EFTA01080591

Page 15 
Moreover, it is black-letter law that the mens rea must exist when the actus revs is 
committed; the two must coincide in time. Actus non fad:  reum, nisi mens sit rea: the act alone 
does not amount to guilt; it must be accompanied by a guilty mind. In short, the Government 
must prove that Mr. Epstein had the specific intent to target a known minor at the time of the 
call. See Offense Instructions 80, Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal, (2003), 
see supra part II.A.1 . ("The Defendant can be found guilty of that offense only if . 
. the 
Defendant believed that such individual was less than eighteen (18) years of age . .') 
Based on all of the evidence collected during a 15-month State investigation and a 
successive 15-month federal investigation, it is clear that the conduct in this case is exclusively a 
matter for State prosecution.' That evidence conclusively demonstrates that the majority of the 
masseuses—such as 
and ME 
were 18 or older. Ms. 
Ms. 
Ms. S 
and Ms. 
each gave recorded interviews to the State in which 
each attested that they were over 18 on every occasion they went to Mr. Epstein's residence. 
The dates reflected in the messy e ads of incoming calls to Mr. Epstein's home as well as 
cellular toll records of 
phone confirm this fact. 
Other masseuses, who were actually 16 or 17 years old, have in sworn, taped interviews 
with both federal and State authorities admitted that they represented themselves to Mr. Epstein 
as 18 or older. 
Indeed man of the interviewed masseuses—including 
and ---explicitly 
confirmed that 
these women either told Mr. Epstein that they were 18 or told others who they were introducing 
to Mr. Epstein to tell him that they were 18. 
For instance, Ms. 
introduced several 16 or 17 year-old women to Mr. Epstein, 
and, as confirmed in their sworn testimon and Ms. 
own, she routinely advised each to 
tell Mr. Epstein that they were 18. See 
Tr. 2 at 6, 8, 12, 22, 45, Exhibit 12 ("most of the 
girls lied when they go in there . . ."). Ms. 
introduced others, many over 18, some under 
18, to Mr. Epstein. She testified in a sworn interview conducted by the United States Attorney's 
Office and FBI that: 'ese girls that I brought, I know that they were 18 or 19 or 20. And the 
girls that I didn't know and I don't know if they were lying or not, I would say make sure that 
you tell him you're 18." 
Tr. at 22, Exhibit 2. These witnesses' testimony that they 
commonly instructed their friends to deceive Mr. Epstein about their age in order to gain 
admittance to his house will make it exceptionally difficult to prove that Mr. Epstein intended to 
7 
The defense i i 
ssession of both police reports and transcripts of taped interviews conducted largely by 
of the Palm Beach police. These transcripts were not intended to generate exculpatory 
testimony; instead they are replete with leading and suggestive questioning designed to elicit accusations 
inculpatory to Epstein. Nonetheless, when examined in the light of the requisites of federal law, they are filled 
with facts that help demonstrate that a federal prosecution is unwarranted. 
EFTA01080611

Page 16 
target minors (much less that he did so at the time of any telephone communication between Mr. 
Epstein's assistants and the young women). 
Mr. Epstein also took several steps to ensure that no minors entered his home—most 
notably, by affirmatively asking the women whether they were actually 18. See e.g., 
a. at 38-39, Exhibit 10. That fact—which many of the potential witnesses have con um 
to 
sworn interviews—strongly indicates that Mr. Epstein specifically intended to preclude anyone 
under 18 from giving him a massage. That fact is confirmed by, among other things, Ms. 
Mk
testified that "he likes the girls that are between the ages of like 18 and 20 . . ." 
. at 12, Exhibit 12. 
Many of the young women who were aged 16 and 17 visited Mr. Epstein's residence only 
once or twice, and the evidence strongly shows that they lied to Mr. Epstein about their age. 
And while a few of those aged 16 and 17 visited Mr. Epstein's residence more frequently, and 
the government claims that Mr. Epstein either knew or should have known their true age, there is 
not a shred of evidence that Mr. Epstein (or anyone associated with Mr. Epstein) ever attempted 
to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce them over the telephone (or over the Internet). See infra 
part II.A. 
Two girls, 
and 
, were 14 or 15 at the time they met Mr. 
Epstein. Given that each has brought a civil lawsuit against Mr. Epstein, with Ms. Ma 
and 
her family seeking $50 million from Mr. Epstein, their testimony against Mr. Epstein is per se 
suspect. The lawyer representing the "victims" made a public statement conceding that they had 
lied about their ages and then dismissed this critical fact. See Herman Public Statement, Exhibit 
16. A copy of each lawsuit is appended as Exhibits 6 and 7. But, despite their obvious incentive 
to harm Mr. Epstein, their testimony actually confirms his innocence. 
Ms. 
, for 
instance, has testified that Ms. Mill —who introduced her to Mr. Epstein—express y to d her 
to lie to Mr. Epstein about her age: 
Q: 
And 
told you that if you weren't 18 Epstein wouldn't let you into his 
house, right? 
A: 
That's - - yes, yes. 
=MI 
(deposition) at 32, Exhibit 3. 
***** 
Q: 
You didn't want Mr. Epstein to know that you were lying about your age, right? 
A: 
Correct. 
Q: 
You didn't want Mr. Epstein to know that you were not 18 yet, right? 
EFTA01080612

Page 17 
A: 
Correct. 
(deposition) at 36, Exhibit 3. 
In fact, Ms. 
with Palm Beach Police. Id. at 35. Ms. 
age was also unknown to Mr. Eps 
she went to his home. 
, who was introduced to Mr. Epstein by Ms. 
testified in her federal sworn interview that Ms. 
told her to lie to Epstein. See 
Tr. at 8, Exhibit 2 ("she just said make sure ou're 18 because Jeffrey doesn't want an 
underage girls") (emphasis added). Ms. 
testimony strongly suggests that Ms. 
lied to Mr. Epstein about her own age as well. Moreover, in addifd t 
shaving a substantial 
i
k 
financial interest in the outcome of any federal prosecution, Ms. 
is not a credible 
witness. She has a documented history of addiction and criminal conduct that included being 
involuntarily committed by her mother for "prostituting herself for crack." Palm Beach County 
Probate Court Case 
She also self represented that she worked at a local erotic 
massage parlor that presumably required a minimum age. 
told Mr. Epstein that she was 18 years old, and confirmed this fact 
In addition to Mr. Epstein's lack of knowledge that certain women were under the age of 
18, there is certainly no evidence that Mr. Epstein exhibited a habit or pattern of targeting 
underage girls. The 
toll records and seized message pads—two documentary sources 
examined during the State investigation (and presumably the successive federal investigation)—
underscore the critical fact that there was no routine and pattern of targeting underage girls. To 
the contrary, Mr. Epstein's assistants called an array of potential masseuses—many of whom 
were over the age of 18, and some whom were not. On A ril 27
lance, calls were made at 
9:02 AM to 
Mand at 9:03 AM to 
Ms. 
was over 18 at the time. 
