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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 51 of 54 
as asking two questions, whether Article III standing exists, and whether the statute at issue 
grants the purported plaintiff a means to seek relief under the applicable statute. Id. at 1355. 
Respondents believe petitioners cannot seek relief under section 3771(d)(3) because they 
cannot establish that the rights enumerated in section 3771(a) attached, in the absence of a formal 
charge being filed. Consequently, petitioners lack standing. 
IX. 
PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT, AND REQUEST FOR 
HEARING. SHOULD BE DENIED 
The statutory text, legislative history, and case authority support the view that the right to 
confer enumerated in section 3771(aX5) does not attach until a formal charge is filed in the 
district court. Therefore, petitioners' motion for enforcement should be denied. 
The remedy petitioners seek is to have this Court set aside the non-prosecution 
agreement. DE 48 at 36-40. Assuming amend° that the Court finds the right to confer did arise 
in the absence of a formal charge being filed, respondents respectfully submit the Court would 
lack the authority to set aside the non-prosecution agreement. As stated previously, a non-
prosecution agreement, unlike a plea agreement, is not subject to judicial pre-approvaL It is an 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion that is "largely unreviewable." 
Inasmuch as a non-prosecution agreement would not normally come before the Court for 
judicial scrutiny and approval, it should not come before the Court in the guise of a motion to 
enforce the CVRA. This would be contrary to section 3771(d)(6)'s clear intention that nothing 
in the CVRA should be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General. 
Petitioners contend that a violation of a right must have a remedy. However, this is not 
always the case. Indeed, courts have recognized that a controversy is moot if effective relief 
51 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 52 of 54 
cannot be granted. Continental Casualty Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 4 F.3d 777, 778 (' Cir. 
1993). The non-prosecution agreement in this case was signed in 2007, and Epstein entered his 
pleas of guilty in July 2008, in Florida circuit court. I k was sentenced by the state court, and 
has served his sentence. Individuals who were sexually abused by Epstein have filed civil 
actions against him, relying upon certain provisions of the non-prosecution agreement. 
Any failure to confer under section 3771(aX5) does not render the non-prosecution 
agreement illegal, as petitioners suggest. A plea agreement that was entered into by the 
government without having conferred with a victim can be disapproved by the district court, 
since all plea agreements are subject to judicial scrutiny and approval. A non-prosecution 
agreement is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, not subject to judicial pre-approval. While 
petitioners may assail the government's exercise of its discretion in this case, the exercise of that 
discretion is not subject to judicial review, either independent of a CVRA motion, or in 
conjunction with such a motion. 
52 
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1 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 
Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 53 of 54 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners' motion for finding of violations of the Crime Victim Rights Act and request 
for a hearing on appropriate remedies should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WIFREDO A. FERRER 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April 8, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing document 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
53 
EFTA00230118

• . 
. 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/08/2011 Page 54 of 54 
SERVICE LIST 
Jane Does 1 and 2 v. United States, 
Case No. 08-80736-CIV-
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Bradley J. Edwards, Esq., 
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, P.L. 
Paul G. Cassell 
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah 
Attorneys for Jane Doe # 1 and Jane Doe # 2 
54 
EFTA00230119

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 
Entered nn FL SD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 10 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 08-80736-Civ-
JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2 
v. 
