EFTA01070407

Pne 1 off 8 ' 
Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Pagel of 8 
\Nam 
703 So.2d 1076 
703 So.2d 1076,22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375,23 Pla. L. Weekly DI69 
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) 
District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
Fifth District 
Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners, 
v. 
Marjorie A. RUZZO, and Exec., Inc., etc., Re-
spondents. 
No. 97-82. 
Page 1 
307A1c31 k. Relevancy and Materiality. 
Most Cited Cases 
Party may be permitted to discover: evidence that 
would be inadmissible at trial, if it would lead to 
discovery of relevant evidence. West's P.S.A. RCP 
Rule 1.280(6)0). 
(3] Pretrial Procedure 307A at=36.7. 
Oct. 10, 1997. 
As Mo4Ifled on Grant of Clarification Jan. 2, 1998. , 
307A Pretrial Procedure
rev .dent ea  p lei '%0:2-6, 21(O k In • , 
307A11 Depositions and Discovery 
Plaintiffs brought action against alleged house of \ (Nen ). 
307AI1(A) Discovery in General 
prostitution for, inter alia, coercion of prostitution. 
307Ak36 Particular Subjects of Disclos- ure 
The Circuit Court, Brevard County, Frank Pound, 
307Ak36.1 k. In General. Most Cited 
J., granted in part defendants' motion to compel dis- 
Cases 
covery. Plaintiffs filed petition for writ of certior- 
Evidence of plaintiffs' past prostitution and their 
art. The District Court of Appeal, W. Sharp, J.. held 
revenues relating to such activities, including activ-
that evidence of plaintiffs' past prostitution and 
ilia with alleged house of prostitution against 
their revenues relating to such activities was dis- 
which they had fded suit, was d'isco'verable, where 
covetable. 
plaintiffs brought action not only fbr coercion of 
prostitution, but also for battery, false imprison-
ment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, violation of their civil rights, 
and racketeering. Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, § 40302, 142 U.S.C.A. § 
13981; West's P.S.A. §§ 772.014, 796.09; West's 
FS.A. RCP Rule 1280(b)(1). 
*1076 Richard E. Johnson and Heather Fisher Lind-
say, of Spriggs I Johnson, Tallahassee, for Peti-
tioners. 
Mark S. Peters of Amari, Therlac & Eisenmenger, 
P.A., Cocoa, for Respondents. 
Petition denied. 
Harris, J., concurred specially and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1) Pretrial Procedure 307A eza31 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307A11 Depositions and Discovery 
307All(A) Discovery In General 
307Ak31 k. Relevancy and Materiality. 
Most Cited Cases 
Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to subject 
matter of case and must be admissible or reason-
ably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. 
West's F.S.A. RCP Rule 1.220(b)(1). 
(21 Pretrial Procedure 307A €.=31 
307A Pretrial Procedure 
307All Depositions and Discovery 
307All(A) Discovery in General 
W. SHARP, Judge. 
Bales and Shumate petition this court for a writ of 
certiorari to review certain portions of the lower 
court's order which granted, in part, a motion to 
compel discovery filed by respondents RU720 and 
Exec., Inc. Petitioners argue that these portions de-
part from the essential requirements of law and will 
cause them irreparable harm because they will be 
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EXHIBIT 
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EFTA01070427