On May 6, there were calls made one minute apart to 
d then 
a
On the afternoon of July 2, calls were made to Ms. 
as well as others. Finlin 
September 18, 5 calls were made to 5 females within 6 
minutes including
and 
(each over 18). See 
Toll Records, Exhibit 9. 
These records reflect that no one associated with Mr. Epstein deliberately targeted known 
minors, and further reflect the improbability that either the caller or Mr. Epstein even knew who 
would answer the phone, who would schedule a visit, what their age was at the time of the 
assistant's call, and what intention Mr. Epstein might have—other than to have his assistant try 
to schedule a massage for a given time on a given day. A sampling of the message pads reflects 
an identically haphazard course of communication that hardly suggests a targeted attempt to 
knowingly communicate an inducement to a known minor to engage in sexual activities with Mr. 
Epstein. See Message Book Entries, Exhibit 8. 
Indeed, in many cases, the identity of a particular masseuse on a particular day was 
simply the result of which masseuse had left a message for Mr. Epstein—NV 
t any prompting 
by Mr. Epstein or his assistants. See e.g., 
Tr. at 3, 4-5, Exhibit 25; 
Tr. at 6, Exhibit 
EFTA01080613

Page 18 
21. 
In other cases, the identity of a particular masseuse resulted from who had returned 
telephone calls and was available, or who was brought by a friend. Indeed, there were instances 
where neither Mr. Epstein nor his assistants knew the masseuse who was coming for a particular 
appointment other than by name (if even b name let alone knew her age and the conduct in 
which they would engage. See generally, 
at 3, 19, Exhibit 10; 
Tr. at 19-20, 
23-23-24, Exhibit 2. The key point here, however, is that the haphazard nature of the scheduling 
calls—and readily apparent randomness of the masseuses on any given day—prove that Mr. 
Epstein and his assistants did not deliberately target minors.8
c. 
Mr. Epstein Did Not Use An Interstate Instrumentality To Induce 
Proscribed Sexual Activity. 
2422(b) also requires that the interstate communication be used to "persuade[], 
induce[], entice[], or coerce[j" minors "to engage in prostitution or any [illegal] sexual activity." 
The evidence in this case demonstrates that Mr. Epstein did not use the interstate 
instrumentalities to induce illegal sexual activity because (i) many of the masseuses were not 
contacted over the phone at all and/or have testified that they were not induced to engage in 
sexual contact over the phone, and (ii) Mr. Epstein did not in any event consistently engage in 
sexual activity with them, making it virtually impossible to prove even circumstantially that the 
phone was used to induce the women to engage in illicit sexual conduct. 
i. 
The Evidence Shows That Mr. Epstein Did Not Use The Phone To 
Induce His Masseuses To Engage In Illicit Sexual Activity. 
The facts and evidence do not show that Mr. Epstein (or his assistants) used an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce to induce sexual activity, because many of the masseuses 
were never contacted over the phone at all or have testified that they were not induced to engage 
in sexual activity over the phone. There was no Internet communication with anyone under 18, 
and there were no phone calls where anyone said anything that went beyond simply scheduling a 
massage. There are no emails—or tapes of phone conversations—which could directly or even 
circumstantially show that the content of any communication was to induce, persuade, entice, or 
8 
Even if there are claims that (a) Mr. Epstein knew a given masseuse was a minor, (b) and that Mr. Epstein had 
someone contact her to schedule a massage after a prior incident of sexual activity, those allegations would not 
make out a claim under § 2242(b) because Congress clearly required the "knowing" inducement to be 
communicated during the use of the interstate facility, and again, without proof that sexual activity routinely 
resulted from the massages, it is well-nigh impossible to prove that the calls included such an inducement. The 
transcript of Ms. 
interview, for instance, claims only that there were occasional, random acts of sex, and 
that in some cases, she did not even provide Mr. Epstein with a massage, let alone Image in sexual activity. 
See ■ 
Tr. at 15, Exhibit 19. On other occasions, communications with Ms. 
resulted only in her 
introducing someone new to Mr. Epstein—an event that again fails to reflect that Mr. Epstein had the requisite 
knowledge of the prospective masseuse's age, much less that sexual activity was likely (or, indeed, inevitable). 
EFTA01080614

Page 19 
coerce a minor into sexual activity. Instead, the evidence in this case demonstrates that the use 
of the phone was entirely incidental to the conduct at issue in this case. Consider the following 
examples: 
Ms. 
testified during her recent sworn deposition that she never 
had any Internet or telephone conversation with Mr. Epstein or any of his employees, and that 
she was not persuaded, induced, coerced, or enticed to o 
Mr. Epstein's home as a result of 
any tel honic or Internet communication. See 
(deposition) at 24-25, Exhibit 3. 
Ms. 
has been described by prosecutors as the lynchp' 
• 
but, according to 
her own testimony, she was brought to Mr. Epstein's house by 
and informed that 
the purpose of her visit was to give a massage; did not ever discuss any sexual activity with Mr. 
Epstein over the Internet or phone; and was never i 
or persuaded to see Mr. Epstein over 
Internet. Id. at 24-25. In fact, Ms. 
had no contact whatsoever with Mr. 
the phone or 
Epstein or any of his employees prior to arriving at Epstein's residence 
9-30 Mr. 
Epstein never had any kind of conversation or communicati 
• 
s. 
before her
single visit to his home, nor had he ever e-mailed Ms. 
or engaged in Internet 
communication of any kind with her. Id. at 29. 
: Ms. M, 
like Ms. ME, 
was introduced to Mr. Epstein by a third 
person without any prior phone communications with Mr. Epstein or 
his employees 
preceding the first visit. See 
Tr. at 8, Exhibit 2. Afterward, it was 
who gave Mr. 
Epstein her number and said "any time you want me to give you a massage again, I'll be more 
than welcome to." Id. Mr. Epstein's assistant would thereafter call 
arding appointments. 
Id. at 14. Seized message pads further reflect incoming calls from 
and others seeking to 
return to Mr. Epstein's residence. As to this group of women, not only did Mr. Epstein not know 
their age, and not only was sexual activity not the predictable or routine outcome of the 
massages, but the phone was used at most to schedule, and never to persuade or induce or entice 
or coerce. See e.g., 
Tr. at 21, Exhibit 2 (she testifies that Mr. Epstein never pulled her 
close in a sexual way) 
Ms. 
was introduced to Mr. Epstein by her friend 
Ms. 
told Ms. 
that Mr. Epstein would pay for a massage and ' 
he was a respectful 
guy. 
Tr. at 5, Exhibit 5A. Ms.. 
extended this offer to Ms. 
in person, not over 
the phone or Internet. Id. at 6-7. Neither Mr. Epstein nor anyone on his behalf communicated 
i.
with Ms. 
b email, or fax, or text messagsior to her
 to Mr. Epstein's residence. 
