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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 20 of 42 
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 321. 
43. On July 3, 2008, as requested, Mr. Edwards sent to the U.S. Attorney's Office a letter. 
In the letter, Mr. Edwards indicated his client's desire that federal charges be filed against 
defendant Epstein. In particular, he wrote on behalf of his clients: "We urge the Attorney 
General and our United States Attorney to consider the fundamental import of the vigorous 
enforcement of our Federal laws. We urge you to move forward with the traditional indictments 
and criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has committed, and we 
further urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our children from this very dangerous 
sexual predator." See Exhibit "J." 
44. When Mr. Edwards wrote his July 3, 2008 letter, he was still unaware that a non-
prosecution agreement had been reached with Epstein — a fact that continued to be concealed 
from him (and the victims) by the U.S. Attorney's Office. Mr. Edwards first saw a reference to 
the NM on or after July 9, 2008, when the Government filed its responsive pleading to Jane 
Doe's emergency petition. That pleading was the first public mention of the non-prosecution 
agreement and the first disclosure to Mr. Edwards (and thus to Jane Due #1 and Jane Doe #2) of 
the possible existence of a non-prosecution agreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 
28-29. 
45. Mr. Edwards detrimentally relied on the misleading representations made by the U.S. 
Attorney's Office that the case was still under investigation when he was writing this letter. He 
would not have wasted his time undertaking a pointless exercise had he known that the U.S. 
20 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 21 of 42 
Attorney's Office had previously negotiated a non-prosecution agreement See Exhibits "E" & 
46. On July 7, 2008, Jane Doe #1 filed a petition for enforcement of her rights under the 
CVRA. At the time, Jane Doe #1 was not aware of the non-prosecution agreement, so she 
sought a court order directing the Justice Department to confer with her before reaching any such 
agreement. Epstein quickly became aware of this petition. Doc. #1 at 1-2. 
47. On July 9, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a victim notification to Jane Doe #1 
via her attorney, Bradley Edwards. That notification contains a written explanation of some of 
the terms of the agreement between Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office. A full copy of the 
terms was not provided. A notification was not provided to Jane Doe 42 because the agreement 
limited Epstein's liability to victims whom the United States was prepared to name in an 
indictment. As a result, Jane Doe #2 never received a notification letter about the agreement 
The notification did not mention the non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office. 
Exhibits "E" & "IC" 
48. The notification that the U.S. Attorney's Office sent to Jane Doe #1 and other victims 
contained false and inaccurate information about the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. 
'rho false information was specifically approved by Epstein's attorneys. 
Supplemental 
Declaration ofM
. Dec. 22, 2008, doc. #35 at 2-3. 
49. On July 11, 2008, the Court held a hearing on Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's 
Emergency Petition for Enforcement of Rights. During the hearing, the Government conceded 
that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were "victims" within the meaning of the Crime Victim's 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 22 of 42 
Rights Act. Epstein was aware of these and subsequent proceedings involving the CVRA. Tr. 
July 11 , 2008, at 14-15. 
50. During the July I I, 2008 hearing, the Government conceded that its agreement had 
been conoluded months before the victims were notified about it. See id et 12 C'. . . the 
agreement was consummated by the parties in December of 2007."). 
51. At all times material to this statement of facts, it would have been practical and 
feasible for the federal government to inform Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 of the details of the 
proposed non-prosecution agreement with Epstein, including in particular the fact that the 
agreement barred any federal criminal prosecution. See U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at I91-
92. 
52. One of the senior prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office joined Epstein's payroll 
shortly after important decisions were made limiting Epstein's criminal liability — and 
improperly represented people close to Epstein. During the federal investigation of Epstein, 
was a senior Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the 
Southern District of Florida. WittCtmontlas_afte,r_thr min-prosecution agreement-was-signed, 
ft the Office and immediately went into private practice as a "white collar" criminal 
defense attorney. 
His office coincidentally happened to be not only in the same building (and 
on the same floor) as Epstein's lead criminal defense counsel, Jack Goldberger, but it was 
actually located right next door to the Florida Science Foundation — an Epstein-owned and -run 
company where Epstein spent his "work release." See http://www.brucereinhartlaw.corn. 
53. While working in this Office adjacent to Epstein's, 
undertook the 
representation of numerous Epstein employees and pilots during the civil cases filed against 
22 
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rlIVX•VeHlet.,.. 
