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statute was designed to reach. 
Mr. Epstein's situation has nothing in common with the scenario Congress acted 
to address. In Mr. Epstein's case, even assuming for purposes of this memorandum that 
there was inappropriate sexual contact with minors, there was no use whatsoever of the 
internet, or any other communication device, in an attempt to induce a minor. 
The statutorily proscribed act is the use of a channel of interstate commerce to 
persuade, induce, entice or coerce. "The underlying criminal conduct Congress expressly 
proscribed in passing § 2422(b) is the persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of 
the minor rather than the sex act itself. That is, if a person persuaded a minor to engage in 
sexual conduct (e.g. with himself or a third party), without then actually committing any 
sex act himself, he would nevertheless violate §2422(b)." United States'. Murrell, 368 
F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2004). See also United States 
Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 639 (02' 
Cu. 2000) ("Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the attempt 
to persuade, not the performance of the sexual acts themselves."). The forbidden conduct 
is the actual or attempted persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion; if there has 
been sexual misconduct without persuasion, there is no violation of this law. 
Furthermore, the persuasion must be first directed at an individual known by the 
defendant to be younger than 18. Second, its subject must be the minor's participation in 
prostitution or sexual activity that would be a criminal offense under state law. Confining 
the statute's reach to such situations is precisely what eliminates what would otherwise be 
First Amendment problems. See Bailey 228 F.3d at 639 ("Defendant simply does not 
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have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex 
acts."). 
As the plain language of the statute and the legislative history shows, the use of 
the Internet, telephone, or mail is not merely a jurisdictional "hook"; it is the very crux of 
the crime. Congress was not addressing face to face interactions between adults and 
minors during which inducement might be used, but rather interactions that occurred over 
the Internet, sometimes followed by the phone or the mail.
The statute requires that the persuasion must occur "knowingly". Thus, someone 
commits the offense only if (I) he knows (or believes) that person is under 18, and (2) 
knows that the activity he is proposing would be illegal with a person of the age he 
believes that person to be. 
Since the age of consent varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction within the United States, and is generally 16 or 17, even an actor's knowledge 
that the individual he is attempting to persuade is not yet 18 does not mean that he is 
knowingly seeking to persuade or induce someone to engage in activity that would 
constitute a crime. See Richard A. Posner & Katharine B. Silbaug, A Guide to America's 
Sex Laws 44 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998). Accordingly, to violate § 2422(b), an actor must 
know that he is trying to persuade not only someone under 18, but someone who is 
considered a minor in the jurisdiction, and that the sexual conduct contemplated would 
constitute a crime. 
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Thus, if u defendant believes he is interacting with an adult, he is not guilty of the 
federal crime even if he is dealing with a minor pretending to he a grown-up. See United 
States'. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2005). 
Mr. Epstein did not use any facility of interstate commerce to do the forbidden act 
- to persuade, entice, induce, or coerce - nor did he attempt to do so. His staff used the 
phone to make a variety of arrangements for Mr. Epstein's stays in Palm Beach, including 
getting the house ready for his arrival, checking movie schedules, and making phone calls 
to schedule doctors' appointments, business appointments, personal training, physical 
therapy and massages Even if Mr. Epstein could be held responsible for his assistant's use 
of the telephone, her calls regarding massages were not the statutorily proscribed 
persuasions or enticements of a minor to do illegal acts but simply to set up 
appointments. 
Assuming Mr. Epstein persuaded individuals to engage in forbidden conduct with 
him in his home, he did not violate the statute. There was no inducement by or on the 
telephone or on the internet, mid none is alleged. For example, if during a massage, Mr. 
Epstein inquired if the masseuse was interested in doing something more, and she said 
yes, the inducement, if any, occurred face to fact and without the use of any telephone or 
the intemet. Any subsequent telephone call by his staff for scheduling purposes for 
another massage was for that purpose and not for an inducement, which had already 
occurred face to fact. 
