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EFTA00277550

UU/U0, ,CUU0 ZU:41 rAA 001OULII01 
UbAU Orb ty 
trJUUZ 
U.S. Department of Justice 
United States Attorney 
Southern District of Florida 
September 6, 2006 
DELIVERY BY FACSIMILE 
Denise Coffman, Esq. 
Counsel to the Clerk of Court and Comptroller 
15th Judicial Circuit of Florida 
West Palm Beach, Florida 
Re: 
Federal Grand Jury Subpoena 
Dear Ms. Coffman: 
Thank you for your agreement to accept service of the attached subpoena by facsimile. As 
I discussed with Kim Collins, the Clerk of Court is the custodian of the transcripts' of the state grand 
jury proceedings. Ms. Collins asked me to inform you that the transcripts are kept in the Circuit's 
Criminal Department. Florida Statute Sections 905.17(1) and 905.27 discuss the disclosure of state 
grand jury transcripts. Pursuant to those statutes, a transcript can be released upon an order of "a 
court." The statutes do not require that the order be issued by the Palm Beach County Court. 
I have attached two cases regarding the procedures for obtaining state grand jury transcripts 
for use in federal grand jury investigations. The cases that I have enclosed suggest that the 
appropriate way is to issue a federal grand jury subpoena to the party currently in possession of the 
tapes and/or transcripts of the proceedings. The cases that I have enclosed both involve orders issued 
by a federal court that compel the production of the transcripts. 
If the Clerk of Court feels that she cannot comply with the grand jury subpoena absent an 
order from the United States District Court compelling the production, then you must file a motion 
to quash the grand jury subpoena before the United States District Judge who empaneled the federal 
grand jury. Alternatively, if you like, you can state in writing your inability to produce the transcript 
absent a court order, and I can proceed before the United States District Judge by filing a motion to 
II do not know whether the grand jury proceedings have yet been transcribed. The enclosed 
subpoena calls for the tapes or the transcripts. If you would prefer to produce the tapes to be 
transcribed by one of our grand jury stenographers, that would satisfy the subpoena. If the Clerk of 
Court would prefer to have one of the state court stenographers do the transcription. production of 
the transcripts also would suffice. 
EFTA00277551

U9/Ub/ZUUb ZU:4Z FAA D010041/6( 
 
USA° nro FL 
14,1 Qua 
DENnECtolauuskEsQ. 
SerrEABER6.2006 
PAGE 2 
compel with a proposed order for the United States District Judge to sign. If you prefer to file your 
own motion, I can assist in notifying the Court of the motion, which should be filed ex parte and 
under seal in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(5) and (6). 
The subpoena calls for the production of the tape(s) OT transcripts by September 15, 2006. 
If you need any additional time, please let me know. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to call me. Thank you for your 
assistance. 
cc: 
Special Agent 
By: 
Sincerely, 
Assistant United States Attorney 
EFTA00277552

UU/U6/ZUUb ZU:4Z !AA Obl4UZII4/ 
USAU nre I-I. 
V.J 0.0V 
United States District Court 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TO: 
CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
Clerk of Court and Comptroller 
15th Judicial Circuit of Florida 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
205 North Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY 
BEFORE GRAND JURY 
FGJ 05-02(WPB)-Fri./No. OLY-17 
SUBPOENA FOR: 
PERSON 
DOCUMENTS OR OBJECT[S] 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury ofthe United States District 
Court at the place, date and time specified below. 
PLACE: 
Palm Beach County Courthouse 
Juvenile Courts Building 
205 N. Dixie Highway 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
(Temporary location for the United States District Courthouse, West Palm Beach) 
ROOM: 
Room 4-A 
DATE AND TIME: 
August 18, 2006 
9:00am 
YOU ARE ALSO COMMANDED to bring with you the following document(s) or object(s): 
Tapes or transcripts of any and all proceedings before the Grand Jury on Wednesday, July 19, 2006, 
referring or relating to Jeffrey Epstein and/or Sarah Kellen, including but not limited to witness 
testimony, statements made by any member of the State Attorney's Office, and instructions given by any 
member of the State Attorney's Office. 
