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FBI VOL00009
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 21 of 33 CVRA. The Government seems to be suggesting that if, as a matter of "prosecutorial discretion," it decides that it would be useful to keep victims in the dark about how their case is being handled, then it has discretion to do so. The CVRA's protection of "prosecutorial discretion" does not extend so far as to allow the Government to decide which parts of the CVRA it will comply with and which parts it will ignore. This Court has a duty to construe the CVRA so that all the parts of the statute are harmonized with one another. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (it is an "elementary canon of construction that a statute should not be interpreted so as to render one part inoperative."). The CVRA's recognition of "prosecutorial discretion" means recognition of the Government's right to determine what charges to file and what charges not to file — not what important aspects of the resolution of a case the Government can conceal from victims. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "prosecutorial discretion" as "[a] prosecutor's power to choose from the options available in criminal case, such as filing charges, prosecuting, not prosecuting, plea-bargaining, and recommending a sentence to the court"). In the context of this case, for example, the Government was free to make the final decision on whether or not to prosecute Epstein. But as this Court has previously held, the CVRA extends to victims a right to "the full unfettered exercise of their conferral rights at a time that will enable the victims to exercise those rights meaningfully." DE 189 at 9. Recognizing a right to confer about the Government's disposition of the case is "not an infringement ... on the government's independent prosecutorial discretion; instead, it is only a requirement that the government confer in some reasonable way with the victims before ultimately exercising its broad discretion." In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 21 EFTA00597338
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 22 of 33 The Government's conduct here was particularly egregious, because it repeatedly found time to confer with the attorneys for the Epstein — the man who had sexually abused the victims. And yet the Government did not extend the same opportunity to the victims, even though they had a congressionally-protected right to confer. Indeed, the Government here stepped over the line from mere passive failure to disclose to affirmative acts of concealment, such as sending letters to the victims counseling "patience" and asking victims' counsel to write a letter to the Government explaining why the case should be prosecuted — even though the Government was in the process of entering into an agreement barring that very prosecution. The Court should grant summary judgment on the victims' claim that the Government violated their right to confer. B. Partial Summary Judgment is Appropriate on the Victims' Argument that Government Violated their CVRA Right to Be Treated with Fairness. Partial summary judgment is also appropriate because the Government indisputably violated the victims' "right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). Entirely apart from whether the victims had any right to confer with prosecutors, at a bare minimum they had a right to be treated fairly — i.e., a right not to be deceived — by the Government. Yet here the Government deliberately misled the victims about what was happening in their case, concealing from them the NPA's negotiation and consummation — until it was too late for the victims to do raise any objection. As with the violation of the right to confer, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Government violated the victims' right to fair treatment at multiple points in the process, including before the NPA 22 EFTA00597339
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 23 of 33 was signed, after the NPA was signed, when Epstein was entering his State guilty pleas, and after Epstein entered his State guilty pleas. While the Government tries gamely to defend its actions, DE 401-2 at 15-20, the undisputed facts show that in January (and later) 2008, well after the NPA had been signed, the Government sent the victims (and, in some cases, their attorneys) deceptive information that the case "is currently under investigation" and that "Titus can be a lengthy process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361 at 31, ¶ 94; Jane Doe 1 Decl., DE 361-26 at 1. The victim notification letters did not disclose that the federal investigation in the Southern District of Florida involving Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were the subject of the NPA entered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office previously, or that there had been any potentially binding resolution. Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361 at 31-32, 1 94; See Gov't Fact. Resp. at 12, 1 94. The Government claims it had no duty to disclose the NPA. See DE 401-2 at 16. But the Government's concealment would be tortious and actionable if committed during the course of a business transaction. The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains the traditional American legal principles surrounding the tort of misrepresentation through non-disclosure during a business transaction: One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated, (a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and (b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and (c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so; and 23 EFTA00597340