In sum, whatever sexual contact occurred, occurred face to face, without the use of 
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an instrumentality of interstate commerce to persuade or induce it, and therefore, was not 
an act proscribed by the statute. Accordingly, Mr. Epstein committed no crime within the 
scope of § 2422(b). 
I$ U.S.C. & 2423(b) (Travel with Intent to Engage in  Illegal Sexual Conduct) 
Similarly, the facts of this case do not make out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). 
Section 2423(b) provides that: 
A person who travels in interstate commerce ... for the 
purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with 
another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 30 years, or both. 
["Illicit sexual conduct" means a sexual act that occurs with a person under age 
16, or a commercial sex act with a person under age 18. See §2423(1) and 18 U.S.C. 
2243(a).] 
Mr. Epstein did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) because his travel to Florida was 
not for the purpose of  engaging in a sexual act with a person younger than 16, nor a 
commercial sex act with a person under 18. Assuming that Mr. Epstein purposefully 
engaged in a proscribed act in Florida, it arose long after his travel to Florida was 
complete, while a massage with a particular masseuse was in progress. 
Like § 2422(b), § 2423(b) does not criminalize sexual conduct, with any person, 
regardless of that person's age. Rather, it criminalizes travel  for the purpose of engaging 
in unlawful sexual activities. United State;'. Hayward 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 
2004). See also United States'. Tykarsky 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006): 
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The relationship between the wens rea and the actus reus 
required by § 2423(b) is neither incidental nor tangential. 
Section 2423(b) does not simply prohibit traveling with an 
immoral thought, or even with an amorphous intent to 
engage in sexual activity with a minor in another state. The 
travel must be for the purpose of engaging in the unlawful 
sexual act. 
See
s2 liftmen 
HufT, 291 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1934) and Mortensen'. United Stales. 
322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944) ("An intention that the women or girls shall engage in the 
conduct outlawed by Section 2 must be found to exist before the conclusion of the 
interstate journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate movement") 
(emphasis added)• Cleveland 
United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) ("There was 
evidence 
that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive.").2
Under these standards, there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Epstein's principal 
purpose in going to Florida was to engage in illicit sexual conduct, as defined by the 
statute, even if we assume that some such conduct occurred while he was there. Given the 
other purposes of his 50 or more Florida trips, the act of going there cannot itself give rise 
to any inference of improper purpose. On the contrary, it is evident that the principal 
purpose of his trips to Florida was to go to his Palm Beach home for reasons that were 
professional, personal and financial, including to minimize his taxes by establishing a 
residence, and to visit his family, in particular his brother, his ailing mother and after his 
mother passed away, the grave sights of both of his parents. Mr. Epstein surely did not go 
I Some Co 
have held that the illicit sexual conduct must be: an "efficient and compelling purpw: 
I15 Fid 1488. 1495 (106 Cir. 19517): • "motivating purpose," United States 
Cagithli. 49 F.3d 1079, 1083 (56 Cif( 1995), or "at least one of the defendant's motivations for taking 
trip in the first place," United Statist I EU& 935 F.2d 365, 389 (In Cir. 1991). Swain 
}Widow', 224 Fed. Appx. 923 (1 I s Cu. 2007) (unpublished). 
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to Florida because its laws governing sexual conduct with young people are particularly 
lax.3
Moreover, no violation of § 2423(b) occurred because, even assuming at some 
point during the massages Mr. Epstein knew that the particular masseuse was under 18 
years old and that certain behavior could be illegal, such knowledge would have come into 
being when he was already in Palm Beach and could not have been a factor motivating him 
to go there. Since the vast majority of his masseuses were over 18, and he usually did not 
know who his masseuse would be until she arrived at his home, sexual contact with a 
minor could not have been a factor motivating his travel.4
18 U.S.C. § 1056(a)(3) (Money Latutderine) 
No reasonable reading of the money laundering statute can countenance a charge 
against Mr. Epstein, for the statute on its face, and as applied by the courts, has absolutely no 
application to the alleged misconduct. Under the facts of this case, to charge Mr Epstein with 
violating the money laundering statute would be unprecedented. 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[t]c, prove money laundering under § 1956(aX3), 
the government must show that the defendant (1) conducted or artentptedlo conduct a 
The age of consent varies from state to sate. In Connecticut, it is 16 for intercourse, Conn. Oen. Stat. 
