EFTA00605403

STERN & KILCULLEN, LLC 
COUNSELORS AT LAW 
HERBERT J. STERN 
KEVIN M. KILCUU-EN 
JEFFREY SPEISER 
JOEL M. SILVERSTEIN 
EOWARO 5. NATHAN 
PASQUALE J. RUFOLO 
JOHN P. INGLESINO 
LINDA A. ELFENBEIN 
TERRY L. TRANTINA 
JOHN P. WYCISKALA 
ALAIN WOMAN 
LISA 0. TAYLOR 
MARK W. RUFOLO 
STEVEN D. GORELICK 
Alan Dershowitz, Esq. 
Hari 
76 UVINGSTON AVENUE 
ROSELAND, NEW JERSEY 07060 
November 19, 2007 
LING LAU 
MELISSA L. NIGLIO GELADE 
SHAUN T. HUGHEY 
NATHAN J. STEIN 
MICHAEL DINGER 
BRIAN J. DEBOER 
HOWARD B. TAT 
EDUARDO J. JIMENEZ 
RICHARD EDWARD HAMILTON 
OF COUNSEL 
Re: 
Jeffrey Epstein 
Dear Mr. Dershowitz: 
You have asked me to review the procedures and methods employed by the 
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida in injecting itself into 
the State of Florida investigation and prosecution of your client, Jeffrey Epstein. 
In short, and as will be set forth at greater length herein, my review indicates that 
the federal authorities inappropriately involved themselves in the investigation by the 
state authorities and employed highly irregular and coercive tactics to override the 
judgment of state law enforcement authorities as to the appropriate disposition of their 
case against your client. What is particularly unusual here is that the allegations against 
Mr. Epstein are the type that are routinely and traditionally investigated and disposed of 
by state authorities and which the United States only rarely, if ever, retains jurisdiction. 
What is even more extraordinary here is the obvious purpose of the federal authorities to 
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..Alan Dershowitz, Esq. 
November 19, 2007 
Page 2 
dictate the outcome of a state proceeding under circumstances of limited, if not actually 
nonexistent federal interest. 
My Background 
I have extensive experience in the administration of criminal justice both on the 
state and on the federal level. I was employed as an Assistant District Attorney in New 
York County from February 1962 until October 1965. One of the investigations I was 
responsible for was the death of Malcolm X. From 1965 until 1969 I was employed by 
the United States Department of Justice in Washington as a trial attorney in the organized 
crime and racketeering section of the Criminal Division. I was assigned to investigate 
and to prosecute cases involving wrongdoing in municipal government and in the trade 
union movement bi 1969 I became the Chief Assistant to the United States Attorney for 
the District of New Jersey. From 1970 to 1971, I was the acting United States Attorney 
for the District of New Jersey. From 1971 through 1973, I was the United States 
Attorney for the District of New Jersey. In these positions I personally conducted or 
supervised trials of numerous public officials on both the state and federal level as well as 
a myriad of other federal crimes, and worked closely with law enforcement officials at 
the local and state levels. From 1973 through 1987, I was a United States District Judge 
for the District of New Jersey and presided over many criminal trials and proceedings. In 
1979 I was selected by the United States Department of State to be the United States 
Judge for Berlin to preside over a trial of individuals who allegedly highjacked an 
airplane from East Germany to West Berlin. Since 1987, I have been in the private 
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practice of law and have represented clients in various jurisdictions who have been 
investigated by federal and state authorities. Attached is a copy of my resume. 
Thus, I am very familiar with the operation of the criminal justice system both on 
the federal and state levels, as well as the factors used by federal and state prosecutors in 
charging defendants. 
The Allegations 
Mr. Epstein is alleged to have had improper sexual contact, solely in Florida, with 
women who were under the age of 18. Mr. Epstein maintained residences both in New 
York and Florida and would repeatedly fly from New York to Florida where his primary 
residence was located. 