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 24 of 33 (d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and (e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2) (1977). While fitting into only one of the five enumerated subsections would be enough to show that the Government committed a tort against the victims by concealing the NPA (assuming that the discussions with the victims are analogous to a "business transaction"), remarkably the Government's actions satisfy all five circumstances. First, Government had disclosure obligations because it stands in a "fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence" to crime victims, because Congress has directed that prosecutors must exercise their "best efforts" to protect victims' rights during the criminal justice process. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). Second, during the course of the case, government prosecutors learned information that made their earlier statements to the victims misleading. For example, when the prosecutors met with Jane Doe 1 at the end of January, she expressed her view that Epstein should be prosecuted. Gov't Fact. Resp. at 12-13 ¶ 96. Whatever the FBI agents had told Jane Doe 1 earlier in October, at the end of January the Government indisputably became aware that Jane Doe I thought that federal prosecution of her case was still possible. Yet the federal attorneys did not disclose to Jane Doe 1 at this meeting that they had already negotiated a NPA with Epstein. Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361, at 32 1 97. Indeed, Jane Doe I's understanding about the posture of the case had been reinforced, in early January, when the Government sent her a letter requesting her "continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." At that point, it became 24 EFTA00597341
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 25 of 33 necessary for the Government to set the record straight to prevent its "partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b) (1977). If the CVRA's promise to victims that they have a right to fair treatment during the criminal justice process is going to mean anything, it must mean that the Government cannot hold a face-to-face meeting with a victim who is requesting federal prosecution for a man who sexually abused her while concealing the fact that it has previously signed an agreement barring such prosecution. While the CVRA may not give victims the right to "dictate the manner, timing, or quantity of conferrals," Jordan v. Dep't of Justice, 173 F. Supp. 3d 44, 52-53 M . 2016), during such a face-to-face meeting, the Government must at least proceed in a straightforward and upright way. Third and similarly, the Government had a duty to speak when it "subsequently acquired information that" it knew made "untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977). The Government argues that it genuinely believed that the case was truly "under investigation" even well after the NPA was signed, because it did not know whether Epstein intended to plead guilty. While the victims strongly dispute this view of the Government's actions, even crediting them, this belief obviously was no longer genuine as of Friday, June 27, 2008, when Epstein told the prosecutors that he was going to Florida court on Monday morning, June 30, to plead guilty. Accordingly, when the Government was contacting the victims in the days before that hearing — such as when it called Mr. Edwards — it had a duty at that point, in light of the "subsequently acquired information" that Epstein was pleading guilty, to alert Mr. Edwards (and the victims) 25 EFTA00597342
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 26 of 33 that the case was no longer "under investigation" and was instead moving to a point where the NPA would be triggered.' Fourth, the Government had a duty to correct its concealment when it subsequently learned Mr. Edwards, for example, was "about to act in reliance upon [misleading government statements] in a transaction with [the Government]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(d) (1977). The Government learned, for example, that Mr. Edwards was going to send it a letter explaining why federal charges should be brought against Epstein — even though Epstein could no longer be prosecuted due to the NPA. Indeed, Mr. Edwards took time from his busy law practice (and away from his family on the eve of the Fourth of July) to write a letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office on July 3, 2008, asking the U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute Epstein — even though the NPA blocking that prosecution had taken final effect three days earlier. The Government's duty to correct the false impression it had (deliberately) created with Mr. Edwards is manifest.' Fifth and finally, under the "objective circumstances" of this case, the victims would have "reasonably expect[ed] disclosure of the facts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977). The victims (and their attorneys) could hardly have expected that the prosecutors and the man who had sexually abused them would be working together to conceal an 7 Here again, the detailed and recently-submitted affidavit from the victims' attorney, Bradley J. Edwards, provides additional detail about what he was told — and not told — about the state guilty pleas. See Edwards Aff. of Aug. II, 2017 at 1 17. If the Government fails to dispute this part of the affidavit, of course that affidavit would provide additional evidence supporting summary judgment for the victims. 8 Here again, the detailed and recently-submitted affidavit from the victims' attorney, Bradley J. Edwards, provides additional detail about how he was relying on misleading statements from the Government. See Edwards Aff. of Aug. II, 2017 at 1 19. If the Government fails to dispute this part of the affidavit, of course that affidavit would provide additional evidence supporting summary judgment for the victims. 26 EFTA00597343