• 
rf•r" 
• 
• 1 (W•Tris- - 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 23 of 42 
Epstein by the victims — cases the involved the exact same crimes and same evidence being 
reviewed by the U.S. Attorney's office when he was employed there. Specifically, he 
represented SEMEpstain's number one co-conspirator who was actually named as such 
in the NPA), his housekeeper (Louel la Ruboyo), his pilots Larry Morrison, Larry Visoski, David 
Rogers, William Hammond and Robert Roxburgh, (Hammond and Roxburgh were not deposed, 
but the others were.) See depositions of these individuals in various Epstein civil cases. On 
information and belief, Reinhart's representation of these individuals was paid, directly or 
indirectly, by Epstein. 
Such representations are in contravention of Justice Department 
regulations and Florida bar rules. Such representations also give, at least, the improper 
appearance that Reinhart may have attempted to curry with Epstein and then reap his reward 
through favorable employment. 
LEGAL MEMORANDUM 
The victims have previously briefed the issues of why they are entitled to entry of an 
order by this Court finding that the U.S. Attorney's Office violated their rights under the CVRA. 
See doc. #1; doc #9 at 3-11; doc. #19 at 3-9, 14. The victims specifically incorporate those 
pleadings by reference here. In short, as explained in the victims' earlier pleadings, the Office 
violated  the victims' right to wafer b;fossuesohins die_nanfrosecutionaent and also 
failed to use its best efforts to comply with the CVRA. The victims now provide additional 
briefing on two issues: (1) the CVRA applies to Jane Doe #1 end Jane Doe #2 even though no 
indictment was filed in their case; and (2) the Court should find that the government has clearly 
violated the CVRA in this case and set up a briefing schedule and hearing on the appropriate 
remedy. 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 24 of 42 
I. 
THE CVRA PROTECTS JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2 EVEN THOUGH 
THIS CASE WAS RESOLVED BY A NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT 
RATHER TTIAN INDICTMENT. 
In this litigation, the Government is apparently taking the position that the Crime 
Victims' Rights Act does not extend tights to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 because no 
indictment was ever filed in federal court and thus no federal court proceedings were ever held. 
This crabbed litigation position about thehreadth of the CVRA cannot be sustained. Indeed, 
neither the FBI nor the U.S. Attorney's Office itself took this position during the Epstein 
investigation — until the victims in this case filed their petition requesting enforcement of their 
rights. Instead, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office recognized that because the U.S. 
Attorney's Office was negotiating a non-prosecution agreement that affected the rights of 
specifically identified victims, the CVRA was applicable. 
The Court should reject the 
Government's newly-contrived position. 
A. 
The Plain Language of the CVRA Makes Clear that Victims Have Rights 
Before an Indictment is Filed. 
The CVRA promises crime victims that they will have various rights, including Itlhe 
reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government  in the case," 18 U.S.C. § 
377I(aX5) (emphasis added), and "the right to be treated with fairness," 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).. 
In earlier pleadings filed in this action, the Government has tried to narrowly construe the CVRA 
so that it applies only to a "court proceeding." See Gov't Response to Victim's Emergency 
Petition (doe. #13) at 1-2. 
The Government's position contravenes the plain language of the CVRA. The CVRA 
guarantees to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 the right to confer with prosecutors "in the case," 
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not in a "court proceeding." And the CVRA broadly extends a right to them "to be treated with 
fairness" a right that is not circumscribed to just court proceedings. Indeed, the fact that (as the 
Government notes) the drafters of the CVRA used the term "court proceeding" elsewhere in the 
statute (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 377 l(a)(2) (victim's right to notice "of any public court proceeding")) 
makes it obvious that they intended to give victims a right to confer that extended beyond simple 
court proceedings — that is, the right to confer about "the case" — as well as a broad right to be 
treated fairly throughout the process. 
Moreover, it is patently obvious that a criminal "case" against Epstein had been going on 
for months before the victims learned about the non-proseoution agreement. As recounted in the 
statement of facts above, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
Florida had opened a "case" involving Epstein's sexual abuse of the victims well before they 
entered into plea negotiations with Epstein. Indeed, as early as June 7, 2007 — more than three 
months before they concluded the NM with Epstein — the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a notice to 
Jane Doe NI stating "your care is under investigation." See Exhibit "C" (emphasis added). •The 
notice went on to tell Jane Doe #1 that "as a victim and/or witness of a federal offense, you have 
a number of rights." Id. at 1. Among the rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself told Jane 
Doe that she possessed was "[t]he right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the 
case." Of course, she would not have had those rights if she was not covered by the CVRA. 