Ann. § 53a-71, and 15 for sexual contact. Conn Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-73a. In Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, the age of consent Is 16. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 23; Mass. Gen, Laws ch. 272, § 35A; NJ. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:14.2. New York sets the age of consent at 17. N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05(3). 
Nor are any of the other sections of 18 U.S.C. 2423 prohibiting •'sex tourism" applicable. Section (a) 
prohibits transporting a minor (under I8) in interstate or foreign commerce for sexual purposes. Section (c) 
prohibits traveling to a foreign county to engage in illicit sexual conduct Section (d) prohibits facilitating 
travel of a person for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct for financial gain. All that has been 
alleged is that Mr. Epstein traveled to his home m Florida and engaged in sexual activities with local 
Florida residents. There are no allegations whatsoever that he ever transported a minor or an adult to 
another state or foreign country for sexual purposes, or for that matter, that he traveled to a foreign country 
to engage in illicit sexual activities. 
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financial transaction (2) involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity, (3) with the intent (a) 'to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity,' (b) 'to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of 
property believed to be the proceeds of sps-sified unlawful activity,' or (c) 'to avoid a 
transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law'," United States I. 
350 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 fil thCir. 2003).' See also United States_l. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331 
(5*  Cir. 1992). 
Thus, it is clear that the statute unquestionably requires (a) the use of proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity; to (b) cash which is or was represented to be the product of 
unlawful activity, with neither paradigm being applicable in the ease. 
Mr. Epstein did not receive money or funds fmm any criminal conduct which he 
then used in a financial transaction. 5_ee, e.g., United Stotts,. Taylor, 239 F. 3d 994 (9th
Cir. 2001) (defendant charged with running an illegal escort service and using proceeds 
from that business to pay credit cards used to purchase airline tickets to fly prostitutes to 
Las Vegas). Nor did Mr. Epstein use money he knew to be unlawfully tainted in a financial 
transaction designed to promote prostitution or other criminal conduct. Rather, to the extent 
the evidence may show that Mr. Epstein paid for sexual services, he most certainly did so 
with untainted, legitimately earned funds. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
s Instructive is the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instrucuun 70.4 which states that the defendant can be found 
guilty of § 1956(aX3XA) only if (I) he knowingly conducted a financial transaction; (2) the transaction 
involved property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity or that was used to conduct 
or facilitate specified unlawful activity, and (3) the defendant engaged in the transaction with the intent to 
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. 
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Having demonstrated that there is no real federal interest in this case, because there is 
no federal crime, it is apparent that the United States Attorney's Office is simply attempting 
to dictate the procedures and outcome of a state prosecution in which federal authorities can 
have no legitimate interest_ It may be that some law enforcement authorities in other 
jurisdictions, state or federal, might choose to handle this matter differently from the way 
chosen by the State of Florida, but that does not permit or even excuse their outside 
interference. 
Moreover, were there in fact a federal crime of some sort here that could be 
prosecuted - - and I suggest there is none - - traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion 
would mitigate against such a prosecution un the facts of this case.
The Factors That Federal Prosecutors Are Mandated To Consider in 
Determining Whether To Bring A Prosecution Militate Against Prosecution. 
I have also reviewed the submissions made on behalf of Mr. Epstein which 
addressed the Petite Policy, which is set forth in the United States Attorney's Manual, 
and concluded that even assuming that there is a valid basis for federal charges, those 
charges would be barred by that Policy. In my professional opinion that conclusion was 
the correct one. 
My review of the USAM not only supports this conclusion regarding the Petite 
Policy but also reveals that there are other sections of the I JSAM which would bar any 
federal prosecution or interference with state proceedings. 