UNITED STATES 
JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE #2'S MOTION TO HAVE THEIR FACTS ACCEPTED 
BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO CONTEST ANY OF THE FACTS 
COME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as "the victims"), by and 
through undersigned counsel, to move this Court to accept all of their facts in their Motion for 
Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The victims have been attempting to 
negotiate with the Government for more than 30 months on a stipulated set of facts. Despite 
repeated opportunities to advise the victims of what facts they are contesting, the Government in 
the last few days has flatly declared that it will not discuss the facts in this case. This is violation 
of the Court's direction to the parties as well as the local rule on the subject. Accordingly, the 
Government should be deemed to have failed to contest the victims' facts and the Court should 
proceed to resolve this case on the basis of the victims' proffered facts. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The victims have been attempting to reach an agreement on the facts surrounding this 
case since filing their petition on June 7, 2008. In that petition, the victims' recited the facts as 
The petition was initially filed on behalf of Jane Doe #1. Jane Doe #2 was quickly 
added into the case. For simplicity, we will refer to the pleadings as having been filed by "the 
1 
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•riccoo70•••••-•-
-Ft 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 10 
they understood them at the time — i.e., the victim asserted "upon information and belie?' that 
they understood that Epstein was involved in on-going plea negotiations with the U.S. Attorney's 
Office for the Southern District of Florida. Victims' Petition (doe. #1) at 1. On July 9, 2008, the 
Government responded with a sealed response (quickly unsealed by the Court), that stated that 
an agreement had already been reached with Epstein. Government's Response to Victims' 
Emergency Petition (dos. #13). Two days later, the victims replied, explaining that they were 
just learning these facts from the Government's pleading. 
See. e.g.. Victims' Reply to 
Government's Response (doe. #9) at 8. 
The Court quickly scheduled a hearing on the victims' petition, held on July 11, 2008. 
The Court discussed a need to "hav[e] a complete record, and this is going to be an issue that's 
... going to go to the Eleventh Circuit, (so it] may be better to have a complete record as to what 
your position is and the government's is as to what actions were taken." Tr. at 25-26. Counsel 
for the victims explained: " . . . I will confer with the government on this and if evidence needs 
to be taken, it [can] be taken at a later date." Tr. at 26. The Court concluded the hearing with the 
following instructions: "So I'll let both of you confer about whether there is a need for any 
additional evidence to be presented. Let me know one way or the other. If there is, we'll 
schedule a hearing. If there isn't and you want to submit sonic additional stipulated information, 
do that, and then I'll take care of this in due course." Tr. at 32. 
The victims and the U.S. Attorney's Office then attempted to reach a stipulated set of 
facts underlying the case. The U.S. Attorney's Office offered a very abbreviated set of proposed 
facts, and the victims responded with a detailed set of proposed facts. Rather than respond to the 
victims." 
2 
EFTA00230121

tw•Iir"^" 
• • 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 10 
victims' specific facts, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office suddenly reversed course. On July 
29, 2008, it filed a Notice to Court Regarding Absence of Need for Evidentiary Hearing (dos. 
#17). 
The U.S. Attorney's Office took the following position: "After consideration, the 
Government believes that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary" (dos. #17 at 1). The Office 
asserted that the Court need only take judicial notice of the fact that no indictment had been filed 
against Epstein to resolve the case. 
On August 1, 2008, the victims filed a response to the Government's "Notice" (doe. #19), 
giving a proposed statement of facts surrounding the case. The proposed statement of facts 
highlighted the fact that the Government had signed a non-prosecution agreement containing an 
express confidentiality provision, which prevented the Government from disclosing the 
agreement to them and other victims. Id. at 5. The victims response also requested that the 
Court direct the Government to confer with the victims regarding the undisputed facts of the 
case, produce the non-prosecution agreement and other information about the case. Id at 14. 
On August 14, 2008, the Court held a hearing on the case regarding the confidentiality of 
the non-prosecution agreement. The Court ultimately ordered production of the agreement to the 
victims. 
After the U.S. Attorney's Office made the non-prosecution agreement available to the 
victims, the victims reviewed it and pursued further discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office. 
Ultimately, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to reach a stipulated set of facts with 
the victims and declined to provide further information about the case. 
With negotiations at an impasse, the victims attempted to learn the facts of the case in 
other ways. In approximately May 2009, counsel for the victims propounded discovery requests 
3 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 10 
in both state and federal civil cases against Epstein, seeking to obtain correspondence between 
Epstein and prosecutors regarding his plea agreement — information that the U.S. Attorney's 
Office was unwilling to provide to the victims. Epstein refused to produce that information, and 
(as the Court is aware) extended litigation to obtain the materials followed. The Court rejected 
all of Epstein's objections to producing the materials. 
