EFTA00177847

EL-AD RESIDENCES AT MIRAMAR CONDOS. MT. HAWLEY 
1265 
Cite as 716 2,..Supp.2d 1257 (S.D.Fhe. 2010) 
Court will not expand its jurisdiction to 
engage in an investigation of Rosenbaum.0 
C. Motion for Protective Order 
Residences' Motion for Protective Order 
is also denied. Residences has not provid-
ed this Court with information to support 
its claim that Rosenbaum has disclosed its 
confidential attorney-client communica-
tions. The Motion can only be understood 
as Garfinkel's and Katzman's personal 
complaints about Rosenbaum, and to the 
extent they ask this Court to enjoin 
Rosenbaum, a non-party, from prospective 
violations of the attorney-client privilege, 
that motion is denied.15 The Court will 
address Garfinkel's and Katzman's claims 
of privilege consistent with its ruling on 
the Motion to Intervene. 
D. Request for Judicial Action 
Rosenbaum, and the Defendant insur-
ers, would both like this Court to step 
beyond the four corners of this lawsuit and 
investigate various possibilities of fraud 
upon this and other Courts. The proposed 
areas of inquiry include: (1) Romain's ap-
parent perjury, either at the March 30 
deposition, or earlier depositions; (2) 
whether Garfinkel or Katzman improperly 
persuaded Romain to recant his sworn ac-
cusations against them; (3) whether Gar-
finkel, Katzman or their consultants en-
gaged in fraud by helping their clients to 
submit false insurance claims. This al-
leged misconduct is serious, and this Order 
should not be misconstrued to suggest oth-
erwise. 
This Court nevertheless declines to en-
gage in a free-ranging inquiry into matters 
14. If the Court felt that such an inquiry were 
appropriate, it would not limit the Inquiry to 
Rosenbaum's alleged transgressions, but 
would include within its scope the serious 
allegations of misconduct by Garfinkel and 
14317.man. 
pending before other courts, as those 
courts are best suited to manage their own 
proceedings. Allegations of inflated insur-
ance claims, kickbacks and improper busi-
ness relationships between lawyers and 
consultants have been raised in the course 
of similar litigation before other courts, 
where they have been addressed in the 
context of those proceedings without hav-
ing to embark on a sweeping investigation. 
The only new information here is Romain's 
March 30 deposition testimony in which he 
recanted his earlier accusations of miscon-
duct by Garfinkel and others, and Rosen-
baum's disclosure, at the April 16 hearing, 
of Katzman's alleged suggestion that Ro-
main could be paid to recant that testimo-
ny. These developments, without doubt, 
are extraordinary. They do not require 
this Court, however, to broadly investigate 
matters before other courts and issue rul-
ings that may limit how other courts deal 
with this evidence, if at all, in the cases 
before them. 
As for this case, this Court can address 
evidence of fraud, perjury and other mis-
conduct as necessary to resolve the issues 
here. For example, whether Residences 
submitted inflated damage claims is rele-
vant to Defendants' defense that the policy 
is void. Exactly what evidence bears on 
this defense and may be submitted to a 
jury, can be decided with pre-trial motions 
and at trial. As already noted, to the 
extent misconduct exceeds the bounds of 
this litigation there are other forums and 
authorities to address them. 
The point is that this Court has proce-
dural mechanisms in place that allow it to 
IS. The Court strongly rejects the request that 
this Court enjoin Rosenbaum from "appear-
ing In any case or taking any action adverse 
to Alan Garfinkel or any of his former clients 
In any case where allegations of Ken Romain 
are, directly or indirectly at issue," as a mis-
use of Its power. [See DE 122, pp. 17-181 
EFTA00177867

1266 
716 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES 
consider these issues, as necessary to 
bring this case to a just conclusion. Given 
those mechanisms, this Court will not ex-
ercise its discretion to make an extraordi-
nary and unnecessary use of its power. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby 
ORDERED that: 
1. Residences' Request for Judicial In-
quiry [DE 103] is DENIED. 
2. The Defendants' Joint Statement 
Requesting a Broad Judicial Inquiry [DE 
121] is DENIED. 
8. Residences' Motion for Protective 
Order [DE 122] is DENIED. 
4. Garfmkel's and Katzman's Motion to 
Intervene [DE 126) is GRANTED. 
6. Garfinkel's and Katzman's Motion to 
Convene A Sealed and Limited Ancillary 
Proceeding [DE 130] is DENIED. 
6. Garfinkel's and Katzman's Motion 
for Hearing [DE 132] is DENIED. 
7. Westchester's Motion for Extension 
of Time to Respond [DE 146) is DENIED 
as moot. 
Donna Katz MAPLES, Plaintiff, 
1. 
UHS OF GEORGIA, INC., UHS of Geor-
gia Holdings, Inc., and UHS of Peach-
ford, L.P., doing business as Peach-
ford BHS of Atlanta, Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-01964—WEJ. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. Georgia, 
Atlanta Division. 
May 3, 2010. 
Background: Former employee brought 
action against her former employer, alleg-
ing employer eliminated her part-time 
nurse position in violation of Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA). Em-
ployer moved for summary Judgment. 
Holdings: The District Court, Walter E. 
Johnson, United States Magistrate Judge, 
held that: 
(1) employee failed to establish prima facie 
case of disparate treatment, and 
(2) employee failed to demonstrate pre-
text. 
Motion granted. 
1. Civil Rights 6=1210 
To establish a disparate-treatment 
claim under the ADEA, an employee must 
prove that age was the but-for cause of the 
employer's adverse decision. 
Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
§ 4(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1). 
2. Civil Rights 6=1672 
The ADEA does not permit a sepa-
rate recovery of compensatory damages 
for pain and suffering or emotional dis-
tress. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 
et seq. 
3. Civil Rights e=.1.539 
Where there is no direct or statistical 
evidence of age discrimination, the court 
applies the burden-shitting framework es-
tablished in McDonnell Douglas to evalu-
ate an ADEA claim based upon circum-
stantial evidence. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 4(aX1), 29 
U.S.C.A. § 623(aX1). 
4. Civil Rights 6=1639 
Under the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting framework, if an employee is 
EFTA00177868