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A. 
Dcclipiogjo Prosecute 
The United States Attorney's Manual [hereinafter "USAM") sets forth when to 
initiate or decline prosecution. Section 9-27.220 provides, in pertinent part: 
The attomey for the government should commence or 
recommend Federal prosecution if he/she believes that the 
person's conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the 
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain 
and sustain a conviction, unless, in his/her judgment, 
prosecution should be declined because: 
1. 
No substantial Federal interest would be served by 
prosecution; 
2. The person is subject to effective prosecution in another 
jurisdiction; or 
3. 
There exists an adequate non-criminal alternative to 
prosecution. 
Mr. Epstein has been prosecuted in Florida, which considered all of the issues and 
determined the appropriate crime to charge him with. As shown above, there is no federal 
interest here. Moreover, were we to assume that Mr. Epstein's conduct constitutes a 
federal crime that can be proved, nevertheless, no "substantial Federal interest" would be 
served by prosecuting him. On this question, the USAM Section 9-27.230 gives specific 
guidance: 
In determining whether prosecution should be declined because no 
substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution, the 
attorney 
for 
the 
government 
should 
weigh 
all 
relevant 
considerations, including: 
I. Federal law enforcement priorities; 
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2. The nature and seriousness of the offense; 
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution; 
4. The person's culpability in connection with the 
offense; 
5. The person's history with respect to criminal 
activity; 
6. The person's willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others; and 
7. The probable sentence or other consequences if 
the person is convicted. 6
Each of these factors militates against prosecution. As indicated, federal law 
enforcement priorities focus on the use of the intermit to target minors, or trafficking in 
minors. The conduct in which Mr. Epstein arguably engaged was different in nature. 
Given its essentially sui genesis character, its prosecution would have little or no 
deterrent effect. 
Mr. Epstein has no criminal history. If prosecuted under statutes designed to 
address far more serious conduct and far more dangerous offenders, he would be subject 
to punishment that is grossly disproportionate to his behavior. 
Clearly, whatever phone calls may have been made by Mr. Epstein's staff were 
merely incidental; they were not a means to lure underage women into illicit sexual acts 
while taking advantage of anonymity and distance. Likewise, Mr. Epstein's interstate 
travel was of no federal interest. He spent a great deal of his time in Florida because he has 
' Each of these factors is discussed m greater detail in IMAM 9-27 230(8). 
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a home and family there, and for a variety of other reasons that had nothing to do with 
sexual behavior with underage woman. Given the attenuated relationship between sexual 
behavior with any person under 18 and the use of the phone (or interstate travel), the 
federal interest in this matter is slight, if existent at all.
The conduct at issue is not an example of a widespread phenomenon that crosses 
state lines or that is difficult for local authorities to prosecute. It does not involve targeting 
of children. It does not involve organized prostitution, sex trafficking, or organized crime. 
It does not involve violence or threat of harm It does not involve child pornography. 
Indeed, the circumstances of this case are idiosyncratic. 
What is alleged here is entirely local sexual encounters - whether with an adult or a 
minor — which are, and always have been, the concern of local prosecutors. They are not 
what the federal statutes target, nor arc they the kind of eases that the U.S. Attorney's 
Office usually pursues. 
K. 
Petite Policy 
In addition to the factors discussed above, the Petite Policy (regarding dual and 
successive prosecutions), should also be a bar to any federal prosecution or involvement 
in the State proceedings. 
The USAM at 9-2.031 establishes guidelines for the exercise of discretion by 
appropriate officers of the Department of Justice in determining whether to bring a 
federal prosecution based on substantially the same acts involved in a prior state or 
federal proceeding. Though the Policy does not create any substantive or procedural 
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rights enforceable by law, it nevertheless provides a valid basis for arguing against the 
institution of charges in this matter: 
This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a 
federal prosecution, following a prior state or federal 
prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or 
transaction(s) unless three substantive prerequisites are 
satisfied: first, the matter must involve a substantial federal 
interest; second, the prior prosecution must have left that 
interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, applying the 
same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the 
government must believe that the defendant's conduct 
constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible 
evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a 
conviction by an unbiased tier of fact. .. . 