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 27 of 33 arrangement that would prevent his prosecution for crimes against them. And the Government must have been aware that it was keeping the victims in a position where they could not object to the plea arrangement until it was consummated.9 A duty of disclosure was manifest. The foregoing analysis simply applies conventional America tort principles to the Government's concealment, showing that the Government's actions were tortious under those principles. But, of course, the victims need not demonstrate that the Government's actions were so extreme as to amount to tort in order to obtain relief. All the victims need show is that the Government failed to discharge its obligation to treat them with "fairness." Congress made clear what it meant by promising victims a right to fairness, describing these CVRA as "broad rights" in the relevant legislative history: The broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be rights themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational. One of these rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course, fairness includes the notion of due process. Too often victims of crime experience a secondary victimization at the hands of the criminal justice system. This provision is intended to direct government agencies and employees, whether they are in executive or judicial branches, to treat victims of crime with the respect they deserve and to afford them due process. It is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled down or marginalized by the courts or the executive branch. This legislation is meant to correct, not continue, the legacy of the poor treatment of crime victims in the criminal process. 150 Cong. Rec. 22952 (Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). The Government did not treat victims with the respect they deserve when it concealed what it was doing. 9 Here again, the detailed and recently-submitted affidavit from the victims' attorney, Bradley I. Edwards, provides additional detail about what was reasonable under these circumstances. See Edwards Aff. of Aug. 11, 2017 at 1 23. If the Government fails to dispute this part of the affidavit, of course that affidavit would provide additional evidence supporting summary judgment for the victims. 27 EFTA00597344
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To be sure, now that the victims have moved for summary judgment, the Government
claims that the reason for this concealment was to prevent cross-examination of the victims about
the financial consequences of a guilty plea. DE 401-2 at 16-17. The Government argues that "it
was completely appropriate for the Government to avoid creating additional impeachment
material by not alerting the victims that the Government was seeking a resolution that would
facilitate their collecting money damages from Epstein." DE 401-2 at 17. If the Court accepts
this argument as a basis for assessing CVRA compliance, then the Government will never have
to give any information in any case to any victim. Of course, whenever the Government obtains
a guilty plea from a criminal defendant to crimes he has committed against victims, that
resolution will "facilitate their collecting money damages" from the defendant through operation
of collateral estoppel. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(1) ("A conviction of a defendant for an offense
involving the act giving rise to an order of restitution shall estop the defendant from denying the
essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State civil
proceeding, to the extent consistent with State law, brought by the victim"). Thus, even
assuming that the Government's alleged motivation is true,10 it cannot serve as a basis for
withholding information from victims, or the CVRA would be sapped of meaning.
In sum, even if the Court limits its view to the undisputed facts, ample basis exists for
concluding that the Government violated the victims' right to fair treatment. Of course, if this
case were to go to trial, the victims have alleged many more actions by the Government that
I° If this case were to go to trial, the victims intend to prove that the Government's true motivation was. among other
things, the one explained in an email to Epstein's defense attorneys — i.e., that the line prosecutor had an admitted
"bias against plaintiffs' attorneys," Victims' Si. Mot., Ex. 70, and thus worked in concert with Epstein's attorneys
to keep Epstein from being sued civilly.
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 29 of 33 violated their rights. See Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361 at 51-53; see also Victims' Resp. to Gov't S.J. Mot., Part VI (filed contemporaneously with this brief). But the simplest way for the Court to proceed at this juncture is to grant the victims' motion for partial summary judgment based on the undisputed facts showing the Government's concealment of the NPA in violation of their CVRA right to fair treatment. C. Partial Summary Judgment is Appropriate on the Victims' Argument that the Government Violated their CVRA Right to Reasonable and Accurate Notice. Partial summary judgment is also appropriate on the undisputed ground that the Government violated the victims' CVRA "right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice of any public court proceedings . . . involving the crime." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) (emphasis added). In a contemporaneously-filed brief, the victims have refuted the Government's legal argument that this right-to-notice provision lacks application with regard to state court proceedings, at least on the unique facts here involving a federal NPA that was directly intertwined with state court guilty pleas needed to trigger its effectiveness. See Victims' Resp. to Gov't S.J. Mot., Part V.A. And in that same brief, the victims have shown why, as a factual matter, the Government is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. Id. at Part V.B. For purposes of this reply, a few words are appropriate on why the undisputed facts are now so clear as to warrant partial summary judgment in favor of the victims. To grant partial summary judgment for the victims, the Court need only put together three undisputed facts. The first is that the NPA between the Government and Epstein made Epstein's guilty plea to Florida state crimes the triggering event for the NPA, which barred federal prosecution of Epstein's crimes against the victims. The plain language of the NPA 29 EFTA00597346
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establishes this fact, see Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361 at 17 (Executed Non-Prosecution
Agreement, Ex. 62), and the Government does not contend otherwise. Second, Epstein pled
guilty in Florida state court to those triggering offenses on June 30, 2008.