Id. at 10. Ms. 
was 17 at the time, and Ms. 
told Ms. 
to lie a 
er age. Id. at 8 
("she told me to say that I was 18 if it was asked"). On one occasion, Ms.111 was asked her 
age and she lied. Id. at 9. Ms. 
was never forced or coerced 
sexual activity 
with Mr. Epstein. Id. at 11-12. Follow-up visits were scheduled by 
' 
who would call 
and "ask me if I would like to come over and give a massage, because he would be in town." Id. 
at 14. There was never a suggestion of any sexual objecting 
the call. Id. at 14-15. Ms. 
i
i 
li 
never spoke to Mr. Epstein over the phone, only Ms. 
or another assistant. Id. at 15. 
she has testified that what occurred thereafter was not planned or discussed in advance, but 
EFTA01080615

Page 20 
was sporadic and consensual. Id. at 16 ("just random things, but not sex"); Id. at 17 ("he would 
never make me do anything"); Id. at 17. 
Ms. 1.1Ilmet Mr. Epstein through 
See 
Tr. 
at 6, Exhibit 4. She went to Mr. Epstein's residence on one occasion, but had no communication 
of any sort with Mr. Epstein before going to his house, nor with any assistant or employee of Mr. 
Epstein. Id. at 5-7. She was never contacted by Mr. Epstein or anyone on his behalf after the 
massage. Id. at 15. She was told by MN= 
who drove her to Mr. Epstein's, to lie about 
her age—and she did, telling Mr. Epstein she was 19. Id. at 16. There was no prior phone 
contact between Ms. 
and anyone associated with Mr. Epstein. 
ii. 
A Federal Case Cannot Proven With Circumstantial Evidence, 
Because Sexual Activity Did Not Invariably Follow The 
Scheduling Of A Massage Over The Phone. 
There is overwhelming evidence that the phone was not used to induce women to engage 
in sexual activity. Mr. Epstein did not knowingly engage in a routine or habit of sexual activity 
with minors, and therefore did not understand that the use of the phones was intended knowingly 
to induce minors to engage in prohibited conduct. Taped interviews from the State investigation 
demonstrate conclusively that there was no governing pattern or practice with respect to Mr. 
Epstein's massages. Sometimes the women were over 18, sometimes they were not; some visits 
resulted in massages, some did not; some massages were topless, some were not; sometimes Mr. 
Epstein masturbated during the massage, sometimes he did not; sometimes the massages would 
lead to other sexual activity, sometimes they did not. 
There is no pattern or practice evident here. When scheduling calls were made (by 
people other than Mr. Epstein), there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein had any knowledge of 
which masseuse had been scheduled; whether she was a minor; whether any massage would be 
given; and whether any sexual activity would occur. What happened during any massage 
depended entirely on face-to-face interaction with Mr. Epstein at the time, not on any prior 
telephone call or Internet communication. Indeed, many females testified that they visited Mr. 
Epstein's house and never even gave a massage; many times, they simply watched television or 
sat by the pool or ate food. See, e.g.,Ill Tr. at 15, Exhibit 19 ("Sometimes...he would have to 
work and he'd be sitting at his desk or something and I'd just be naked there watching television 
or reading a book...sometimes he wanted to just watch TV or read...that's it, not touch him or 
anything and I'd get paid three hundred dollars...sometimes he'd just invite me over for 
breakfast or dinner, or just to use the swimming pool, and I'd get paid for that too...I'd get paid 
just to hang out with him. That's it."). 
Moreover, the evidence shows that Mr. Epstein's assistants scheduled everything in his 
life, from doctor's appointments and business meetings to haircuts, dinners, and massages. They 
knew no more about what would occur during a massage—or the real ages of the masseuses—
than they did about a sensitive business meeting. 
They were simply "schedulers" or 
"appointment makers," rather than knowing participants in a scheme to lure, induce, entice, 
EFTA01080616

Page 21 
persuade, or coerce underage women to visit Mr. Epstein's home with the purpose of engaging in 
unlawful sexual activity. 
Instead, to the extent any unlawful sexual activity ever occurred—which we deny—it 
was solicited during a face-to-face encounter with Mr. Epstein at his house, after the massage 
had been scheduled. The masseuses' own testimony makes this clear. As many have stated: 
during the course of the massage Mr. Epstein would at times offer them additional money to 
engage in activity in which they had never previously engaged—some would accept and others 
would not, with Mr. Epstein invariably respecting the decisions made "on the scene" by the 
masseuse in question. But the prior telephone conversations simply involved determining when 
and if a masseuse was available to come to Mr. Epstein's residence—for a massage, and nothing 
else. In short, the testimony, evidence and facts do not make out the elements of a federal crime, 
i.e. the necessary showing that a scheduling call itself was specifically intended to produce 
sexual activity with a minor at the time of the cal1.9
Nor is it possible to prove that Mr. Epstein intended the scheduling calls to induce sexual 
activity based on the fact that sexual contact occurred during an earlier massage. The fact that a 
call may have preceded a visit by a young woman who had, on one or more previous occasions, 
engaged in activity of a sexual nature with Mr. Epstein is not sufficient to establish that the next 
call included a knowing attempt to "persuade[], induce(), entice[] or coerce[)." At most, such a 
call might be a link in a causal chain that may or may not end in proscribed sexual activity—but 
it cannot be characterized as an attempt to persuade, induce, entice or coerce. Those, after all, 
are verbs that suggest a level of unwillingness on the part of the person at the other end of the 
communication, and that certainly is not the case with respect to repeat visitors (many of whom 
contacted Mr. Epstein themselves about the possibility of a return visit). 
In any event, courts have repeatedly held (in the context of entrapment) that neither mere 
solicitation nor the creation of opportunities to commit an offense comprises inducement, even if 
it creates a risk that an offense will occur. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 
65, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1125 (2006). The Eleventh Circuit has stated in 
entrapment cases that government inducement may be shown by a defendant's producing any 
evidence sufficient to raise a jury issue "that the government's conduct created a substantial risk 
9 
Section 2422(b) also requires that the objective of the interstate communication be "to engage in prostitution or 
any [illegal] sexual activity". The statute looks to State law for whether sexual activity is unlawful, which 
defmcs unlawful sexual activity as: "Oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of 
another; anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; or the handling or fondling of the sexual 
organ of another for the purpose of masturbation; however, the term does not include acts done for bona fide 
medical purposes." FL Stat. &796.07(1X0. "Prostitution" as defined by Florida law requires "the giving or 
receiving of the body for sexual activity for hire", FL. Stat. &796.07(IXa). The prostitution offense is 
predicated on the definition of "sexual activity" cited above. It bears mentioning that masturbation, by itself, is 
not considered illegal sexual activity under Florida law. 
EFTA01080617

Page 22 
that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it . . " 
Nevertheless, "evidence of the government's mere suggestion of a crime or initiation of contact 
is not enough ... Instead, ... inducement requires an element of persuasion or mild coercion.... 
['inducement consists of opportunity plus something like excessive pressure or manipulation ... 
." United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.917 (1995). 
Likewise, a telephone call that merely initiates contact or sets up an opportunity for something 
inappropriate to occur, without pressure or manipulation, cannot amount to inducement. Nor can 
it amount to persuasion, enticement, or coercion, which are variations on the same theme. 