It is alleged that before he would travel to Florida, Mr. Epstein would ask his 
assistant to make various arrangements, including appointments with physicians, business 
meetings and the like. He would also have her arrange for women to come to his home to 
provide him with massages, for which they were paid. 
Mr. Epstein says that he 
specifically directed his assistant that be wished the masseuses to be young, but that they 
should all be over 18 years of age. There are allegations that during the massage, Mr. 
Epstein would occasionally masturbate, and with the woman's consent, would on 
occasion ask to touch her. There are also disputed allegations that on occasions there 
may have also been penetration. 
What does not seem to be in dispute is that there are no claims that Mr. Epstein 
transported any minors in interstate commerce, nor did he troll the internet or use the 
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Page 4 
intemet to identify or lure any minor to engage in any improper conduct. There is no 
credible evidence that Mr. Epstein specifically targeted young children for sexual activity 
of any sort or that he is a sexual predator who preys on children, although it later turned 
out that some of the women were younger than 18. Nor are there any plausible claims 
that Mr. Epstein used force or threats against anyone or that be profited financially. 
The matter came under investigation by the State officials in Florida. After Mr. 
Epstein learned of the allegations, he fully cooperated with the State authorities. The 
investigation revealed what is stated above - - no violence was ever used, there was no 
targeting of minors, there was no coercion, financial gain etc. - - and, importantly, there 
were serious creditability problems with many of the witnesses, at least one of whom 
refused to comply with a grand jury subpoena to testify. Accordingly, after a 13 month 
investigation, the State offered Mr. Epstein a plea to aggravated assault with a sentence of 
5 years probation. The State also agreed that it would not be necessary for Mr. Epstein to 
plead to an offense that would require him to register as a sex offender with state 
authorities, since state prosecutors did not regard him as posing a danger to children or 
others. 
After a disgruntled local police officer complained of the terms of the plea 
agreement between Mr. Epstein and the State of Florida, the United States Attorney's 
office interjected itself in the disposition of this case, conducted an investigation, and 
advised Mr. Epstein that he must consent to a plea with the State of Florida that would 
require: a) at least an 18 month jail sentence, b) that he register as a sex offender, c) that 
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he agree, without even knowing their names, that women who claimed they provided him 
with massages - - as many as 40 persons - - be allowed to sue him, d) that he would not 
contest jurisdiction or the facts of those suits, e) that each woman be entitled to 5150,000 
in damages (or an amount agreed to by the parties), 
and that the United States 
Attorney's office select the attorney for the women (a business colleague of the boyfriend 
of the Assistant United States Attorney handling the case was initially chosen). Mr. 
Epstein was threatened that upon a failure by him to comply with all of these demands, 
the United States Attorney would bring additional charges against him for violations of 
federal law, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2422(c)(Enticement of a Minor to Engage in Sexual 
Activity) and/or 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (Travel with Intent to Engage in Illegal Sexual 
Conduct) and perhaps money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(aX3). 
These threats, if implemented, would have exposed Mr. Epstein to a period of 
incarceration of approximately 180 months (15 years) under the Sentencing Guidelines. 
I have reviewed the submissions made on behalf of Mr. Epstein to the United 
States Attorney's office in the Southern District of Florida, which concluded that the 
cited federal statutes are inapplicable to the allegations made against Mr. Epstein and 
therefore, as a matter of substantive federal law, it was inappropriate for the United States 
Attorney's office to threaten such a prosecution. In my professional opinion, these 
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conclusions are correct. I will first address those statutes and explain why I believe the 
conclusions reached in the prior submissions were appropriate. 
18 U.S.C. 6 2422(b) (Enticement of a Minor) 
Section 2422(b) provides: 
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of 
interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
knowingly persuades, induces, entices or coerces any 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to 
engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any 
person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts 
to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not 
less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. 
Section 2422(b) was added to the Mann Act ten years ago, as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, in order to combat intemet predators. As the Eleventh 
Circuit has recognized: 
(T)his particular sub-section was included in Title V of the 
Telecommunications Act, which is the section titled 
'Obscenity and Violence,' after the Senate Judiciary 
Committee held a hearing regarding child endangerment 
via the intemet. 
