EFTA00230786

objectivity in its response to hearing the District Attorney disavow the 
reliability of the Board's recommendation, in receiving the arguments of 
counsel for Appellant, and in rendering its Order as a whole. 
First, although the SORA statute clearly contemplates that the 
District Attorney may depart from the Board's recommendation based 
upon its own evaluation of the evidence,15 see Correction Law §§ 168-
16 
For example, SORA expressly provides, "If the district attorney seeks a 
determination that differs from the recommendation submitted by the board, at 
least ten days prior to the determination proceeding the district attorney shall 
provide to the court and the sex offender a statement setting forth the 
determinations sought by the district attorney together with the reasons for seeking 
such determinations." Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168-n(2). While the more 
common application of this provision involves the People seeking a higher risk level 
than the Board, the provision clearly encompasses any deviation from the Board's 
recommendation, including the People's discretion to recommend a lower risk level. 
See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 53 A.D.3d 571, 572 (2d Dep't 2008) (holding that 10-
day notice requirement applies not only to changes in RAI scoring, but to changes in 
factual predicates for RAI scoring). 
Incidentally, it bears noting that the People failed to comply with these 
procedural mandates, constituting a further procedural flaw in these proceedings. 
See Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168-n(2). While the People provided Appellant with 
a written alternative RAI immediately prior to the SORA hearing -- and not ten 
days prior to the hearing, as required by SORA -- it appears that the People failed 
to submit their RAI to the Court at all. See Appendix generally. Before rejecting 
out of hand the People's stance that a Level 3 determination could not be supported 
by sufficient evidence, the Court should have adjourned the matter to receive and 
review a written statement of the People's recommended determination and 
order where defendant and court did not receive proper 10-day notice of People's 
revised RAI); cf. People v. Jordan, 31 A.D.3d 1196, 1196 (4th Dep't 2006) (holding 
People's failure to provide sufficient notice of revised RAI was cured where Court 
adjourned matter to allow meaningful opportunity to consider revised RAI). The 
Court's failure to enforce the procedural mandates of the SORA statute was 
prejudicial to Appellant, in that the Court did not have sufficient opportunity to 
39 
EFTA00231586

k(2), 168-n(2), here, the Court rejected the investigation and advocacy of 
the People. Indeed, the Court went so far as to express "shock" that the 
People would support a lower risk level determination than that 
recommended by the Board, almost as a matter of principle. See A.86:9 
(Tr.). The Court disregarded the detailed evidentiary investigation and 
careful parsing of allegations that the People undertook in evaluating 
the Board's recommendation. Ignoring the record at issue concerning 
Appellant and the evidence pertaining to him, the Court focused instead 
on the irrelevant facts of some unidentified case completely unrelated to 
Appellant's: 
I have to tell you, I am a little overwhelmed 
because I have never seen the prosecutor's office 
do anything like this. I have never seen it. I had 
a case with one instance it was a marine who 
went to a bar, and I wish I had the case before 
me, but he went to a bar and a 17 year old, he 
was an adult obviously, he was a Marine, a 17 
year old came up to him and one thing lead [sic] 
to another and he had sex with her and the 
People would not agree to a downward 
modification on that. 
understand the compelling reasons for the alternative RAI calculation that the 
People promoted. See id. 
40 
EFTA00231587

So I am a little overwhelmed here because I see --
I mean I read everything here, I am just a little 
overwhelmed that the People are making this 
application. 
I could cite many many, I have done many 
SORAs much less troubling than this one where 
the People would never make a downward 
departure like this.16
A.84:21-85:10 (Tr.). Later, when Appellant's counsel disputed that 
there were any credible -- much less prosecuted -- allegations that 
Appellant ever used force, the Court again began comparing Appellant's 
case to the same irrelevant case about "a marine" -- a matter completely 
unknown to Appellant and having no connection whatsoever to 
Appellant's case -- seemingly to suggest that Appellant should 
nevertheless be scored as Level 3 under SORA: 
There was no allegation of force in the marine 
either, who met a girl in a bar, a young girl 17, 
there was no force there. 
16 
Notably, the People were not asking the Court to make a downward 
departure from the RAI calculation, but were advising the Court that the evidence 
required a recalculation of Appellant's risk level based on the RAI factors. See Sex 
Offender Registration Act: 
Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, 
Commentary (2006) at 4-5, ¶¶ 5, 6. 
41 
EFTA00231588