Puge 2 of 8 
Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Rage 2 of B 
703 Sold 1076 
703 So.2d 1076,22 Fla. I.,. Weekly D2375,23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 
(Cite as: 703 Sold 1076) 
compelled to disclose intimate details of their sexu-
al history. We decline to issue the writ of certiorari. 
Batas and Shumate filed suit against Ruzzo and Ex-
ec, Inc., doing business as "The Boardroom." Ac-
cording to Batas and Shumate, The Boardroom op-
erates ostensibly as *1077 a leisure spa but actually 
is a house of prostitution. Balls worked at The 
Boardroom from December 1993 until February 
1996; Shumate worked there from October 1992 
until March 1996. Ruzzo, the sole officer and 
shareholder of Exec, Inc., collected about fifty to 
sixty percent of each employees earnings from per-
forming sexual acts. 
According to Batas and Shumate, Ruzzo exerted 
mental and emotional control over her employees 
and thus she was able to exploit them as prostitutes. 
Ruzzo required her employees to pay her substan-
tial sums of money to attend "metaphysical work-
shops" conducted by Russo or persons associated 
with her. At the work place, the employees were re-
quired to participate in religious and quasi-religious 
"circles," rituals and incantations. These practices 
were allegedly designed to break down the person-
alities of the women who worked for Ruzzo and to 
foster dependency and loyalty to herself. At one 
time when the earnings of a new employee were 
missing and believed to be stolen, Ruzzo required 
that the petitioners be strip searched and body cav-
ity searched. Ruzzo caused the petitioners to be-
lieve their continued employment was dependent on 
their submission to these searches and that they 
might be arrested on felony charges if they refused 
to submit to the searches. 
Batas and Shumate's second amended complaint 
against Ruzzo contains seven counts. Count I is an 
action for coercion of prostitution pursuant to sec-
tion 796.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioners allege the 
requirement that they perform sexual acts to retain 
their employment constitutes Inducement and coer-
cion to engage in prostitution. Count II is a claim 
for battery for the unwanted and offensive touching 
of the petitioners' bodies. Count IR is a claim for 
false imprisonment for physically confining the pe-
Page 2 
tido:ten against their will. Count IV alleges that re-
spondents' actions constituted an invasion of peti-
doners' privacy. Count V is a claim for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.,Count VI al-
leges a civil rights action-that respondents have vi-
olated petitioners' right to be free from crimes of vi-
olence motivated by gender within the meaning of 
42 U.S.C. section 13981. Finally, count VII seeks 
civil remedies for criminal practices or racketeering 
pursuant to section 772.104, Florida:Statutes. The 
petitioners claim that they suffered emotional pain, 
anguish, humiliation, Insult, indignity, loss of self-
esteem, inconvenience, hurt and emotional distress. 
They seek an award of general and punitive dam-
ages, among other relief. 
The discovery to which the petitioners are being re-
(mired to respond is as follows: 
I. 
Interrogatory 8: Please advise how long have you 
been engaged in prostitution.... 
U. 
Interrogatory 22: State with specificity the man-
ner in which the acts as described in your Com-
plaint have materially affected hoW you interact 
with your husband, boyfriend, fiancEe' [sic] or 
any other individual of the opposite PAL 
IR. 
Request for Production 30: A copy of any photo-
graphs, movies or videotapes in which you per-
formed sexual acts and/or simulated sexual acts 
in exchange for money or other consideration. 
IV. 
Interrogatory 16: Please list the names, addresses, 
telephone numbers and rates of pay for all em-
ployers for which you worked, Including the 
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EFTA01070428

Page 3 of 8 
Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 3 of 8 
703 So.2d 1076 
703 30.7A 1076, 72 Pla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) 
nature of the work, during the five years immedi-
ately preceding the date of employment with the 
Boardroom and from the date of your termination 
with the Boardroom to the present, providing the 
names of your immediate supervisors at each 
place of employment and the reason for your 
leaving each place of employment. 
V. 
Interrogatory 26: Please state your total income 
while employed at the Boardroom, and state the 
source of that income including any income from 
other employment or *1078 income earned from 
prostitution other than at the Boardroom. 
VI. 
Request for Production 34: Business records from 
any selfemployment or owned business ventures 
In the Iasi 5 years, including any records or list of 
customers, "special customer lists" or "sugar 
daddy's list." 
WIZ Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to 
the subject matter of the case and must be admiss-
ible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible 
evidence. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston, 
655 So.2d 91 (Pla.1995); Amente v. Newman, 653 
So.2d 1030 (Pla.1995); Russell v. Stardust Cruis-
ers, Inc., 690 So.2d 743 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The 
concept of relevancy Is broader in the discovery 
context than in the trial context and a party may be 
permitted to discover evidence that would be Inad-
missible at trial, If it would lead to the discovery of 
relevant evidence. Allstate; Amente. Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1280(b)(1) delineates the proper 
scope of discovery: 
In General. Parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to 
the subject matter of the pending action, whether 
It relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any 
other patty, including the existence, description. 
Page 3 
nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and 
the identity and location of persons ,having know-
ledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information Sought will be 
inadmissible.at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence. 
Nonetheless, the discovery of certain kinds of in-
formation may cause material injury ,of an irrepar-
able nature, This Includes the "cat-out-of-the-bag" 
material that could be used to injure another person 
or party outside the context of the litigation, materi-
al protected by privilege, trade secrets or work 
product. Discovery was never intended to be used 
as a tactical tool to harass, embarrass or annoy 
one's adversary. Rather, pretrial discovery was im-
plemented to simplify the issues in a case, to elim-
inate the elements of surprise, to encourage the set-
tlement of cases, to avoid the cost of litigation, and 
to achieve a balanced search for the truth to ensure 
a fair trial. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So2d 517 (Pla.1996). 
Here the petitioners argue that the information 
sought to be discovered regarding prostitution and 
their sexual activities was propounded solely to em-
barrass them and to invade their right to privacy. 
The petitioners also claim that this information is 
privileged under section 796.09 and is not calcu-
lated to lead to evidence which would be admiss-
ible at trial. 
Section 796.09 provides a person with a civil cause 
of action for compensatory and punitive damages 
against anyone who coerces that person into prosti-
tution, who coerces that person to remain in prosti-
tution, or who uses coercion to collect or receive 
any part of that person's earnings. derived from 
prostitution. In the course of litigation under this 
section, any transaction about which 'a plaintiff test-
ifies or produces evidence does not subject the 
plaintiff to criminal prosecution or to any penalty or 
forfeiture. In addition, any testimony or evidence or 
any Information produced by the plaintiff or wit,-
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EFTA01070429