Please coordinate your compliance of this subpoena and confirm the date and time of your appearance with 
Special Agent Nesbitt Kuyrkendall, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Telephone: (561) 822-5946. 
Please sec additional information on reverse 
This subpoena shall remain in effect until you are granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting on behalf 
of the court. 
CLERK 
This subpoena is issued upon application 
September 6, 2006 
Name, Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S.  Attorney 
EFTA00277553

UN/VD/LOUD ZU:4C rAA 0010V41JOI 
VaAv tiff, IL, 
832 F.2d 554 
832 F.2d 554, 24 Fed. R. Evid. Sm. 275 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554) 
H 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Seventh Circuit. 
In re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS—Subpoena to 
State Attorney's Office. 
Thomas H. Greene, Dawson A. McQuaig, Jake 
Godbold, Don McClure, Intervenors-
Appellants. 
Nos. 87-3228, 87-3412-87-3414, and 87-3472. 
Oct. 26, 1987. 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Dec. 10, 
1987. 
Persons whose state grand jury testimony had been 
subpoenaed by a federal grand jury appealed from 
order of the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida. Nos. MISC-J-86-183-14, 
MISC-J-86.183- 4, Susan H. Black, J., which 
denied motions to suppress subpoenas. 
The Court 
of Appeals, Tjoflat, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) 
appellants could appeal denial of the motions to the 
extent that they asserted a privilege, but (2) Florida 
statute imposing secrecy on grand jury does not 
create evidentiary privilege. 
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1) Criminal Law C=01023(3) 
110k1023(3) 
Grand jury proceeding is not a "civil action" for 
purposes of statute permitting interlocutory appeals 
in civil actions with respect to controlling questions 
of law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b). 
[2) Criminal Law (C
1023(3) 
1101c1023(3) 
Persons whose state grand jury testimony had been 
subpoenaed by federal grand jury could appeal the 
denial of their motions to quash the subpoenas to 
the extent that they asserted a privilege as to the 
material, but could not raise issues of procedural 
violations or federal-state comity on appeal. 
[3) Criminal Law e8=1023(3) 
110k1023(3) 
When party has been subpoenaed to testify or 
produce records for grand jury and third-party 
merely fears that privileged material may be 
disclosed along with other, nonprivileged material, 
Page 1 
the case is not ripe for appellate review until the 
subpoenaed party has actually been asked to reveal 
specific material covered by the assertive privilege. 
(4) Grand Jury C=D36.9(2) 
193k36.9(2) 
Federal common-law presumption of grand jury 
secrecy cannot be asserted in the form of a privilege 
by those seeking to prevent disclosure to a federal 
grand jury of their state grand jury testimony. 
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 6(e). 18 U.S.C.A. 
[5) Grand Jury C=,41.10 
193k41.10 
[5] Witnesses C=184(1) 
410k184(1) 
Florida statute imposing secrecy on 
proceedings 
does 
not 
create 
an 
privilege. 
West's F.S.A. § 905.27; 
Evid.Rule 501, 28 U.S.C.A. 
*555 Lamar Winegeark III, Arnold. 
Booth, Jacksonville, Fla., for Greene. 
grand jury 
evidentiary 
Fed.Rules 
Stratford & 
Elizabeth L. White, Sheppard & White, William 
Sheppard, Jacksonville, Fla., for McQuaig. 
Lacy Mahon, Jr., Jacksonville, Fla.. for appellants. 
Robert W. Mettle, Curtis S. FaLipner, M. Alan 
Ccballos, Assk U.S. Attys., U.S. Attorney's 
Office. Jacksonville, Ha., for appellee. 
Appeals from the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida. 