The theme that money was the implied inducement or enticement would also fail to meet 
the communication as crime element. The variability of payments counter any sort of pattern. 
See Police Report at 78, Exhibit 17 
received amount of $100 per hour); 
Tr. at 10, 
Exhibit 25 received amounts of $100 and $200); 
Tr. at 10, Exhibit 26 (received $200); 
at 26, Exhibit 10, (received amounts of $300); 
Tr. at 11, 20 (received amounts 
of $300, $400, $500 and $600). The fact that (i) the amounts given for massages were akin to set 
amounts for other persons (e.g., chiropractors and facialists who came to the house after 
receiving a similar call ("are you available") and (ii) payments were often decoupled from even a 
massage, see. 
Tr. at 15, Exhibit 19, and certainly from illegal sexual conduct, negates any 
notion that an enticement to have illegal sexual activity could be implied from the mere fact that 
Mr. Epstein and the masseuse each would expect there to be payment for a massage. Any 
additional agreement would occur, if at all, randomly, and only in person i.e. would not be 
known at the time of the communication in question. The requirement of a "knowing" 
inducement or enticement requires more. 
Neither mere solicitation nor the creation of 
opportunities to commit an offense comprises inducement. 
Rather, inducement refers to 
government conduct that persuades a person to turn "from a righteous path to an iniquitous one." 
United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 468 (1's Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Inducement entails 
some semblance of "arm-twisting," pleading, or coercive tactics. See id. Florida law is similar. 
See Marred v. State, 841 So.2d 600, 603 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2003) ("Inducement cannot be 
found by prompting or creating an opportunity: Neither mere solicitation nor the creation of 
opportunities to commit an offense comprises inducement?) 
In this case, there was no unwillingness at all. Young women who visited Mr. Epstein's 
home more than once did so willingly and of their own volition. Whatever activity these women 
engaged in while there was also entirely =induced by any antecedent phone call. A compilation 
of messages from message pads seized by the State during a search of Mr. Epstein's Palm Beach 
property clearly reflects that if there was a regular pattern it was of women calling Mr. Epstein's 
home or his assistants to determine whether they could be scheduled to come to his residence to 
give a massage rather than providing evidence that Epstein's assistant would knowingly use the 
phone to induce or entice or persuade or coerce as required by § 2422(b). See Message Pad 
Entries, Exhibit 8. 
Additionally, any reliance on implication or routine would require a theory of criminal 
liability that stands in stark contrast to the heartland of the reported precedents we have 
EFTA01080618

Page 23 
examined. See Table of § 2422 Cases, Exhibit 28. A great majority of § 2422(b) cases are 
brought under the attempt theory where the charged defendants believed the target of their 
inducement was 18 but where they were in fact communicating with a law enforcement agent 
conducting a "sting" operation. In such cases, the intent element is proven by repeated explicit 
Internet communications evidencing both the defendant's belief of age (the norm is for the 
"sting" to fabricate an age significantly under the statutory limit) and the defendant's 
unambiguous intent to engage in sexual intercourse, oral sex, or other conduct squarely within 
the heartland of "illegal sexual activities". Importantly, in these cases, the age of the victim is 
typically 14 or under. Further, the give and take of express communications in these cases 
(generally via e-mail, instant messenger, or postings in chatrooms) provide explicit proof of a 
knowing inducement, persuasion, enticement or more. These communications are replete with 
explicit sex talk, multiple explicit sexual propositions and specific sexual requests, making clear 
both the perpetrator's intention to induce as well as the illicit sexual activity intended to be 
induced. Most other non-sting cases feature explicit inducements, often the sending or receiving 
of graphic photos from which age can be readily deduced, and unambiguous references to 
targeted illegal sexual objectives. None of the reported decisions rest alone on communications 
by a third party aimed at "scheduling" or at inquiring whether someone is available to work at a 
specific time or on responsive messages merely communicating availability to work—i.e. give a 
massage—all without an express and knowing inducement, express evidence of knowledge of 
age, or any agreed objective of an illegal sexual activity as it is defined by Florida statute. 
The bottom line here is that there is no proof that any given call arranged for (or was 
intended to arrange for) sexual activity, and thus no proof that the phones were used to lure, 
induce, entice, persuade, or coerce someone to engage in such activity. Without a predicable 
pattern linking illegal sexual activity to each visit, there is no viable implication that any given 
communication was intended to yield sexual activity. And such an implication would in any 
event be contrary to fact, since all of the evidence in this case demonstrates that the decision to 
engage (or not engage) in sexual conduct was made on the spur-of-the-moment it was "solicited" 
during the face-to-face encounter rather than over the phone. 
d. 
There Is No Vicarious Liability. 
There is no evidentiary basis for initiating a prosecution based on calls made by Mr. 
Epstein's assistant: She did not know the women's ages, lacked knowledge that any criminal 
sexual activity was intended, and never used the phone to persuade or induce anyone to visit Mr. 
Epstein except for the purpose of providing a massage. Without these elements, Mr. Epstein's 
assistant cannot be proven to be a co-conspirator or abettor, and without evidence that Mr. 
Epstein specifically directed his assistant to call a specific witness who Mr. Epstein then knew to 
be under 18 and with whom Mr. Epstein at that time specifically intended to engage in a criminal 
sexual activity, Mr. Epstein cannot be held criminally liable for the phone calls made by his 
assistant. 
EFTA01080619

Page 24 
While the Government apparently believes that there may be evidence that Mr. Epstein 
was told the ages of a small subset of the masseuses, there is no evidence that the other required 
elements of proof could be established—namely that the phone was used to induce sexual 
activity, rather than schedule a massage, and that at the time of the call, Mr. Epstein had the 
specific intent required to violate the statute (i.e. that he knew who the assistant was calling, that 
he authorized the assistant to persuade or induce or entice over the phone, that he had actual 
knowledge or belief that the person called was a minor, and that he was directing the call with 
the specific intent to have illegal sexual activities with the minor, as defined by Florida law). 
Again, the evidence here conclusively shows that any sexual activity that followed from a 
scheduled massage was in fact random, not part of a consistent pattern or practice, and resulted 
from the spontaneity of the post-telephone person-to-person contact that alone is subject to State 
prosecution. 
e. 
There Is No Evidence Of A Conspiracy. 
The requirements of § 2422 or the other two federal statutes for that matter, cannot be 
diluted or circumvented merely by resorting to a conspiracy charge. Conspiracies require a 
meeting of the minds of the essential elements of the criminal object which in this case would be 
a violation of §§ 2422(b), 2423(b), or 1591. Elements such as the use of the interstate facility to 
knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce in § 2422(b), or the purpose to have illicit sex with 
a minor while engaged in interstate travel in 2423(b), see infra part II.C, are not jurisdictional 
hooks but instead are the essence of the federal crime. A conspiracy must include an agreement 
to each such clement. These federalizing elements cannot be diminished or made irrelevant by 
resort to a conspiracy—they are the necessary object of any federal conspiratorial agreement and 
are unproven as to Mr. Epstein and equally unproven as anyone directly employed by him. 
f. 