118 
103 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
previous order, courts are restrained by a 
careful statutory analysis for each item of 
a bill of costs. While United States'. 
Kolesar is helpful in deciding whether the 
costa of a stenographic transcript should be 
awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), it is not 
applicable to the decision whether photo-
copying expense is reimbursable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1920(4). The following statement 
is a clear explanation of the necessity re-
quired for copies under subsection (4): 
Photocopying charges attributable to dis-
covery and the court's copies of plead-
ings, motions, and memoranda are "rea-
sonable necessary for use in the case" 
and can be awarded. Extra copies of 
filed papers and correspondence, and cop-
ies of cues, however, are not necessary 
but are for the convenience of the attor-
neys and therefore not taxable. 
Independence Tube Corp. I Copperweld 
Corp., 643 F.Supp. 706, 722 (N.D.Ill.1982). 
B. Disallowance of Reimbursement for 
Costs of Depositions Not Adequately 
Identified as Necessary for Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
(8) In the previous order, this court 
awarded the costs of two depositions which 
were tendered into evidence at the trial. 
The court's allowance of the costs of those 
two depositions does not mean, as suggest-
ed in the defendant's motion for reconsider-
ation, that this court would not award the 
costs of depositions used in supporting a 
successful motion for summary judgment. 
Such an award is appropriate when the 
attorneys can point to the use of the depo-
sitions with some particularity. Consider-
ing, however, the strong policy of the 
American system against the shifting of 
litigation expenses, a general statement by 
the attorneys that the parties and the court 
relied on five depositions for an order 
granting summary judgment is not suffi-
cient; the party seeking reimbursement 
must show how the depositions were neces-
sary for the court's disposition of the mo-
tion. This court's ruling, therefore, was 
consistent with Jeffries I. Georgia Resi-
dential Finance Authority, 90 F.R.D. 62 
(N.D.Ga.1981), and reconsideration is un-
necessary. 
In summary, the defendant's motion for 
reconsideration is hereby DENIED, and the 
court hereby ALLOWS $137.26 for photo-
copying expense under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). 
This court's review of the bill of costs is 
now complete and the items, as allowed in 
this order and the previous order, may now 
be included in the judgment. 
Claire NELSON, Plaintiff, 
I 
Samuel N. GREENSPOON, and Eaton, 
Van Winkle and Greenspoon, a 
partnership, Defendants. 
No. 83 Chi. 7962 (SWK). 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Sept. 11, 1984. 
An action was filed involving a dispute 
between a corporation's former president 
and her attorney. The corporation sought 
to intervene to preserve its claims to a 
purported attorney-client privilege sur-
rounding documents generated by the at-
torney. The District Court, Kram, J., held 
that: (1) the corporation could intervene, 
and (2) the corporation failed to carry its 
burden of showing that the documents 
were privileged. 
Motion to intervene granted and mo-
tion for suppression and return of docu-
ments denied. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure 0=321 
Corporation's motion seeking return of 
allegedly privileged documents in its for-
mer president's possession and suppression 
of those documents already produced in 
EFTA00177869

NELSON'. OREENSPOON 
coo as 103 P.R.D. 118 (1984) 
litigation could be treated as motion to 
intervene, even though moving papers did 
not explicitly seek leave to intervene. Fed. 
Rules. Civ.Proc.Rules 24, 24(a, c), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure s=135 
Although corporation which sought to 
intervene in order to protect allegedly privi-
leged documents did not meet with formali-
ties required by intervention rule, that did 
not preclude granting intervention in that 
denial of motion would exalt form over 
substance. 
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 24, 
24(a, c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Federal Courts s=23 
If corporation's intervention to pre-
serve its claims to purported attorney-client 
privilege surrounding various documents 
involved in litigation was as of right, dis-
trict court could hear case irrespective of 
corporation's citizenship under doctrine of 
ancillary jurisdiction. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 
Rules 24, 24(a, c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
4. Federal Civil Procedure ts=t335 
Corporation could intervene in action 
between corporation's former president and 
her attorney concerning attorney's repre-
sentation of president in order to assert its 
claim of attorney-client privilege surround-
ing documents generated by attorney, who 
also represented corporation, where attor-
ney was not actively protecting that privi-
lege. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 24(a), (aX2), 
28 U.S.C.A.; Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 501, 28 
U.S.C.A.; N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 4503. 
6. Witnesses o=>198(1) 
Existence of attorney-client privilege is 
based upon policy of encouraging openness 
and full disclosure between client and his 
or her attorney. N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 
4503. 
6. Witnesses 9:=198(1) 
In order to minimize intrusion of attor-
ney-client privilege upon ascertainment of 
truth, scope of privilege must be, and is, 
confined to narrowest possible ambit which 
will still achieve purpose of full disclosure 
between client and his or her attorney. 
N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 4603. 
119 
7. Witnesses 4=222 
Burden of establishing existence of at-
torney-client privilege is upon party claim-
ing privilege. 
N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 
4508. 
8. Witnesses <3:=204(2) 
Former president of corporation, which 
claimed that corporate documents were 
protected by attorney-client privilege, was 
properly in possession of those documents 
where documents discussed former presi-
dent's personal matters. N.Y.McKinney's 
CPLR 4503. 
9. Witnesses CP>205 
Corporate documents which involved 
communications to or from third parties, 
which contained information obtained from 
third parties or which referred to on-going 
communications with third party were not 
confidential and, therefore, were not pro-
tected by corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege. N.Y.McKinney's CPLR 4503. 
10. Witnesses A=204(2) 
Corporation could not use its claim of 
attorney-client privilege with respect to 
documents to regain possession of purport-
edly privileged documents in possession of 
corporation's 
former 
president. 
N.Y. 
McKinney's CPLR 4503. 
Morris Pottish, New York City, for plain-
tiff. 
Olnick, Boxer, Blumberg, Lane & Troy 
by Andrew N. Krinsky, New York City, for 
defendant Samuel N. Greenspoon. 
Richenthal, Abrams & Moss by Arthur 
Richenthal, New York City, for proposed 
intervenor Hosiery Corp. of America. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
KRAM, District Judge. 
The above-captioned action is before this 
Court in an unusual posture: a corporation, 
Hosiery Corporation of America ("HCA"), 
seeks to intervene in this dispute between 
its erstwhile president, Claire Nelson, and 
EFTA00177870