On June 30, 2010, counsel for Epstein sent to counsel for the victims approximately 358 
pages of e-mail correspondence between criminal defense counsel and the U.S. Attorney's Office 
regarding the plea agreement that had been negotiated between them. See Jane Doe #1 and Jane 
Doe #2's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act and Request for a 
Hearing on Appropriate Remedies, Attachment "A." These e-mails fully disclosed for the rust 
time the extreme steps that had been taken by the U.S. Attorney's Office to avoid prosecuting 
Epstein and to avoid having the victims in the case learn about the non-prosecution agreement 
that had been reached between Epstein and the Government. 
In mid-July 2010, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 settled their civil lawsuits against 
Epstein. 
Then, armed with the new information, they turned to moving forward in the CVRA 
case. 
On September 13, 2010, the victims informed the Court that they were preparing new 
filings in the case. 
On October 12, 2010, the Court entered an order directing the victims to provide a status 
report on the case by October 27, 2010. That same day, counsel for the victims again contacted 
the U.S. Attomey!s Office about the possibility of reaching a stipulated set of facts in the case. 
That same day, the U.S. Attorney's Office responded: "We don't have any problem with 
agreeing that a factual assertion is correct if we agree that is what occurred" (doc. #41 at 2). 
4 
EFTA00230123

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 10 
On October 23, 2010, the victims e-mailed to the U.S. Attorney's Office a detailed proposed 
statement of facts, with many of the facts now documented by the correspondence between the U.S. 
Attorney's Office and Epstein's counsel. The victims requested that the U.S. Attorney's Office 
identify which facts it would agree to. In a letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office, the victims stated: 
If you believe that any of the facts they propose are incorrect, Jane Doe #1 and Jane 
Doe #2 would reiterate their long-standing request that you work with us to arrive at a 
mutually-agreed statement of facts. As you know, in the summer of 2008 Jane Doe 
#1 and Jane Doe #2 were working with you on a stipulation of facts when you 
reversed course and took that position that no recitation of the facts was necessary 
(see doc. #19 at 2). . . . I hope that your e-mail means that you will at least look at our 
facts and propose any modifications that you deem appropriate. Having that evidence 
quickly available to the Court could well help move this case to a conclusion. 
That same day, the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed to forward the proposed statement of facts to the 
appropriate Assistant U.S. Attorney for review (doc. #41 at 2-3). 
On October 26, 2010, rather than stipulate to undisputed facts, the U.S. Attorney's Office 
contacted the victims' attorneys and asked them to delay the filing of their motion for a two-week 
period of time so that negotiations could  be held between the Office and the victims in an attempt to 
harrow the range of disputes in the case and to hopefully reach a settlement resolution without the 
need for further litigation. Negotiations between the victims and the U.S. Attorney's Office then 
followed over the next two days. However, at 6:11 p.m. on October 27, 2010 — the date on which the 
victims' pleading was due — the U.S. Attorney's Office informed the victims that it did not believe 
that it had time to review the victims' proposed statement of facts and advise which were accurate 
and which were inaccurate. The Office further advised the victims that it believed that the victims did 
not have a right to confer with their Office under the CVRA in this case because in its view the case 
is "civil" litigation rather than the "criminal" litigation (doe. #41 at 3). 2
2 In seeming contradiction to this position, on March 17, 2011, the U.S. Attorney's Office 
5 
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.. . 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 10 
As a result, purely as an accommodation to the U.S. Attorney's Office, on October 27, 2010, 
the victims filed a report with the Court in which they agreed to delay filing their motion and 
accompanying facts for up to two-weeks to see if negotiations can resolve (or narrow) the disputes 
with the U.S. Attorney's Office (doe. #41 at 4). Discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office dragged 
on, including a meeting between Jane Doe #1 and the U.S. Attorney in December 2010. 