There Is No Basis For A Prosecution Under .4 2422(b). 
Given all of this, there is no basis for prosecuting Mr. Epstein under § 2422(b). Mr. 
Epstein did not place telephone calls inviting underage women to his house. The vast majority 
of women who came to Mr. Epstein's house were 18 or over. Those who were under 18 were 
told to lie about their age and did. Mr. Epstein's assistant did not know that the women she 
called were in fact under 18. Mr. Epstein did not direct his assistant to use the phone to induce 
underage women to engage in illicit sexual activity with him. And Mr. Epstein's assistant did 
not use the phone to induce underage women to engage in illicit sexual activity with him. 
4. 
Clear Statement Rule 
To the extent there is any ambiguity about the statutory requirements, it should be 
resolved against a prosecution of Mr. Epstein. Under our federal system, the "States possess 
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 635 (1993). Accordingly, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[w]hen Congress criminalizes 
conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects 'a change in the sensitive relation 
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.' United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 
EFTA01080620

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• 1 
(1995) (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)). In Enmons, the Court 
refused to accept the Government's "broad concept" of the Hobbs Act, because it would have 
rendered all manner of minor actions subject to federal prosecution and stringent federal 
punishment, covering even "the worker who threw a punch on a picket line, or the striker who 
deflated the tires of his employer's truck." Enmons, 410 U.S. at 410-11 ("Neither the language 
of the Hobbs Act nor its legislative history can justify the conclusion that Congress intended to 
work ... such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States."). 
The same rationale applies here. The crime of engaging in underage criminal sexual 
activity (or underage prostitution) is traditionally considered within the State's historic police 
power. It is well-settled law that if Congress had wanted to federalize such crimes, it needed to 
say so with unmistakable clarity in § 2422(b). See. e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) ("Ulf Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between 
the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear 
in the language of the statute.") (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 
242 (1985)); id. at 65 (Congress "should make its intention `clear and manifest' if it intends to 
pre-empt the historic powers of the States) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218 (1947)); see also United States v. Drury, 344 F.3d 1089, 1101 (11th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
that in the absence of "unmistakably clear" language signaling Congress's intent to alter the 
federal-State balance, courts should interpret the statute in the manner "that does not impute an 
intention upon Congress to invoke its full commerce power to regulate conduct traditionally 
controlled by the States'). 
Needless to say, Congress did not say with unmistakable clarity in § 2422(b) that it 
wanted to federalize historically State crimes. Quite the opposite: Congress criminalized only 
"using" an interstate facility to "knowingly persuade" or "inducer a minor to engage in 
unlawful sexual activity. Again, the most natural reading of that language is that § 2422(b) 
creates a crime of communication across an interstate facility. That is why most of the reported 
prosecutions under § 2422(b) involve sting operations in which the criminal sexual activity never 
actually took place; it was enough that a defendant knowingly attempted to induce such behavior 
via the telephone or Internet. In any event, there is no sign in § 2422(b)—much less an 
unmistakable sign—that Congress intended to federalize a host of State crimes like underage 
solicitation or prostitution. 
The more narrow reading of § 2422(6) is consistent with the position recently articulated 
by the Department of Justice in a similar context. See November 9, 2007 DOJ letter to the 
Judiciary, at 8-9, Exhibit 15. In reviewing proposed changes to human trafficking statutes like 
22 U.S.C. § 2151, the DOJ opposed removing the requirement that a defendant have knowledge 
of a minor's age. The DOJ argued that eliminating the knowledge-of-age requirement would 
"run() counter to the criminal law goal of punishing culpable states of mind" and would create an 
unusual strict liability crime with a harsh mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 8, 1 17. 
Likewise, the DOJ opposed expanding the Mann Act to include cases "affecting" interstate 
commerce. It reasoned that federal law already adequately covers crimes in which victims have 
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been trafficked by force or coercion, and that "pandering, pimping and prostitution-related 
offenses have historically been prosecuted at the state or local level." Id. (emphasis added); see 
also id. ("Furthermore, the Department is not aware of any reasons why state and local 
authorities are not currently able to pursue prostitution-related crimes such that Federal 
jurisdiction is necessary.") Those observations could hardly be more apt in this case. Expanding 
§ 2422(b) to reach a prostitution-related offense is "unnecessary and a diversion from Federal 
law enforcement's core anti-trafficking mission." Id at 9. 
In the end, federal prosecutors attempt to argue that § 2422(b) applies wherever anyone 
uses an interstate facility and unlawful sexual activity ensues. However, the statute clearly aims 
at the conduct of Internet predators, i.e., those who knowingly and intentionally target children 
through some means of interstate commerce. That is the natural reading of the text, and it is 
consistent with the statute's purpose, the rule of lenity, and principles of federalism. See 
Scheidler v. Nall Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 16-21 (2006) (construing the Hobbs Act 
narrowly based on statutory text and history, as well as the need not to "federalize much ordinary 
criminal behavior"). On any broader interpretation, § 2422(b) would federalize nearly any 
sex-related crime if there were use of the telephone or Internet. If Congress had wanted to effect 
that sort of sea-change in the balance between federal and State power, it could and would have 
said so when it enacted § 2422. 
Florida law defines a range of prostitution and prostitution related offenses, but it teats 
them as misdemeanors, making it a felony for a third violation. See Fla. Stat.796.07(4). To 
ratchet up the punishment, by invoking the federal statute, to felony crime with a long mandatory 
minimum prison sentence attached, is not what Congress intended when it enacted this law, nor 
does the statute give fair warning that the statute made such conduct a federal criminal offense. 
It would work a major shift in the State-federal balance—at a time when the administration has 
eschewed, on federalism grounds, extending federal criminal law into areas that are primarily 
and historically of State concern. And it would do so where the federal (as opposed to the State) 
interest is minimal, assuming a federal interest exists at all. In addition, it would raise questions 
of the utmost seriousness under the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses, since a prosecution 
of Mr. Epstein under § 2422(b) would require a construction of the statute that was unforeseeable 
when the conduct at issue occurred. See, e..g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 
(1964). If a judicial construction of a criminal statute is "unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, "it must not be given 
retroactive effect. Id. at 354, quoting Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 61 (2d ed. 1960). 
5. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the facts and evidence do not fit the elements required to prove the crime. There 
are numerous factual and legal hurdles that must overcome to meet the key elements of this 
crime. Federal prosecutors will have to establish from credible evidence that Mr. Epstein used a 
phone to engage in the prohibited acts. To the extent others made the phone calls, there is no 
evidence that the phone was used to induce the young women to do anything other than provide 
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a massage. The facts clearly will not establish that Mr. Epstein knew that whoever made the 
calls was engaging in an attempt to induce anything other than a massage. The facts and 
evidence do not establish that parties who were spoken to, were "persuaded, induced, enticed, or 
coerced." And the facts and evidence establish that Mr. Epstein did not know the ages of the 
women who came over when the phone was used, and did not at the time of the calls intend to 
solicit prostitution or any sexual activity chargeable under Florida law. 
