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CASE NO.: 08-80119-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
Service List 
Jeffrey M. Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Herman & Mermelstein, P.A. 
18205 Biscayne Blvd, Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
Fax: 305 931 0877 
8 
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
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Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 
Page 1 of 4 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, Jane Doe No. 2, ("Jane" or "Jane Doe"), by and through her undersigned counsel, 
files this Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and states as follows: 
1. 
Defendant, Jeffrey Epstein is alleged to have sexually abused Jane Doe when she was 
a minor. The Complaint is in two Counts: Count I is labeled "Sexual Assault", and alleges an 
intentional tort based on the actions of Jeffrey Epstein; Count II alleges the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress based on the same factual allegations. Defendant Epstein has moved 
to dismiss only Count I of the Complaint, contending that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 
Simultaneously herewith, Plaintiff intends to file an Amended Complaint which substantially revises 
Count I and moots the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.' 
2. 
In any event, the Complaint sufficiently alleged a claim for sexual assault and battery. 
' The Amended Complaint also adds as Count III a federal claim against Defendant Epstein under 18 
U.S.C. §§2422 and 2255. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), a party may amend the pleading once as a 
matter of course before being served with a "responsive pleading". Defendant has not to date filed a 
"responsive pleading" in this case within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(a). It is established in the 
courts of the Eleventh Circuit that a motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading" and does not 
affect a plaintiff's right to amend the pleading once as a matter of course. Williams t. Board of 
Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007). 
HERMAN & MERMELSTEIN, P. A. 
www.hermanlaw.com 
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The gravamen of the claims in Count I is set forth in paragraph 16 of the Complaint: "Epstein 
tortiously assaulted Jane Doe sexually. Epstein's acts were intentional, unlawful, offensive and 
harmful." 
3. 
Count I does not purport to be brought under the criminal statutes.2 Whether a 
Complaint states a claim for relief is not based on labels or conclusions; rather it is determined by 
the factual allegations, which "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." 
Bell Atlantic Corp. I. Twombley 127 5. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Here, the factual allegations 
establish an intentional tort claim for sexual assault and battery.3 See Paul . Holbrook, 696 So.2d 
1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ("[a] battery consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact 
upon another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is 
imminent"); Scelta 
Delicatessen Support Services. Inc. 57 F.Supp. 2d 1327, 1358-59 (M.D. Fla. 
1999) (allegation that defendant attempted to put his hands down plaintiff's dress, and that there was 
an actual and intentional touching, sufficient to state a claim for battery); Hogan'. Tavzel, 660 
So.2d 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (tortfeasor may be liable for battery for infecting another with a 
sexually transmitted disease); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts Assault, § 21 (1965) (stating 
that an assault occurs when a person "acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the 
person of the other, or an imminent apprehension of such contact, and the other is thereby put in 
such imminent apprehension"). 
'Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes is mentioned in the Complaint (118) because conduct against a 
person in violation of the criminal laws of the State generally give rise to a civil claim for intentional 
tort. Count I does not purport to bring a separate civil claim for violation of a strictly criminal 
statute. 
3 Assault and battery are closely related common law intentional torts that are commonly alleged 
together. See Herzfeld'. Herzfeld, 781 So.2d 1070 (Fla.2001) (noting that plaintiff alleged 
intentional tort of "assault and battery" based on allegations of sexual abuse). Sullivan 
Atlantic 
Federal Savings & Loan 454 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that a cause of action for 
assault and battery cannot be based entirely on an omission). 
HERMAN & MERMELSTEIN. P. A. 
www.hermanlaw.com 
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4. 
Epstein's conduct as alleged in this case of masterbating during the massage, 
directing the Plaintiff to remove her clothes, and touching the Plaintiff, constitutes the intentional 
tort of assault and battery. Accordingly, even if the Complaint had not been amended, it sufficiently 
alleges facts establishing an assault and battery. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is moot, and, in any event, not well 
founded, and therefore should be denied. 