After further discussions failed to produce any agreement or other visible progress, the 
victims informed the U.S. Attorney's Office that they would file their "summary judgment" 
motion with the Court on March 18, 2011 and requested further cooperation from the Office on 
the facts. 
Ultimately, after months of discussion, the U.S. Attorney's Office informed counsel for 
the victims that — contrary to promises made earlier to stipulate to undisputed facts — no such 
stipulation would be forthcoming. Instead, on March 15, 2011, the U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of Florida, Wilted° A. Ferrer, sent a letter to the victims declining to reach any 
agreement on the facts: 
Because, as a matter of law, the CVRA is inapplicable to this matter in which no 
federal criminal charges were ever filed, your requests for the government's 
agreement on a set of proposed stipulated facts is unnecessary and premature. 
That is, because whether the rights in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) attach prior to the filing 
of a charge in a federal court is a matter of statutory interpretation, resolution of 
that question is not dependent upon the existence of any certain set of facts, other 
than whether a charging document was ever filed against Jeffrey Epstein in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. And while this 
Office remains willing to cooperate, cooperation does not mean agreeing to facts 
that are not relevant to the resolution of the legal dispute at issue .. . . 
informed the victims that it would not be making any initial disclosures to the victims as required 
for civil cases by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). The U.S. Attorney's Office did not explain why they 
believe that this rule of civil procedure is inapplicable if they think this case is properly viewed 
as a "civil" case. 
6 
EFTA00230125

1
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 10 
• 
Letter from Wifrcdo A. Ferrer to Paul G. Cassell (March 15, 2011).3
Accordingly, the victims were left with no choice but to file a motion without stipulated 
facts. Contemporaneously with the filing of this motion, the victims are filing a comprehensive 
Motion for Finding of Violations of the Cu= Victims' Rights Act and Request for a Hearing on 
Appropriate Remedies. The motion contains the detailed set of facts which the victims have long 
been attempting to discuss with the government. 
THE COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE CASE ON THE BASIS 
OF THE VICTIMS' PROFFERED FACTS. 
In view of the deliberate decision by the U.S. Attorney's Office not to discuss with the 
victims which facts they are disputing, the Court should resolve this case on the basis of facts 
that the victims offer in their motion seeking a finding of violations of the CVRA. For more than 
30 months, the victims have given the U.S. Attorney's Office repeated opportunities contest their 
facts, only to see the Office first commit to reviewing the facts, then later claim they did not have 
sufficient time to review the facts, and then ultimately renege on that commitment to review the 
facts. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney's Office now argues that the facts are "not relevant" to the 
court's determination. If so, the Court should take up the U.S. Attorney's Office's position and 
simply accept the facts that the victims proffer. If the U.S. Attorney's Office is correct that the 
facts are irrelevant, they should not be heard to object when the victims propose a specific set of 
facts for resolving this case. 
3 
To avoid any suggestion that the victims are disclosing confidential settlement 
discussions, we are not attaching a copy of this letter to this pleading. We believe, however, that 
this paragraph is relevant to the issue before the Court and have accordingly reproduced it. See 
Fed. R. Evict. 408(b) (while settlement discussions are generally inadmissible, they are 
permissible for purposes other than proving the validity of a claim). 
7 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 10 
The Court should also accept the victims' facts because the U.S. Attorney's Office has 
violated the local rules regarding stipulating to facts. Local Rule 88.10(O) contains a broad, 
commonsense provision requiring the parties to work together to reduce disputes over the facts: 
The Local Rule provides: "The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to stipulate 
to all facts or points of law the truth or existence of which is not contested and the early 
resolution of which will expedite the trial." For more than two-and-a-half years, the victims 
have been trying to get the U.S. Attorney's Office to stipulate to uncontested facts. The U.S. 
Attorney's Office, however, promised to do so, then refused to do so, then promised to do so, 
and now finally is refusing to do so. Because its failure to try and reach a stipulation is a clear 
violation of the local rule, the Court should simply adopt the victims' facts. 