So United Sates v. Searcy, 418 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11) Cir. 2005) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 
104-458, at 193 (1996) (Conf.Rep.)). See also K. Seto, Note: How Should Legislation Deal 
with Children and the Victims and Perpetrators of Cyherstallcine?, 9 Cardozo Women's 
L.J. 67 (2002). 
In enacting subsection (b), Congressional concerns were focused on a particular 
and recent phenomenon. Young people were using the Internet in ever-increasing 
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numbers, and it was proving to be a dangerous place. According to a DOJ study, one in 
five youths (ages 10 to 17) had received a sexual approach or solicitation over the 
intemet in the previous year. One in 33 had received an "aggressive sexual solicitation," 
in which a predator had asked a young person to meet somewhere, called a young person 
on the phone, and/or sent the young person correspondence, money, or gifts through the 
U.S. Postal Service. See Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OVC 
Bulletin. "Internet Crimes Against Children" (3d prtg. 2005). 
Unfortunately, computers and the intemet had facilitated sexual predators who 
prey on children. Historically, child predators found their victims in public places where 
children tend to gather, such as schoolyards and playgrounds. But, as Congress 
recognized, with so many children online, the intemet provided predators a new place - 
cyberspace - to target children for criminal acts. Use of the intemet, which occurs in 
private, and the secrecy and deception it permits, eliminates many of the risks predators 
face when making contact in person, and presents special law enforcement problems that 
are difficult for any local jurisdiction to tackle. 
The statutory language and reported decisions confirm the statute's important but 
narrow focus. Unlike 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 et sm, § 2422(b) does not establish any federal 
sex crimes with a minor. Section 2422's subject is not sex, sexual activity, or face-to-face 
sexual exploitation of minors. Such behavior remains a matter of state, not federal, 
concern. 
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Section 2422(b) defines a crime of communication, not of contact. It makes 
unlawful a narrow category of communication, one not protected by the First 
Amendment because the target is a minor, and the subject is one that enjoys no 
constitutional protection. Both the attempt and the substantive crime defined by § 2422 are 
complete at the time that communication with a minor, or purported minor, takes place; 
the essence of the crime occurs before any face to face meeting or any sexual activity with 
a minor has taken place, regardless of whether any meeting or activity ever eventuates. 
In sum, the statute was designed to address, and is therefore limited to situations 
where a person, purposefully and knowingly, targets a minor, and communicates with that 
minor by means of an instrumentality of interstate commerce. This conduct almost 
always originates in a chatroom on the Internet or by email - - to use the anonymity and 
opportunities for deception permitted by these media - - to persuade a person he knows or 
believes to be a minor to engage in sexual activity, which would constitute a crime under 
state law, were it to occur. 
The reported cases reveal that is the way federal prosecutors have understood the 
statute. Virtually all of the prosecutions brought under § 2422(b), resulting in published 
decisions, have essentially involved a standard fact pattern where an undercover agent 
pretends to be a young teenager on-line, and is directly solicitated. 
United States v. 
Father, 251 F.3d 510 (5ih Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Root 296 F.3d 1222, 1227-
28 (11'h Cir. 2002); United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 959 (10th Cir. 2005)• United 
States v. Helder, 452 F.3d 751 (8'h Cir. 2006); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717-
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20 (9ib Cir. 2004). 
There are approximately two dozen Eleventh Circuit cases involving prosecutions 
under § 2422(b), most of which involve this prototypical fact pattern. See. e.g. United 
States v, Morton 364 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated for further consideration in liaht 
21 Booker, 125 S. Ct. 1338 (2006), opinion reinstated by, 144 Fed. Appx. 804 (2005); 
United States v. Ortega, 363 F.3d 1093 (11h Cir. 2004); United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 
1322 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tillman 195 F.3d 640 (11th Cir. 1999); United 
States v.Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299 (11° Cir. 2003); United States v. Garrett, 190 F.3d 1220 
(11th Cir. 1999); gintosovvsisto, 175 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 1999); United. States v. 