Dated: September 22, 2008. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
Jeffrey M. Herman (FL Bar No. 521647) 
jherman@hermanlaw.com 
Stuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245) 
ssm@hermanlaw.com 
Adam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980) 
ahorowitz@ hermanlaw.com 
HERMAN & MERMELSTEIN, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Jane Doe 
18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
Tel: 305-931-2200 
Fax: 305-931-0877 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 22, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing document 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being 
served this day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via 
transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized 
manner for those parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic 
Filing. 
/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
HERMAN & MERMELSTEIN. P. A. 
www.hermanlaw.com 
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Entered on FLSD Docket 09/22/2008 
Page 4 of 4 
SERVICE LIST 
DOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
igoldberger@agwpa.com 
Michael R. Tein, Esq. 
tein@lewistein.com 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
rcritton@bciclaw.com 
Michael Pike, Esq. 
mpike@bc1claw.com 
/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
HERMAN & MERMELSTEIN. P. A. 
www.hermanlaw.com 
4 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, Jane Doe No. 2 ("Jane" or "Jane Doe"), brings this Complaint against Jeffrey 
Epstein, as follows: 
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue 
I. 
Jane Doe No. 2 is a citizen and resident of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and is sui 
juris. 
2. 
This Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of the 
Plaintiff because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse upon a 
minor. 
3. 
Defendant Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen and resident of the State of New York. 
4. 
This is an action for damages in excess of $50 million. 
5. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1332(a), as the matter in controversy (i) exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs; 
and (ii) is between citizens of different states. 
6. 
This Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(a) as a substantial 
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. 
Factual Allegations 
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7. 
At all relevant times, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein") was an adult male, 52 
years old. Epstein is a financier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to 
billionaires. He is himself a man of tremendous wealth, power and influence. He maintains his 
principal home in New York and also owns residences in New Mexico, St. Thomas and Palm Beach, 
FL. The allegations herein concern Epstein's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. 
8. 
Upon information and belief, Epstein has a sexual preference and obsession for 
underage minor girls. He engaged in a plan and scheme in which he gained access to primarily 
economically disadvantaged minor girls in his home, sexually assaulted these girls, and then gave 
them money. In or about 2004-2005, Jane Doe, then approximately 16 years old, fell into Epstein's 
trap and became one of his victims. 
9. 
Upon information and belief, Jeffrey Epstein carried out his scheme and assaulted 
girls in Florida, New York and on his private island, known as Little St. James, in St. Thomas. 
10. 
Epstein's scheme involved the use of young girls to recruit underage girls. (Upon 
information and belief, the young girl who brought Jane Doe to Epstein was herself a minor victim 
of Epstein, and will therefore not be named in this Complaint). Under Epstein's plan, underage girls 
were recruited ostensibly to give a wealthy man a massage for monetary compensation in his Palm 
Beach mansion. The recruiter would be contacted when Epstein was planning to be at his Palm 
Beach residence or soon after he had arrived there. Epstein or someone on his behalf would direct 
the recruiter to bring one or more underage girls to the residence. The recruiter, upon information 
and belief, generally sought out economically disadvantaged underage girls from western Palm 
Beach County who would be enticed by the money being offered - generally $200 to $300 per 
"massage" session - and who were perceived as less likely to complain to authorities or have 
credibility if allegations of improper conduct were made. This was an important element of 
Epstein's plan. 
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11. 
Epstein's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. Upon arrival at 
Epstein's mansion, the underage victim would be introduced to Sarah Kellen, Epstein's assistant, 
who gathered the girl's personal information, including her name and telephone number. Ms. Kellen 
would then bring the girl up a flight of stairs to a bedroom that contained a massage table in addition 
to other furnishings. There were photographs of nude women lining the stairway hall and in the 
bedroom. The girl would then find herself alone in the room with Epstein, who would be wearing 
only a towel. He would then remove his towel and lie naked on the massage table, and direct the girl 
to remove her clothes. Epstein would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious and sexual acts, 
including masturbation and touching the girl's vagina. 