Before 
TJOFLAT 
and 
KRAVITCH, 
Circuit 
Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: 
Appellants appeal from an order of the district 
court denying their motion to quash a federal grand 
jury subpoena directing a state prosecutor to 
produce transcripts of their testimony before a state 
grand jury. We affirm. 
I. 
In 1985, the State Attorney's Office for the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida initiated a 
grand jury investigation into allegations of improper 
C 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
EFTA00277554

88/66/2086 20:43 FAX 5618021787 
tISA0 UPS FL 
1j006 
832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554, *555) 
influence peddling by certain public officials of the 
City of Jacksonville. 
Witnesses appearing before 
the state grand jury included the four appellants in 
this case: 
Jake Godbold, then the mayor of 
Jacksonville. Don McClure, 
Godbold's chief 
administrative aide, Dawson McQuaig, a former 
general counsel for the city, and Thomas Greene, a 
practicing attorney and an associate of Godbold's. 
Each of these witnesses appeared and testified 
voluntarily. 
No criminal charges resulted from the state grand 
jury investigation. 
In August 1985, however, the 
state grand jury issued a report that identified 
several instances in *556 which 'political favors and 
game-playing for friends" had infected the City's 
process of awarding contracts for professional 
services. 
Godbold. McClure, McQuaig, and 
Greene each waived his right under Fla.Stat. § 
905.28(1) (1985) to suppress the report. 
The 
report, however, did not contain the substance of 
their testimony. 
Meanwhile, federal prosecutors had initiated a 
federal grand jury investigation into substantially 
the same matters investigated by the state grand 
jury. 
Godbold. McQuaig, McClure, and Greene 
each indicated that he would assert the fifth 
amendment if subpoenaed to testify before the 
federal grand jury. 
Relying on the disclosure 
provisions of Fla.Stat. §n905.27(1)(c) (1985). [FNI) 
the United States in August 1985 petitioned a state 
to order the StateAttomev_to_nim over tnjhe 
federal grand jury the appellants' state grand jury 
testimony. 
The United States made no factual 
submission in support of its petition. 
Jle_state 
tiigerefagegij
i, characterizing the 
effort to obtain the testimony as a -fishing 
FNI. Undo this provision, a cowl may order 
disclosure of grand jury testimony for the purpose 
of 'fflurthering justice." 
In October 1986, the federal nand jury issued_a_ 
subpoena duces tecum ordering the State Attorney 
to produce appellants' state grand jury testimony. 
The State Attorney moved the federal district court 
to juash the subpoena, arguing that disclosure of 
grand jury transcripts was unlawful under Florida SP 
law, that the United States had not demonstrated 
sufficient need for the transcripts, and that comity 
required the district court to honor the state court's 
Page 2 
ruling against disclosure. 
Greene and McQuaig 
then moved the court to permit them to intervene 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 and to file similar 
motions to quash. In his motion to intervene, 
McQuaig asserted that prior to testifying before the 
state grand jury, he had received assurances from 
the State Attorney that Florida law prohibited any 
disclosure of his grand jury testimony. Greene did 
not allege in his motion that he had received similar 
assurances, bui stated that he was entitled to 
intervene because "state grand jury proceedings 
(are) secret and confidential by virtue of the 
provisions of Chapter 905 of the Florida Statutes.' 
The district court granted the motions to intervene, 
and subsequently permitted Godbold and McClure _} 
to intervene as well. [FN2) 
F/42. Godbold and McClure also based their 
motions to intervene on the Florida grand jury 
secrecy requirement. 
The substance of the 
privilege that appellants assert is discussed in Part 
Eft infra. 
In November 1986, the district court entered an 
order inviting the United States to make an ex pane 
factual submission showing why, it needed the state 
grand jury transcripts. The government declined to 
accept the invitation and made no submission. The 
court then entered an order granting the motions to co. 
quash. 
Applying the balancing test set forth in 
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nonhwest, 441 
U.S. 211, 99 S.Ct. 1667. 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), 
the court found that the government had failed to 
establish a sufficient need for the testimony. 