Rojas, 145 Fed. Appx. 647 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Root 296 F. 3d 1222 (11th
Cir. 2002). 
What all of these cases have in common is that the defendant used the intemet to 
purposefully communicate directly with a minor or a purported minor (or a person with 
influence over such a minor or purported minor), with the intent to arrange a sexual tryst 
believing that the individual was a minor and with the knowledge that such sexual 
activity was illegal because of the age of the victim. This is precisely the situation the 
statute was designed to reach. 
Mr. Epstein's situation has nothing in common with the scenario Congress acted 
to address. In Mr. Epstein's case, even assuming for purposes of this memorandum that 
there was inappropriate sexual contact with minors, there was no use whatsoever of the 
intemet, or any other communication device, in an attempt to induce a minor. 
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The statutorily proscribed act is the use of a channel of interstate commerce to 
persuade, induce, entice or coerce. "The underlying criminal conduct Congress expressly 
proscribed in passing § 2422(b) is the persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of 
the minor rather than the sex act itself. That is, if a person persuaded a minor to engage in 
sexual conduct (e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any 
sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States v. Murrell 368 
F.3d 1283, 1286 (111b Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th
Cir. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt 
to persuade, not the performance of the sexual acts themselves."). The forbidden conduct 
is the actual or attempted persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion; if there has 
been sexual misconduct without persuasion, there is no violation of this law. 
Furthermore, the persuasion must be first directed at an individual known by the 
defendant to be younger than 18. Second, its subject must be the minor's participation in 
prostitution or sexual activity that would be a criminal offense under state law. Confining 
the statute's reach to such situations is precisely what eliminates what would otherwise be 
First Amendment problems. See Bailey 228 F.3d at 639 ("Defendant simply does not 
have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex 
acts."). 
As the plain language of the statute and the legislative history shows, the use of 
the internet, telephone, or mail is not merely a jurisdictional "hook"; it is the very crux of 
the crime. Congress was not addressing face to face interactions between adults and 
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minors during which inducement might be used, but rather interactions that occurred over 
the Internet, sometimes followed by the phone or the mail. 
The statute requires that the persuasion must occur "knowingly". Thus, someone 
commits the offense only if (1) he knows (or believes) that person is under 18, and (2) 
knows that the activity he is proposing would be illegal with a person of the age he 
believes that person to be. 
Since the age of consent varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction within the United States, and is generally 16 or 17, even an actor's knowledge 
that the individual he is attempting to persuade is not yet 18 does not mean that he is 
knowingly seeking to persuade or induce someone to engage in activity that would 
constitute a crime. See Richard A. Posner & Katharine B. Silbaug, A Guide to America's 
ex Laws 44 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998). Accordingly, to violate § 2422(b), an actor must 
know that he is trying to persuade not only someone under 18, but someone who is 
considered a minor in the jurisdiction, and that the sexual conduct contemplated would 
constitute a crime. 
Thus, if a defendant believes he is interacting with an adult, he is not guilty of the 
federal crime even if he is dealing with a minor pretending to be a grown-up. See United 
States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2005). 
Mr. Epstein did not use any facility of interstate commerce to do the forbidden act 
- to persuade, entice, induce, or coerce - nor did he attempt to do so. His staff used the 
phone to make a variety of arrangements for Mr. Epstein's stays in Palm Beach, including 
getting the house ready for his arrival, checking movie schedules, and making phone calls 
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to schedule doctors' appointments, business appointments, personal training, physical 
therapy and massages. Even if Mr. Epstein could be held responsible for his assistant's use 
of the telephone, her calls regarding massages were not the statutorily proscribed 
persuasions or enticements of a minor to do illegal acts but simply to set up 
appointments. 