12. 
Consistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, Jane Doe was recruited to give 
Epstein a massage for monetary compensation. Jane was brought to Epstein's mansion in Palm 
Beach. Once at the mansion, Jane was introduced to Sarah Kellen, who led her up the flight of 
stairs to the room with the massage table. In this room, Epstein told Jane to take off her clothes and 
give him a massage. Jane kept her panties and bra on and complied with Epstein's instructions. 
Epstein wore only a towel around his waste. After a short period of time, Epstein removed the towel 
and rolled over exposing his penis. Epstein began to masturbate and he sexually assaulted Jane. 
13. 
After Epstein had completed the assault, Jane was then able to get dressed, leave the 
room and go back down the stairs. Jane was paid $200 by Epstein. The young girl who recruited 
Jane was paid $100 by Epstein for bringing Jane to him. 
14. 
As a result of this encounter with Epstein, Jane experienced confusion, shame, 
humiliation and embarrassment, and has suffered severe psychological and emotional injuries. 
COUNT I 
Sexual Assault and Battery 
15. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. 
16. 
Epstein acted with intent to cause an offensive contact with Jane Doe, or an imminent 
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apprehension of such a contact, and Jane Doe was thereby put in such imminent apprehension. 
17. 
Epstein made an intentional, unlawful offer of offensive sexual contact toward Jane 
Doe, creating a reasonable fear of imminent peril. 
18. 
Epstein intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact on the person of Jane Doe, 
with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is imminent. 
19. 
Epstein tortiously committed a sexual assault and battery on Jane Doe. Epstein's acts 
were intentional, unlawful, offensive and harmful. 
20. 
Epstein's plan and scheme in which he committed such acts upon Jane Doe were 
done willfully and maliciously. 
21. 
As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's assault on Jane, she has suffered and 
will continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological and 
emotional damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein for compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and such other and further relief as this 
Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT II 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
22. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. 
23. 
Epstein's conduct was intentional or reckless. 
24. 
Epstein% conduct with a minor was extreme and outrageous, going beyond all bounds 
of decency. 
25. 
Epstein committed willful acts of child sexual abuse on Jane Doe. These acts resulted 
in mental or sexual injury to Jane Doe, that caused or were likely to cause Jane Doe's mental or 
emotional health to be significantly impaired. 
26. 
Epstein's conduct caused severe emotional distress to Jane Doe. Epstein knew or had 
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reason to know that his intentional and outrageous conduct would cause emotional distress and 
damage to Jane Doe, or Epstein acted with reckless disregard of the high probability of causing 
severe emotional distress to Jane Doe. 
27. 
As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's intentional or reckless conduct, Jane 
Doe, has suffered and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and pain. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein for compensatory damages, costs, punitive damages, and such other and further relief as this 
Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT III 
Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 C.S.C. §2422 
28. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 above. 
29. 
Epstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, 
induce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or 
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. 
30. 
Epstein's acts and conduct are in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422. 
31. 
As a result of Epstein's violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422, Plaintiff has suffered personal 
injury, including mental, psychological and emotional damages. 
32. 
Plaintiff hired Herman & Mermelstein, P.A., in this matter and agreed to pay them a 
reasonable attorneys' fee. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein for all damages available under 28 U.S.C. §2255(a), including without limitation, actual 
and compensatory damages, costs of suit, and attorneys' fees, and such other and further relief as 
this Court deems just and proper. 
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiff demands a jury trial in this action on all claims so triable. 
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Dated: September 22, 2008 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
Jeffrey M. Herman (FL Bar No. 521647) 
jherman@hermanlaw.com 
Stuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245) 
ssm@hermanlaw.com 
Adam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980) 
ahorowitz@hermanlaw.com 
HERMAN & MERMELSTE1N, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
Tel: 305-931-2200 
Fax: 305-931-0877 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on September 22, 2008, I electronically filed the foregoing document 
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being 
served this day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via 
transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized 
manner for those parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic 
Filing. 