120 
103 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
her attorney, Samuel N. Greenspoon, con-
cerning Greenspoon's representation of 
Nelson, in order to preserve its claims to a 
purported attorney-client privilege sur-
rounding various documents generated by 
Greenspoon, also RCA's attorney, copies of 
which were sent to Nelson during her ten-
ure with HCA and remain in her possession 
to date. HCA seeks an order directing 
Nelson to turn over all of the documents, 
and any copies thereof, and prohibiting her 
from producing or disseminating those doc-
uments in any way. For the reasons stated 
below, HCA is granted leave to intervene, 
but its motion to restrain plaintiff and re-
plevy the documents is denied. 
—BACKGROUND—
HCA is a closely-held Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in 
Pennsylvania. HCA is primarily engaged 
in selling hosiery through the mails. 
Plaintiff Claire Nelson, along with her 
late husband Jules, had been the sole and 
joint owners of the outstanding shares of 
HCA. Claire Nelson also was President, or 
executive officer in charge of operations, of 
HCA for several years prior to the end of 
1980. On December 2, 1980, Claire and 
Jules Nelson entered into a separation 
agreement. On the same date, Claire en-
tered into an agreement with HCA where-
by HCA would pay Claire $1,260,000, over 
the course of ten years, in redemption of 
her interest in the corporation. 
Claire was represented in the preparation 
of these agreements by defendant Green-
spoon. Greenspoon is a member of the bar 
of the State of New York. He had, before 
and after the preparation of these agree-
ments, represented Claire in personal mat-
ters. 
Additionally, Greenspoon had at 
times represented Jules in personal mat-
ters. He also has been HCA's general 
counsel since 1977. Greenspoon was the 
only attorney involved in the preparation of 
these agreements. 
1. HCA is represented here by the attorney who 
represents Greenspoort in the Surrogates Court 
In or about March, 1981, Claire Nelson's 
employment by HCA was terminated. She 
has not been affiliated with HCA since that 
time. 
In or about December, 1981, Jules Nel-
son instituted an action against Claire in 
New York State Supreme Court The sub-
stance and merits of that action are irrele-
vant for purposes of this motion. Claire 
counterclaimed in that action to set aside 
the agreements. On November 19, 1983, 
Jules Nelson died, slowing the progress of 
the Supreme Court action. That action is 
still pending. 
Jules Nelson's will was filed for probate 
in Surrogate's Court, New York County. 
Greenspoon and Helen Gioulis (not a party 
herein) were appointed preliminary execu-
tors. The eligibility of Greenspoon for per-
manent letters testamentary is being con-
tested in Surrogate's Court. 
In November, 1988, Claire instituted this 
action against Greenspoon alleging mal-
practice and conversion. Discovery in this 
action had been proceeding apace. Then, 
in the course of discovery, Claire produced 
copies of letters written by Greenspoon. 
Greenspoon maintained that the documents 
were privileged as between HCA and its 
attorney, but responded to questions con-
cerning them. 
HCA 
then brought on the instant mo-
tion by Order to Show Cause dated May 11, 
1984. In support of its motion, HCA sub-
mitted an affidavit by Arthur Richenthal, 
dated May 7, 1984 ("Richenthal Aff."). At-
tached as exhibits to the affidavit were 
copies of several documents which Claire 
Nelson has produced during discovery 
herein as to which HCA claims an attorney-
client privilege applies. By this motion, 
HCA seeks the return of all privileged doc-
uments (and any copies thereof) in Claire's 
possession and the suppression of those 
privileged documents already produced by 
Nelson in this action. 
proceeding. 
EFTA00177871