Twenty-eight days after the court panted the 
motions to quash, the United States filed a " 
for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order" along 
with an ex pane affidavit identifying facts 
supporting the grand jury's need for the testimony. 
The district court questioned the procedural 
correctness of the 
government's motion for 
reconsideration, and stated that under ordinary 
circumstances it would not consider the motion. In 
the court's view, however, denial of the motion 
would not prevent the United States from obtaining 
the testimony: 
the United States could simply 
reissue the subpoena and defeat any motion to quash 
on the strength of the information contained in the 
ex pane affidavit. 
The court concluded that the 
most efficient' solution was to consider the newly 
submitted information in the context of the 
government's motion for reconsideration. 
After 
O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
EFTA00277555

U*14.$0, LUVO LV.40 fAA 
JOAOULLIOI 
VJAV 
OfD fL 
wjvul 
832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554, *556) 
considering the new information in camera, the 
district court entered an amended order in which it 
reversed its original order denying the motion to 
quash. 
The district court certified its amended 
order for interlocutory *557 appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), and this 
court granted permission to appeal. The four 
intervenors appealed, although the State Attorney 
did not. 
Appellants make two arguments before this court. 
First, they argue that the government's motion for 
reconsideration was untimely and that the district 
court therefore had no authority to hear it. 
According to appellants, the applicable time limit 
for 
the 
motion 
was 
the 
ten-day 
limit of 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). not, as the government 
contends, the thirty-day limit of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 
(1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Second, appellants argue 
that the district court's amended order was in error 
for the following reasons: (1) the government had 
failed 
to demonstrate a sufficient need for 
appellants' grand jury testimony, and (2) comity 
required the court to give greater deference to the 
state 
judge's 
decision 
against 
releasing 
the 
testimony. 
Because of the nature of our ruling 
today, we do not reach the merits of these 
arguments. 
n. 
We first address the threshold issue whether we 
have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Although this 
court granted the intervenors permission to appeal 
pursuant to section 1292(b), we must of course 
dismiss the appeal if we are without jurisdiction. 
See Robinson v, Tanner. 798 F.2d 1378, 1379 (11 th 
Cir.1986), cen. denied. 481 U.S. 1039, 107 S.Q. 
1979, 95 L.Ed.2d 819 (1987). 
Under section 1292(b), a district court may certify 
for appeal a non-final order entered in a civil action 
if the court is of the opinion that the order "involves 
a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion" and 
that resolution of the question 'may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 
By its terms, section 1292(b) applies only to orders 
in civil actions, and has no application to appeals in 
criminal cases. 
See United States v. Doucer, 461 
P.2d 1095 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Lowe. 
433 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.1970). Therefore, we have 
no jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
section 1292(b) unless the district court's order 
Page 3 
denying the motion to quash can be considered an 
order entered in a "civil action." 
(1) We hold that a grand jury proceeding is not a 
"civil action' for purposes of section 1292(b). Just 
in terms of the plain meaning of words, it seems 
self-evident that an order denying a motion to quash 
a subpoena issued by a grand jury investigating 
possible criminal violations is not part of a "civil 
action.' 
We base our conclusion on more than a 
mechanical labeling of the proceedings below, 
however. 
By expressly limiting section 1292(b)'s 
application to "controlling question[s] of law" in 
"civil' cases, Congress clearly indicated its intent 
not to disturb well-established precedent forbidding 
piecemeal review of grand jury proceedings. 
In 
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 
S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940), decided eighteen 
years before Congress enacted section 1292(b), the 
Supreme Court held that a district court's denial of 
a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena was not an 
appealable final decision within the meaning of the 
predecessor section of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). 
