a claim for punitive damages in 
Royal Marco Point I Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. OBE Ins. Corp., 2010 WL 2609367 (M.D. Fla. June 
30, 2010). As the Court stated: 
It is important to emphasize, at the outset, the limited nature of the review a court 
may undertake in considering the sufficiency of an evidentiary proffer under Fla. 
Stat. §768.72. Courts reviewing such proffers have recognized that "a `proffer' 
according to traditional notions of the term, connotes merely an `offer' of 
evidence and neither the term standing alone nor the statute itself calls for an 
adjudication of the underlying veracity of that which is submitted, much less for 
countervailing evidentiary submissions." Estate of Despain v. Avante Group, 
Inc., 900 So.2d 637, 642 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (quoting State of Wisconsin 
Investment Board v. Plantation Square Associates, Ltd., 761 F. Supp. 1569, 1581 
n. 21 (S.D. Fla. 1991)). 
Therefore, "an evidentiary hearing where witnesses testify and evidence is offered 
and scrutinized under the pertinent evidentiary rules, as in a trial, is neither 
contemplated nor mandated by the statute in order to determine whether a 
reasonable basis has been established to plead punitive damages." Id. (collecting 
cases). 
3 
EFTA01099076

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAC 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
It is thus neither necessary nor appropriate for a court to make evidentiary rulings, 
weigh rebuttal evidence, or engage in credibility determinations in considering the 
sufficiency of the proffer. 
"...a proffer should be evaluated by standards akin to those governing a motion to 
dismiss, where the truth of the plaintiffs allegations are assumed, and not the 
more rigorous summary judgment standard, where the opposing party must show 
that there is sufficient admissible evidence in the record to support a reasonable 
jury finding in his favor." 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The pleadings and discovery taken to date as confirmed by Epstein's voluntary dismissal 
of all claims brought by him against -Bnadley :J: Edwards, show that there is• an absence of 
competent evidence to demonstrate that Edwards participated in any fraud against Epstein, show 
the propriety of every aspect of Edwards' involvement in the prosecution of legitimate claims 
against Epstein, and further support the conclusion that Epstein sued Edwards out of malice and 
for the purpose of intending to intimidate Edwards and Edwards' clients into abandoning or 
compromising their legitimate claims against Epstein. Epstein sexually abused three clients of 
Edwards 
M., and Jane Doe — and Edwards properly and successfully represented them 
in a civil action against Epstein. Nothing in Edwards's capable and competent representation of 
his clients could serve as the basis for a civil lawsuit against him. Allegations about Edwards's 
participation in or knowledge of the use of the civil actions against Epstein in a "Ponzi Scheme" 
were never supported by probable cause or any competent evidence and could never be 
supported by competent evidence as they are entirely false. 
4 
EFTA01099077

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
A. 
Epstein's Complaint 
Epstein's Second Amended Complaint essentially alleged that Epstein was damaged by 
Edwards, acting in concert with Scott Rothstein (President of the Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler law 
firm ("RRA") where Edwards worked for a short period of time). Epstein appeared to allege that 
Edwards joined Rothstein in the abusive prosecution of sexual assault cases against Epstein to 
"pump" the cases to Ponzi scheme investors. As described by Epstein, investor victims were 
told by Rothstein that three minor girls who were sexually assaulted by Epstein:.., 
., and 
Jane Doe were to be paid up-front money to prevent those girls from settling their civil cases 
•-• against • Epstein. 
In Epstein's, view, these child sexual assault -cases had "minimal value" 
(Complaint & 42(h)), and Edwards's refusal to force his clients to accept modest settlement 
offers was claimed to breach some duty that Edwards owed to Epstein. Interestingly, Epstein 
never states that he actually made any settlement offers. 
The supposed "proof' of the Complaint's allegations against Edwards includes 
Edwards's alleged contacts with the media, his attempts to obtain discovery from high-profile 
persons with whom Epstein socialized, and use of "ridiculously inflammatory" language in 
arguments in court. Remarkably, Epstein has filed such allegations against Edwards despite the 
fact that Epstein had sexually abused each of Edwards's clients and others while they were 
minors. Indeed, in discovery Epstein has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than 
answer questions about the extent of the sexual abuse of his many victims. Even more 
remarkably, since filing his suit against Edwards, Epstein settled the three cases Edwards 
handled for an amount that Epstein insisted be kept confidential. Without violating the strict 
5 
EFTA01099078

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
confidentiality terms required by Epstein, the cases did not settle for the "minimal value" that 
Epstein suggested in his Complaint. Because Epstein relies upon the alleged discrepancy 
between the "minimal value" Epstein ascribed to the claims and the substantial value Edwards 
sought to recover for his clients, the settlement amounts Epstein voluntarily agreed to pay while 
these claims against Edwards were pending will be disclosed to the court in-camera. 
B. Summary of the Argument 
The claims against Bradley J. Edwards, Esq., were frivolous for at least three separate 
reasons. 
First, because Epstein-elected to hide behind the-shield of his right against self- 
--
incrimination to preclude his disclosing any relevant information about the criminal activity at 
the center of his claims, he was barred from prosecuting his case against Edwards. Under the 
well-established "sword and shield" doctrine, Epstein could not legitimately seek damages from 
Edwards while at the same time asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege to block relevant 
discovery. His case was therefore subject to summary judgment and on the eve of the hearing 
seeking that summary judgment Epstein effectively conceded that fact by voluntarily dismissing 
his claims. 
Second, all of Edwards' conduct in the prosecution of valid claims against Epstein was 
protected by the litigation privilege, a second absolute legal bar to Epstein's claims effectively 
conceded by his voluntary dismissal. 
Third, and most fundamentally, Epstein's lawsuit was not only unsupported by both the 
applicable law, it was based on unsupported factual allegations directly contradicted by all of the 
6 
EFTA01099079