A.90:13-15 (Tr.).17 The Court's subjective comparison of Appellant's 
case to some unidentified, unrelated case was improper and highly 
irregular, and it clearly interfered with the Court's duty to make an 
assessment based on the law. 
Similarly, in response to an argument by counsel regarding the 
implications that a Level 3 assignment would have on Appellant, who 
does not actually reside in New York, the Court abandoned any 
semblance of judicial objectivity by dismissively suggesting that he 
should "give up his New York home if he does not want to come every 90 
days." A.93:18-19 (Pr.). Rather than giving reasoned consideration to 
whether Appellant's residence outside of New York might be a relevant 
factor in its overall risk assessment (such as for a downward departure 
from an RAI calculation), the Court improperly allowed its judgment to 
be clouded by apparent personal disdain for Appellant. 
Furthermore, the Court's apparent distaste for Appellant has 
eliminated any likelihood that Appellant will receive a fair 
redetermination hearing should this matter be remanded back to the 
'7 
Significantly, the Court in fact scored 10 points against Appellant for forcible 
compulsion, despite the parties' agreement that there was no legitimate evidentiary 
basis to score Appellant for the use of force or violence. See A.94:7-8 ('Fr.). 
42 
EFTA00231589

same Justice. Indeed, this Court has recognized that reassignment of a 
matter to a different Justice following appeal is warranted and 
appropriate where the apparent impartiality of the lower court has been 
legitimately questioned, as it most certainly has here. See, e.g., People 
v. Rampino, 55 A.D.3d 348, 349 (1st Dep't 2008) (remanding 
resentencing matter to a different Justice where the "appearance of 
fairness and impartiality [was] compromised by the actions of the 
Justice to whom defendant's application was assigned"); Fresh Del 
Monte Produce N.V. v. Eastbrook Caribe, 40 A.D.3d 415, 421 (1st Dep't 
2007) (remanding matter to a different Justice where "a reasonable 
concern about the appearance of impartiality" had been raised on 
appeal). 
Accordingly, should this Court deem remand the only 
appropriate mechanism for recalculating Appellant's risk assessment 
level, Appellant respectfully asks that the SORA proceeding be 
reassigned to a different Justice. 
In sum, a court only has discretion to go beyond the factors 
outlined in the SORA guidelines in evaluating a person's risk level 
where justified by clear and convincing evidence. See People v. Sherard, 
73 A.D.3d 537, 537 (1st Dep't 2010) (citing People v. Miller, 854 N.Y.2d 
43 
EFTA00231590

138 (2008), lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 711, 860 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2008)) (holding 
that where a court exercises discretion to depart from the evidence-
based scoring of an RAI, the court must base such departure on "clear 
and convincing evidence of aggravating factors to a degree not taken 
into account" in the RAI); see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk 
Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, Commentary (2006) at 4-5, ¶¶ 
5, 6. Here, the Court's SORA determination, made in the express 
absence of clear and convincing evidence, 18 constituted an abuse of 
discretion, warranting reversal of the Court's Level 3 determination and 
Order. 
Moreover, given the Court's demonstrated lack of judicial 
objectivity toward Appellant, should remand be required, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this matter be reassigned to a different 
Justice in the Supreme Court. 
le 
The Court did not -- and could not -- cite any factors within or outside of the 
Revnyl's ennsirieratinn, prriven by Clear and convincing evitionen, flint would justify .a
Level 3 determination under RAI scoring or constitute lawful grounds for an 
upward departure. See A.82 (Tr. generally). Instead, the Court fully adopted the 
Board's calculation, scoring Appellant a presumptive rating of Level 3, without 
meaningful inquiry into any of the underlying allegations or any consideration of 
other evidence which could bear upon Appellant's risk level. See A.93:21, 94:6-95:9, 
96:11.13 (Tr.). 
44 
EFTA00231591