Paze 4 of 8 
Case 9:08-cv-80811-I<AM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Frage 4 of 8 
703 Sold 1076 
703 So.2d 1076,22 Pla. L Weekly D2375. 23 Fla. L. Weekly DI69 
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) 
ness for the plaintiffs cannot be used against the 
plaintiffs or witness in any other investigation or 
proceeding, except one for perjury. 
Section 796.09(5) specifically provides that it is not 
a defense that the plaintiff was paid or otherwise 
compensated for prostitution, that the plaintiff had 
engaged in prostitution prior to any involvement 
with the defendant or that the plaintiff made no at-
tempt to escape from the defendant. Section 
796.09(6) provides that convictions for prostitution 
or prostitution-related offenses are inadmissible for 
the purpose of attacking the plaintiffs' credibility. 
This legislation was the result of the Florida Su-
preme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, 
which conducted an extensive investigation of pros-
titution in this state. The Commission's activities 
included interviews with law enforcement and cor-
rections personnel,*1079 judges, public defenders, 
prosecutors, drug rehabilitation counselors, social 
workers, medical personnel, prostitutes, clients and 
pimps. The Commission found prostitution to be 
prevalent and uniform throughout the state and law 
enforcement largely unable to deter it under pre-
vailing social attitudes and judicial practices. The 
Commission further found that prostitutes are often 
victims of economic, physical, and psychological 
coercion, that most persons do not chose to become 
prostitutes, but do so to survive, and that ninety 
percent of street prostitutes, both adult and chil-
dren, are controlled by pimps who use a variety of 
coercive methods to maintain this control. The 
Commission determined that clients and pimps are 
rarely prosecuted and, when prosecuted, receive 
light sentences; whereas prostitutes, who are mainly 
females, are frequently prosecuted and receive 
harsher treatment in the courts. The Commission 
recommended changes in the methods of interven-
tion in prostitution from punitive to therapeutic, 
changes in the law to require more equal treatment 
by the courts of the prostitute in relation to the cli-
ent and the pimp and to lessen the incentive to 
traffic in human flesh by giving the prostitute ac-
cess to the judicial system without first having to be 
attested. 
Page 4 
Under section 796.09, the petitioners' prior involve-
ment in prostitution and their earnings from prosti-
tution would be Irrelevant. Hence discovery should 
not be permitted because such Information would 
not be admissible at trial nor would It be reasonably 
calculated to lead to evidence ultimately admissible 
at trial. Even though the scope of discovery is gen-
erally quite broad, section 796.09 is designed to en-
courage prostitutes to sue their pimps. Thus the 
usually broad scope of discovery may be constric-
ted so that prostitutes will not bo embarrassed, har-
assed or hindered in their actions. 
13) Had the petitioners brought their lawsuit against 
Ruzzo and The Boardroom only under section 
796.09, evidence of petitioners' past prostitution, 
including with the Boardroom, and Their earnings 
relating to such activities, may not Have been dis-
coverable. However, the petitioners filed a multi-
count complaint for compensatory; and punitive 
damages, alleging numerous causes of action 
against the respondents. These other causes carry 
no such protection from discovery. Since the in-
formation sought by discovery may be relevant or 
may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in 
one or more of these other causes of action or to 
determination of damages, we cannot; conclude that 
the trial court departed from the essential require-
ments of law in granting this discovery. See Smith 
v. TIB Bank of the Keys, 687 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1997) (by alleging fraud as well as breach of 
contract, purchaser placed at issue her reliance on 
venders' assertions, the veracity of financial docu-
ments she submitted to the vender, and the state of 
her mental health, including memory problems she 
was experiencing at the time of the alleged tortious 
conduct, thus deposition questions concerning her 
state of mind were relevant). 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED. 
THOMPSON, J., concurs. 
HARRIS, 
J., 
concurs 
specially 
with 
opin-
lon.HARItIS, Judge, concurring specially: 
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EFTA01070430