Interestingly, the letter also advised Jane Doe #1 that "if you believe that the rights set forth 
above [e.g.. the right to confer and other CVRA rights] are being violated, you have the right to 
petition the Court for relief." M at 1. 
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Case 9:0&cv-80736•KAtvl Document 48 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011' Page 26 of 42 
The plain language of the CVRA makes clear that crime victims have righeeven before 
A 
the filing of any indictment. The CVRA's instnictsthat crime victims who seeks to assert rights 
in pre-indictment situations should proceed in the court where the crime was committed: wile 
rights described in subsection (a) [of the CVRA] shall be asserted in the district in which a 
defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, V no prosecution is underway, in the district court 
in the district in which the crime occurred." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (emphasis added). The 
victims have relied on this language through their pleadings, but the Government has not offered 
any response. 
The CVRA also directs that "[Officers and employees of the Department of Justice and 
other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the detection, Investigation, or 
prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that erime_victimmare notified  of, and 
accorded, the rights described in [the CVRAJ." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1) (emphasis added). Of 
course, there would be no reason to direct that agencies involved in the "detection" and 
"investigation" of crime have CVRA obligations if the Government's construction of the Act 
were correct. 
Plainly, Congress envisioned the victims' rights law applying during the 
"detection" and "investigation" phases of criminal cases. 
For all these reasons, the Court need look no further than the language of the CVRA to 
conclude that the victims in this case had protected rights under the Act. 
B. 
Other Courts Have Recognized That Crime Victims Have Rights Before An 
Indictment is Filed. 
In its briefing to date, the Government has yet to cite a single case that has accepted its 
sweeping position that the CVRA only extends rights to victims after the formal filing of an 
26 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 27 of 42 
indictment. This is because the case law all cuts the opposite way and recognizes that the CVRA 
does protect victims during the investigation of federal criminal cases. 
In a case remarkably similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit has held that victims have a 
right to confer with federal prosecutors even before any charges are filed, In In re Dean, 527 
P.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008), a wealthy corporate defendant reached a generous plea deal with 
the Government — a deal that the Government concluded and filed for approval with the district 
court without conferring with the victims. When challenged on a mandamus petition by the 
victims, the Fifth Circuit held: 
The district court acknowledged that "Where are clearly rights 
under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway." 
BP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at '11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEX1S 
12893, at 836. Logically, this includes the CVRA's establishment 
of victims' "reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5). At least in the posture of 
this case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other 
situations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable 
way to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and 
to ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea 
bargain. 
Id. 
As we understand the Government's attempt to distinguish Dean, it asks this Court to 
decline to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding antiseSELsatsfstkritv o.n_this important 
issue. See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2-3. Instead, the Government would have this 
Court deviate from the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion because the Circuit's "discussion of 
the scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the court ultimately declined to issue 
mandamus relief." Gov't Response at 2 (citing Dean, 527 F.3d at 395). This is simply untrue. 
The Fifth Circuit faced a petition for mandamus relief from the victims in that case, asking the 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAKI Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 28 of 42 
Court to reject a proposed "binding" plea agreement negotiated under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(c)(IXC) (i.e., a plea agreement obligating the judge to impose a specific sentence). The 
victims asked for that relief because of the Government's failure to confer with them before the 
charges and accompanying plea agreement were filed. The Fifth Circuit held that the victims' 
rights had been violated in the passages quoted above. It then went on to remand the matter to 
district court for further consideration of the effect of the violations of the victims' rights: 
We are confident, however, that the conscientious district court will tbily consider 
the victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement 
should be accepted. 
The decision whether to giant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude that 
the better course is to deny relief, confident that the district court will take heed 
that the victims have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA and will 
carefully consider their objections and briefs as this matter proceeds. 
In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 396. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit could not have instructed the District 
Court to "take heed" of the violations of victims' rights unless it has specifically held, as a matter 
of law, that the victims' rights had been violated. 