III. THE COURTS ORDER DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
MANDATES OF SORA AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUE 
PROCESS AND MUST BE VACATED. 
Finally, the Court's Order determining Appellant to be a Level 3 
sex offender is itself facially defective in numerous regards and should 
be vacated as legally invalid. In addition, the Court's failure to set forth 
any factual basis for its Level 3 determination renders the Order 
constitutionally infirm, warranting reversal on federal due process 
grounds as well. 
SORA provides that it is the "duty of the court" to determine, 
pursuant to the SORA guidelines, both the "level of notification" 
required of an offender and whether any designations defined in section 
168-a(7) apply. Correction Law §§ 168-k(2), 168-n(2). In addition, 
SORA mandates that the court "render an order" which sets forth "its 
determinations and the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which 
the determinations are based." Correction Law §§ 168-k, 168-n. 
Here, the Court's compliance with these requirements fell 
woefully short. The only order issued by the Court in this matter was a 
standard boilerplate form where the Court circled a pre-printed number 
and provided a signature and date. See A.4 (Order Appealed From, 
45 
EFTA00231592

dated Jan. 18, 2011). Indeed, upon close examination of the only 
"order" in this matter, it appears that the form Order is actually 
intended to be a cover sheet to accompany a more formal order, with 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon submission to the 
Division. See A.4 (Order Appealed From, dated Jan. 18, 2011) (stating, 
"A copy of the order setting forth the risk level and designation 
determinations, and the findings and conclusions of law on which such 
determinations are based, shall be submitted to the Division of 
Criminal Justice Services' Sex Offender Registry Unit by the Court. In 
addition, please complete and attach this form indicating the offender's 
risk level and designation to the Court's order."). Yet this legally 
insufficient Order was served on Appellant following the SORA 
proceeding and was sent to the Division so that the Level 3 
determination could be executed and enforced. See A.78 (Letter of 
Supreme Court, dated Jan. 19, 2011). 
The appellate courts have consistently held that cursory, non-
specific "findings" issued after SORA hearings -- including the 
wholesale adoption of a Board recommendation or recitation of RAI 
factors without further explanation, as the Court offered here -- are 
46 
EFTA00231593

legally insufficient under SORA. See, e.g. People v. Strong, 77 A.D.3d 
717, 717-18 (2d Dep't 2010) (reversing SORA order issued without 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, where court relied on RAI but 
failed to introduce the RAI in evidence or indicate any evidence relied 
upon); People v. Gilbert, 78 A.D.3d 1584, 1584 (4th Dep't 2010) (holding 
that the SORA court's conclusory recitation that it reviewed the parties' 
submissions and was adopting the Board's case summary and 
recommendation was insufficient to fulfill SORA's statutory mandate); 
People v. Miranda, 24 A.D.3d 909, 910-11 (3d Dep't 2005) (holding that 
the court's adoption of the Board's RAI scores and "generic listing of 
factors" failed to "fulfill the statutory mandate" of SORA and precluded 
"meaningful appellate review of the propriety of the court's risk level 
assessment"). 
In addition, the Order in this case is constitutionally deficient, in 
that the Court's failure to set forth any factual or legal bases for its 
Level 3 determination falls short of the minimum due process rights 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In the landmark case of Goldberg 
v. Kelly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, in relevant part, to 
demonstrate compliance with the procedural due process requirement 
47 
EFTA00231594

that the decision maker's conclusion rest solely on the legal rules and 
evidence adduced at hearing, "[the] decision maker should state reasons 
for his determination and indicate evidence he relied on, though his 
statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal fmdings of 
fact and conclusions of law." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) 
(internal citations omitted).19 
In short, the minimal due process 
requirement that the order set forth the basis for the court's 
determination is designed to provide some assurance that the court's 
conclusion rested on sufficient reliable evidence--which in Appellant's 
case, it did not. 
The utterly deficient Order issued by the Court in this matter 
itself provides an independent basis for reversal of the Court's Level 3 
determination, on both state statutory and federal constitutional 
grounds. 
19 
SORA, by specifically requiring the Court to issue findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to support its determination, therefore sets forth a higher 
standard than is required by federal due process. See Correction Law if 168-k, 168-
n (requiring the court to "render an order setting forth its determinations and the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based"). 
48 
EFTA00231595

CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Appellant Jeffrey E. Epstein 
respectfully submits that the January 18, 2011 Order of the New York 
Supreme Court determining Appellant Jeffrey E. Epstein to be a Level 
3 sex offender, without designation, should be vacated, and Appellant's 
SORA level should be recalculated -- either by this Court based on the 
present record or upon remand to a different Justice in the lower court 
-- in accordance with the law, based solely on the evidence that can be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence, to wit, the undisputed conduct 
encompassed by Appellant's registerable crime of conviction. 
February 22, 2011 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sandra 
nn Musumeci 
kland.com 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
601 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant 
Jeffrey E. Epstein 
EFTA00231596

PRINTING SPECIFICATION STATEMENT 
This computer generated brief was prepared using a 
proportionally spaced typeface. 
Name of Typeface: 
Century Schoolbook 
Point Size: 
14-point type 
Line Spacing: 
Double-spaced 
The total number of words in the brief, inclusive of point headings 
and footnotes and exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, 
table of authorities, and printing specification statement is 10,522. 
50 
EFTA00231597

CERTIFICATE OF DIGITAL-SUBMISSION COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that: 
(1) all required privacy redactions have been made and, with the 
exception of those redactions, every document submitted in Digital 
Form or scanned PDF format is an exact copy of the written document 
filed with the Clerk; and 
(2) the digital submissions have been scanned for viruses with the 
most recent version of a commercial virus scanning program (McAfee 
Enterprise 8.5 Virus Scan, updated as of March 9, 2009) and, according 
to the program, are free of viruses. 
Jay PJLefkowitz, P.C. 
Sandra Lynn Musumeci 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
601 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
EFTA00231598

SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- against -
JEFFREY E. EPSTEIN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Index No.: 
30129-2010 
PRE-ARGUMENT STATEMENT 
1. TITLE OF ACTION: As set forth in caption. 
2. FULL NAMES OF ORIGINAL PARTIES AND ANY CHANGE IN THE PARTIES: 
As set forth in caption. There has been no change in the parties. 
3. NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
OR PETITIONER: 
Jay P. Lefkowitz, P.C. 
Sandra Lynn Musumeci 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
601 Lexington Avenue 
New York, Neirri4611 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
4. NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF COUNSEL FOR 
RESPONDENT: 
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. 
NEW YORK DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
One Hogan Place 
New York, NYilli m
Telephone: 
5. COURT AND COUNTY, OR ADMINISTRATIVE BODY, FROM WHICH APPEAL 
IS TAKEN: New York Supreme Court (Criminal Term), New York County. 
6. THENATURE AND OBJECTOF THE CAUSE OF-ACTION OR SPECIAL 
PROCEEDING: Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) hearing, pursuant to Article 6-C of the 
Correction Law. 
7. RESULT REACHED IN THE COURT OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODY BELOW: 
Supreme Court, New York County, adjudged appellant Jeffrey E. Epstein to be a Level 3 sexual 
offender, without additional designation. 
8. GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVERSAL, ANNULMENT, OR MODIFICATION: The 
Court's designation of appellant Jeffrey E. Epstein as a Level 3 sexual offender was an abuse of 
EFTA00231599