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PPASeggf 8 
703 Sold 1076 
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 
(Cite as: 703 Sold 1076) 
There is a temptation In cases such as this to inquire 
which, the pot or the kettle, is imbued with the 
darker hue. Indeed that may ultimately be the ques-
tion uppermost in the jurors' minds. But the issue 
presently before us is simply whether the pot, in or-
der to establish the parties' comparative complex-
ion, may discover the historical condition and the 
inherent characteristics of the kettle. 
We are here involved with parties that the limited 
record before us indicates were co-conspirators in a 
joint effort to violate Florida's laws against prosti-
tution. The defendants are the owner/operators of a 
"social club" whose primary service is prostitution; 
the plaintiffs are employees of the club who 
provide such services. The employees are suing the 
owner/operators for, among other counts, taking ad-
vantage of their vulnerabilities ("coercing" them to 
be prostitutes) through manipulation and exploita-
tion. In order to prepare a defense to the action, de-
fendants have filed certain interrogatories for the 
employees to answer. These intenogatories+1080 
request such information as how long the employ-
ees have been engaged in prostitution; how the em-
ployees have been affected by the defendants' con-
duct; copies of photographs, movies, and video-
tapes in which the employees have performed sexu-
al acts or simulated sexual acts; the names of previ-
ous employers and previous rates of pay; and a 
statement of income received from defendants. 
These interrogatories survived the employees' ob-
jections. I agree certiorari should be denied. 
The employees' primary cause of action is based on 
section 796.09(1), Florida Statutes, which provides: 
(1) A person has a cause of action for compensatory 
and punitive damages against: 
',a) A person who coerces that person into prostitu-
tion; 
:b) A person who coerces that person to remain in 
prostitution, or 
,It) A person who uses coercion to collect or receive 
Page 5 
any part of that person's earnings derived from 
prostitution. 
The employees resist discovery of thdir past prosti-
tution or their past or present earning experience on 
the basis of subparagraph 5 of section 796.09: 
:5) It does not constitute a defense to a complaint 
under this section that: 
a) The plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated 
for acts of prostitution; 
b) The plaintiff engaged in acts of prostitution pri-
or to any involvement with the defendant 
But the question before us is not whether prior acts 
of prostitution (or the receipts of earnings there-
from) which might be revealed by answering the in-
terrogatories could be used as a defenSe to the com-
plaint, but rather whether evidence of such conduct 
or such earnings would be relevant In determining 
whether the employees were, in fact, reoerced" into 
prostitution, into remaining prostitutes, or into shar-
ing the proceeds of their services with defendants. 
The relevancy of this information! depends, of 
course, on what constitutes coercion. : 
If we apply the definition of "coercion" which is 
commonly accepted, then the relevancy of the re-
quested Information is apparent and this appeal has 
no merit at all. Webster defines "coercion" as: (L) 
to restrain or dominate by force, (2). to compel an 
act or choice, or (3) to enforce or bring about by 
force or threat. In sexual battery cats the legis-
lature has adopted the common meaning of the 
word "coercion" and has even placed limits on it. It 
has provided that consent will not be recognized if 
submission is coerced by threats of:force or viol-
ence if the victim reasonably belleveS the perpetrat-
or has the present ability to execute the threat"" 
Consent also will not be recognized if submission is 
coerced by a threat of retaliation against the victim 
or another if the victim reasonably believes that the 
perpetrator has the ability to execute the threat in 
the future.nn And in sexual battery cases, the le-
gislature has vitiated what might otherwise be con-
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EFTA01070431

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Pitge 6 of 8 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 6 of 8 
703 So.2d 1076 
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly O169 
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) 
sidered as consensual if one exploits a known phys-
ical or mental weakness of the victim to achieve his 
or her goal or takes advantage of one who is phys-
ically helpless or Involuntarily intoxicatecinn 
Therefore, oven in sexual battery cases, before co-
ercion or exploitation will vitiate consent, the free 
will of the victim must be overcome by force or 
threat or some unfortunate circumstance suffered 
by the victim. 
F/41. Section 794.011(4)(6), Florida Stet-
"tea. 
FM. Section 794.011(4)(c), Florida Stat-
utes. 
PN3. Section 794.011(4)(a),(d),(e), and (f), 
Florida Statutes. 
But then we get to the definition of "coercion" con-
tained in section 796.09(3): 
,3) As used in this section, the term "coercion" 
means any practice of dominion, restraint, or in-
ducement for the purpose of or with the reason-
ably foreseeable effect of causing another person 
to engage in or remain in prostitution or to relin-
quish earnings derived from prostitution, and in-
cludes, but is not limited to: 
te) Physical force or threats of physical force. 
a)) Physical or mental torture. 
re) Kidnapping. 
41081(d) Blackmail. 
;e) Extortion or claims of indebtedness. 
',1) Threats of legal complaint or report of delin-
quency. 
s,g) Threat to interfere with parental rights or re-
sponsibilities, whether by judicial or administrat-
ive action or otherwise. 
',11) Promise of legal benefit. 
Page 6 
1) Promise of greater financial rewardsl 
J) Promise of marriage. 
10 Restraint of Speech or communications with 
others. 
) Exploitation of a condition of developmental 
disability, cognitive limitation, afiOtive disorder, 
or substance dependency. 
e,m) Exploitation of victimization by sexual abuse. 
'",n) Exploitation of pornographic performance. 
:o) Exploitation of human needs for food, shelter, 
safety, or affection. 
The definition urged by the employees herein is the 
"promise of a greater financial reward." Whether 
the requested information is relevant to the issue of 
coercion in this case will depend on what the legis-
lature intended by subsection (I) in the meaning of 
"coercion." 
I agree with Judge Altenbernd's thoughtful analysis 
in State v. Brigham, 694 So.2d 793 (1997): 
There can be no dispute that the legislature's unusu-
al definition of "percent" is not a common dic-
tionary definition. This is perhaps 'an appropriate 
case in which to remind ourselves of Learned 
Hand's famous observation that a "mature and de-
veloped jurisprudence" does not "make a fortress 
out of the dictionary." 
But even so, one would expect some nexus between 
the commonly accepted meaning of a word and the 
definition of that word ascribed by the legislature. 
for example, the legislature defined "canine" as 
Including cats, although one might, jurispruden-
tially speaking, expect to hear a meow emanate 
from a Great Dane, the courts should nevertheless 
closely examine the legislative history to see if that 
is really what the legislature intended. The court In 
Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 69 N.W.2d 534, 
537 (1955), stated this principle as follows: "But 
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EFTA01070432