Assuming Mr. Epstein persuaded individuals to engage in forbidden conduct with 
him in his home, he did not violate the statute. There was no inducement by or on the 
telephone or on the Internet, and none is alleged. For example, if during a massage, Mr. 
Epstein inquired if the masseuse was interested in doing something more, and she said 
yes, the inducement, if any, occurred face to face and without the use of any telephone or 
the internet. Any subsequent telephone call by his staff for scheduling purposes for 
another massage was for that purpose and not for an inducement, which had already 
occurred face to face. 
In sum, whatever sexual contact occurred, occurred face to face, without the use of 
an instrumentality of interstate commerce to persuade or induce it, and therefore, was not 
an act proscribed by the statute. Accordingly, Mr. Epstein committed no crime within the 
scope of § 2422(b). 
18 U.S.C. & 2423(b) (Travel with Intent to Engage In Illegal Sexual Conduct) 
Similarly, the facts of this case do not make out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). 
Section 2423(b) provides that: 
A person who travels in interstate commerce ... for the 
purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with 
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another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 30 years, or both. 
["Illicit sexual conduct" means a sexual act that occurs with a person under age 
16, or a commercial sex act with a person under age 18. 
§2423(f) and 18 U.S.C. 
2243(a).] 
Mr. Epstein did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) because his travel to Florida was 
not for the purpose of  engaging in a sexual act with a person younger than 16, nor a 
commercial sex act with a person under 18. Assuming that Mr. Epstein purposefully 
engaged in a proscribed act in Florida, it arose long after his travel to Florida was 
complete, while a massage with a particular masseuse was in progress. 
Like § 2422(b), § 2423(b) does not criminalize sexual conduct, with any person, 
regardless of that person's age. Rather, it criminalizes travel for the purpose of engaging 
in unlawful sexual activities. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 
2004). See also United States v. TvIcarskv, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006): 
The relationship between the mess rea and the actus reus 
required by § 2423(b) is neither incidental nor tangential. 
Section 2423(b) does not simply prohibit traveling with an 
immoral thought, or even with an amorphous intent to 
engage in sexual activity with a minor in another state. The 
travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful 
sexual act. 
See also Hansen v. Huff, 291 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1934) and Mortensen v. Unikd Stales, 
322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944) ("An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the 
conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to exist before the conclusion of the 
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interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement.") 
(emphasis added); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was 
evidence ... that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.").' 
Under these standards, there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Epstein's principal 
purpose in going to Florida was to engage in illicit sexual conduct, as defined by the 
statute, even if we assume that some such conduct occurred while he was there. Given the 
other purposes of his 50 or more Florida trips, the act of going there cannot itself give rise 
to any inference of improper purpose. On the contrary, it is evident that the principal 
purpose of his trips to Florida was to go to his Palm Beach home for reasons that were 
professional, personal and financial, including to minimize his taxes by establishing a 
residence. Mr. Epstein surely did not go to Florida because its laws governing sexual 
conduct with young people are particularly lax.2
Moreover, no violation of § 2423(b) occurred because, even assuming at some 
point during the massages Mr. Epstein knew that the particular masseuse was under 18 
years old and that certain behavior could be illegal, such knowledge would have come into 
being when he was already in Palm Beach and could not have been a factor motivating him 
to go there. Since the vast majority of his masseuses were over 18, and he usually did not 
I Some Courts have held that the illicit sexual conduct must be: an "efficient and compelling purpose," 
United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10' Cir. 1997); a "motivating purpose," United States v 
Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1083 (56 Cir. 1995), or "at least one of the defendant's motivations for taking the 
trip in the first place," United States v Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389 (1' Or. 1991). See alstk United States ; 
poschouct 224 Fed. Appx. 923 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). 
The age of consent varies from state to state. In Connecticut, it is 16 for intacoursc, Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 53a-71, and 15 for sexual contact. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-73a. In Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, the age of consent is i6. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211§ 23; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 35A; NJ. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C: I4-2. New York sets the age of consent at 17. 
. Penal Law § 130.05(3). 