Noting that the Constitution itself makes the grand 
jury part of the criminal process, the Court 
concluded that "(i)t is no less important to safeguard 
against undue interruption the inquiry instituted by a 
grand jury than to protect from delay the progress 
of the trial after an indictment has been found." Id. 
at 327, 60 5.Q. at 542; see also Di Bella v. United 
States. 369 U.S. 121, 124, 82 S.Q. 654, 656-57, 7 
L.P.d.2d 614 (1962) ("This insistence on finality and 
prohibition of piecemeal review discourage undue 
litigiousness and leaden-footed administration of 
justice, particularly damaging to the conduct of 
criminal cases."). 
Although Cobbledick was based on the principle of 
finality found in section 1291, that same principle 
finds expression in section 1292(b). We are unable 
to 
conclude 
that 
Congress, 
by 
authorizing 
permissive interlocutory appeals of 'controlling 
question(sj of law' in "civil" actions, intended to 
undermine the strong policy against permitting 
appellate 
interruption 
of 
grand 
jury 
*558 
proceedings. Accord In re April 1977 Grand Jury 
Subpoenas. 584 F.2d 1366, 1369 (6th Cir.1978) 
("(Section 1292(b) ] limits interim review of • a 
controlling question of law' to civil cases only and, 
therefore, should not be read to allow interlocutory 
review of grand jury proceedings."), cert. denied, 
440 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 1277, 59 L.E1.26 492 
(1979). 
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832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554, '558) 
[2] We next examine whether there is a separate 
basis for appellate jurisdiction in this case. 
As we 
have already indicated, orders denying motions to 
quash grand jury subpoenas are ordinarily not 
appealable final orders under section 1291. 
The 
subpoenaed party can obtain review by refusing to 
comply with the subpoena and then contesting a 
contempt citation, which is immediately appealable. 
See United Stares v. Ryan. 402 U.S. 530, 532-33, 
91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). The 
contempt route for obtaining review, however, is 
not open to a third party who claims a privilege of 
nondisclosure with respect to materials in the 
custody of the subpoenaed party. 
In such a case, 
the putative privilege-bolder has no power to 
compel the subpoenaed party to incur a contempt 
citation. 
And the subpoenaed party, unless he has 
either a particularly close relationship to the putative 
privilege-holder 
or 
a 
personal 
interest 
in 
nondisclosure of the material, is unlikely to risk a 
contempt citation simply to vindicate the rights of 
the third party. In this situation, the order denying 
the motion to quash is indeed final with respect to 
the putative privilege-bolder, for any prejudice be 
suffers as a result of disclosure will remain forever 
unredressed unless appeal is permitted. 
Accordingly, this circuit follows the so-called 
Perlman exception to the general rule prohibiting 
interlocutory appeal of orders denying motions to 
quash grand jury subpoenas. See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Twist), 689 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir.1982) 
; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 
199 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981); 
cf. 
In re 
International Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996 (11th 
Cir.1982) 
(discovery 
order 
in 
bankruptcy 
proceedings). 
This exception, derived from 
Perlman v. United Smiles. 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 
417, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918), and confirmed in United 
Suites V. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 
3099, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), permits an order 
denying a motion to quash to be 'considered final as 
to the injured third party who is otherwise 
powerless to prevent the revelation." 
Fine, 641 
F.2d at 202. 
[3) The circumstances supporting application of the 
Perlman exception are present in this case. 
Relying on the Florida grand jury secrecy 
requirement, appellants in essence assert a privilege 
of nondisclosure. 
The material with respect to 
which they assert the privilege—transcripts of their 
state grand jury testimony—is in the custody of the 
Page 4 
State Attorney. 
The State Attorney has indicated 
his intention to produce the transcripts. 
in light of 
these circumstances, the order denying the motion 
to quash is a final order as far as appellants are 
concerned. 
We therefore have jurisdiction to hear 
their appeal. [FN3] 
FN3. We note that the only material sought from 
the subpoenaed party in this case is material that 
falls squarely within the privilege asserted by the 
third parties. 
This is not a a 
then, where a 
party has been subpoenaed to testify or produce 
records and a third party moray fears that 
privileged material may be disclosed along with 
other, 000privilcgal material. 