/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
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SERVICE LIST 
DOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOHNSON 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
jgoldberger@agwpa.com 
Michael R. Tein, Esq. 
tein@lewistein.com 
Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
rcritton@bciclaw.com 
Michael Pike, Esq. 
mpike@bciclaw.com 
/s/ Jeffrey M. Herman 
- 8 - 
EFTA00222742

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Page 1 of 1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA 
Jane Doe No. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS AS MOOT 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to 
Answer or Otherwise Respond to Complaint (DE 13) and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint (DE 40). As Plaintiff's Complaint has been replaced by an Amended Complaint, it is 
hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
(1) Defendant's Motion for Enlargement of Time to Answer or Otherwise Respond to 
Complaint (DE 13) is DENIED as moot. 
(2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Complaint (DE 40) is DENIED as moot. This denial 
is without prejudice to Defendant reasserting the grounds asserted in the motion if he deems it 
appropriate as to the Amended Complaint. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, 
this 23s day of September, 2008. 
se 
 
rZ 
KENNETH A. MARRA 
United States District Judge 
copies to: 
All counsel of record 
EFTA00222743

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80119-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 2 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S. EPSTEIN, MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR MORE 
DEFINITE STATEMENT DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Defendant, JEFFERY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves 
to dismiss and for more definite statement of Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 2's Amended 
Complaint. Rules 12(b)(6), and 12(e) and (f), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008). In support of his 
motion, Defendant states: 
Introduction 
Defendant is filing similar motions to dismiss and for more definite statement 
directed to the Amended Complaints filed against Defendant in this Court in JANE DOE 
NO. 2, JANE DOE NO. 3, JANE DOE NO. 4 and JANE DOE NO. 5. The motions are 
directed to the Counts for "Sexual Assault and Battery," and "Coercion and Enticement 
to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422" in each of the respective complaints. 
However, there are distinctions in the four motions filed based on the complaint 
allegations. For example, Defendant challenges the Plaintiffs' allegations as to assault 
in all four actions, and challenges the battery allegations in JANE DOE NOS. 2 and 3, 
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Case No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
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but not in JANE DOE NOS. 4 and 5. Defendant moves to dismiss the §2422 count in all 
four actions. 
Motion 
1. Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint are required to be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has 
failed to allege sufficient factual allegations in the Counts and instead alleges labels and 
conclusions, and an attempted formulaic recitation of the elements in each Count. 
2. In the alternative, Defendant seeks more definite statement of Count I and Ill. In 
Count I, the Plaintiff is required to more definitely allege what was done to her; what 
EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what 
was the intentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and 
battery. In Count III, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the underlying factual 
allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C. §2422(b) and 
§2455. Rule 12(e). See discussion of law below herein. 
3. Also, Plaintiffs reference in Count III to 28 U.S.C. §2255, pertaining to habeas 
corpus proceedings is required to be stricken as immaterial. Rule 12(f). Plaintiff is 
required to more definitely state what statutory provision she is relying on. Rule 12 (e). 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and 
III, strike the immaterial statutory reference, and require Plaintiff to more definitely plead 
the underlying elements of her claims. 
Supporting Memorandum of Law 
Standard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss 
As established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly 127 
S.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead 
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"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id, at 1974. 
Although the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief 
in the complaint must state "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id, at 1965. Further, "[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the 
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. 
On a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiffs complaint are taken as 
true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County 
Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006). 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twomblv abrogated the 
often cited observation that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove not set of facts in 
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a 
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff 
might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." Id. As 
explained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. supra at 1664-65: 
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 
need detailed factual allegations ibid.. Sanivan v. American Bd. of 
Psychiatry and Neurology. Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs 
obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires 
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 
of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 
106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are 
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice and 
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Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) 
("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts 
that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on 
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 
n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 
327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (" Rule 12(b)(6) does not 
countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's 
factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 
40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 
appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). 
Pursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading "is so vague or 
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response." The motion is required 
to point out the defects and the desired details. Id. 
Count I — "Sexual Assault and Battery" is sublect to dismissal as Plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
It is well settled that this Court is to apply Florida substantive law in this action. 
Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Pursuant to Florida law, although the term 
"assault and battery" is most commonly referred to as if it were a legal unit, or a single 
concept, "assault and battery are separate and distinct legal concepts, assault being the 
beginning of an act which, if consummated, constitutes battery." 3A FIa.Jur.2d Assault 
§1. An assault and battery are intentional acts. See generally, Spivey v. Battaglia 258 
So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972); and Travelers lndem. Co. v. PCR. Inc., 889 So.2d 779 (Ha. 
2004). 
An "assault" is an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, 
or exertion of force directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a 
reasonable fear of imminent peril. See Lay v. Kremer 411 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1982). It must be premised upon an affirmative act - a threat to use force, or the actual 
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exertion of force. See 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1("The essential element of the tort of 
assault is the violence offered, and not actual physical contact."). 
Tort of "battery" consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon 
another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is 
imminent. Quilling v. Price, 894 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Sullivan v. Atlantic 
Federal Savings & Loan 454 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)("a battery consists of the 
intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon the person of another"). See 
3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1. 
With the standard of pleading established in Twomblv, supra, in the context of 
the elements for assault and battery, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). As to the elements of assault, here are no factual 
allegations as to what was said or done to Plaintiff such that it constituted an 
"intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or exertion of force 
directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril." See ¶12 of Am. Comp. The same is true for the claim of battery. 
Plaintiff makes the general allegation that "he (Defendant) sexually assaulted Jane." 
The other allegations in ¶12 pertain to what Plaintiff allegedly did. Under applicable law, 
Plaintiff is required to give more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action. Twomblv, supra. Plaintiff is required to allege the 
facts of what was done to her; what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear 
and apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the intentional offensive or harmful contact? 
As noted in the introduction and as this Court is well aware, there is more than 
one action brought against this Defendant attempting to allege similar sounding claims. 
EFTA00222748

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 46 
Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2008 
Page 6 of 10 
Case No. CV-80119-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 6 
With all due respect, the details as to a particular claim asserted by a particular Plaintiff 
are important to give this Defendant fair notice of Plaintiffs claim so he may properly 
respond. Accordingly, under applicable law, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 
sexual assault and battery. 
In the alternative to dismissing Count I, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be 
required to give more definite statement as to what was done to her; what EPSTEIN 
said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the 
intentional offensive or harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and battery. 
Rule 12(e). 
Count III — "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 
U.S.C. §2422" - Is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Count III also contains an 
immaterial reference to 28 U.S.C. fi2255, which is required to be stricken 
and more definitely stated. 
Count III of Plaintiffs Complaint attempts to assert a claim for "Coercion and 
Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422." In her prayer for relief in 
Count III, Plaintiff "demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey Epstein for all 
damages available under 28 U.S.C. §2255(a), 
." 
Although the reference to "28 U.S.C. §2255," pertaining to habeas corpus 
proceedings - federal custody and remedies on motion attacking sentence, is probably 
a typographical error by Plaintiff, and the reference to "28" was meant to be "18," 
Defendant requests that Plaintiff correct this error so that Defendant may have fair 
notice of the claim Plaintiff is attempting to assert. 
Whether or not the "28" is 
typographical error, Defendant is still entitled to dismissal of the count. 
The applicable version of these statutory provisions, (pre-2006 Amendments, as 
the Amended Complaint alleges a time period of "in or about 2004-2005,"18), provides: 
EFTA00222749