Again, the
Government does not dispute this obvious fact. Victims' S.J. Mot., DE 361, at 361 112. And
third, the Government did not notify the victims that what was happening when Epstein pled
guilty on June 30, 2008, was that he was triggering this NPA barring prosecution of the crimes
against them. Again, this fact is undisputed. See Gov't Fact. Resp. at 10, 1 82 ("The government
did not inform the victims of the NPA, until after Epstein entered his plea . . . .").
Based on these simple and uncontested facts, summary judgment for the victims is
appropriate.
Given the circumstances of the case, the Government's notice was neither
"reasonable" nor "accurate."
As explained in the victims' response to the Government's
summary judgment motion, "accurate" is commonly defined as "in exact conformity to truth or
to some standard." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 14 (1993). The
Government did not provide notice exactly conforming to the truth when it concealed from the
victims what was really happening. And "reasonable" is commonly defined as being "fair [or]
proper . . . under the circumstances; sensible." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (10 ed. 2014).
Under the circumstances of this case, it was not fair or proper for the Government to conceal that
Epstein's guilty pleas to the state crimes triggered the NPA. Indeed, the Government did not
inform the victims' (or their attorneys) of the single most important thing about Epstein's guilty
pleas: that his pleas would, via operation of the NPA, block federal prosecution of Epstein for his
federal crimes against the victims.
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 31 of 33 Of course, if this case were to go to trial, the victims would prove in more detail why the Government refused to give notice to the victims. In particular, the victims would show that the Government was trying to keep the victims from raising any objection to the plea deal in front of the Florida judge, and thus the Government needed to conceal the NPA's existence until the pleas had been accepted. But the Court need not delve into the Government's motivations to grant summary judgment for the victims. The Court should simply grant summary judgment on the undisputed facts, which establish unreasonable and inaccurate notice. CONCLUSION The undisputed facts of this case prove that, rather than forthrightly discharging its obligations to numerous child sexual assault victims, the Government chose to enter into a secret deal with the man who had victimized them. Perhaps before Congress enacted the CVRA, such outrageous behavior could escape a judicial response. But now that the CVRA is the law of the land, the Court is obligated to take all necessary steps to "ensure" that the victims' rights are protected. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b). On the undisputed facts, this is not a close case. This is a summary judgment case. For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should find the Government violated the rights of Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and other similarly situated victims under the CVRA — specifically, their "reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case," their right "to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy," and their right "to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5), (8), (2). 31 EFTA00597348
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 32 of 33 If the Court grants their motion, the victims would then ask the Court to set an appropriate schedule for briefing and a hearing on the issue of the remedy for the violations of their rights. DATED: August 11, 2017 Respectfully Submitted, AI Sada/ 9 E&04414 Bradley J. Edwards FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, ■. 425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Telephone (954) 524-2820 Facsimile (954) 524-2822 E-mail: And Paul G. Cassell Pro Hac Vice S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah' 332 S. 1400 E. Salt Lake City, UT 84112 Telephone:801-585-5202 Facsimile:801-585-6833 E-Maikcassellp@law.utah.edu Attorneys for Jane Does 1 and 2 This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah. 32 EFTA00597349
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 33 of 33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that the foregoing document was served on August 11, 2017, on the following using the Court's CM/ECF system: Dexter Lee A. Marie Villafafia 500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 (561) 820-8711 Fax: (561) 820-8777 E-mail: Dexter.Lee@usdoj.gov E-mail: ann.marie.c.villafana@usdoj.gov Attorneys for the Government Roy Eric Black Jacqueline Perczek Black Srebnick Komspan & Stumpf 201 S Biscayne Boulevard Suite 1300 Miami, FL 33131 305-371-6421 Fax: 358-2006 Email: Attorneys for Jeffrey Epstein Isl &alai j2. £dagvu[a 33 EFTA00597350
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