—DISCUSSION—
(1) Plaintiff raises several procedural 
arguments in opposition to HCA's motion 
which must be dealt with first. Initially, 
plaintiff claims that HCA is a non-party 
with no standing to move in this action. 
Admittedly, FICA's moving papers do not 
explicitly seek leave to intervene, but rath-
er indicate that HCA appears "for [a] spe-
cific and limited purpose." 
Richenthal 
Aff., II 2. However, on June 7, 1984, HCA 
addressed a letter to the Court requesting 
that the Court construe the motion as in-
cluding a request to intervene. The Court 
will, therefore, construe this motion as one 
to intervene. 
12) Plaintiff next argues that HCA's pa• 
pers are insufficient to support a motion to 
intervene pursuant to Rule 24 of the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 24(c) 
provides in relevant part, that "[a] person 
desiring to intervene shall serve a motion 
to intervene ... [which] shall state the 
grounds therefor and shall be accompanied 
by a pleading setting forth the claim or 
defense for which intervention is sought." 
HCA has not met the formalities required 
by Rule 24(c); however, denying its motion 
on that ground would exalt form over sub-
stance. See Belgian American Mercan-
tile Corp. I De Groeve-Marcotte & Fits, 
433 F.Supp. 1098, 1101 (S.D.N.Y.1977). In 
Belgian American, as in this case, the 
movant, a non-party, had acted by Order to 
Show Cause for some relief and had not 
specifically styled its request a petition to 
intervene. In that case, as in this one, the 
relief sought was clearly spelled out in the 
Order to Show Cause, albeit not in the 
form of a pleading. Noting that the "Sec-
ond Circuit has held that in the face of 
strong circumstances the formal require• 
ments of Rule 24 need not be insisted on" 
(citing Kuplerman • 
Consolidated Re-
search & Mfg. Corp.. 469 F.2d 1072, 1014 
n. 1(2d Cir.1972)), the court held that "non-
compliance with the strict requirements of 
Rule 24(c)" would not preclude intervention 
2. If these documents relate solely to Green-
spoon's representation of FICA. as HCA con-
tends, this Court is at a loss to understand how 
they are relevant to, or the subject of, this ac-
NELSON I. GREENSPOON 
121 
P.R.D. I le (1984) 
and a determination of the intervenor's mo-
tion on the merits. 483 F.Supp. at 1101. 
This Court feels that that is the proper 
course to take in this instance as well. 
(3) Plaintiff also argues that the Court 
would be divested of subject matter juris-
diction if HCA were permitted to intervene 
because HCA is not of citizenship diverse 
from that of plaintiff. If HCA's interven-
tion is as of right, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
24(a), then this Court is empowered to hear 
this case irrespective of RCA's citizenship 
under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 
See Formulate, Inc. 
Hartley Pen Co., 
318 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.1963). 
Rule 24(a) provides, in relevant party, as 
follows: 
Upon timely application anyone shall 
be permitted to intervene in an action: 
(2) when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and he 
is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair 
or impede his ability to protect that inter-
est, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
(4) HCA seeks to intervene here to as-
sert its purported attorney-client privilege 
to documents being made a subject of this 
action. This Court finds that the provi-
sions of Rule 24(a)(2) do apply to this situa-
lotion: to wit, the client claims an interest, 
an attorney-client privilege, in documents 
which are the subject of the action,' and 
the existing party, the attorney, is not ac-
tively protecting that privilege. See In re 
Katz, 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980). 
HCA claims that various documents in 
Claire Nelson's possession are HCA docu-
ments, subject to the attorney-client privi-
lege, and that she should not be permitted 
to produce, or otherwise use, such privi-
leged documents in this lawsuit. The pa-
tion. Be that as It may, Nelson has produced 
them, and questioned Greenspoon about them; 
therefore, plaintiff has essentially made them 
the subject of this action at this stage. 
EFTA00177872

