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in the 1 hour and 25 minutes of additional deposition time Plaintiff has agreed to provide to 
Defendant's counsel.9
The Magistrate Judge issued a clearly erroneous decision in large part because she did not 
have the benefit of the complete 446-page transcript of Jane Doe No. 4's deposition at the time 
she made her ruling. 
She did not have the benefit of the transcript because she ruled 
prematurely, before Plaintiffs' counsel had an opportunity to reply to Defendant's Response or to 
file the complete transcript. In this instance, a careful review of the transcript is necessary in 
determining whether additional time is necessary for a fair deposition of Jane Doe No. 4. 
Instead, the Magistrate Judge's decision was premised on an inaccurate characterization of the 
existing deposition record and the topics yet to be covered, which Plaintiff's counsel could have 
corrected and clarified in the Reply prior to the Magistrate Judge's decision, if afforded the time 
to do so provided under S.D. Fla.L.R. 7.1(C). 
To make matters worse, the Magistrate Judge ordered that Defendant's counsel have up 
to four additional hours deposition time of Jane Doe No. 4, without restriction or qualification. 
In contrast, this Court's Order Consolidating Cases dated May 14, 2009 (DE 98) expressly notes 
that the waiver of the 7-hour limit set forth therein I° "shall not be construed as authority for any 
party to take unnecessarily long depositions, or abuse the process." (Order, p. 4, ¶ 8). No such 
admonition is present in the Magistrate Judge's Order. 
The Magistrate Judge ultimately makes the following finding: 
The Court agrees with Epstein that all of the foregoing issues are 
directly relevant to Plaintiffs' damage claims and credibility, and 
to deny him additional time in which to depose these Plaintiffs 
9 This will provide Defendant's counsel with an aggregate 7 hours of deposition time. 
10 As discussed above, Plaintiffs believe that the waiver of the 7-hour rule set forth in that Order 
does not authorize the Defendant to take a deposition of a Plaintiff in excess of 7 hours. 
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would be unreasonable under the circumstances and result in 
prejudice to Epstein by denying him the opportunity to obtain 
discovery that is central to his defense. 
(Omnibus Order (DE 413), pp. 4-5). As discussed above, Defendant has submitted nothing in 
the record to support the conclusion that he will be prejudiced or denied the opportunity to obtain 
discovery that is central to his defense. To the contrary, a review of the transcripts of Jane Doe 
No. 4's deposition emphatically demonstrates that this finding is wrong. The Magistrate Judge's 
Order is thus clearly erroneous. 
In support of the Order, the Magistrate Judge relies upon Osboume v. Columbia 
Helicopters, Inc., 2009 WL 2215076 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). (See Omnibus Order, p. 5). Osboume 
was a employment case in which the Court permitted the plaintiff's deposition to exceed 7 hours 
because plaintiff "submitted unverified, incomplete and inaccurate responses to [defendant's] 
written discovery." Id. at *5. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs have not been evasive in discovery. 
Defendant has not only received written discovery responses from Plaintiff, but extensive 
discovery from Plaintiff's psychiatric expert, Dr. Gilbert Kliman, and an 8-hour independent 
medical examination of the Plaintiff. An objection was made by Plaintiff to detailed written 
discovery requests on Plaintiff's sexual history with men other than Epstein. The Plaintiff's 
objection on this narrow issue was decided by the Magistrate Judge in favor of Epstein, who 
granted Epstein's Motion to Compel in its entirety (DE 377) shortly after the deposition of Jane 
Doe No. 4 took place on October 27, 2009.11 
Nonetheless, contrary to the Magistrate Judge's 
" As discussed above, the instances in which Jane Doe No. 4 was instructed not to answer 
questions based on the then undecided issue of discovery of Plaintiffs sexual history were de 
minimus, and do not support an extended deposition of Jane Doe No. 4. 
Additionally, 
subsequent to the deposition, Plaintiff answered Defendant's written discovery requests on the 
subject of her sexual history in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's Order. 