The Court should also accept the victims' facts because the Government has failed in its 
duty to confer with the victims. Not only did this Court order counsel for the Government and 
the victims to confer at the conclusion of the July 11, 2008 hearing, but the Crime Victims' 
Rights Act specific afford to victims It]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government in the case." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). A fundamental part of conferring about a 
case would at least be learning what the Government agrees were the facts in the case. But the 
Government is apparently unwilling to do even that. Accordingly, the Court should simply find 
that the victims' understanding of the facts is correct and proceed to resolve this case on that 
basis. 
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 
As recounted above, the victims have repeated sought to learn which facts the 
Government is disputing, but the Government has declined to review the facts with the victims. 
8 
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1 rncrtrnr -
1 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 10 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should resolve this case on the basis of the facts 
that the victims have offered. 
DATED: March 21, 2011 
Respectfully Submitted, 
s/ Bradley J. Edwards 
Bradley J. Edwards 
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, 
EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.I.. 
and 
Paul G. Cassell 
Pro Hac Vice 
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the 
University of Utah 
Attorneys for Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 
EFTA00230128

• 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 49 Entered on FLSO Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The foregoing document was served on March 21, 2011, on the following using the Court's 
CM/ECF system: 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
500 S. Australian Ave., Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
Joseph L. Ackerman, Jr. 
Fowler White Burnett PA 
(courtesy copy of pleading via U.S. mail) 
10 
EFTA00230129

1"Afferr—
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 1 of 15 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 08-80736-C1v-
JANE DOES #1 AND #2, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent. 
UNITED STATES' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
JANE DOES #1 AND #2'S MOTION TO HAVE 
THEIR FACTS ACCEPTED BECAUSE OF 
THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO CONTEST ANY OF THE FACTS IDE491 
The United States, by and through the undersigned, hereby opposes Petitioners' Motion to 
have their "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" accepted as true 03E49]. Petitioners argue that 
the Court should accept their Statement as true, despite its conclusory allegations and internal 
inconsistencies, solely because of the United States' failure to stipulate to the Statement. The Court 
should deny the motion because: (1) Petitioners have misstated that United States' efforts at reaching 
agreement on the Statement; (2) the "Undisputed Material Facts" are irrelevant, as Petitioners have 
previously acknowledged; (3) agreeing to the "Undisputed Material Facts" demanded by Petitioners 
would have required the United States to violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(c) and/or 
constitutional and ethical mandates; and (4) the United States is not obligated to agree to any "facts," 
especially those that are incomplete or false. 
EFTA00230130

tt,
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 2 of 15 
BACKGROUND 
In DE 49, Petitioners ask the Court to accept as true their proposed "Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts" contained in DE48 because they claim that the United States has failed "to advise 
the victims of what facts they are contesting." Petitioners then spend several pages making 
unsupported assertions and reciting from letters and email correspondence in an attempt to persuade 
the Court to adopt as true the Petitioners' averments even when the falsity of some of those "facts" 
is apparent from the text itself. 
Contrary to their assertions, the Petitioners have not been attempting to negotiate with the 
government for more than 30 months. As set forth in the Procedural History Section of the United 
States' Opposition to Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion for Finding of Violations of the Crime 
Victim Rights Act ("CVRA"), at the last hearing on the Petitioners' Emergency Petition, on August 
14, 2008, counsel for Petitioners stated to the Court, "I believe that you do have a sufficient record, 
in that 1 don't think that — I think that we're in agreement that additional evidence does not need to 
be taken in the case for Your Honor to make a niling." (DE27 at 4 (emphasis added).) 
Thereafter, there was no contact regarding the CVRA petitioner for years — until the Court 
issued its administrative order closing the case. A flurry of activity ensued. Efforts were made to 
resolve the matter amicably, without success, including allowing the Petitioners, that is Jane Does 
#1 and #2, and their counsel, the opportunity to meet with the U.S. Attorney, as Jeffrey Epstein's 
attorneys did.' 