122 
103 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
rameters of the claimed privilege in this 
diversity action are defined by state law. 
Fed.R.Evid. 501. The attorney-client privi-
lege in New York is governed by section 
4503 of the New York Civil Practice Law 
and Rules ("CPLR"); however, it is deeply 
rooted in common law. See People 
O'Connor, 85 A.D.2d 92, 94, 447 N.Y.S.2d 
553, 656 (4th Dep't 1982). 
[6, 61 The existence of such a privilege 
is based upon a policy of encouraging open-
ness and full disclosure between a client 
and his or her attorney. See Upjohn Co.' 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 
677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); Priest' 
Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 6748, 431 N.Y. 
S.2d 611, 613-514, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985-986 
(1980). Nonetheless, the application of the 
privilege serves to exclude reliable evi-
dence and, often, to block the truth-deter-
mining processes of the courts. Priest, 61 
N.Y.2d at 68, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 514, 409 
N.E.2d at 986; In re Jacqueline F., 47 
N.Y.2d 215, 219, 417 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886-87, 
891 N.E.2d 967, 969-70 (1979). In order to 
minimize the intrusion of the privilege upon 
the ascertainment of truth, the scope of the 
privilege must be, and is, confined to the 
narrowest possible ambit which will still 
achieve the purpose of full disclosure. 
Priest, 61 N.Y.2d at 68, 431 N.Y.2d at 514, 
409 N.E.2d at 986; see also In re Bekins 
Storage Co., 118 Misc.2d 173, 177, 460 N.Y. 
S.2d 684, 690 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.1983). 
(7) The specific formulation of the priv-
ilege, as set out in section 4503 of the 
CPLR, provides, in relevant part, as fol-
lows: 
Unless the client waives the privilege, 
... any person who obtains without the 
knowledge of the client evidence of a 
confidential communication made be-
tween the attorney ... and the client in 
the course of professional employment, 
shall not ... be allowed to disclose such 
communication. 
N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law § 4503 (McKinney 1963) 
(Supplementary Pamphlet 1964 to 1983). 
3. Although, as discussed below, it Is not always 
clear who the client was. 
Whether or not that privilege covers the 
communications here at issue must be re-
solved by this Court, but the burden of 
establishing the existence of an attorney-
client privilege applicable to these particu-
lar circumstances is upon HCA, the party 
claiming the privilege. 
See Priest, 61 
N.Y.2d at 69, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 514, 409 
N.E.2d at 986; see also Katz, 623 F.2d at 
125; United States' Demauro, 581 F.2d 
50, 66 (2d Cir.1978). 
HCA argues initially that these commu-
nications were made during the course of 
an attorney-client relationship, and there 
appears to be no dispute about this' HCA 
further argues that these corporate com-
munications are confidential, urging baldly 
that "[c)onfidentiality exists where the 
communications sought to be protected 
were made for the purposes of either re-
ceiving or giving legal advice." HCA's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion, p. 4. 
HCA also argues baldly that it has not 
waived its privilege, and that Nelson pos-
sessed these documents without RCA's 
knowledge. These last three contentions 
are hotly disputed. 
Treating the last argument first, it is 
beyond peradventure that HCA "knew" 
Nelson obtained these documents,' since 
she is named on the documents (or at least 
most of them) as an addressee, either of 
the original or of a copy. Nelson argues, 
therefore, that section 4608, by its terms, is 
inapplicable. HCA argues in response that 
Nelson received these documents solely in 
her capacity as corporate officer. As such, 
HCA argues, Nelson's receipt was the 
equivalent of HCA's receipt, so the docu-
ments remained privileged (to the same 
extent that they were privileged to begin 
with). HCA argues further that it did not 
"know" that she retained the documents 
after she left her employ there, and that 
such retention was wrongful and did not 
divest HCA of its claimed privilege. Nel-
son, on the other hand, responds that these 
documents were addressed to her personal-
ly, not as corporate officer, and/or that 
4. At least insofar as a corporation can 'knows" 
anything. 
EFTA00177873

HCA knew she retained them, at least be-
cause Jules (the sole remaining sharehold-
er, chief officer, and director of HCA) 
shipped them to her and knew she had 
them. HCA argues that Jules' knowledge 
of, or even complicity in, Nelson's retention 
of the documents is irrelevant because he 
did not have the authority to waive HCA's 
• privilege.° 
The Court has attempted to parse these 
bickering thrusts and parries in an effort 
to determine the applicability of section 
4603. It is essential that the general na-
ture of the relationship among the four 
parties involved—Claire, Jules, HCA and 
Greenspoon—be understood. HCA is, or 
was a very closely held corporation. Claire 
and Jules were the sole shareholders, and 
were the principal officers, of the corpora-
tion. HCA was, in sum, very much a 
"Mom and Pop" operation—the alter ego of 
Claire and Jules. Greenspoon, was the at-
torney for all three. He handled the Nel-
sons' personal affairs as well as their busi-
ness affairs. The distinctions that HCA 
makes now, between Claire Nelson, as cor- 
porate officer, and Claire Nelson, as indi-
vidual, and between Claire Nelson and 
HCA, were not so neatly defined in fact.° 
DU A perusal of the documents as to 
which HCA claims its privilege° indicates 
that Greenspoon quite simply did not al-
ways distinguish between Claire, the indi-
vidual, and HCA. In other words, several 
of the documents were addressed to per-
sonal matters as well as corporate ones. 
For example, document D 220 discusses 
property owned by Jules and Claire Nelson 
in the context of a broader discussion of 
corporate matters. Likewise, document D 
5. HCA makes this argument through the affida-
vit of its attorney without any citation or sup-
port in case law or In corporate records. The 
Court, however, need not address this conten-
tion here. 
6. The other courts Involved In these tripartite 
proceedings have apparently held to the same 
effect with respect to the blurred distinction 
between Jules and HCA. 
7. The Court notes that RCA has not shown the 
same vigor with which it arguer its desire to 
NELSON I.  GREENSPOON 
123 
Cite as 103 F.R.D. 113 (1934) 
241 refers to life insurance (presumably 
personal) amidst corporate matters. Docu-
ment D 394 refers to Claire's potential 
criminal exposure from HCA's activities. 
These are but examples of the personal 
information discussed in what seem to be 
predominantly corporate documents. Since 
these documents discuss Claire's personal 
matters, I find that she is properly in pos-
session of them. 
(9) Moreover, the Court finds that some 
of these documents are not confidential, 
and therefore are not privileged. RCA's 
bald assertion that a document is automati-
cally confidential if legal advice is sought 
or provided in the document is not %correct 
statement of the law. See Herbert'. Lan-
do, 73 F.R.D. 381, 899 (S.D.N.Y.), remand-
ed on other grounds, 668 F.2d 974 (2d 
Cir.1977), rev'd and remanded on other 
grounds, 441 U.S. 163, 99 S.Ct. 1685, 60 
L,Ed.2d 116 (1979). There, the court stab 
ed, "(n)or is privileged status automatically 
conferred by the fact that the memoran-
dum may express an opinion of counsel; 
opinions are privileged only to the extent 
that they are based upon, and consequently 
reveal, information furnished by the client 
in confidence." it (emphasis added). A 
communication is not confidential if it ip-
volves third parties. See, e.g., People 
Beige, 59 A.D.2d 807, 308, 399 N.Y.S.2d 
689, 542 (4th Dept1977) (quoting United 
States 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 
F.Supp. 357, 368-69 (D.Mass.1950) ("with-
out the pLesence of strangers")); Randy 
Intl Ltd.". Automatic Compactor Corp., 
97 Misc.2d 977, 412 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Civ.Ct.. 
Queens Co. 1979). 
Thug, documentary 
communications to or from third parties 
are not confidential. Likewise, documenta-
keep these documents privileged and confiden-
tial in the way it actually treats those docu-
ments. HCA submitted copies of the very docu-
ments it claims arc privileged to this Court as 
exhibits In the publicly filed order to show 
cause. HCA did not make any effort to have 
those documents sealed from public access. 
Since I find that the documents are not privi-
leged, I need not determine whether HCA unwit-
tingly waived its privilege by filing these docu-
ments In this manner. 
EFTA00177874