The Government's next effort to deflect the force of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that the 
Circuit did not directly quote three words found in the CVRA'a right to confer — the words "in 
the case." See Gov't Response to Emergency Petn. at 2. But the Fifth Circuit had received 
briefs totaling close to 100 pages in that case and was obviously well aware of the statute at 
hand. Indeed, in the very paragraph the Government claims is troublesome, the Filth Circuit 
cited to the district court opinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. 
See United States v. BP Products, 2008 WL 501321 at '7 (noting victims right to confer "in the 
case"), cited in In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394. 
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The Government finally notes that the Fifth Circuit stated that its ruling about the 
Government violating the right to confer applied "in the posture of this case." In re Dean, 527 
F.3d at 394. But the posture of the case involving Epstein here — at least in its relevant aspects — 
is virtually identical to the posture there. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government had an 
obligation to confer with the victims before charges were filed and before a final plea 
arrangement was reached. Without giving the victims a chance to confer before hand, the plea 
agreement might be fatally flawed because it did not consider the concerns of the victims. Thus, 
the Fifth Circuit emphasized the need to confer with victims before any disposition was finally 
decided: "The victims do have reason to believe that their impact on the eventual sentence is 
substantially less where, as here, their input is received after the parties have reached a tentative 
deal. As we have explained, that is why we conclude that these victims should have been heard 
at an earlier stage." Id at 395. The posture in this case is exactly the same — the Government 
should have conferred before the parties "reached a tentative deal." The fact that the deal 
reached here is slightly different than the deal reached in the Dean case (a non-prosecution 
agreement versus a plea agreement) is truly a distinction without a difference. If anything, the 
facts here cry out for conferral even more than in that case. At least the defendant there agreed 
to plead guilty to a federal felony. Here, the wealthy defendant has escaped all federal 
punishment— a plea deal that Jane Doe 01 and Jane Doe 02 would have strenuously objected to . 
if the Government had given them the chance. 
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Dean has been cited favorably in two recent District Court 
decisions, which provides further support for Petitioner's position here. In United States v. 
Rubin, 2008 WL 2358591 (BD.N.Y. 2008), the victims argued for extremely broad rights under 
29 
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,
,
,
,
,
,
 
•
 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 30 of 42 
the CVRA. After citing Dean, the District Court agreed that the rights were expansive and could 
apply before indictment, but subject to the outer limit that the Government be at least 
"contemplating" charges: 
Quite understandably, movants perceive their victimization as having begun long 
befott the government got around to filing the superseding Indictment. They also 
believe their rights under the CVRA ripened at the moment of actual 
victimization, or at least at the point when they first contacted the government. 
Movants rely on a decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that 
CVRA rights apply prior to any prosecution. In United States v. BP Products 
North America, Inc., the district court reasoned that because § 377I(dX3) 
provided for the assertion of CVRA rights "in the district court in which a 
defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in 
the district court in the district in which the crime occurred," the CVRA clearly 
provided for "rights ... that apply before any prosecution is underway." (United 
States v. BP Products North America, Inc., Criminal No. H-07434, 2008 WL 
501321 at *11 (S.D.Tex. Feb.21, 2008) (emphasis in original), mandamus denied 
in part, In re Dean, No. 08-20125, 2008 WL 1960245 (5th Cir. May 7, 2008). 
But, assuming that it was within the contemplation end intendment of the CVRA 
to guarantee certain victim's rights prior to formal commencement of a criminal 
proceeding, the universe of such rights clearly has its logical limits. For example, 
the realm of cases in which the CVRA might apply despite no prosecution being 
"underway," cannot be read to include the victims of uncharged crimes that the 
government has not even contemplatechit is impossible to expect the government, 
much less a court, to notify crime victims of their rights if the government has not 
verified to at least an elementary degree that a crime has actually taken place, 
given that a corresponding investigation is at a nascent or theoretical stage. 
Id. at *6. Here, of course, the criminal investigation went far beyond the "nascent or theoretical 
stage" — to a point whore the Government determined that crimes had been committed and that 
the defendant should plead'guilty to either a state or federal offense. 
Similarly, at least one other district court has reviewed the issue and agreed with the 
victims' position that crime victims can have rights before charges are filed. In rejecting an 
argument that the CVRA should be limited to cases in which a defendant has been convicted, 
United States v. Okun, explained: "Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has noted that victims acquire 
30 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 31 of 42 
rights under the CVRA even before prosecution. See In re Dean, 527 F3d 391, 394 (5th 
Cir.2008). This view is supported by the statutory language, which gives the victims rights 
before the accepting of plea agreements and, therefore, before adjudication of guilt. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3771(aX4)." 2009 WL 790042 at •2 (W.Va. 2009). 