discretion and constituted reversible legal error based, in part, on the following: (1) the Court 
improperly relied on untrustworthy double and triple hearsay contained in the recommendation 
of the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, even though the District Attorney, as the party 
appearing on behalf of the State, rejected much of the Board's recommendation as not 
constituting clear and convincing evidence to support a Level 3 designation where such hearsay 
allegations were rejected as a basis for state prosecution; (2) the Court failed to provide the 
parties with an opportunity to present evidence on contested issues, as required by statute, and 
instead relied wholesale upon the recommendation of the Board, over the objection of the 
District Attorney, without any inquiry; (3) the Court did not apply the guidelines established by 
the Board, as required by statute; and (4) the Court failed to set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on which its determinations in support of a Level 3 designation were based, 
as required by statute. 
9. THERE IS NO RELATED ACTION OR PROCEEDING NOW PENDING IN ANY 
COURT OF THIS OR ANY OTHER JURISDICTION. 
10. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL APPEAL PENDING IN THIS ACTION. 
Dated: February 9, 2011 
Ja 
. Lefkowitz, P.C. 
S dra Lynn Musumeci 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
601 Lexington Avenue 
New York, Nellii4611 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey E. 
Esptein. 
-2-
EFTA00231600

March 20, 2011 
To whom it may concern: 
I served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida from 2005 through 2009. Over the 
past weeks, I have read much regarding Mr. Jeffrey Epstein. Some appears true, some appears 
distorted. I thought it appropriate to provide some background, with two caveats: (i) under 
Justice Department guidelines, I cannot discuss privileged internal communications among 
Department attorneys and (ii) I no longer have access to the original documents, and as the 
matter is now nearly 4 years old, the precision of memory is reduced. 
The Epstein matter was originally presented to the Palm Beach County State Attorney. Palm 
Beach Police alleged that Epstein unlawfully hired underage high-school females to provide him 
sexually lewd and erotic massages. Police sought felony charges that would have resulted in a 
term of imprisonment. According to press reports, however, in 2006 the State Attorney, in part 
due to concerns regarding the quality of the evidence, agreed to charge Epstein only with one 
count of aggravated assault with no intent to commit a felony. That charge would have resulted 
in no jail time, no requirement to register as a sexual offender and no restitution for the underage 
victims. 
Local police were dissatisfied with the State Attorney's conclusions, and requested a federal 
investigation. Federal authorities received the State's evidence and engaged in additional 
investigation. Prosecutors weighed the quality of the evidence and the likelihood for success at 
trial. With a federal case, there were two additional considerations. First, a federal criminal 
prosecution requires that the crime be more than local; it must have an interstate nexus. Second, 
as the matter was initially charged by the state, the federal responsibility is, to some extent, to 
back-stop state authorities to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice, and not to also 
prosecute federally that which has already been charged at the state level. 
After considering the quality of the evidence and the additional considerations, prosecutors 
concluded that the state charge was insufficient. In early summer 2007, the prosecutors and 
agents in this case met with Mr. Epstein's attorney, Roy Black. Mr. Black is perhaps best known 
for his successful defense of William Kennedy Smith. The prosecutors presented Epstein a 
choice: plead to more serious state felony charges (that would result in 2 years' imprisonment, 
registration as a sexual offender, and restitution for the victims) or else prepare for a federal 
felony trial. 
What followed was a year-long assault on the prosecution and the prosecutors. I use the word 
assault intentionally, as the defense in this case was more aggressive than any winch i, or the 
prosecutors in my office, had previously encountered. Mr. Epstein hired an army of legal 
superstars: Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz, former Judge and then Pepperdine Law Dean 
Kenneth Starr, former Deputy Assistant to the President and then Kirkland & Ellis Partner Jay 
Lefkowitz, and several others, including prosecutors who had formally worked in the U.S. 
EFTA00231601