Satisfaction of the three substantive prerequisites does not 
mean that a proposed prosecution must be approved or 
brought The traditional elements of federal prosecutorial 
discretion continue to apply. 
USAM 9-2.031(A) 
The Policy does not apply unless there has been a prior prosecution resulting in an 
acquittal or a conviction, including one resulting from a plea agreement. USAM 9-
2.031(C). While here there technically has not been a conviction in the state courts, there 
would have been one but for the interference of federal authorities. Thus under the spirit, 
if not the language itself, the policy should apply here. 
This matter does not involve a substantial federal interest, nor would the state 
prosecution leave a substantial federal interest "demonstrably unvindicated." "In general, 
the Department will presume that a prior prosecution, regardless of result, has vindicated 
the relevant federal interest." USAM 9-2.031(D). 
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The presumption may be overcome when the prior prosecution resulted in a 
sentence which was manifestly inadequate in light of the federal interest involved or if the 
choice of charges in the prior prosecution was affected by certain inappropriate or 
irrelevant factors such as "incompetence, corruption, intimidation, or undue influence." 
No such factors exist here. The negotiations between Mr. Epstein and the State's 
Attorney's office were conducted at arms length, and sometimes in an atmosphere of 
mutual hostility. At no point was Mr. Epstein granted any sort of "break" in his ease due to 
his wealth, his political affiliations, or the prominence of his lawyers. If anything, those 
factors worked against him. The state prosecutors devoted enormous resources in a 13 
month investigation. 
Ultimately, the State's Attorney's office charged Mr. Epstein with a more severe 
crime than originally contemplated. In determining the charges, that Office obviously 
took into account the fact that some of the alleged victims have serious credibility 
problems, including damaging histories of lies, illegal drug use, and crime and therefore 
was concerned with the substantial possibility that with these witnesses it might not be 
able to make any cast against Mr. Epstein. 
The charging decision was not an act of favoritism, but rather an appropriate 
exercise of the State's Attorney's office's discretion. The conduct of the United States 
Attorney here is not merely intrusive of these arms length negotiations, it is coercive of a 
defendant and requires him to ask the State to impose a harsher punishment upon himself 
than the State itself has determined appropriate.
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C. 
Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction 
Furthermore, another section of the USAM 9-27.240, Initiating and Declining 
Charges Because of a Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction, would also prohibit any 
federal charges here. 
In determining whether prosecution should be declined because the person is 
subject to prosecution in another jurisdiction, the attorney for the government should 
weigh all relevant considerations, including: 
1. 
The strength of the other jurisdiction's interest in prosecution; 
2. 
The other jurisdictions ability and willingness to prosecute effectively; and 
3. 
The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted in 
the other jurisdiction. 
There can be no dispute that the State of Florida had a strong interest in this 
prosecution and the ability and the willingness to prosecute it. Furthermore, the behavior 
alleged here is certainly one of local interest and of particular interest to the State 
authorities who conducted a 13 month investigation. 'Ibis is not a civil rights case from 
the 1960's brought half heartedly and resulting in an acquittal. The sentence agreed to by 
the State, while it may not be to the federal authorities liking, is certainly within the 
parameters of sentences for these types of crimes and does not warrant federal 
intervention. 
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a 
Payments of Money 
The federal authorities have also insisted that any plea with the State of Florida 
must require Mr. Epstein to agree to be sued by as many as 40 of the women, that he not 
contest jurisdiction or the facts of those suits and that each woman be entitled to 
$150,000 in damages (or an amount agreed to by the parties). It is apparent that the 
federal authorities have inappropriately tried to impose upon Mr. Epstein penalties 
provided for in 18 U.S-C. § 2255(a). 