Accordingly, rather than create a split of authority, this Court should follow the Fifth 
Circuit's holding in Dean (and the view of the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of 
New York and the Eastern District of Virginia) and conclude that the CVRA extends rights to 
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 under the facts of this case. 
C. 
The U.S. Attorney's OfficeHas Previously Recognized that Jane Doe til and 
Jane Doe #2 Have Rights tinder the CVRA. 
A final reason for concluding that Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe *2 are protected by the 
CVRA is that the U.S. Attorney's Office itself reached that conclusion — well before the victims 
filed this petition. The U.S. Attorney's Office arranged to have the FBI send a notice to, for 
example, Jane Doe HI informing her that she had lights under the CVRA. Later, in discussions 
with defendant Epstein, the Office explained to Epstein their obligations to the victims under the 
CVRA. Indeed, it was only after Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 filed a petition with this Court 
seeking protection of their rights that the U.S. Attorney's Office reversed its position. The Court 
should reject this remarkable about-face. 
As recounted in more detail above, the U.S. Attorney's Office made clear to both the 
victims and to Epstein that the victims had rights under the CVRA. For example, on about June 
7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to June Doe Ul a standard CVRA victim notification letter, 
promising that the Justice Department would makes its "best efforts" to protect Jane Doe #1's 
31 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 32 of 42 
rights, including "Nike reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the 
case" and "to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving 
plea . . . ." Exhibit "C." Similarly, on about November 27, 2007, then First Assistant U.S. 
Attorney 
sent an e-mail to Jay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein stating: la 
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 
(emphasis rearranged). 
Apparently, this assertion produced some sort of objection from 
defendant Epstein. The U.S. Attorney's Office, however, rejected those objections In a letter 
on about December 6, 2007, 
First Assistant U.S. Attorney again sent a letter 
to Jay Leflcowitz, reiterating the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims 
informed of the status of 
The letter stated: 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 33 of 42 
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added). What this correspondence shows 
is that the U.S. Attorney's Office quite clearly took the position with defendant Epstein that the 
CVRA extended rights to Epstein's victims. Yet when the victims in this case filed a petition in 
this Court asking those rights to be respected, the Government simply reversed course. The U.S. 
Attorney's Office had it right the first time — the CVRA does extend rights to Jane Dot #1 and 
Jane Doe #2 in this case. 
D. 
The U.S. Attorney's Office Is Estopped From Arguing that the CVRA Does 
Not Apply in this Case. 
For all the reasons just explained, it is clear that the CVRA applies to this case and the 
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 had rights under the Act. In addition, however, the Government is 
simply stopped from arguing otherwise. The Government told the victims that they had rights 
under the CVRA and would keep them informed about the progress of the case. Exhibits "Cr 
"D," "F," & "G." Having made those representations to the victims — and having induced 
reliance by the victims—the Government is stopped from taking a different position now. 
As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, to make out a claim of estoppel against the 
Government, a party must adduce evidence of the following: 
(I) words, conduct, or acquiescence that induces reliance; 
(2) willfulness or negligence with regard to the acts, conduct, or acquiescence; 
(3) detrimental reliance; and 
(4) affirmative misconduct by the Government. 
United States v. hicCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292 (111 Cir. 2003). Each of these four factors is easily 
met here. 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 34 of 42 
First, the Government made statements to the victims that induced reliance. The victims 
received an official notice on Justice Department letterhead that they were crime victims in the 
Epstein case and that the Justice Department would use its "best efforts" to protect their rights. 
Second, these statements were obviously not accidental —to the contrary, the Government 
specifically and deliberately sent these notices to the victims. 
Third, the victims detrimentally relied on these statements. As explained at greater 
length in the victims proposed facts, the victims were lead to believe that their case was "under 
investigation." As a result, they did not take steps to object to Epstein's plea agreement and, 
indeed, did not even attend the court hearing where Epstein pled guilty. Similarly, their attorney 
(Mr. Edwards) was induced to spend an afternoon writing a letter to the U.S Attorney's Office 
about why Epstein should be federally prosecuted — time that was taken away from other matters 
at his busy law practice. This was a complete wild goose chase, as the U.S. Attorney's Office 
was concealing front Mr. Edwards at the time that a federal non-prosecution agreement had 
already been reached with Epstein. 