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finding, any lack of discovery on the issue of sexual history does not support an additional four 
hours of deposition of Jane Doe No. 4. Indeed, it may be anticipated that Epstein's counsel will 
use this additional time for abusive questioning on Jane Doe No. 4's sexual history. 12
Finally, it should be noted that this is not a document driven commercial or employment 
case, where the need for a lengthy deposition of a party may be supported with cause. See 
Dunkin Donuts. Inc. v. Mary's Donuts. Inc. 206 F.R.D. 518, 522 (S.D.Fla. 2002), (allowing the 
plaintiff to depose the defendant's accountant and corporate representative for an additional 
seven hours because it was a complex commercial case involving seven years of commercial 
activity and 10,000 pages of documents). att gm Pace v. City of Palmetto 2007 WL 470477 
(S.D.Fla. 2007) (granting one hour additional deposition time because the deponent had not read 
documents in advance, and was taking an inordinate amount of time during the deposition to read 
documents). In such a case, it may be anticipated that there will be little if any prejudice or 
damage to the party witness created by a lengthy deposition exceeding one day. In stark 
contrast, the depositions of the Plaintiffs in these cases covers the most intimate and private 
details of their lives. Particularly given the harassing and badgering questioning engaged in by 
Defendant's counsel, a two day deposition will needlessly revictimize, embarrass and humiliate 
the Plaintiffs, which is the apparent strategy of Defendant in these cases. 
V. 
Conclusion, 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4 respectfully requests that the 
Magistrate Judge's Omnibus Order (DE 413) be reversed as it pertains to the amount of time 
I! See, a, Transcript, Exh. 2, pp. 181-182 where Defendant's counsel asks Plaintiff if her 
former boyfriend "had taken his penis and inserted it in your vagina", and whether she had given 
him oral sex. He later in the deposition asked her again, regarding the same boyfriend, "when 
was the first time you gave him oral sex", and "when was the first time he stuck his penis in you 
and ejaculated." Transcript, Exh. 3, p. 355. 
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remaining for Jane Doe No. 4's deposition; that Defendant's counsel be limited to an additional 
one hour and 25 minutes of deposition time for Jane Doe No. 4; that Defendant's counsel be 
admonished to refrain from abusive deposition conduct pursuant to S.D.Fla.L.R. 30.1(A)(5); and 
that Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. 
Dated: December 1, 2009 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein 
. Mermel Lein FL Bar No. M) 
MERMELSTE1N & HOROWffZ, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jane Doe Nos. 2-8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on December 1, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being 
served this day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via 
transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized 
manner for those parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic 
Filing. 
/s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein 
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SERVICE LIST 
DOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
ack Alan oldbc er E . 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
Bradley James Edwards 
Isidro Manuel Garcia 
a k Patrick Hill 
Katherine Warthen Ezell 
Michael James Pike 
Paul G. Cassell 
Richard Horace Willits 
C.
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 433 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/03/2009 Page 1 of 7 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 08-CIV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
Related cases: 
08-80232, 08-80380, 08.80381, 08-80994, 
08-80993, 08-80811, 08-80893, 09-80469, 
09-80591, 09-80656, 09-80802, 09-81092 
OMNIBUS ORDER 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the following motions: (1) Plaintiff' Jane Doe's 
Motion for Protective Order Barring Second Deposition and for Sanctions (D.E. #378); and, 
(2) Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4's Motion for Protective Order Re Second Day of Deposition 
(D.E. #392). For the following reasons said Motions are granted in part and denied in part 
in accordance with the terms herein. 
In this case, which has been consolidated for purposes of discovery, Plaintiffs are 
former under-age girls who allege they were sexually assaulted by Defendant, Jeffrey 
Epstein ("Epstein"), at his Palm Beach mansion home. The scheme is alleged to have 
taken place over the course of several years in or around 2004-2005, when the girls in 
question were approximately 16 years of age. As part of this scheme, Epstein, with the 
I 
EXHIBIT 
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help of his assistant 
allegedly lured economically disadvantaged minor girls 
to his homes in Palm beach, New York and St. Thomas, with the promise of money in 
exchange for a massage. Epstein purportedly transformed the massage into a sexual 
assault. The three-count Complaint alleges sexual assault and battery (Count I), 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count II), and, coercion and enticement to sexual 
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422 (Count III). 