In the latter 
situation. the case is not ripe for appellate review 
until the subpoenaed party has actually been asked 
to reveal specific material covered by the asserted 
privilege See in re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe 
). 831 F.2d 222 (11th Cir.1987). 
In deciding that the narrow Perlman exception 
applies in this case, we have also necessarily 
defined the scope of the matters properly before us 
for review. 
Appellants raise several objections to 
disclosure, including procedural objections and 
objections based on comity considerations and the 
need to protect da
Liitatai
oulaikaida.-grand 
jury system. 
However, the only matter that the 
Perlman exceptionjives us jurisdiction to review is 
the appellants' _claim_ of prix ece to prevent — 
disclosure of their state grand jury testimony. 
*559 The rationale of the Perlman exception 
extends only to appeals based on privileges personal 
to the third party seeking review: if the subpoenaed 
parry has a direct or primary interest in the right or 
privilege in question, the concerns giving rise to the 
Perlman exception simply are not present. 
Here, 
to the extent that their objections to disclosure are 
based .on concerns relating to comity and the 
integrity of the Florida grand jury, appellants 
cannot argue that the subpoenaed party had no 
interest in seeking to vindicate their derivative 
rights. 
Indeed, the subpoenaed party—the State of 
c.rrimseaaad-by
 Cr" .  Attorney— had 
ants p..
actizttemst theprotection 
its 
jury system. Accordingly, the Perlman exception 
does not give us jurisdiction to review the 
appellants' arguments concerning comity and the 
need to preserve the integrity of the Florida grand 
jury. [FN4) 
Nor does it give us jurisdiction to 
review their procedural argwrimus. 
Thus, we do 
not pass upon the district court's disposition of 
2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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utni 
832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 F.2d 554, *559) 
those matters and we turn to appellants' claims of 
privilege. 
FN4. We should emphasize that this discussion 
relates only to appellants' right to appeal wider the 
Perlman exception. 
It does not relate to their 
standing to raise these claims before the district 
court. 
The appellants' motions to intervene in the district 
court proceedings reveal the nature of the privilege 
they assert. 
Appellant McQuaig's motion stated 
that "[p)rior to appearing before the [state) Grand 
Jury, Mr. McQuaig was advised by the State 
Attorney that pursuant to Section 905.27, Fla.Stat. 
(1985): a) none of the testimony he provided to the 
Grand Jury was disclosable under the law; and b) 
any disclosure of said testimony was a crime." 
Appellant Green's motion stated that "[the) state 
grand jury proceedings were secret and confidential 
by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 905 of the 
Florida Statutes." 
Appellant Godbold's motion 
stated that "testimony was provided with the 
understanding on the part of Jake Godbold that 
pursuant to § 905.27 of the Florida Statures. his 
testimony would not and could not be disclosed 
under the law." 
Finally, appellant McClure's 
motion stated that "[Ole substantial interest of Don 
McClure is equal to or greater than that of the two 
other parties previously allowed to intervene? 
In etc/nine, then, appellants derive the privilege 
they assert from the Florida statutory grand jury 
secrecy requirement. 
The statute imposing that 
requirement provides as follows: 
(I) A grand juror, state attorney, assistant state 
attorney, reporter, stenographer, interpreter, or 
any other person appearing before the grand jury 
shall not disclose the testimony of a witness 
examined before the grand jury or other evidence 
received by it except when required by a court to 
disclose the testimony for the purpose of: 
(a) Ascertaining whether it is consistent with the 
testimony given by the witness before the court; 
(b) Determining whether the witness is guilty of 
perjury: or 
(c) Furthering justice. 