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know who his masseuse would be until she arrived at his home, sexual contact with a 
minor could not have been a factor motivating his trave1.3
18 U.S.C. 4 1956(a)(3) (Money LaunderIng 
No reasonable reading of the money laundering statute can countenance a charge 
against Mr. Epstein, for the statute on its face, and as applied by the courts, has absolutely no 
application to the alleged misconduct Under the facts of this case, to charge Mr. Epstein with 
violating the money laundering statute would be unprecedented. 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[t3o prove money laundering under § 1956(a)(3), 
the government must show that the defendant (1) conducted or attemptedlo conduct a 
financial transaction (2) involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity, (3) with the intent (a) 'to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity,' (b) 'to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of 
property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,' or (c) 'to avoid a 
transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law',' United States v. Puche, 
350 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (11th Cir. 2003).4 See also United States v, Arditti 955 F.2d 331 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
3 Nor are any of the other sections of 18 U.S.C. 2423 prohibiting "sex tourism" applicable. Section (a) 
prohibits transporting a minor (under 18) in interstate or foreign commerce for sexual purposes. Section (c) 
prohibits traveling to a foreign country to engage in illicit sexual conduct. Section (d) prohibits facilitating 
travel of a person for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct for financial gain. AU that has been 
alleged is that Mr. Epstein traveled to his home in Florida and engaged in sexual activities with local 
Florida residents. There are no allegations whatsoever that he ever transported a minor or an adult to 
another state or foreign country for sexual purposes, or for that matter, that he traveled to a foreign country 
to engage in illicit sexual activities. 
1 Instructive is the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 70.4 which states that the defendant can be found 
guilty of § I956(aX3)(A) only If (1) he knowingly conducted a financial transaction; (2) the transaction 
involved property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity or that was used to conduct 
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Thus, it is clear that the statute unquestionably requires (a) the use of proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity; at (b) cash which is or was represented to be the product of 
unlawful activity, with neither paradigm being applicable in the ease. 
Mr. Epstein did not receive money or funds from any criminal conduct which he 
then used in a financial transaction. $ee. e.g. United States v. Taylor 239 F. 3d 994 (9th
Cir. 2001) (defendant charged with running an illegal escort service and using proceeds 
from that business to pay credit cards used to purchase airline tickets to fly prostitutes to 
Las Vegas). Nor did Mr. Epstein use money he knew to be unlawfully tainted in a financial 
transaction designed to promote prostitution or other criminal conduct Rather, to the extent 
the evidence may show that Mr. Epstein paid for sexual services, he most certainly did so 
with untainted, legitimately earned funds. 
• 
• 
• 
Having demonstrated that there is no real federal interest in this case, because there is 
no federal crime, it is apparent that the United States Attorney's Office is simply attempting 
to dictate the procedures and outcome of a state prosecution in which federal authorities can 
have no legitimate interest It may be that some law enforcement authorities in other 
jurisdictions, state or federal, might choose to handle this matter differently from the way 
chosen by the State of Florida, but that does not permit or even excuse their outside 
interference. 
or facilitate specified unlawful activity; and (3) the defendant engaged in the transaction with the intent to 
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. 
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Moreover, were there in fact a federal crime of some sort here that could be 
prosecuted - - and I suggest there is none - - traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion 
would mitigate against such a prosecution on the facts of this case. 
The Factors That Federal Prosecutors Are Mandated To Consider in 
Determining Whether To Bring A Prosecution Militate Against Prosecution. 
I have also reviewed the submissions made on behalf of Mr. Epstein which 
addressed the Petite Policy, which is set forth in the United States Attorney's Manual, 
and concluded that even assuming that there is a valid basis for federal charges, those 
charges would be barred by that Policy. In my professional opinion that conclusion was 
the correct one. 
My review of the USAM not only supports this conclusion regarding the Petite 
Policy but also reveals that there are other sections of the USAM which would bar any 
federal prosecution or interference with state proceedings. 