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PA%70 131gf 8 
703 So.2d 1076 
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L Weekly D2375, 23 Me. L. Weekly D169 
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) 
before a definition is construed so as to expand the 
meaning of a well-known word to include its ant-
onym ..., the intention of the legislature to that ef-
fect must be clear." As Judge Campbell observed in 
Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., 
580 So.2d 814, 
818 (Fla- 2d DCA 1991): 
it is our primary duty to give effect to legislative 
intent and, if a literal interpretation of a statute 
leads to unreasonable results, then we should ex-
ercise our power to interpret reason and logic to it. 
Unfortunately, it is apparent that In enacting this le-
gislation, the legislature has, without redefining 
the terms for the purposes of this legislation, of-
ten used terms with commonly accepted mean-
ings for purposes at great variance from those 
commonly accepted meanings. 
In our case, the legislature did define the term for 
the purpose of the act. But because the term 
(coercion) as so defined can be interpreted two 
ways-one consistent with the commonly accepted 
meaning and one at variance-we should not accept 
the "antonym" unless such legislative intent is 
clear. A free will decision, even if based on a hope 
of financial gain, is the opposite of a coerced de-
cision. 
The employees urge that the mere promise of a 
greater reward brings them within the act. But if the 
mere promise of a greater reward Is sufficient to es-
tablish coercion, then anyone who makes a volun-
tary and reasoned exercise of free will motivated by 
the hope of economic gain has been coerced. This 
definition removes the element of compulsion im-
plicit in the commonly accepted meaning of coer-
cion and substitutes therefor the mere desire for fin-
ancial gain. The employees herein assert that since 
they were offered "a greater financial reward" for 
providing the services performed by them through 
defendants' establishment, they were coerced into 
their prostitution activities. This equates the giving 
Page 7 
of an opportunity to make a decision with the coer-
cion of that decision. But subsection (I) can also 
mean *1082 that the promise of a minder reward is 
coercion only (1 such promised reward is sufficient 
to overcome one's natural revulsion to selling one's 
body for money. If there is no such revulsion, there 
can be no coercion. Becoming a prostitute only be-
cause one likes the hours and wages or "because it 
beats the heck out of working for a living" simply 
should not meet the test of section 796.09(1). 
At oral argument herein, it was suggested without 
contradiction, that at least one of the employees has 
a college degree and gave up a well-paying, legit-
imate Job in order to engage in this profession for 
the greater reward. Section 796.09 does not appear 
to be a general prostitute's relief act. It is based on a 
report by the Gender Bias Study Commission which 
recommended the equalization of treatment in rela-
tion to the prostitute, the client and the "pimp." It is 
based on the premise that prostitutes are generally 
victims of economic, physical, and psychological 
coercion and choose prostitution in order to sur-
vive. Further, the Commission was concerned that 
90 percent of the street prostitutes are controlled by 
"pimps" who use a variety of coercive methods to 
maintain control. It seems clear that the legislature 
was not intending to depart from the precepts of the 
commonly understood meaning of "coercion" and 
to redefine it to include both free will decisions and 
compelled decisions.. The interpretation urged by 
the employees seems at variance with the stated 
goal of the legislature and the Gender Bias Com-
mission. 
Since there is no cause of action prOvkled for one 
who makes a reasoned and voluntaiy exercise of 
their free will to enter or continue into profession 
solely for financial rewards (assuming "coercion" is 
given the definition more consistent with its com-
monly accepted meaning and assuming that my in-
terpretation of legislative intent is coifed), coercion 
becomes the critical issue in the trial of such action. 
The interrogatories propounded by defendants ap-
pear relevant to the issue of coercion. 
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EFTA01070433