Fourth, the U.S. Attorney's Office engaged in affirmative misconduct We do not make 
this allegation lightly. But the facts recounted above demonstrate the following chain of events. 
The U.S. Attorney's Office first reached a non prosecution agreement with Epstein, in which it 
agreed not to prosecute him for numerous crimes (including, for example, sex offenses 
committed by Epstein against Jane Doe #1). As part of that agreement, the U.S. Attorney's 
Office agreed to a "confidentiality" provision that forbade publicly disclosing the existence of 
the agreement. As a result, the U.S. Attorney's Office (and FBI agents acting under its 
34 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 35 of 42 
direction4) kept the existence of the non-prosecution agreement secret from the victims and the 
public. The reasonable inference from the evidence is that the U.S. Attorney's Office wanted to 
keep the agreement a secret to avoid intense criticism that would have surely ensued had the 
victims and the public learned that a billionaire sex offender with political connections had 
arranged to avoid federal prosecution for numerous felony sex offenses against minor girls. 
As part of this pattern of deception, the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed victim 
notification with the defendant sex offender and, after he raised objections, stopped making 
notifications. Then later in January 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office arranged for letters to be 
sent to the victims — including Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 — that falsely stated that to each that 
your "case is currently under investigation." This was untrue, as the U.S. Attorney's Office had 
already resolved the federal case by signing a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Indeed, 
the pattern of deception continued even after Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were represented by 
legal counsel. In May 2008, the Office sent a similar letter stating "your case is currently 
investigation" to another victim (represented by attorney Bradley J. Edwards). As late as the 
middle of June 2008 — more than eight months after the non-prosecution agreement had been 
signed — the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case told Edwards to send information that he 
wanted the Office to consider in determining whether to file federal charges. The Office 
concealed from him that it had already made the determination not to file federal charges end 
that the Office had in fact signed a non•prosecution agreement long ago. The Office also 
concealed from him the fact that guilty pleas in state court were imminent. The Office disclosed 
4 it is unknown whether the U.S. Attorney's Office even made the FBI aware of the NPA 
in a timely fashion. 
35 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 36 of 42 
the non-prosecution agreement only after Epstein had entered his guilty pleas in state court — in 
other words, only after the time for the victims to be able to object to the non-prosecution 
agreement during the plea process had come and gone. Even at that time, the Office did not 
disclose the provisions in the agreement. In short, the victims never learned about the non-
prosecution agreement barring federal prosecution of their oases because of a deliberate 
decisions by the U.S. Attorney's Office, not mere "negligence or inaction." McCorkle, 321 F.3d 
at 1297. Accordingly, the Government is stopped from arguing that the Crime Victims' Rights 
Act does not apply to this case. 
IL 
THE COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS HAVE BEEN 
VIOLATED AND TEEN SET TIP A BRIEFING SCHEDULE AND HEARING ON 
THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY. 
This U.S. Attorney's Office's behavior in this case does not satisfy the Office's 
obligations under the CVRA to use its "best efforts" to insure that victims receive protection of 
their rights. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX'). In particular, the undeniable chain of events makes clear 
that the victims wore not afforded their right "to confer with the attorney for the Government in 
the case." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX5). Whatever else may be said about the deception, it also 
starkly violates the victims' right "to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's 
dignity . ..." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). The pattern also denied the victims of timely notice of 
court proceedings, 18 U.S.C. §3771(a)(3), including in particular the state court guilty plea. 
As we understand the position of the Government, it does not truly contest that — if the 
CVRA applied — it managed to discharge its various obligations under the Act. Instead, the 
Government relies solely on a technical argument to reach the conclusion that it discharged its 
obligations — namely, the argument that the CVRA does not apply until a foimal indictment is 
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filed. As just explained, however, that technical argument must be rejected as inconsistent with 
the CVRA's plain language and interpretation by other courts. Accordingly, this Court should 
find that the Government has violated its CVRA obligations. 
Once the Court finds such a violation, the next issue becomes what remedy should apply. 
Since the earliest days of our nation, it has been settled law that "where there is a legal right, 
there is also a legal remedy . . .." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (internal 
quotation omitted). Moreover, "[i]f the right is created by a federal statute, the federal courts 
have the power to fashion an appropriate remedy." Intracoastal Tranrp., Inc. v. Decatur County, 
Georgia 482 F.2d 361, 371 (5d1 Cir. 1973). As we understand the Government's position in this 
case, however, they believe that this Scottie_ owerless-to-do-anything to rorrect_ths._. palpable 
violation of victims' rights documented in this case. 