Attorney's Office and in the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section of the Justice Department. 
Defense attorneys next requested a meeting with me to challenge the prosecution and the terms 
previously presented by the prosecutors in their meeting with Mr. Black. The prosecution team 
and I met with defense counsel in Fall 2007, and I reaffirmed the office's position: two years, 
registration and restitution, or trial. 
Over the next several months, the defense team presented argument after argument claiming that 
felony criminal proceedings against Epstein were unsupported by the evidence and lacked a basis 
in law, and that the office's insistence on jail-time was motivated by a zeal to overcharge a man 
merely because he is wealthy. They bolstered their arguments with legal opinions from well-
known legal experts. One member of the defense team warned me that the office's excess zeal in 
forcing a good man to serve time in jail might be the subject of a book if we continued to 
proceed with this matter. My office systematically considered and rejected each argument, and 
when we did, my office's decisions were appealed to Washington. As to the warning, I ignored 
it. 
The defense strategy was not limited to legal issues. Defense counsel investigated individual 
prosecutors and their families, looking for personal peccadilloes that may provide a basis for 
disqualification. Disqualifying a prosecutor is an effective (though rarely used) strategy, as 
eliminating the individuals most familiar with the facts and thus most qualified to take a case to 
trial harms likelihood for success. Defense counsel tried to disqualify at least two prosecutors. I 
carefully reviewed, and then rejected, these arguments. 
Despite this army of attorneys, the office held firm to the terms first presented to Mr. Black in 
the original meeting. On June 30, 2008, after yet another last minute appeal to Washington D.C. 
was rejected, Epstein pled guilty in state court. He was to serve 18 months imprisonment, 
register as a sexual offender for life and provide restitution to the victims. 
Some may feel that the prosecution should have been tougher. Evidence that has come to light 
since 2007 may encourage that view. Many victims have since spoken out, filing detailed 
statements in civil cases seeking damages. Physical evidence has since been discovered. Had 
these additional statements and evidence been known, the outcome may have been different. But 
they were not known to us at the time. 
A prosecution decision must be based on admissible facts known at the time. In cases of this 
type, those arc unusually difficult because victims are frightened and often decline to testify or if 
they do speak, they give contradictory statements. Our judgment in this case, based on the 
evidence known at the time, was that it was better to have a billionaire serve time in jail, register 
as a sex offender and pay his victims restitution than risk a trial with a reduced likelihood of 
success. I supported that judgment then, and based on the state of the law as it then stood and the 
evidence known at that time, I would support that judgment again. 
Epstein's treatment, while in state custody, likewise may encourage the view that the office 
should have been tougher. Epstein appears to have received highly unusual treatment while in 
jail. Although the terms of confinement in a state prison are a matter appropriately left to the 
EFTA00231602

State of Florida, and not federal authorities, without doubt, the treatment that he received while 
in state custody undermined the purpose of a jail sentence. 
Some may also believe that the prosecution should have been tougher in retaliation for the 
defense's tactics. The defense, arguably, often failed to negotiate in good faith. They would 
obtain concessions as part of a negotiation and agree to proceed, only to change their minds, and 
appeal the office's position to Washington. The investigations into the family lives of individual 
prosecutors were, in my opinion, uncalled for, as were the accusations of bias and / or 
misconduct against individual prosecutors. At times, some prosecutors felt that we should just 
go to trial, and at times I felt that frustration myself. What was right in the first meeting, 
however, remained right irrespective of defense tactics. Individuals have a constitutional right to 
a defense. The aggressive exercise of that right should not be punished, nor should a defense 
counsel's exercise of their right to appeal a U.S. Attorney to Washington, D.C. Prosecutors must 
be careful not to allow frustration and anger with defense counsel to influence their judgment. 
After the plea, I recall receiving several phone calls. One was from the FBI Special Agent-In-
Charge. He called to offer congratulations. He had been at many of the meetings regarding this 
case. He was aware of the tactics of the defense, and he called to praise our prosecutors for 
holding firm against the likes of Messrs. Black, Dershowitz, Lefkowitz and Starr. It was a proud 
moment. I also received calls or communications from Messrs. Dershowitz, Le&owitz and 
Starr. I had known all three individuals previously, from my time in law school and at Kirkland 
& Ellis in the mid 90s. They all sought to make peace. I agreed to talk and meet with each of 
them after Epstein pled guilty, as I think it important that prosecutors battle defense attorneys in 
a case and then move on. I have tried, yet I confess that has been difficult to do fully in this case. 
The bottom line is this: Mr. Jeffrey Epstein, a billionaire, served time in jail and is now a 
registered sex offender. He has been required to pay his victims restitution, though restitution 
clearly cannot compensate for the crime. And we know much more today about his crimes 
because the victims have come forward to speak out. Some may disagree with the prosecutorial 
judgments made in this case, but those individuals are not the ones who at the time reviewed the 
evidence available for trial and assessed the likelihood of success. 
Respectfully, 
R. Alexander Acosta 
Former U.S. Attorney 
Sothern District of Florida 
EFTA00231603