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-3 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 Plgroe Of 8 
703 So.2d 1076 
703 80.261076,22 Fla. L Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L Weekly D169 
(Cite am 703 So.2d 1076) 
This is a cue of first impression based on a relat-
ively new statute. As indicated, the legislative his-
tory of the new law suggests that the statute is de-
signed to assist those who were forced to enter 
prostitution in order to keep a roof over their heads 
or food on their table. It does not appear to be in-
tended to aid those who voluntarily enter the pro-
fession in order to drive a Mercedes instead of a 
Ford. The limited record before us indicates that 
even beginning employees of the defendants (those 
who do not have an established clientele) bring in 
$700 a day and can keep 50% of their earnings. 
Based on a five-day work week, this would reflect 
an income of $87,500 a year even with a two week 
vacation. And the employees herein are not begin-
ners. 
There is no indication that the legislature intended 
to legalize prostitution or to make it a respectable 
profession. It merely Intended to place the prosti-
tute on the same footing with the client and the 
"pimp." If a prostitute voluntarily makes the de-
cision to participate, free from force, intimidation, 
or disadvantageous circumstance, then he or she is 
on the same footing as the other participants and 
should be treated the same, 
Although it might well serve a legitimate public 
purpose to permit the cannibalistic demise of such 
enterprises (end I am not unsympathetic with this 
view), that does not appear to be the policy behind 
the current statute, Therefore, in al= 
where coer-
cion is not present (and this may or may not be 
ono), the court should continue its tradition of not 
interceding In civil conflicts Involving transactions 
that are either illegal or are against public policy. 
See Wechsler v. Novak 157 Fla- 703, 26 So.2d 884
(1946); Thomas 14 Refiner, 462 So.2d 1157, 1160 
(Pie. 3d DCA 1984), rev. dented, 472 So.2d 1182 
(Fla.1985) ("An action may lie for Interference with 
an unenforceable contract and even perhaps a void-
able contract. No such cause of action Iles for Inter-
ference with a contract void as against public policy 
(anther's representation of a client obtained by a 
doctorflawyees illegal personal injury solicitation 
Page & 
in the hospital] and which makes one who is a party 
thereto, as the appellant in the instant ease, guilty of 
a criminal act for entering into such an agree- meat.") 
We are not asked in this proceeding to rule on the 
admissibility of the discovered information as evid-
ence at the trial of this cause. We are to determine 
only if the information might lead to admissible 
evidence. Even *1083 though we deny the Writ I 
suggest we certify the following question: 
DOES ONE, FREE FROM FORCE, nnadom, 
TION, OR DISADVANTAGEOUS CIRCUM-
STANCE, WHO MAKES A REASONED DE-
CISION TO BECOME OR REMAIN A PROSTI-
TUTE OR TO SHARE TEE PROCEEDS 
THEREOF BECAUSE OP A PROMISE OP A 
GREATER FINANCIAL REWARD HAVE A 
CAUSE 
OF ACTION 
UNDER 
SECTION 
796.09(1), FLORIDA STATUTES? 
ON MOTIONS FOR REHBARINO, FOR CLARI-
FICATION, FOR CERTIFICATION, AND FOR RE-
HEARING EN BANC t 
W. SHARP, Judge. 
Petitioners Bales and Shumate have filed motions 
for rehearing, clarification and certification. We 
deny the motions in full except for one regard. We 
delete the sentence in the lest iWl paragraph of the 
opinion which reads: "These other causes of action 
carry no such protection from discover'y." 
Motion for Clarification GRANTED as stated 
above; Motion for Rehearing and Certification 
DENIED. 
HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., cone*. 
Fla.App.5 Dist..1997. 
Bales v. Ruzzo 
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly 112375, 23 Pla. 
L. Weekly D169 
END OP DOCUMENT 
CO 2009 Thomson Reuters/ West No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstrcam.aspx?sv=Split&prft=1-ITMLYS/iftn=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 
EFTA01070434

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-4 
Entered on ELSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 1 of 2 3V 
A.C., 
v. 
Plaintiff, 
E. EPSTEIN, and 
Defendants. 
IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH 
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PALM 
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 502008CA025129)OOO(MB Al 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO 
FIRST REQUEST TO PRODUCE TO PLAINTIFF AND TO OVERRULE 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS, & FOR DEFENDANT'S EXPENSES 
INCLUDING ATTORNEYS' FEES 
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Epstein's Motion To 
••• 
Compel Responses To First Request To Produce To Plaintiff And To Overrule 
Plaintiffs Objections, & For Defendant's Expenses, Including Attorneys' Fees 
and the Court having heard argument of counsel and being fully advised in these 
premises, it Is hereby 
.. • 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion is hereby granted/ 
denied  oto 
4 r7 4 411 
ett2Nu__Q-4 
ao. to 4 22 
GLaI
nbriarket . 
L aro 
...ape,. ID Sap. 
DONE AND ORDERED at Paltry Beach Cotes 
urthouse, West Palm 
Beach, Florida, this  '1,  day of  
/-0
Edward A. Garrison 
Circuit Judge 
Copies furnished: 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ., and MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.. 616 North Hagler Drive, Stile 400, West Pain Beach, 
FL 33401; JACK SCAROLA, ESQ., AND JACK P. HILL, ESQ., Seamy Denney Sterols Barnhart & 
Shipley, PA, 2139 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., West Palm Beach, FL 33409, and JACK A. 
GOLDBERGER. ESQ., Alterbury Goldberger & Weise, PA, One Manage Centre, Suite 1400, 250 
, 
Australian Avenue South, West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
IJ,n if 0, 
Sc 
10 
EXHIBIT e 
- 6' ce 
A25) 
EFTA01070435