Under these circumstances, taking a statute plainly not intended to cover this alleged 
conduct and stretching to accomplish something Congress never intended would be to grossly 
overreach—especially where State law normally covers this territory. Mr. Epstein undeniably 
committed State offenses. He was so indicted and has agreed, subject to the resolution of the 
successive federal criminal investigation, to plead guilty to that which the evidence proves—
State offenses. 
Consistent with Congress's focus on sexual predators, federal prosecutors have never 
used § 2422(b) in this way. We have identified 199 prosecutions under § 2422(b),10 and all of 
them have involved Internet predation, for-profit prostitution rings, sex tourism, or some other 
situation in which the defendant himself either abused the victim or aggressively induced minors 
over the mail, phone or Internet. Needless to say, Mr. Epstein is not a sexual predator, let alone 
an Internet predator. Evidence shows that Mr. Epstein did not target minors; that women were 
motivated by the opportunity to make money; that all sexual touching was entirely consensual; 
and that all of the conduct took place in Mr. Epstein's home in Palm Beach County. 
B. 
18 U.S.C. § 1591 
Section 1591 criminalizes human trafficking. It reads as follows: 
18 U.S.C. § 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion 
(a) Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, 
harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means a person; or 
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation 
in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph 
(1), 
10 We identified a total of 230 prosecutions under § 2422(b), but 31 of those case opinions fail to provide any 
information as to the facts underlying the charges. 
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Page 28 
knowing that force, fraud, or coercion ... will be used to cause the person to 
engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 
18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act....(emphasis 
added) 
The text, structure, and history of this statute make clear that it was never intended to 
apply to a case like this one, and the Department's own policy statements and past prosecuting 
decisions demonstrate that applying § 1591 in this case would be unprecedented and 
inappropriate. 
1. 
The Text Of The Statute Forecloses Its Application In This Case. 
By its plain text, the statute requires (I) the deliberate (2) obtaining or enticing (3) in 
interstate commerce of (4) a person (5) while "knowing that force, fraud, or coercion ... will be 
used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act," or "knowing that" the person "has 
not attained the age of 18 years and" (6) "will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act." 18 
U.S.C. § 1591. These elements cannot be satisfied. 
To begin with, by no stretch of the imagination did Mr. Epstein use "force, fraud, or 
coercion" in connection with any of the women who came to his home. In fact, it was just the 
opposite. There is ample testimony that the women felt comfortable with Mr. Epstein. Those 
who came to his house were told before they chose to come that Mr. Epstein would request a 
massage and might possibly request that the masseuse remove her clothing. It was also made 
clear to those who came to his home, that if ever Mr. Epstein requested more from them, and 
they did not feel comfortable with his request, all they need do was tell him so and he would be 
fine with that. Each individual approached about Mr. Epstein was free to accept or reject any 
invitation, each was free to introduce or not introduce Mr. Epstein to their friends (as many did), 
each was free, if asked, to reject any request by Mr. Epstein for anything more than a simple 
massage and to end the massage at any time. In fact, some did reject his requests and end the 
massage, and they were still paid for their services. In a number of cases, even those who ended 
massages early returned, either to bring friends or to wait, talk and snack in Mr. Epstein's house. 
Still many others returned to Mr. Epstein's house time and time again to perform massages. See 
Summary of Testimony re No Coercion, Exhibit 31. 
To suggest that Mr. Epstein in any way 
used "force, fraud, or coercion" with these women is baseless. To the contrary, the young 
women's' testimony in this case clearly reflects, there is not even the slightest whiff of coercion 
in this case, nor any suggestion that the young women involved were lacking in the ability to 
make fully informed choices. The clear record that all the conduct in question was voluntary, 
non-violent, and non-coercive plainly demonstrates that this would be an inappropriate case in 
which to presume coercion. 
Furthermore, the evidence in this case conclusively establishes that the underage girls 
who visited Mr. Epstein's home have, without exception, either expressly admitted that they lied 
to Mr. Epstein about their age or instructed others to lie to Mr. Epstein about their age. See 
supra at part II.A.3.b. And the identity of the masseuses (and their ages) was purely random—
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Page 29 
some girls were over 18, some were under, and the identity of a given masseuse on a given day 
depended entirely on who was available or who was brought to Mr. Epstein home, unsolicited, 
by a friend. There was, in short, no deliberate effort to target underage girls; to the extent any 
underage girls visited Mr. Epstein's home, it was pure happenstance, made possible only because 
the girls themselves deceived Mr. Epstein in order to gain access to his property. 
Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Epstein or his assistants acted with knowledge that the 
minors would "be caused to engage in a commercial sex act." Again, Mr. Epstein's massages 
did not invariably lead to sexual contact (and often did not lead to sexual contact), see supra at 
part II.A.3.c., which makes it impossible to prove that the girls were recruited by someone 
"knowing" that those girls would "be caused to engage in a commercial sex act." After all, one 
cannot be said to have "known" that something "would" happen if it did not actually happen. 
Perhaps more important, the statute's use of the term "be caused to engage" demonstrates that 
Congress contemplated some use of undue influence or pressure to induce the minor to perform 
"a commercial sex act." When two people willingly and consensually engage in a sex act—even 
one that involves the exchange of money—it cannot be said that one has "be[en] caused" by the 
other to engage in the act. And if the statute were applied without requiring some element of 
undue influence, then it would apply to any act of consensual prostitution involving a willing 
minor, which certainly was not Congress's intent. The "knowing causation" element of the 
statute thus makes clear that the statute targets traditional pimps—those who recruit underage 
women and influence or require them to engage in sexual acts with third parties—not the third-
party "Johns" who unwittingly solicit an underage prostitute acting under the influence of a 
pimp. 
Needless to say, there is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Epstein was pimping the young 
women who came to his home—and there is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Epstein wielded 
any undue influence over those young women in their own interactions. To the contrary, each 
was free to accept or reject any invitation to his home; each was free to introduce or not 
introduce him to their friends; each was free, if asked, to reject any escalation of a simple 
massage into something more. 
Indeed, many of the girls visited Mr. Epstein's home 
unsolicited—and many left messages with Mr. Epstein's assistant seeking to visit him. See 
supra at part I. The statute cannot plausibly be read to cover these circumstances, where there is 
no serious question that the masseuses chose—but were not "caused to"—perform massages on 
Mr. Epstein, and, occasionally, more. 