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 respectfblly request that the Court set up a briefing 
schedule and a hearing on this important issue. The victims believe that they can establish that 
the appropriate remedy for the clear violations of their rights is to invalidate the Non-Prosecution 
Agreement. While the victims request an opportunity to provide more extensive briefing on this 
subject, they provide a few citations in support of their position here. 
When other plea arrangements have been negotiated in violation of federal law, they have 
been stricken by the courts. For example, United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), 
held that where a sentence on a new crime could not run concurrently with a probation 
revocation the defendant was then serving — contrary to the assumption of the parties to the plea 
agreement — the defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement. The 
Court explained that the case was one "in which the bargain is vitiated by illegality . ..." /d. at 
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•
rile.
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 38 of 42 
947. Here, of course, exactly the same is true: the non-prosecution agreement is vitiated by 
illegality — namely, the fad that it was negotiated in violation of the victims' rights. Other cases 
reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10°' Cir. 1995) 
(prosecutor agreed to recommend probation, but it later appeared that would be an illegal 
sentence in this case, and thus only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw plea); 
Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951, 959-60 (Cob. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial 
court have authority to modify or waive the mandatory parole period," such "is not a permissible 
subject of plea negotiations," and thus, even if "the trial court erroneously approves of such an 
illegal bargain" such plea is "invalid" and thus will not be specifically enforced). Nor can the 
defendant claim some right to specific performance of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. See 
State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 881-82 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement for 81 months sentence, 
but court added 10-year conditional release term because, under facts of case, sentence without 
such release term "plainly illegal," and thus remedy of specific performance not available); State 
v. Wail, 348 N.C. 671, 502 8.13.2d 585, 588 (1998) (plea agreement was for sentence to be 
concurrent with one not yet completed, but state statute mandates consecutive sentence on facts 
of this case; "defendant is not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action 
would violate the laws of this state"); Re parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed fair on its face when executed, it has become 
unenforceable due to circumstances beyond the control of [the parties], namely the fact that one 
of the enhancement paragraphs was mischaracterized in the indictment, resulting in an illegal 
sentence far outside the statutory range," proper remedy is plea withdrawal, as "there is no way 
of knowing whether the State would have offered a plea bargain within the proper range of 
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Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 39 of 42 
punishment that he deemed acceptable"); State v. Mazzone, 212 W.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891, 897 
(2002) (where plea agreement was that defendant would plead guilty to 2 felony counts of felon 
in possession of firearm and prosecutor would dismiss remaining 6 counts re other offenses with 
prejudice, and all parties erroneously believed these 2 crimes were felonies, lower court 
"correctly resolved this unfortunate predicament by holding that a plea agreement which cannot 
be fulfilled based upon legal impossibility must be vacated in its entirety, and the parties must be 
placed, as nearly as possible, in the positions they occupied prior to the entry of the plea 
agreement"). 
The Non-Prosecution Agreement that the Government entered into in this case was 
simply illegal. The Government did not protect the congressionally-mandated rights of victims 
before it entered into this Agreement. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Agreement is so 
shockingly lenient — blocking prosecution for dozens and dozens of federal felony sex offenses 
against several dozen minor girls. But regardless of the leniency, the only issue for the Court is 
whether the Agreement was lawfhl. It was not, and so the Court invalidate it.3 The victims 
respectfully ask for a full briefing schedule and a hearing on this important issue. 
3 Defendant Jeffrey Epstein was notified about this case long ago, and was notified on 
August 26, 2010, that the victims would be filing correspondence in support of their motions.' 
He has not chosen to intervene in this action, and so he should not be heard to complain about 
remedy the Court might impose. 
In any event, there are no double jeopardy barriers to invalidating the plea. As explained 
in a leading criminal procedure treatise: 
The review of defendant's sentence is also provided in federal cases upon 
application of a victim. The Crime Victim's Rights Act allows a victim to seek to 
reopen a sentence through a writ of mandamus, if the victim has asserted and been 
denied the right to be heard at sentencing. Like the prosecution's statutory right 
to appeal, the victim's statutory remedy should pose no double jeopardy 
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