Beach, Florida, this  23 day of 
3C.
Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-4 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 2 of 2 
Plain*, 
v. 
1W
E. EPSTEIN, and 
Defendants. 
IN THE COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH 
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR PALM 
BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 502008CA0'25129*C<MB Al 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES AND TO OVERRULE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS. & FOR 
DEFENDANTS EXPENSES, INCLUDING ATTORNEYS' FEES 
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Epstein's Motion To 
Compel Answers To Interrogatories And To Overrule Plaintiffs Objections, .& For 
Defendant's Expenses, Including Attorneys' Fees, and the Court having heard 
argument of counsel and being fully advised in these premises, it is hereby 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion is hereby granted/ 
tom- 
•IAD 4 IS, 12 4 1 8 
/At , Lai 
eta.) 
4.2 
to dap. 
DONE AND ORDERED at Palm Beach Cou oy Courthouse, West Palm 
dward A. Garrison 
Circuit Judge 
Copies furnished: 
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ., and MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ, 515 North Fleeter Drive, Suite 400, West Pafm Beach, 
FL 33401; JACK SCAROLA, ESQ., AND JACK P. HILL, ESQ., Searcy Denney Scare's Barnhart & 
Shipley, PA, 2139 Palm Beach Lakes Blvd., West Palm Beach, FL 33409, and JACK A. 
GOLDBERGER, ESQ., Atterbury Goldberger & Welsa, P.A., One Clearlake Centre, Suite 1400, 250 
Australian Avenue South, West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
EFTA01070436

r
ase 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 1 of 14 
1 
IN THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA 
CASE NO.. 0 2008CA020614XXXXMB AF; 
JANE DOE II, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN and 
Defendants. 
COPY 
COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE DIANA LEWIS 
DATE: 
March 3, 2009 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
U.S. Le al' Su ore 
EXHIBIT 
EFTA01070437

se 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2000 
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APPEARANCES: 
GARCIA LAW FIRM, P.A. 
224 Datura Avenue 
Suite 900 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
BY: ISIDRO M. GARCIA, ESQUIRE 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive 
Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Counsel for Defendant 
BY: ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQUIRE 
U.S. Le al Su ort 
EFTA01070438

Case 9:08-cv 80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
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that but I'd just like to do that. 
THE COURT: Right. And if you want to 
contact the other individuals saying, you know, 
I'm the one that's questioning whether or not 
these need to be before one judge. You may have 
a different perspective than your colleagues who 
are prosecuting some of the cases. 
I understand the damages. I'm riot 
saying consolidate. I'm saying transfer. It's 
not a consolidation issue. Everybody gets that 
confused for some reason. The words are very 
different out of my mouth, your mouth and how 
they're written. 
So let me go ahead and take a gander at 
this. I did read it last night. I'm not sure 
that we need to get -- we need names? 
MR, CRITTON: Right. Well, here's what some 
of the issues are is that, as an example -- if I 
could approach the bench. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CRITTON: This is some of the 
information that we've obtained through discovery 
from some of the -- from at least in this 
instance, it would be this particular Jane Doe. 
THE COURT: You know who Jane Doe is I take 
U.S. Legal Support 
EFTA01070439

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 4 of 14 
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it? 
MR. CRITTON: Right. 
THE COURT: You know who the Jane Doe is? 
MR. CRITTON: Yes, correct. And so this 
particular lady has kept in part a diary dnd 
she -- which appears to have started some time --
this is not in any way significant -- but some 
time after she learned that she could file a 
lawsuit. I think she's also been to Oakwood 
Center some time after she learned she could file 
a lawsuit and seek damages from Mr. Epstein. 
There's no history of this lady 
beforehand other than. in some of the Oakwood 
records where she, was Taker Acted, she started 
drinking beerat'16, she started Xanax at 16, 
started mariju'na at'15, that she's sexually 
active. 
So how she has interacted -- she has a 
claim. for emotional damages, mental pain and 
anguish, psychiatric-type damages. How she's 
interacted with friends, with family, the events 
in her life, school, work, her interpersonal 
relationships both with men and let's -- we'll 
use an'example men here, but other individuals. 
She's saying that this event with Mr. Epstein, 
U.S. Legal Support: 
EFTA01070440

Case 9:08-cv 80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
Page 5 of 14 
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this sexual assault and whatever occurred during 
these events is that -- has caused her damage. 
And therefore damages in the cede such 
as the emotional, mental, psychiatric-type. 
damages are completely subjective, I mean' 
separate and apart from any medical bills that 
may be -- which are clearly intangible. So these 
are intangible damages. And the jury is 
instructed, you know, you advise the greater 
weight of the evidence, what's fair and 
reasonable under the circumstances. 
So what we would have is basically this 
young lady's testimony as to what she claims her 
damages are and what the circumstances are with 
her situation with Mr. Epstein. She claims on 
page 13, you know, I love this guy, I'm dating 
this guy Chris. On page 15 --
THE COURT: Is this part of a diary for 
treatment? 
MR. CRITTON: I have no idea what it is. It 
was just produced in response to discovery. And 
she apparently started in, I think this is 
December of '08. You know I took Jay Lyntenis' 
girl to the zoo, had an amazing day, I love her, 
i.e., the girl. We have so much fun. I want a 
U.S. Legal Support 
EFTA01070441