The instant Motions are nearly identical and seek, as to each respective Plaintiff, 
Jane Doe in the case of D.E. #378 and Jane Doe 4 in the case of D.E. #392, 
protection/limitation from having to appear at a second deposition. Jane Doe was deposed 
on September 20, 2009 for a total of anywhere between just under 7 hours to 8 hours. 
Jane Doe 4 was deposed on October 27, 2009, and the parties are in agreement that 
taking into account breaks, the deposition lasted 5 hours and 35 minutes. Plaintiffs contend 
that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1), S.D. Fla. L.R. 26.1(K), and the Court's Consolidation 
Order (D.E. #98), all of which limit a deposition of an individual to a single day of seven 
hours unless leave of Court is granted, it is Defendant's burden to demonstrate why more 
than seven hours of deposition time is necessary for a particular Plaintiff. According to 
Plaintiff, Epstein has failed to sustain his burden in this regard and, as such, he should not 
be able to re-depose Jane Doe at all2, and should only be able to re-depose Jane Doe 4 
' In her Motion, Jane Doe represents that she was deposed for 8 hours. For his part, 
Defendant Epstein contends in his Response in Opposition that taking into account 
lunch and other breaks, the actual figure is 6 hours and 50 minutes, which figure he 
contends was confirmed with the court reporter. The Court finds that whether Jane Doe 
was deposed for just under 7 hours as Epstein contends, or for 8 hours as Jane Doe 
alleges, is under the circumstances herein presented, of no consequence. 
2 This is based on Plaintiffs' representation that Jane Doe's deposition lasted 8 hours. 
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for an additional 1 hour and 25 minutes, providing Epstein with an aggregate of 7 hours 
deposition time of Jane Doe 4. 
Epstein contends the Court's May 14, 2009 Consolidation Order, which provides 
that "Local Rule 26.1K (limiting deposition time to one day of seven hours) is waived so as 
to allow each party an adequate opportunity to develop fully the record as it may relate to 
that party," effectively waives L.R. 26.1K's limitation on the length of a deposition, thereby 
relieving Epstein from the seven hour deposition limit. The Court disagrees with Epstein's 
interpretation of the District Court's Order and finds that Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(1) and 
S.D.Fla.L.R. 26.1(K) which, absent agreement or court order, presumptively limits 
depositions to 7 hours, applies in this case. That said, the undersigned finds that Epstein 
has provided sufficient and reasonable grounds in his Response Memorandum to sustain 
his burden under the Rules of showing additional time to depose Jane Doe and Jane Doe 
4 is needed to fully and fairly prepare his defense. 
Plaintiffs are seeking millions of dollars in personal injury damages for, among other 
things, physical injury, pain and suffering, emotional distress, psychological trauma, mental 
anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, and invasion of 
privacy. Epstein's counsel represents he will need an additional 2 1/2  to 3 hours to depose 
Jane Doe, so that he can cover such topics as background information not disclosed in 
answers to interrogatories, family background information, details regarding Jane Doe's 
visits to Epstein's home, Jane Doe's knowledge of other witnesses, school records and 
medical records, and finally, details regarding her past sexual history, an opportunity he 
did not have when he began her deposition as the Court had not yet ruled on Epstein's 
Motion to Compel (D.E. #s 67 & 68), which sought information related to Plaintiff's past 
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sexual history. 
As for Jane Doe 4, Epstein's counsel represents he will need approximately an 
additional 4 hours to complete her deposition, owing to her "complicated and eventful past 
history" including alleged drug use, repeated instances of domestic violence, multiple 
aborted pregnancies and arrests. Defs Resp., p. 2. Also, as with Jane Doe, Epstein's 
counsel claims he needs additional time to depose Jane Doe 4 on details regarding her 
past sexual history, an opportunity he did not have when he began her deposition as the 
Court had not yet ruled on Epstein's Motion to Compel (D.E. #s 67 & 68), which sought 
information related to Plaintiffs past sexual history. All agree that there were instances 
at Jane Doe 4's initial deposition where she was instructed by her counsel not to answer 
questions "relat[edj to sexual partners' names or sexual positions." Jane Doe 4 Deposition 
Excerpt, attached as Ex. "B" to Defs Resp., at 5. With these subjects fairly open to inquiry, 
it is only reasonable that Epstein's counsel will require additional time to depose Jane Doe 
and Jane Doe 4 on these areas. 