124 
103 FEDERAL RULES DECISIONS 
ry communications are not confidential if 
copies thereof are sent to third parties. 
Furthermore, information obtained from 
third parties is not privileged. See Bekins 
Storage Co., 118 Misc.2d at 179, 460 
N.Y.S.2d at 691. Document D 220 as to 
which HCA claims a privilege, was ad-
dressed to Mr. Terry Arch of Touche, Ross 
& Co., and therefore is not privileged. A 
copy of document D 271 was sent to Ms. 
Dolores Geraghty and therefore is not priv-
ileged.' Plaintiff's Exhibits 37 and 38 (part 
of Exhibit 6 to the Order to Show Cause 
herein) contain information obtained from 
Mr. Arch, and refer to ongoing communica-
tions with Mr. Arch regarding the subject 
of the documents; therefore, these are not 
confidential. See J.P. Foley & Co., Inc 
Vanderbilt, 
66 
F.R.D. 
523, 
626 
(S.D.N.Y.1974). These are but examples of 
the several documents that are not confi-
dential, and therefore not privileged for 
this reason as well. 
(10) Finally, HCA has not cited a single 
example of the attorney-client privilege be-
ing used to regain possession of purported-
ly privileged documents. Given the need to 
limit the scope of the privilege, this Court 
will not countenance HCA's attempt to cre-
ate new affirmative applications for the 
privilege. Cf., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 
Engels, 41 Misc.2d 49, 51, 244 N.Y.S.2d 
983, 986 (Sup.CL Kings Co.1963) (privilege 
is a shield, not a sword), offd, 21 A.D.2d 
808, 260 N.Y.S.2d 851 (2d Dep't 1964). 
In sum, HCA has failed to carry its bur-
den of showing that these documents are 
privileged. They appear to properly be in 
Claire Nelson's possession, and shall re-
main so. HCA's motion to intervene is 
GRANTED and its motion for suppression 
and return of the documents is DENIED. 
Preparation for trial is to continue apace. 
SO ORDERED. 
8. The Court does not know the nature of the 
relationship between Ms. Geraghty and HCA. 
Ms. Geraghty may be a corporate Insider such 
that the communication remained confidential; 
however, HCA certainly did not sustain its bur. 
den of establishing that fact, if It is the case. 
GOLDEN EAGLE DISTRIBUTING 
CORPORATION, Plaintiff, 
I. 
BURROUGHS 
CORPORATION, Defendant 
No. C-84-0523-WWS. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. California. 
Sept. 19, 1984. 
Action was brought to recover dam-
ages arising out of allegedly defective com-
puter system sold to corporation. After 
removal from state court to federal court 
in Minnesota on basis of diversity, followed 
by transfer to the Northern District of 
California, seller moved to dismiss claims 
as time barred. Following denial of ma 
tion, counsel for defendant was directed to 
submit memorandum explaining why sanc-
tions should not be imposed in connection 
with the motion. 
The District Court, 
Schwarzer, J., held that (1) legal argu-
ment purporting to reflect existing law but 
instead being predicated upon, and not 
merely arguing for, an extension of the 
existing law violates rule relating to attor-
ney's certification of pleadings, motions, 
and other papers by his signature thereon, 
regardless of whether purpose is to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless expense or 
whether counsel acted in good faith, and (2) 
failure to cite authority adverse to mov-
ant's position or to make reasonable in-
quiry to determine whether motion to dis-
miss is warranted by existing law also via 
lates rule, warranting sanctions. 
Sanctions ordered. 
L Attorney and Client 4=42(14) 
Local counsel associated in case with 
out-of-state counsel for party to the action 
The same is true of documents addressed to Mr. 
Uri Shoham, except in the ease of those docu-
ments, since they were addressed to Mr. Sho-
ham at HCA's address, the Court was willing to 
assume the insider status of Mr. Shoham in 
spite of RCA's failure of proof. 
EFTA00177875

hups://web2.wesilawoom/prinUprintstream.aspiks=WLW11.078Lvr=2.0.. 
Wdstlaw, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Refs & Annos) 
Kui Title IV. Parties 
Rule 24. Intervention 
(a) Intervention of Right.On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: 
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or 
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that 
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless 
existing parties adequately represent that interest. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. 
(1) In General.On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who: 
(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or 
(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. 
(2) By a Government Officer or Agency.On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental 
officer or agency to intervene if a party's claim or defense is based on: 
(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or 
(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order. 
(3) Delay or Prejudice.ln exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly 
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties' rights. 
(c) Notice and Pleading Required.A motion to intervene must be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5. The 
motion must state the grounds for intervention and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out the claim or defense for 
which intervention is sought. 
I of 2 
9/25/11 9:21 PM 
EFTA00177876