A. 
Declining To Prosecute 
The United States Attorney's Manual [hereinafter "USAM"] sets forth when to 
initiate or decline prosecution. Section 9-27.220 provides, in pertinent part: 
The attorney for the government should commence or 
recommend Federal prosecution if be/she believes that the 
person's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the 
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain 
and sustain a conviction, unless, in his/her judgment, 
prosecution should be declined because: 
1. No substantial Federal interest would be served by 
prosecution; 
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2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another 
jurisdiction; or 
3. 
There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to 
prosecution. 
Mr. Epstein has been prosecuted in Florida, which considered all of the issues and 
determined the appropriate crime to charge him with. As shown aboVe, there is no federal 
interest here. Moreover, were we to assume that Mr. Epstein's conduct constitutes a 
federal crime that can be proved, nevertheless, no "substantial Federal interest" would be 
served by prosecuting him. On this question, the USAM Section 9-27.230 gives specific 
guidance: 
In determining whether prosecution should be declined because no 
substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution, the 
attorney for 
the 
government should weigh all 
relevant 
considerations, including: 
1. Federal law enforcement priorities; 
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense; 
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution; 
4. The person's culpability in connection with the 
offense; 
5. The person's history with respect to criminal 
activity; 
6. The person's willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others; and 
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Page 19 
7. The probable sentence or other consequences if 
the person is convicted. 5
Each of these factors militates against prosecution. As indicated, federal law 
enforcement priorities focus on the use of the Internet to target minors, or trafficking in 
minors. The conduct in which Mr. Epstein arguably engaged was different in nature. 
Given its essentially sui generis character, its prosecution would have little or no 
deterrent effect. 
Mr. Epstein has no criminal history. If prosecuted under statutes designed to 
address far more serious conduct and far more dangerous offenders, he would be subject 
to punishment that is grossly disproportionate to his behavior. 
Clearly, whatever phone calls may have been made by Mr. Epstein's staff were 
merely incidental; they were not a means to lure underage women into illicit sexual acts 
while taking advantage of anonymity and distance. Likewise, Mr. Epstein's interstate 
travel was of no federal interest. He spent a great deal of his time in Florida because he has 
a home there, and for a variety of other reasons that had nothing to do with sexual behavior 
with underage woman. Given the attenuated relationship between sexual behavior with 
any person under 18 and the use of the phone (or interstate travel), the federal interest in 
this matter is slight, if existent at all. 
The conduct at issue is not an example of a widespread phenomenon that crosses 
state lines or that is difficult for local authorities to prosecute. It does not involve targeting 
Each of these factors is discussed in greater detail in USAM 9-27.230(B). 
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November 19, 2007 
Page 20 
of children. It does not involve organized prostitution, sex trafficking, or organized crime. 
It does not involve violence or threat of harm. It does not involve child pornography. 
Indeed, the circumstances of this case are idiosyncratic. 
What is alleged here is entirely local sexual encounters - whether with an adult or a 
minor — which are, and always have been, the concern of local prosecutors. They are not 
what the federal statutes target, nor are they the kind of cases that the U.S. Attorneys 
Office usually pursues. 
B. 
Petite Policy 
In addition to the factors discussed above, the Petite Policy (regarding dual and 
successive prosecutions), should also be a bar to any federal prosecution or involvement 
in the State proceedings. 
The USAM at 9-2.031 establishes guidelines for the exercise of discretion by 
appropriate officers of the Department of Justice in determining whether to bring a 
federal prosecution based on substantially the same acts involved in a prior state or 
federal proceeding. Though the Policy does not create any substantive or procedural 
rights enforceable by law, it nevertheless provides a valid basis for arguing against the 
institution of charges in this matter: 
This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a 
federal prosecution, following a prior state or federal 
prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or 
transaction(s) unless three substantive prerequisites are 
satisfied: first, the matter must involve a substantial federal 
interest; second, the prior prosecution must have left that 
interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, applying the 
same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the 
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