The federal prosecutors have attempted to circumvent the requirements of that 
statute by essentially making anyone who claims to be a victim automatically entitled to a 
S150,000 payment without any requirement of proof of injury, which the statute requires. 
Prosecutors shouldn't be in the business of helping alleged victims of state crimes secure 
financial settlements especially here where some of the victims may be suspect. 
In addition, a threat by a prosecutor to prosecute unless payments arc made to 
potential prosecution witnesses is highly inappropriate and not something that I have ever 
encountered before? In United States'. Singleton 165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) 
the Court frowned upon such behavior: 
Our conclusion in no way permits an agent of the 
government to step beyond the limits of his or her office to 
make an offer to a witness other than one traditionally 
exercised by the sovereign. 
A prosecutor who offers 
something other then a concession normally granted by the 
7 While federal law provides foe restitution to victims and prosecutors have required restitution as part of 
plea agreements, it is done in situations where the victims arc readily identifiable and their losses are 
reasonably ascertainable. Here, without any proof the prosecutors demanded payments to unkriovrn 
individuals who may not have been harmed at all. What is more, the government has stated that it takes no 
position as to validity of these alleged victim's claims. 
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government in exchange for testimony is no longer the alter 
ego of the sovereign and is divested of the protective 
mantle of the government.
The demand for such payments for unproven "victims" in amounts unrelated to 
any rational standard is beyond the bounds of any legitimate or even rational 
governmental conduct. 
In sum, coercing Mr. Epstein to pay $150,000 to 40 or so "victims" when no 
determination has been made that they are entitled to any compensation, in any amount, 
is unknown to me in my experience and is beyond mere heavy handedness: it is 
oppressive. 
Conclusion 
There was no reason for federal authorities to interfere in this case. The State of 
Florida devoted substantial resources investigating the case and considered all the 
evidence, including its strengths and weaknesses, in determining the appropriate sentence 
to resolve this matter. That sentence would have ensured that the defendant would never 
engage in such conduct again 
In my experience, as a line prosecutor, as a prosecutor in charge of a United 
States Attorney's office, and as a defense attorney involved in criminal casts throughout 
the country, I have never encountered a situation like this one where a federal prosecutor 
injects himself into a state proceeding and used threats of federal prosecution to force 
changes in the outcome of a state proceeding not merely to one more to his liking, but 
one which has no rational relationship to the situation. As unusual as this would be if 
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there were a clear federal interest hem, it is all the more shocking in this instance: a 
matter that is solely of state concern - - local sex crimes having no interstate or national 
importance - - with no attendant federal crime. 
Furthermore, even if these federal statutes somehow applied to the situation here, 
it would still not be appropriate to bring these charges. The federal statutes were meant 
to address exploitation of minors, trafficking in illegal sex across state and national 
borders, and child pomogTaphy. What we have here is one individual seeking sexual 
gratification in the privacy of his own home and if he did something inappropriate, it is 
not for the federal government to intrude by ignoring the Petite Policy and other similar 
restrictions, as well as our traditional concepts of federalism. The situation here is not 
what Congress had in mind when it enacted these statutes. If the federal authorities 
believe that the states are not properly policing the sex trade, the remedy should be to 
lobby Congress for stronger statutes, not to interfere in a state proceeding in order to 
make some kind of statement. It is not the federal government's role to police the states' 
exercise of prosecutional discretion, barring a serious impropriety. Surely, this is not that 
situation. If the true motivation of federal prosecutors here is simply their personal dislike 
of Mr. Epstein, or mere personal dislike for the crime or of their sympathy for the 
women, those are clearly impermissible considerations and are improper. Sec USAM 9-
27. 260(AX2). 
In my judgment and experience, it would be most appropriate for the prosecutors 
in the United States Attorney's office to advise the State authorities that they have no 
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further interest in these proceedings and that State and the defendant are free to negotiate 
whatever resolution they deem appropriate. 
Sincerely, 
HJS:It 
lie ben J. Stern 
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