Fla.Stat. § 905.27 (1985). [FN5) 
F145. The remainder of section 905.27 provides as 
follows: 
(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to 
publish, 
broadcast, 
disclose, 
divulge, - or 
Communicate to any other person, or knowingly to 
Page 5 
cause or permit to be published. broadcast. 
disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other 
person. in any manner whatsoever, any testimony 
of a witness examined before the grand juty. or the 
Content. gist, or import thereof, except when such 
testimony is or has been disclosed in a court 
proceeding. When a court orders the disclosure of 
such testimony pursuant to subsection (1) for use in 
a criminal case, it may be disclosed to the 
prosecuting attorney of the court in which such 
criminal case is pending, and by him to his 
assistants, legal associates, and employees, and to.
the defendant and his attorney, and by the laner to 
his legal associates and employees. 
disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to• 
subsection (I) for use in a civil case, it may be 
disclosed to all parties to the ease and to their 
attorneys and by the latter to their legal associates 
and employees. 
However, the grand jury 
testimony afforded such persons by the court can 
only be used in the defense or prosecution of the 
civil or criminal case and for no other purpose 
whatsoever. 
(3) NOM* in this section shall affect the attorney 
diem relationship. A client shall have the right to 
communicate to his attorney any testimony given 
by the client to the grad jury, any matters 
implying the client discussed in the client's 
presence before the grand jury, 2nd any evidence 
involving the client received by or proffered to the 
grand jury in the client's presence. 
(4) Persons convicted of violating this section shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, 
punishable as provided is s. 775.083, or by fine 
not exceeding $5,000. or both. 
(5) A violation of this section shall constitute 
criminal contempt of court. 
[4] Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that 
privileges in federal court pros. wsings " 1560 shall 
be governed by the principles of the common law as 
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience." The 
privilege appellants assert, as stated in their motions 
to intervene, is based solely on state law. [FN6) 
We acicnowledge that some federal courts have 
recognized state law evidentiary privileges in 
particular cases when to do so would not 
substantially burden federal policies. 
See, e.g., 
Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 576 
(E.D.N.Y.); 
cf. ACLU v. Flitch, 638 F.2d 1336. 
1342-45 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981). 
F146. In their briefs, appellants suggest that the 
privilege they assert has an independent basis in the 
federal common law presumption of grand jury 
secrecy. 
That presumption, which is codified it. 
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tj.J.L.1 
832 F.2d 554 
(Cite as: 832 Fad 554,'560) 
Fed.R.Crim.12. 6(e). relates to disclosure of federal 
grand jury records. 
It cannot be asserted in the 
form of a privilege by appellants. who seek to 
prevent disclosure of their stare grand jury 
testimony. 
[5] We need not apply any such balancing test 
here, however, because we find that the privilege 
asserted by appellants is without a basis in Florida 
law. We find no evidence that the Florida courts 
derive an evidentiary privilege from Fla.Stat. § 
905.27. 
Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has 
noted that 
It)he 
rule 
of 
secrecy 
concerning 
matters 
transpiring in the grand jury room is not designed 
for the protection of witnesses before the grand 
jury. but for that of the grand jurors, and in 
furtherance of the public justice. 
A witness 
before the grand jury has no privilege of having 
his testimony there treated as a confidential 
communication.... 
Stare a rel. Brown v. Dave11, 167 So. 687, 690 
(Fla.1936). 
Florida case law directly construing 
section 905.27 
fails to provide a contrary 
interpretation of the relationship between the 
secrecy requirement and the rights of grand jury 
wimesses. (FN7j Accordingly, we conclude that 
Page 6 
appellants have no privilege of nondisclosure under 
state law. A federal court will not selectively reach 
into a state code and fashion evidentiary privileges 
merely to suit the purposes of the parties before it. 
R47. Some Florida cases refer to the "privilege 
of a grand jury witness, but only with reference to 
the general principle wider Florida law that a 
witness' testimony in a judicial proceeding cannot 
be used as the basis of a defamation mien. See, 
e.g.. 
Sae 
v. 
Tiller, 
111 
So.24 
716 
(FLi.Dist.O.App.1959). 
IV. 
In light of our conclusion that appellants have no 
privilege of nondisclosure under state law, we 
affirm the district court's order denying their 
motion to quash. 