Finally, the statute's express requirement that there be a nexus between the inducement of 
a minor and interstate commerce is not satisfied in this case. That requirement makes clear that 
Congress intended to target commercial prostitution operations with a substantial impact on the 
interstate economy—i.e., those involving the coercive "trafficking" of minors across State or 
national boundaries as part of a commercial enterprise--rather than purely local prostitution. But 
that's all that was involved here. Mr. Epstein did not entice anyone located in another State or 
country. He did not entice anyone to cross State or national lines. None of the women in this 
case ever did cross State lines. Any sexual contact that occurred took place between Palm Beach 
EFTA01080625

Page 30 
residents in Palm Beach. And any impact that the private, consensual activities at issue in this 
case could have had on interstate commerce was far too attenuated to sustain the application of 
this statute to Mr. Epstein's alleged conduct—not least of all because there is no evidence 
whatsoever that Congress intended § 1591 to target the sort of purely local conduct at issue here 
(as opposed to the interstate or transnational trafficking of minors). Needless to say, application 
of the statute under these circumstances would raise grave constitutional concerns, see, e.g., 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), 
and given the absence of any basis in the text, structure, or history of the statute for thinking that 
Congress intended to reach such purely local conduct, it should not be stretched to apply here. 
2. 
The Structure Of The Statute Forecloses Its Application In This Case. 
The broader structure of the statute likewise makes clear that § 1591 was never intended 
to apply to the sort of conduct at issue in this case. § 1591 was enacted in 2000 as part of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which is a comprehensive legislative scheme aimed 
at the problem of human trafficking. That statute created four new offenses, each of which 
unquestionably is directed at coercive human trafficking, rather than simple solicitation of 
prostitution: Section 1589 addresses forced labor; section 1590 addresses trafficking with respect 
to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude or forced labor; § 1591 addresses trafficking of 
children or by force, fraud, or coercion; and section 1592 addresses the concealment or 
confiscation of another person's passport or identification in the course of violating the 
preceding trafficking provisions. And the TVPA goes on to provide for the civil and criminal 
forfeiture of trafficking proceeds. 
In every respect, then, the TVPA is directed at interstate and international human 
trafficking, particularly of women and children (and involving forced labor and sex). Each 
section of the statute plainly targets the operators of trafficking regimes, not their "Johns." 
Reading the statute to apply to simple prostitution, which is all this case involves, would wrench 
§ 1591 from its surrounding context, and strain it to apply here--where there is not even a whiff 
of coercion, and no evidence whatsoever that the young women involved in this case were 
incapable of making their own choices. 
3. 
The History Of The Statute Forecloses Its Application In This Case. 
The legislative history of § 1591 and the TVPA further makes clear that Congress 
intended the statute only to cover human trafficking offenses, not mere solicitation. See 114 Stat. 
1464 § 102 (Oct. 2000) (purpose of § 1591 is "to combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary 
manifestation of slavery"); id. ("Trafficking in persons is a modem form of slavery, and it is the 
largest manifestation of slavery today. At least 700,000 persons annually, primarily women and 
children, are trafficked within or across international borders. Approximately 50,000 women 
and children are trafficked into the United States each year."). 
None of the stated goals of the TVPA in general, and of § 1591 in particular, apply to 
acts of solicitation of prostitution. Nothing in the legislative history states or any way suggests 
EFTA01080626

Page 31 
that Congress was addressing the evils of human trafficking by targeting Johns. Instead, the 
clear Congressional focus was on traffickers that is, those who participate and engage in a 
modem day form of slavery, by using force, fraud, or coercion to exploit the unwitting. See, e.g., 
Legal Options To Stop Human Trafficking: Hearing Before The Subcomm. on Human Rights and 
the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 15 (Mar. 26, 2007) (statement of Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Grace Chung Becker) ("Human trafficking is really about force, 
fraud or coercion, and that is the key element that describes human trafficking."); Report on 
Activities to Combat Human Trafficking, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division 
(Feb. 24, 
2006), 
available 
at 
http://149.101.1.32/crt/crizziltrafficking_report_2006.pdf 
("(Tjrafficking is the modern-day form of slavery. It requires the use of force, fraud or coercion 
by a trafficker to compel a person, or hold someone in an employment situation in which he or 
she will be criminally exploited."). 
Again, there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein's conduct or that of his associates resembles 
the kind of conduct at which this statute was aimed. To the contrary, the evidence shows again 
and again that the young women involved in this case were willing participants: they lied about 
their age because they knew Mr. Epstein was not interested in minors; they called the home 
seeking to make their own appointments with Mr. Epstein; many returned to the home on 
multiple occasions; and they were free to stay or leave on whatever terms they desired. Congress 
plainly did not intend § 1591 to cover these circumstances. 
4. 
The Department's Own Policy Statements Regarding The TWA 
Foreclose The Application Of 6 1591 In This Case. 
The Department's own policy statements on prostitution-based cases underscores that 
§ 1591 cannot and should not be distorted to include the conduct at issue in this case. As the 
Department has explained, "Federal law prioritizes crimes in which victims have been trafficked 
as a result of force, fraud, or coercion, including the sex trafficking of children in which coercion 
is presumed i.e. crimes that fall under the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on slavery and 
involuntary servitude, and commercial sex involving transportation in interstate commerce." See 
November 9, 2007 DOJ letter to the Judiciary, at 8, Exhibit 15. The Department's position 
further opposes the federalization of "prostitution-related offenses" as an unnecessary "diversion 
from Federal law enforcement's core anti-trafficking mission," and expresses the view that State 
and local authorities are more than capable of addressing such offenses. Id. at 8-9. 
Needless to say, Mr. Epstein is not a "trafficker" of children. He derived no profit from 
any prostitution business. And the testimony of the women is clear and uncontroverted: Mr. 
Epstein did not exercise force, fraud, or coercion over any female—in fact, quite the opposite. 
See Summary of Testimony re No Coercion, Exhibit 31. Therefore, there is no basis for 
presuming coercion here, given the clear record that the conduct in question was voluntary, non-
violent, and non-coercive. 
5. 
The Department's Prosecution History and Existing Case Law Foreclose 
The Application Of 6 1591 In This Case. 
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Page 32 
Federal prosecutors have never used § 1591 in a case involving facts like these. We have 
identified 21 prosecutions under § 1591,11 and all of them have involved international sex 
trafficking; for-profit prostitution rings, usually involving minors and forcible coercion; or 
forcible rape or physical abuse and intimidation. See, e.g., United States v. Norris, 188 Fed. 
Appx. 822, 2006 WL 1889654 (11th Cir. 2006) (prosecution of several men for conspiracy to 
hold young women in peonage, and to traffic them for commercial sex acts, involving force and 
threats); United States v. Sims, 161 Fed. Appx. 849, 2006 WL 14581 (11th Cir. 2006) (defendant 
picked up young woman, transported her over State lines, ordered her to prostitute herself, and 
took money from her). 
Moreover, in the cases enforcing the statute, the victim is typically 14 and under. See 
Table of § 1591 Cases, Exhibit 29. Therefore, witnesses under 18 years old in this case are not 
the "children" in respect of whom trafficking cases have historically been enforced. With two 
exc tions, all such witnesses were 16 years old or over. Of the two exceptions, one, 
has given multiple sworn statements that no commercial sex act occurred (and that she 
lied to Mr. Epstein about her age). The other, MEM. 
who has a history of criminal 
misconduct and drug addiction, has sought to collect monetary remuneration from Mr. Epstein in 
a civil suit and her credibilit is
 beyond any reasonable reliance. Importantly, other girls 
have testified that Ms. =I. 
told them to lie about their ages because Mr. Epstein did not 
want underage girls in his home. This strongly suggests that Ms. 
herself lied to Mr. 