(Amended December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948; December 29, 1948, effective October 20, 1949; Januai 
1963, effective July 1, 1963; February 28, 1966, effective July I, 1966; March 2, 1987, effective August 1, 1987; 
30, 1991, effective December I, 1991; April 12, 2006, effective December 1, 2006; April 30, 2007, efft 
December 1, 2007.) 
Amendments received to 7-15-11 
Westlaw. (C) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
2of2 
EFTA00177877

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 
Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 1 of 9 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
JANE DOE I and JANE DOE 2, 
Plaintiffs, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR LIMITED INTERVENTION OF JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
This is a motion by Jeffrey Epstein pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) and 
24(b) to intervene for the limited purpose of seeking a protective order and responding to the 
motions of Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doc 2 for disclosure, evidentiary use, and widespread dissemination 
of the plea negotiation letters and emails between his lawyers and federal prosecutors. Those letters 
and emails were written in furtherance of plea negotiations, encouraged by the broad protections of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 410, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f), and the constitutional right 
to effective assistance of counsel. They are privileged, confidential, not discoverable, and 
inadmissible as evidence at any proceeding in this case. 
I. MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY INTERVENTION An PROPER 
Intervention is proper as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) 
because Mr. Epstein has an interest in protecting his privileged and confidential plea negotiations, 
and "disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [his] ability to protect [his] 
interest . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Unless allowed to intervene, Mr. Epstein could suffer the 
injustice of having his privilege and confidentiality claims erased without ever having been heard. 
EFTA00177878

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2.011 Page 2 of 9 
See El-Ad Residences at Miramar Condo. Ass'''. Inc. I Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 
1262 (S.D. Fla. 2010), quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Newparent Inc.), 274 F.3d 563, 570 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (in the context of the attorney-client privilege, ruling that colorable claims of privilege 
are a textbook example of the right to intervene as of right); Appeal of Hughes, 633 F.2d 282, 286 
(3d Cir. 1980) ("The governing rule in these circumstances is that the possessor of the claimed 
privilege or right may intervene to assert it"). 
Discretionary intervention is also proper under Rule 24(b) because Mr. Epstein's interests 
in protecting his plea negotiations "share with the main action a common question of law or fact." 
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). That common question of law involves the privileged and confidential nature 
of Mr. Epstein's plea negotiations, and the unprecedented request of Jane Doc 1 and Jane Doe 2 to 
use those negotiations as evidence to vacate the product of Mr. Epstein's plea bargain. This is 
plainly prohibited by Rule 410, and for good reason. The "central feature" of Rule 410 is that "the 
accused is encouraged candidly to discuss his or her situation in order to explore the possibility of 
disposing of the case through a consensual arrangement." United States ! Herman, 544 F.2d 791, 
797 (5th Cir. 1977). To allow Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 to now "introduce statements uttered in 
reliance on the rule would be to use the rule as a sword rather than a shield." Id. 
D. THE OBJECTION OF JANE DOE 1 AND JANE DOE 2 
As required by Local Rule 7.1, we asked counsel for Jane Doc 1 and Jane Doe 2 whether they 
objected to Mr. Epstein's limited intervention. Counsel responded that they "oppose the motion on 
timeliness and other grounds." Mr. Epstein's motion is timely for the reasons set forth below. As 
to the "other grounds" that Jane Doe I and Jane Doe 2 may advance, counsel for both plaintiffs 
previously admitted that Mr. Epstein has a right to intervene. 
2 
EFTA00177879

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 
Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 3 of 9 
First, they argued in their opposition to the intervention of attorneys Black, Weinberg, and 
Lefkowitz that Mr. Epstein "is the real party in interest" and that "harm from the release of the 
materials (if any) could be only to Jeffrey Epstein." Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Response To 
Motion To Intervene of Roy Black, Martin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz [DE 78] at 6. 
Second, also in opposing the intervention of attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Lefkowtiz, the 
plaintiffs argued that "[o]nly Epstein has an interest in the validity of the non-prosecution agreement 
. . . ." Jane Doe I and Jane Doe 2's Response To Motion To Intervene of Roy Black, Martin 
Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz [DE 78] at 4. 
And third, in their "Motion to Use Correspondence To Prove Violations of The Crime 
Victim 's Rights Act And To Have Unredacted Pleadings Unsealed," filed five months ago, Jane Doe 
1 and Jane Doe 2 expressly state that they do not object to Mr. Epstein's timely intervention: 
The victims have no objection to Epstein intervening in this case — at this time. lf, 
however, Epstein delays intervention until after a reasonable period of time, the 
victims will argue that his motion to intervene is untimely. 
[DE 51 at 8]. 
III. MR. EPSTEIN'S MOTION To INTERVENE Is TIMELY 
We address at the outset what has not yet happened in this litigation: 
There has been no trial or adjudication on the merits of the claims and defenses, and 
this motion to intervene is not made on the eve of such trial. 
There is no final judgment that would be undone or affected by Mr. Epstein's 
intervention. Nor is a final judgment imminent given the discussions about discovery 
and related matters addressed during the August 12, 2011 hearing. 
There are no discovery cut off dates, and the motion to intervene is therefore not filed 
on the eve of such deadlines or after they have passed. 
3 
EFTA00177880