Because we must observe the 
limitations on our appellate jurisdiction discussed 
above, we dismiss their appeal to the extent that it is 
based on other objections to disclosure. 
AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part. 
832 F.2d 554, 24 Fed. R. Evid. Sent. 275 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(7 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
EFTA00277559

824 F.Supp. 330 
824 F.Supp. 330 
(Cite as: 824 F.Supp. 330) 
C 
United States District Court. 
W.D. New York. 
In the Matter of Subpoena Duces Tecum Directed to 
the Honorable Kevin M. 
DILLON, District Attorney of Erie County. 
Civ. No. 92-13A. 
Feb. 20, 1992. 
State district attorney moved to quash subpoena 
duces return issued by federal grand jury seeking 
production of state grand jury records as part of 
investigation into whether police officers violated 
federal criminal civil rights statute when making 
arrests. 
The District Court, Arcata, J., held that 
federal grand jury was entitled to transcripts and 
tapes 
of 
state 
grand 
jury 
testimony 
of 
uncooperating police officers. 
Motion to quash denied. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Grand Jury C=025 
193k25 
Grand jury is to be afforded wide latitude in 
conducting its investigation. 
[2) Grand Jury C=36.4(2) 
1931136.4(2) 
Federal 
grand 
jury 
subpoena 
may 
not 
be 
unreasonable or oppressive. it may not violate 
constitutional, common law or statutory privilege. 
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 17(c), 18 U.S.C.A. 
(3) Grand Jury C=036.9(2) 
193k36.9(2) 
Federal grand jury subpoenas are presumed to be 
reasonable and party seeking to quash subpoena 
bears burden of showing that compliance would be 
unreasonable 
or 
oppressive. 
Fed.Rules 
Cr.Proc.Rule 17(c), 18 U.S.C.A. 
[4] Grand Jury €36.4(2) 
193k36.4(2) 
Federal grand jury was entitled to subpoena 
transcripts and tapes of state grand jury testimony of 
police officers as part of investigation to determine 
whether officers violated federal criminal civil 
rights laws during or after arrests; 
disputed 
testimony was relevant and neceseary to federal 
Page 11 
grand jury investigation after police officers refused 
to cooperate, subpoena was definite and did not call 
for 
production 
of 
unreasonable 
amount 
of 
documents, United States bad strong interest in 
insuring just enforcement of its criminal laws, and 
privacy limitations on federal grand jury documents 
limited potential harm from disclosure. Fed.Rules 
Cr.Proc.Rules 
6(e), 
17, 
18 
U.S.C.A.: 
N.Y.MnICinney's CPL § 190.25, subd. 4. 
(5) Grand Jury C=, 36.3(I) 
193)66.3(1) 
(51 States €18.63 
360k18.63 
State statutes which preclude disclosure of state 
grand jury records to general public cannot be used 
to prevent federal grand juries from obtaining 
records through subpoena. 
(61 Grand Jury C=36.4(1) 
193k36.4(1) 
Custodian of records, who is proper party for 
service of federal grand jury subpoena, is person or 
entity who is in actual possession of documents at 
time subpoena is issued. N.Y.McKinney's CPL § 
190.25, subd. 4. 
[7] Grand Jury C=.4110 
193k41.10 
Basic purposes of New York grand jury secrecy 
laws are: to prevent accused from escaping before 
being indicted; 
to prevent tampering with 
wirntects; and to protect accused person who is not 
indicted 
from 
unwarranted 
exposure. 
N.Y.McKinney's CPL § 190.25, subd. 4. 
[8] Witnesses €184(1) 
410k184(1) 
Evidentiary 
privileges 
protect 
confidential 
communications 
between 
persons 
in 
special 
relationships from disclosure and are generally 
disfavored in that privileges impede search for 
truth. 
(9J Grand Jury C=36.3(2) 
193106.3(2) 
When faced with claim that grand jury should be 
denied evidence because of privilege, reviewing 
court must weigh potential harm from disclosure 
against benefits of disclosure. 
62 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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