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
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baby especially with him. Okay. So I know who 
this person is. We are all so open together, I 
love him and Jay and Lynn, what do I do with 
Chris, who is another guy in her life. 
All right. This is circumstances where 
this young lady is saying, look, Jeffrey Epstein 
has ruined my life from a damage standpoint, 
okay. Let me depose other individuals with whom 
you've had a relationship. And what if it turns 
out -- as with some of these girls did -- is they 
had relationships or had escapades or 
circumstances with individuals, older men similar 
to Mr. Epstein well before Mr. Epstein. 
And this girl, I don't know one way or 
the other, but let's assume she had a situation 
where she was assaulted or molested or raped, ' 
that all is going to affect her emotional and her 
mental pain and anguish and it will all factor 
into evaluating damages. 
You know, it's not something that I'm 
going to spread around. I'm happy to keep it, 
you know, within the confines of the discovery of 
this case. But if she says every other 
relationship in my life has been perfect but Jeff 
Epstein has done this to me and it has affected 
U.B. Legal Support 
EFTA01070442

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
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my ability to trust men and my sexual 
relationships with other men, which is part of 
her interpersonal relationships, okay, let's talk 
to Sam Smith. 
THE COURT: When does your client allege 
that she had her first encounter with 
Mr. Epstein? 
MR% GARCIA: At what age? 
THE COURT: Well, what year? 
MR. CRITTON: June of '03. 
MR. GARCIA: June of '03, Judge. 
'MR. CRITTON: She claims from June of '03 
through November of '04. 
MR. GARCIA: She was I believe 16 at the 
beginning and ended at 17. She was a minor 
during all this time. 
THE COURT: June of '03 to now is six years. 
Let me hear from Mr. Garcia. 
MR. GARCIA: Judge, in the criminal case 
that was filed against Mr. Epstein, he would not 
have had a right to do this type of discoVery and 
I -- if I could hand up --
THE COURT: They wouldn't care about' the 
women. 
MR. GARCIA: Right. Well, I mean --
U.S. Legal Support 
EFTA01070443

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2008 Page 8 of 14 
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THE COURT: This is damages. There's no --
they weren't seeking damages at the time.' 
MR. GARCIA: Right. And we have not alleged 
in the complaint or in the answers to 
interrogatories that her ability to have a 
relationship with a man has been affected by 
Mr. Epstein's conduct. 
We have alleged that she has been 
hospitalized for depression, anxiety but we have 
not alleged any damages concerning -- the only 
reason this would be relevant is if we were 
making a claim at her ability to have either 
sexual relations or to have emotional relations 
with men was effected by her experience with 
Mr. Epstein. 
So this damages' claim is just a smoke 
screen to attempt to get evidence to show the 
jury that this woman has had other consensual 
relationships with young men that are 
approximately her age what I would characterize 
as a slut defense. She had it coming to her 
because she engaged in other voluntarily 
consensual --
THE COURT: Mr. Critton wouldn't try the 
slut defense in my courtroom, I'm sure. 
U.S. Legal Support 
EFTA01070444

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
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MR. GARCIA: Maybe not, but certainly that's 
the way this discovery is going. And, Judge, 
what --
THE COURT: What are the damages you think 
your client is seeking? 
MR. GARCIA: She is seeking emotional 
distress damages for depression and anxiety and 
she has been hospitalized at the Oakwood Center. 
Her friend -- she was on the phone to a friend 
who called the sheriff's office because she 
thought she was suicidal. The sheriffs 
responded. They Baker Acted her that day and 
they took her eventually to the Oakwood Center. 
THE COURT: How do we know it's not 
intertwined with her rejection by three other men 
since Mr. Epstein? 
MR. GARCIA: Well, even if it was related to 
her rejection by three other men -- you mean 
other men's rejection of her? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, how do you not know 
that? I mean you can't do it until you do 
discovery. Has anybody attempted to review the 
records from Oakwood to find out what's going on? 
MR. CRITTON: It's like a one-time visit 
when she was Baker Acted and then there's some 
U.S. Le al 8 
ort 
EFTA01070445

Case 9:08-cv-80811-KAM 
Document 54-5 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 
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other --
THE COURT: She didn't receive treatment? 
MR. CRITTON: She received treatment for 
that day and she's been back a couple of times. 
She's on medication. Again, I don't know what or 
the extent but she's got -- her medical bills are 
de minim's. 
Again as an example, Judge, didsthe 
Court have an opportunity to look at the case 
that I also attached to the motion? Because 
there's a case that's almost on all fours with . 
this which I attached to our motion which is 
called Belles versus Russo. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. CRITTON: It was a case where the 
plaintiff was sued -- the plaintiff sued the 
former owners of a house of prostitution.' So 
that part is different, but within it there were 
a number of claims including a sexual assault 
claim and they sought emotional pain, humiliation 
and emotional distress. 
Within the complaint that was filed in 
this particular case, she is seeking severe 
emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation, 
embarrassment, past and future, compensatory 
U.S. Legal Support 
EFTA01070446