The Court agrees with Epstein that all of the foregoing issues are directly relevant 
to Plaintiffs' damage claims and credibility, and to deny him additional time in which to 
depose these Plaintiffs would be unreasonable under the circumstances and result in 
prejudice to Epstein by denying him the opportunity to obtain discovery that is central to 
his defense. See Osborne v. Columbia Helicopters, Inc., 2009 WL 2215076 (S.D. W.Va. 
2009)(granting the defendant an additional one day of 7 hours to depose the plaintiff, 
reasoning that because the plaintiff provided incomplete written discovery responses, the 
defendant "did not have full opportunity to examine Mr. Osborne respecting all of the 
information which might properly be considered in his discovery deposition?). 
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Nonetheless, with the Court now having the benefit of the 446 page, three-volume 
deposition transcript, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiffs' Appeal of Magistrate Judge 
Decision (D.E. #430), the Court finds the 4 additional hours requested by Defendant to 
depose Jane Doe 4 unreasonable under the circumstances. A review of the deposition 
transcript reveals numerous instances of Jane Doe 4 being subjected to repetitive 
questioning about exceedingly sensitive issues such as the emotional pain caused by 
having three abortions, the sexual positions she has engaged in, and Epstein's treatment 
of her. To re-phrase Plaintiffs' counsel's words', while it may be appropriate to ask a 
plaintiff in a personal injury case a question about whether having abortions caused her 
emotional distress, when the essentially identical question is re-phrased and asked over 
and over again, the questioning becomes badgering and harassing. 
Counsel for 
Defendant must be mindful that the depositions of the Plaintiffs in these cases covers the 
most intimate and private details of their lives and if not handled correctly may serve to 
needlessly revictimize, embarrass and humiliate them. 
In order to avoid this result, in all future depositions of the Plaintiffs in these cases, 
including the re-depositions of Jane Doe and Jane Doe 4, Defendant's counsel is ordered 
to refrain from repetitive questioning. This does not mean that Defense counsel may not 
follow-up on questions asked or ask similar questions of a related nature, but counsel is 
expected to conduct himself in a responsible and professional manner befitting members 
of the Bar and balance the need for the information sought against the psychological 
trauma that could result from repetitive, humiliating questions regarding the sensitive 
3 See Plaintiffs' Appeal of Magistrate's Order (D.E. #430), p.6-7. 
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issues at play in this case. 
As for the time permitted defense counsel to re-depose these Plaintiffs, the Court 
finds that any remaining questions regarding Jane Doe 4 or Jane Doe 4's sexual history 
can fairly and reasonably be covered in 2 hours, rather than the 4 hours requested, and 
that any remaining questions regarding Jane Doe or Jane Doe's sexual history can fairly 
and reasonably be covered in the requested 3 hours. The Court's allowance of this 
additional time should not be construed by defense counsel as authority to take the 
depositions of these Plaintiffs for any longer time than is necessary, and in no event will 
the Court tolerate questioning of an abusive nature. In accordance with the above and 
foregoing, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Jane Doe's Motion for Protective Order 
Barring Second Deposition and for Sanctions (D.E. #378); and Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4's 
Motion for Protective Order Re Second Day of Deposition (D.E. #392) are GRANTED IN 
PART AND DENIED IN PART in accordance with the terms of this Order. Epstein's 
counsel is hereby given leave to re-depose Jane Doe for up to 3 additional hours and 
hereby given leave to re-depose Jane Doe 4 for up to 2 additional hours. Counsel for the 
parties are ordered to immediately confer and come to mutual agreement on a date and 
time in which these depositions can be continued sometime within two (2) weeks from the 
date hereof, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. Plaintiffs' request for sanctions is 
denied. 
DONE AND ORDERED this December 3, 2009, in Chambers, at West Palm Beach, 
Florida. 
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LINNEA R. JO 
ON 
UNITED STA ES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
CC: 
The Honorable 
All Counsel of Record 
7 
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