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Case 9:08-cv-80993-KAM 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80993-Hurley-Hopkins 
JANE DOE NO. 7 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S MOTION TO DISMISS & FOR MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO.7'S COMPLAINT 
Defendant, JEFFERY EPSTEIN, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves 
to dismiss and for more definite statement of Plaintiff JANE DOE NO. 7's Complaint. 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2008). In support of his motion, Defendant 
states: 
Introduction 
Defendant previously filed motions to dismiss and for more definite statement 
directed to the Amended Complaints filed against Defendant in this Court in JANE DOE 
NO. 2 (Case No. 08-CV-80119-Marra/Johnson), JANE DOE NO. 3 (Case No. 08-CV-
80232-Marra/Johnson), JANE DOE NO. 4 (Case No. 08-CV-80380-Marra/Johnson), 
and JANE DOE NO. 5 (Case No. 08-CV-80381-Marra/Johnson). Defendant is also 
filing similar motions in the actions filed by JANE DOE NO. 6 (Case No. 08-CV-80994-
Marra/Johnson), and JANE DOE NO. 7 (Case No. 08-CV-80993-Hurley/Hopkins). The 
motions are directed to the Counts for Count I - "Sexual Assault and Battery," andCount 
III - "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422" in each 
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of the respective complaints. However, there are distinctions in the six motions filed 
based on the complaint allegations. For example, in the previously filed four motions 
(Jane Doe Nos. 2 through 5), Defendant challenged the Plaintiffs' allegations as to 
assault in all four actions, and challenged the battery allegations in JANE DOE NOS. 2 
and 3, but not in JANE DOE NOS. 4 and 5. Defendant moved to dismiss the §2422 
count in all four of the JANE DOE Nos. 2 through 5 actions. As to JANE DOE NO. 6, 
Defendant challenges the battery allegations, but does not as to JANE DOE NO. 7 as 
the underlying facts of the requisite "touching" are alleged. Defendant challenges the 
18 U.S.C. §2422 count in both JANE DOE NO. 6 and NO. 7. 
Motion 
1. Counts I and III of JANE DOE NO. 7's Complaint are required to be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has 
failed to allege sufficient factual allegations in the Counts and instead alleges labels and 
conclusions, and an attempted formulaic recitation of the elements in each Count. 
2. In the alternative or in conjunction with, Defendant seeks more definite statement 
of Count I and III. In Count I, the Plaintiff is required to more definitely allege what 
EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff in 
asserting the claim of assault. In Count III, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state 
the underlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 
U.S.C. §2422(b) and §2455. Rule 12(e). See discussion of law below herein. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Counts I and 
III, and require Plaintiff to more definitely plead the underlying elements of her claims. 
Supporting Memorandum of Law 
Standard on Rule 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss 
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As established by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly 127 
S.Ct. 1955 (2007), a motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff does not plead 
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id, at 1974. 
Although the complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief 
in the complaint must state "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do? Id, at 1965. Further, "[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the 
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. 
On a motion to dismiss, the well pleaded allegations of plaintiff's complaint are taken as 
true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. M.T.V. v. DeKalb County 
Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, 1156 (11th Cir.2006). 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly abrogated the 
often cited observation that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove not set of facts in 
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief" Id, (abrogating and quoting Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim [can] survive a 
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings le[ave] open the possibility that a plaintiff 
might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." Id. As 
explained by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp., supra at 1664-65: 
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not 
need detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Sanivan v. American Bd. of 
Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc. 40 F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiffs 
obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires 
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 
of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 
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106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are 
not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) 
C[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts 
that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on 
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 
n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 
327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (" Rule 12(b)(6) does not 
countenance ... dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's 
factual allegations"); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 
40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 
appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). 
Pursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading "is so vague or 
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response." The motion is required 
to point out the defects and the desired details. Id. 
Count I - "Sexual Assault and Battery" is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
It is well settled that this Court is to apply Florida substantive law in this action. 
Erie R.Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Pursuant to Florida law, although the term 
"assault and battery" is most commonly referred to as if it were a legal unit, or a single 
concept, "assault and battery are separate and distinct legal concepts, assault being the 
beginning of an act which, if consummated, constitutes battery." 3A FIa.Jur.2d Assault 
§1. An assault and battery are intentional acts. See generally, _Spivey v. Battaglia 258 
So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972); and Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR, Inc. 889 So.2d 779 (Fla. 
2004). 
An "assault" is an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, 
or exertion of force directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a 
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reasonable fear of imminent peril. See Lay v. Kremer 411 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1982). It must be premised upon an affirmative act - a threat to use force, or the actual 
exertion of force. See 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1("The essential element of the tort of 
assault is the violence offered, and not actual physical contact?). 