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA 040800XXXXM BAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
record evidence. From the beginning, Edwards diligently represented three victims of sexual 
assaults perpetrated by Epstein. As explained in detail below, each and every one of Edwards's 
litigation decisions was grounded in proper litigation judgment about the need to pursue effective 
discovery against Epstein, particularly in the face of Epstein's stonewalling tactics. Edwards's 
successful representation finally forced Epstein to settle and pay appropriate damages. Effective 
and proper representation of child victims who have been repeatedly sexually assaulted cannot 
form the basis of a separate, "satellite" lawsuit, and therefore Edwards is entitled to summary 
judgment on these grounds as well. 
The truth is the record is entirely devoid of
 evidence to support Epstein's claims and 
is completely and consistently corroborative of Edwards's sworn assertion of innocence. Put 
simply, Epstein made allegations that have no basis in fact. To the contrary, his lawsuit was 
merely a desperate measure by a serial pedophile to prevent being held accountable for 
repeatedly sexually abusing minor females. Epstein's ulterior motives in filing and prosecuting 
this lawsuit are blatantly obvious. Epstein's behavior is another clear demonstration that he feels 
he lives above the law and that because of his wealth he can manipulate the system and pay for 
lawyers to do his dirty work - even to the extent of having them assert baseless claims against 
other members of the Florida Bar. Every one of Epstein's Complaints against Edwards was 
nothing short of a far-fetched fictional fairy-tale with absolutely no evidence whatsoever to 
support his preposterous claims. It was his last ditch effort to escape the public disclosure by 
Edwards and his clients of the nature, extent, and sordid details of Epstein's life as a serial child 
molester. 
7 
EFTA01099080

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
ARGUMENT 
II. 
THE RECORD AND PROFFERED EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES 
THAT 
EDWARDS'S CONDUCT COULD NOT POSSIBLY FORM THE BASIS OF ANY 
LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF EPSTEIN 
A. The Summary Judgment Standard. 
Rule 1.510(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a court may enter summary 
judgment when the pleadings, depositions and factual showings reveal that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a-matter of law. See 
Snyder v. Cheezem Development Corp., 373-So: 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Rule.1.510(c), 
Fla. R. Civ. P. Once the moving party conclusively establishes that the nonmoving party cannot 
prevail, it is incumbent on the nonmoving party to submit evidence to rebut the motion for 
summary judgment. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1966). It is not enough for the 
opposing party merely to assert that an issue of fact does exist. Fisel v. Wynns, 667 So.2d 761, 
764 (Fla.1996); Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (same). 
Moreover, it is well-recognized that the non-moving party faced with a summary 
judgment motion supported by appropriate proof may not rely on bare, conclusory assertions 
found in the pleadings to create an issue and thus avoid summary judgment. Instead, the party 
must produce counter-evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. See Bryant v. 
Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc., 479 So.2d 165, 168 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985); 
see also Lanzner v. City of North Miami Beach, 141 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1962) 
(recognizing that mere contrary allegations of complaint were not sufficient to preclude summary 
8 
EFTA01099081

Edwards adv. Epstein 
Case No.: 502009CA040800XXXXMBAG 
Second Renewed Motion for Leave to Assert Claim for Punitive Damages 
judgment on basis of facts established without dispute). Where the nonmoving party fails to 
present evidence rebutting the motion for summary judgment and there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, then entry of judgment is proper as a matter of law. See Davis v. Hathaway, 408 
So. 2d 688, 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); see also Holl, 191 So. 2d at 43. Faced with these 
well-established legal principles, Epstein voluntarily dismissed his claims against Edwards on 
the eve of the hearing on Edwards Motion for Summary Judgment. 
B. Epstein's Claim Regarding Edwards Had Absolutely No Factual Basis. 
This was not a complicated case for granting summary judgment. To the contrary, the 
uncontested record clearly established that each and every one -of-Epstein's claims against 
Edwards lacked any merit whatsoever.' 
1. 
Epstein's allegations regarding Edwards' involvement in Rothstein's "Ponzi 
Scheme" were unsupported and unsupportable because Edwards was simply 
not involved in any such scheme. 
a. Edwards Had No Involvement in the Ponzi Scheme. 
The bulk of Epstein's claims against Edwards hinged on the premise that Edwards was 
involved in a Ponzi scheme run by Scott Rothstein. Broad allegations of wrongdoing on the part 
of Edwards were scattered willy-nilly throughout the complaint. None of the allegations 
provided any substance as to how Edwards actually assisted the Ponzi scheme, and allegations 
that he "knew or should have known" of its existence are based upon an impermissible 
pyramiding of inferences. In any event, these allegations all fail for one straightforward reason: 
I The dismissal of Epstein's claims against Edwards did not affect Epstein's claims against Scott Rothstein. Epstein 
had already chosen to dismiss all of his claims against.., the only other defendant named in the suit. 
9 
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