U
S.J. QUINNEY 
COLLEGE OF LAW 
, THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Wifredo A. Ferrer 
United States Attorney 
Southern District of Florida 
99 N.E.4th Street 
Miami, FL 33132 
PAUL G. CASSELL 
Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law 
Telephone: 
September 29, 2011 
Re: 
Follow-up on leffre,y Epstein 
Dear Mr. Ferrer: 
As you know, Brad Edwards and I represent Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 in their 
efforts to protect their rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. You were nice enough to 
meet with Jane Doe #1 in December 2010 on that case, and we appreciate that. At the 
conclusion of that meeting I also provided you with a letter presenting my grave concerns 
about possible improper influences being brought to bear on your Office during its 
negotiation of the Jeffrey Epstein non-prosecution agreement. (For your convenience, I 
attach a copy of that letter.) It was my understanding that you deemed my allegations 
serious enough to forward my letter to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for 
further investigation, and it was my impression that 0PR was going to look into the 
allegations raised in my letter. 
I must say that I was surprised to receive a letter five months later from 0PR 
indicating that my concerns were not being investigated. On May 6, 2011, OPR stated that 
it was their policy "to refrain from investigating issues or allegations that were, are being, 
or could have been addressed in the court of litigation, unless a court has made a specific 
finding of misconduct by a DOJ attorney ... or there are present other circumstances." 0PR 
stated that my allegations fell into the category of allegations that were being litigated 
because Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were raising these issues in their CVRA case. 
Accordingly, OPR indicated it was not going to review the allegations that I presented. 
I am writing now to request the opportunity to meet with you further and to pass 
along additional information in support of my concerns. I wanted to follow up with you to 
make sure that someone was looking into my allegations about improper influences 
affecting your Office's decision to accord Jeffrey Epstein an extraordinarily lenient plea. It 
may well be that 0PR has some policy precluding an investigation. But will your Office then 
investigate these issues? 
I am also writing to alert you to additional information that continues to lead me to 
believe that something was rotten with the way this case was handled. 
1 
www.law.utah.edu • Main Office 
• Facsimile 
332 South 1400 East, Room 101 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84112-0730 
EFTA00231604

As you may know, 
was a senior prosecutor and supervisor in your 
Office when the non-prosecution agreement with Jeffrey Epstein was approved. It is our 
impression that he was directly involved in supervising the Epstein investigation as the 
former Chief of the Criminal Division of your Office. 
It has been our understanding for 
quite some time that he frequently corresponded with Epstein's attorneys, especially Lily 
Ann Sanchez, during the plea discussions, and it is our understanding that he left your 
Office around the time the non-prosecution agreement was signed. 
Our private investigator has recently learned that a 
left your office to work at 
a New York law firm representing white collar criminals. He also learned that M's 
quite expensive apartment in New York City is located in close proximity to real estate 
properties (specifically condos) owned by Jeffrey Epstein. The location of M's 
apartment, his role during the Epstein negotiations and his departure immediately after 
the NPA was signed, leads us to believe that 
and Epstein may have had a business 
or other relationship either during or after 
time in the Office. If that is the case, 
then we would appreciate you providing the information that you have in that regard 
voluntarily, as opposed to us having to conduct formal discovery to get it. 
As you also know, Judge Marra has recently ordered discovery to proceed in this 
case. We obviously would like for that process to go as smoothly as possible and want to 
avoid becoming involved in true adversary litigation with your Office. On behalf of our 
clients, we just want to get to the bottom of this, and we feel safe in assuming that you do 
too at this point 
For all these reasons, I am writing to request another chance to meet with you about 
our concerns and about making the discovery process go smoothly. Thank you in advance 
for considering this request I would be happy to provide any other additional information 
that would be useful to you. 
Sincerely, 
4 
Paul G. Casse I 
cc: 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
cc: 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
2 
EFTA00231605