Tort of "battery" consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon 
another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is 
imminent. Quilling v. Price, 894 So.2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) Sullivan v. Atlantic 
Federal Savings & Loan, 454 So.2d 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)("a battery consists of the 
intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon the person of another"). See 
3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1. 
With the standard of pleading established in Twombly supra, in the context of 
the elements for assault and battery, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). As to the elements of assault, there are no factual 
allegations as to what was said or done to Plaintiff such that it constituted an 
"intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or exertion of force 
directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril." See ¶13-14 of Comp. In ¶14, Plaintiff alleges that "Jane returned on 
many occasions to the Palm Beach mansion to provide EPSTEIN massages for 
money." Plaintiff does not allege how many times she returned, or the dates thereof, 
other than "in or about 2004" (¶9 of Comp.), or the circumstances of how she returned. 
The alleged fact that Plaintiff returned on many occasions does not indicate that Plaintiff 
had "a reasonable fear of imminent peril" so as to constitute the elements of assault. 
Under applicable law, Plaintiff is required to give more than labels and conclusions, and 
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a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, supra. Plaintiff is 
required to allege the facts of what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, to create fear 
and apprehension of imminent peril in Plaintiff. 
As noted in the introduction and as this Court is well aware, there is more than 
one action brought against this Defendant attempting to allege similar sounding claims. 
The details as to a particular claim asserted by a particular Plaintiff are important to give 
this Defendant fair notice of Plaintiff's claim so he may properly respond. Accordingly, 
under applicable law, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for sexual assault. 
In the alternative to dismissing Count I, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be 
required to give more definite statement as to what EPSTEIN said and did, if anything, 
to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; what was the intentional offensive or 
harmful contact in pleading the elements of assault and battery; and how many times, 
along with the dates and circumstances thereof, she returned to the "mansion."Rule 
12(e). 
Count Ill — "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 
U.S.C. 42422" - is subject to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be wanted. Rule 12(b)(6). 
Count III of Plaintiffs Complaint attempts to assert a claim for "Coercion and 
Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. §2422." In her prayer for relief, 
Plaintiff demands judgment against EPSTEIN "for all damages available under 18 
U.S.C. §2255(a), 
." Count III is required to be dismissed as Plaintiff has failed to 
state a claim under the statutes for which relief can be granted. 
The applicable version of these statutory provisions, (pre-2006 Amendments, as 
the Amended Complaint alleges a time period of "in or about 2004," ¶9), provides: 
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CHAPTER 117--TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY 
AND RELATED CRIMES 
§ 2422. Coercion and enticement 
(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or 
Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
20 years, or both. 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution 
or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned 
not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. 
CHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF 
CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243 
2251, 2251A, 2252 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who 
suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any 
appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual 
damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be 
deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. 
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the 
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in 
the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after 
the disability. 
Relevant to Plaintiffs complaint, 18 U.S.C. 2255(a) creates a civil remedy for "a 
minor who is a victim of a violation of section ... 2422 ... of this title and who suffers 
personal injury as a result of such violation ... ." Plaintiff has failed to plead any factual 
allegations whatsoever pertaining to violations of 18 U.S.C. 2422. Rather, Plaintiff has 
alleged conclusory allegations simply attempting to track parts of the statutory language 
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in the statute without underlying factual allegations pertaining to the Plaintiff and any 
conduct by Defendant. See ¶29 of Comp. Plaintiffs allegations, (or lack of factual 
allegations), are precisely what the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Ben 
Atlantic Corp. prohibits — Plaintiffs complaint alleges only "labels and conclusions, and 
a (partial) formulaic recitation of the elements." 
First, the Complaint fails to designate whether Plaintiff is relying on §2422(a) or 
§2422(b). 
Second, although the complaint does contain a partial tracking of the 
language in 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), it contains absolutely no factual allegations concerning 
the requisite "using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce" 
by Plaintiff to state a cause of action based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). As well, 
there are no underlying factual allegations involving this Plaintiff as to the requisite 
elements that a defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced any 
individual (Plaintiff in this case) who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in 
prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempted to do so. See 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); i.e. with what criminal offense 
could Plaintiff and Defendant have been charged. Again, a Plaintiff cannot simply track 
the language of a statute without some underlying factual allegations to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Count III is required to be dismissed. 
In the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more definitely state the 
underlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§2422(b) and §2455. 
Conclusion 
As discussed above herein, under the pleading standard established in Twombly,
supra, and law concerning the elements of Count I and III, Plaintiff has failed to state 
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claims upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs complaint lacks 
underlying factual allegations and, thus, in the alternative to dismissal or in conjunction 
with, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the requisite factual allegations. 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with 
the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being 
served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the 
manner specified by CM/ECF on this 14th day of October, 2008: 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Jeffrey Marc Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami, FL 33160 
Counsel for Plaintiff Jane Doe #2 
Respectfully submitt 
By: 
ROBERT D.JCRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida BayNo. 224162 
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401 
(Co-Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
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