Despite the Petitioners' earlier statement to the Court that no additional facts were needed, 
many hours were spent trying to revise the Petitioners' proposed statement of facts so that it would 
'Only Jane Doe #1 and her counsel elected to attend a meeting with the U.S. Attorney. 
EFTA00230131

Case 9:08-cv-80136-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 3 of 15 
contain only facts, not argument, not inferences, not incorrect innuendos.' Even after the U.S. 
Attorney's Office advised Petitioners that the Justice Department's position was that the CVRA's 
rights only attached upon the filing of federal criminal charges and, hence, that none of the 
Petitioners' proposed facts were relevant, further attempts were made. Petitioners' counsel, 
however, demonstrated no interest in proposed compromises. Specific factual corrections also were 
suggested and rejected' Thus, counsel for Petitioners know that some of the proposed "undisputed 
material facts" are in fact disputed and, in many cases, wrong. 
2The U.S. Attorney's Office also repeatedly reminded Mr. Cassell of the Justice 
Department's policy not to comment on the guilt or innocence of an unconvicted person. The 
ABA's Model Rule of Professional Conduct on the SpecialResponsibilities of a Prosecutor contains 
similar guidance. For example, there has been no civil or criminal fording by any judge or jury that: 
defendant Jeffrey Epstein (a billionaire with significant with significant political 
connections) sexually abused more than 30 minor girls at his mansion in West Palm 
Beach (sic), Florida, and elsewhere. Epstein performed repeated lewd, lascivious, 
and sexual acts on them, including (but not limited to) masturbation, touching of their 
sexual organs, using vibrators or sexual toys on them, coercing them into sexual acts, 
and digitally penetrating them. Because Epstein used a means of interstate commerce 
and knowingly traveled in interstate commerce to engage in abuse of Jane Doe #1 
and Jane Doe #2 (and the other victims), he committed violations of federal law, 
including repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. 
(DEA8 at 3-4' 1.) Jane Does No. 1 and No. 2 had the opportunity to prove these allegations at trial 
but elected to sign confidential settlement agreements where, presumably, there was no 
acknowledgement of criminal or civil liability. Respectfully, the U.S. Attorney's Office cannot 
express a factual position, immaterial to the present litigation, on whether Jeffrey Epstein ('Epstein") 
committed crimes (other than those to which he pled guilty in Palm Beach County Circuit Court). 
'For example, Petitioners were repeatedly advised the Epstein lived in Palm Beach, not West 
Palm Beach. Even this simple correction was ignored. (See DM8 at 3-4.) 
3 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 4 of 15 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
ALL OF THE "UNDISPUTED FACTS" ARE IRRELEVANT. 
In their motion asking the Court to accept as true all of their purported "undisputed material 
facts," Petitioners rely on only two citations, the CVRA's "right to confer with the attorney in the 
case" and Local Rule 88.10(0), which governs discovery in criminal cases. 
Local Rule 88.10(0) reads: "The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to 
stipulate to all facts or points of law the truth and existence of which is not contested and the early 
resolution of which will expedite the trial." (Emphasis added.) Contrary to Petitioners' suggestion, 
reaching agreement on Petitioners' "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" would not expedite 
the resolution of this matter. As the United States has explained since August 1, 2008, at the very 
start of the litigation, (see DEI9,) — and as admitted by Petitioners during the hearing on August 14, 
2008, (see DE27 at 3) — no additional facts are needed for the Court to resolve the Emergency 
Petition and Petitioners' Motion seeking a finding that the CVRA was violated. The only material 
fact is that the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida never filed federal 
°Whether or not the CVRA applies is the central question in dispute in this maser because 
no federal criminal case was ever filed against Jeffrey Epstein and one is certainly not pending now. 