Epstein about her own age. 
It is little wonder, then, that the courts have made clear that § 1591 simply is not intended 
to cover the kind of alleged conduct at issue here. Thus, as the Eleventh Circuit has explained, 
"Section 1591 does not criminalize all acts of prostitution (a vice traditionally governed by state 
regulation)." 
Rather, its reach is limited to sex trafficking that involves children or is 
accomplished by force, fraud, or coercion." United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 n.1 
(2007); see also United States v. Sims, 161 Fed. Appx. 849, 2006 WL 14581 at *3 (11th Cir. 
2006) (to "establish Sims's guilt on the sex trafficking of a minor count, the government had to 
show that Sims benefited financially from Owen's sexual activity and that Sims knew that (a) 
force or coercion would be used to cause Owens to engage in a criminal sex act or (b) that 
Owens was under the age of 18." (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the 
statute makes perfect sense: were § 1591 not limited in that fashion, it would threaten to 
criminalize a host of localized behavior that has nothing to do with human trafficking. 
In these respects, Mr. Epstein's case hardly could differ more from the typical § 1591 
case, like Evans—where a stereotypical pimp enticed an AIDS-inflicted 14 year-old into 
prostitution for commercial purposes and essentially held her in bondage. 476 F.3d at 1176-78. 
II We identified a total of 25 prosecutions under § 1591, but 4 of those case opinions fail to provide any 
information as to the facts underlying the charges. 
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Page 33 
Conversely, Mr. Epstein was not involved in any kind of human trafficking, enslavement or 
commercial prostitution enterprise. 
We have attached sworn testimony that shows that 
Mr. Epstein solicited, received, and paid for massages which included, on some occasions, 
consensual sexual touching from local women in his Palm Beach home. Some of these women 
were under 18 at the time of the conduct, but they systematically lied to Mr. Epstein about their 
age. These facts are nothing like any of the prior cases in which the Department has initiated a 
§ 1591 prosecution. 
At bottom, Mr. Epstein's conduct was purely local; it did not involve "trafficking of 
women or children in the sex industry" and was not part of a phenomenon that, in the aggregate, 
had an economic impact on interstate or foreign commerce. Extending the statute to local 
customers who seek prostitution services, even on a regular basis, would collide with the limits 
imposed by Evans, by the history of a statute that is premised on the Thirteenth Amendment, by 
the statute's placement in Chapter 77 of the Title 18 (titled "Peonage, Slavery, and Trafficking in 
Persons"), and by the Department's own representations that prostitution is properly reserved for 
State and local prosecution absent its featuring commercial sex trafficking of children. Mr. 
Epstein simply is not a "trafficker" by any stretch of language, policy or imagination. Therefore, 
prosecution under § 1591 should not be authorized. It has never before been approved on facts 
like this, and no reported precedent encompasses Epstein's conduct within the ambit of a viable 
§ 1591 prosecution. See Table of § 1591 Cases, Exhibit 29. 
C. 
18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) 
Section 2423(b) criminalizes domestic and international sex tourism. It reads as follows: 
18 U.S.C. § 2423. Transportation of minors 
(b) Travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct —A person who 
travels in interstate commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States 
citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States who 
travels in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual 
conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 30 years, or both. 
(Emphasis added.) Section 2423(b) thus provides up to 30 years of imprisonment for anyone 
who travels across State lines (i) for the purpose of engaging in (ii) illicit sexual conduct with a 
minor. Neither of those elements is satisfied here. Mr. Epstein did not travel to Palm Beach for 
the purpose of engaging in sexual activity with a minor, and whatever sexual activity did occur 
was not "illicit sexual conduct" within the meaning of the statute. 
First, Mr. Epstein's trips to Palm Beach were not undertaken "for the purpose of 
engaging" in sexual activity, much less for the purpose of engaging in "illicit sexual conduct." 
To the contrary, the prospect that Mr. Epstein might engage in sexual activity in Florida was not 
the dominant motive—or even a significant motive—for his travel. See Mortensen v. United 
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Page 34 
States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944) (intention to engage in proscribed conduct must "exist before 
the conclusion of the interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate 
movement.") (emphasis added); United States v. Hoschouer, 224 Fed. Appx. 923, 924 (11th Cir. 
2007) (affirming jury instruction that "the Government must show that the Defendant's criminal 
purpose was not merely incidental to the travel"); id. at 927 ("By requiring that the jury find that 
Defendant's illicit sexual conduct was more than `merely incidental' to his purpose in 
traveling..., the district court effectively required that Defendant's illicit purpose be an 
important purpose of the travel.") (emphasis added); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 
471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[Tjhe relationship between the mens rea and the actus reus required by 
§ 2423(b) is neither incidental nor tangential. § 2423(b) does not simply prohibit traveling with 
an immoral thought, or even with an amorphous intent to engage in sexual activity with a minor 
in another state."). 
Instead, Mr. Epstein spent at least 100 days a year in Palm Beach for family purposes, 
business purposes, and social purposes, and to maintain a home that he has owned in Palm Beach 
since 1991—more than a decade before the incidents giving rise to this investigation. In fact, 
Mr. Epstein's longstanding ties to the Palm Beach community led him to establish a residence 
there nearly 20 years ago. While in Palm Beach, he routinely visits family members and close 
friends, has seen his primary care physician for checkups and prescribed tests in the Palm Beach 
area, and until her death in May of 2004, regularly saw his mother who was hospitalized and 
then convalesced in south Florida. Any massages he may have received in Palm Beach were 
entirely incidental to these regular trips home. 
Flight records previously provided to the United States Attorney's Office show that in 
2003, Mr. Epstein traveled to and from his Palm Beach home on 31 occasions, and spent 29 
multi-day weekends at the residence. In 2004, Mr. Epstein traveled to and from his Palm Beach 
home on 37 occasions, 36 of which included a multi-day weekend stay. In the first 9 months of 
2005 the pattern continued: 24 multi-day trips to Palm Beach including 21 multi-day stays over 
weekends. From 2003 through 2005 there was no month when Mr. Epstein did not spend at least 
one weekend in Palm Beach. In fact, the Palm Beach area is the home base for his flight 
operations, for maintenance of his aircraft, and for periodic FAA inspections. Additionally, Mr. 
Epstein's pilots and engineers all resided in Florida. Mr. Epstein's gun license, until recently, 
was a Florida license. He has given generously to charities in Florida. He has met business 
associates at his Palm Beach residence. 
In short, the evidence is indisputable that Palm Beach was where Mr. Epstein spent most 
of his discretionary time, and that his travels to Palm Beach were trips returning to his home—
not the escapades of a sex tourist off to some destination inextricably intertwined with the 
significant or dominant purpose of having "illicit sexual conduct." Epstein's trips to Palm Beach 
were simply those of a business person traveling home for weekends or stopping over on his way 
to or from New York and St. Thomas. 
EFTA01080630