The undersigned knows of no case where the •right to confer with the attorney in the case" has been 
interpreted to allow victims to demand that the Government confer repeatedly—even after good faith 
efforts at reaching compromise have failed — in a case filed by victims against the Government 
pursuant to the CVRA. Nonetheless, Petitioners' argument seems to be that, because they aver that 
the CVRA applies, the Government's failure to accord them their very expansive reading of the 
CVRA's "right to confer is a further violation of the CVRA. At least one court has noted and 
rejected this Catch-22: "the Court refuses to adopt an interpretation of [the CVRA] that prohibits the 
government from raising legitimate arguments in support of its opposition to a motion simply 
because the arguments in support of its opposition to a motion may hurt a victim's feeling or 
reputation. More pointedly, such a dispute is precisely the kind of dispute a court should not involve 
itself in since it cannot do so without potentially compromising its ability to be impartial to the 
government and defendant, the only true parties to the trial of the indictment" United States v. 
Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
4 
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.i i r-
ate':
, 
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 5 of 15 
criminal charges against Jeffrey Epstein. That fact is undisputed. 
Accordingly, all of the "facts" contained in Petitioners' statement are not "material" and the 
resolution of those "facts" will not "expedite the trial." Quite simply, all of the allegations, 
inferences, and innuendos contained in Petitioners' statement serve no purpose relevant to this 
litigation. 
H. 
AGREEING WITH MANY OF PETITIONERS' "FACTS" WOULD HAVE 
VIOLATED FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) AND/OR CONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATES. 
Several of the "facts" that Petitioners include allege that Epstein and others have committed 
crimes for which they were never charged or convicted. Others refer to matters that were occurring 
before the grand jury. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, constitutional mandates, and the 
ABA Model Rules on the Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor address several of the items to 
which the Petitioners asked the Government to agree. The Government correctly refused to agree 
to those "facts," and the Petitioners cannot now use that refusal to ask the Court to adopt those 
"facts" as true. 
A. 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) 
Rule 6(e) states that "an attorney for the government" "must not disclose a matter occurring 
before the grand jury." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(0)(2)(3).5 Courts have construed "a matter occurring 
before the grand jury" to include "events which have already occurred before the grand jury, such 
as a witness's testimony, [and] matters which will occur, such as statements which reveal the identity 
of persons who will be called to testify or which report when the grand jury will return an 
5Pctitioncrs have no similar obligation. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2XA). 
5 
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 58 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/07/2011 Page 6 of 15 
indictment.' In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202, 216-17 (5th Cir. 1980). 
While Petitioners were merely asking the Government to agree with their assertions of "fact" 
based upon materials Petitioners had received from counsel for Epstein, rather than asking the 
Government to make affirmative disclosures of grand jury material, "Rule 6(e) does not create a type 
of secrecy which is waived once public disclosure occurs." In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142 
F.3d 496, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting in re North,16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). "[E]ven 
if material concerning the grand jury investigation had been disclosed to the public, the Government 
attorney ... had a duty to maintain grand jury secrecy. This attorney could neither confirm nor deny 
the information presented by the 'external party."' Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 1992 WL 119127 at *3 (D.D.C. May 13, 1992) (citing Barry v. 
United States, 740 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.D.C. 1990) ("Rule 6(e) does not create a type of secrecy 
'It is worth noting that, within the same case, a court can take differing positions on this. 
Compare: 
[Title disclosure of information obtained from a source independent of the grand jury 
proceedings, such as a prior government investigation, does not violate Rule 6(e). 
A discussion of actions taken by government attorneys or officials, e.g., a 
recommendation by the Justice Department attorneys to department officials that an 
indictment be sought against an individual does not reveal any information about 
matters occurring before the grand jury. Nor does a statement of opinion as to an 
individual's potential criminal liability violate the dictates of Rule 6(e). 
With: 
Disclosures which expressly identify when an indictment would be presented to the 
grand jury, the nature of the crimes which would be charged, and the number of 
persons who would be charged run afoul of the secrecy requirements codified in Rule 
6(e). 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d at 217, 218. In light of such conflicting directives, the 
government must err, if at all, on the side of treating all information related to grand jury proceedings 
as "matters occurring before the grand jury." 
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