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 4 of 9 
There have been no evidentiary hearings or factual findings by the Court that would 
be undone by the motion to intervene. Rather than impede the litigation, Mr. 
Epstein's participation will aid the Court in ruling on the sensitive and novel legal 
issues concerning plea negotiations. 
Finally, time is not of the essence to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 — after all, they 
ignored this litigation for a year and a half while they pursued money damages 
against Mr. Epstein. The Court's order dismissing this case for lack of prosecution, 
which is dated September 8, 2010, noted that there had been no activity in the case 
since April 2009. [DE 38]. 
A motion to intervene must be timely. But "(t]imeliness is not a word of exactitude or of 
precise measurable dimensions . . . [T]imeliness is not limited to chronological considerations but 
is to be determined from all the circumstances." Stallworth 'Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263-64 
(5th Cir. 1977). Those circumstances are considered in light of four factors: 
I. The length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or 
reasonably should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for 
leave to intervene. 
2. The extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer as 
a result of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply for intervention as soon as he 
actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case. 
3. The extent of the prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if his petition 
for leave to intervene is denied. 
4. The existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a 
determination that the application is timely. 
Id. 
1. The length of time during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably 
should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned for leave to intervene: 
Mr. Epstein's interests arose during the August 12, 2011 hearing, when the plaintiffs argued 
for the first time that their rights under the CVRA were violated not only by the government, but also 
by Mr. Epstein. Even though Mr. Epstein has no legal duties to the plaintiffs under the CVRA, the 
4 
EFTA00177881

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 
Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 5 of 9 
plaintiffs argued at the hearing that Mr. Epstein was somehow responsible for the government's 
communications with each Jane Doe and that Mr. Epstein, a private citizen, caused the government 
to violate its obligations under the Act. According to the plaintiffs, Mr. Epstein "engineered" and 
"orchestrated" the claimed CVRA violations, and he "insisted that the rights of these victims" be 
violated. [Trans. August 12, 2011 at 33-34, 611. The plaintiffs argued that because of this supposed 
conspiracy between Mr. Epstein and the government, the plaintiffs are entitled to copies of all the 
plea negotiation letters and emails, to use them as evidence in these proceedings seeking invalidation 
of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. Id. at 33-34, 61, 107-09. 
When the plaintiffs articulated a supposed conspiracy directed by Mr. Epstein to use 
Assistant United States Attorneys to deny the plaintiffs their rights, it became clear that the plaintiffs' 
purpose in seeking the plea negotiations is to offer them as evidence against Mr. Epstein, in violation 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 410. This showed that Mr. Epstein's interests were being implicated 
in the ongoing litigation between the government and the Jane Does and that limited intervention 
was timely and warranted. 
2. The extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer as a result 
of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply for intervention as soon as he actually knew or 
reasonably should have known of his interest in the case: 
Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 will suffer no prejudice if Mr. Epstein is allowed to intervene. 
As noted earlier, Jane Doc 1 and Jane Doe 2 ignored this case for a year and a half while they 
pursued claims for money damages against Mr. Epstein. They obviously do not view time as being 
of the essence and were in no hurry to litigate their claims, despite their knowledge that as of June 
30, 2008 Mr. Epstein was in a county jail, and that as of the summer of 2009 he was serving a term 
of community control, which did not end until July of 2010. 
5 
EFTA00177882

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 6 of 9 
Additionally, during the time period when the plaintiffs demonstrated no urgency and sought 
no expedited relief, Mr. Epstein, pursuant to his obligation under the Non-Prosecution Agreement, 
paid an attorney representative, Robert Josefsberg, substantial legal fees to represent many of the 
witnesses against him and settled many civil cases brought by the attorney representative. Mr. 
Epstein settled those cases in large part because one of the conditions of the Non-Prosecution 
Agreement was that Mr. Epstein waive certain defenses in civil litigation if certain identified 
plaintiffs sued him exclusively under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2255. In short, Mr. Epstein met 
every condition of his Non-Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office between June 
30, 2008 and the Summer 2010, during which time there was inaction by the plaintiffs. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs are aware that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) & (5)(13) 
require that CVRA claims be raised and resolved on an exigent basis, and that litigation, including 
appeals from adverse rulings, be expedited in order to avoid the current circumstance, where a 
plaintiff seeks to invalidate an agreement after a citizen has fully served his sentence and has been 
subjected to a myriad of collateral and adverse consequences, none of which can be reversed. 
There is also no prejudice to the plaintiffs because there has been no trial or adjudication of 
the merits of the claims or defenses raised by the existing parties, depositions have not been taken, 
there have been no evidentiary hearings or factual findings by the Court, and there is no final 
judgment or decree that would be undone or affected by Mr. Epstein's intervention. 
In their"Motion to Use Correspondence To Prove Violations of The Crime Victim's Rights 
Act And To Have Unredacted Pleadings Unsealed," Jane Doc 1 and Jane Doe 2 argue that any 
motion to intervene by Mr. Epstein would be untimely if filed "after the date on which the 
government must respond to the victims' motion for a finding of violation of the CVRA," because 
6 
EFTA00177883

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 
Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 7 of 9 
"that is when the victims must begin drafting a reply pleading." Id. This argument of inconvenience 
does not go far because many of the issues raised by Mr. Epstein parallel the issues raised by 
attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Letkowitz as well as those raised during the August 12, 2011 
hearing, and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 do not have to file their responsive pleadings addressing 
those issues for one more month.' Thus, by the time Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 would have to 
respond to the merits of Mr. Epstein's motion for a protective order, they will have already done 
most if not all of the work involved in addressing the common legal issues. Allowing Mr. Epstein 
to intervene will bring the plaintiffs no undue prejudice. 
3. The extent of the prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if his petition for leave 
to intervene is denied: 
The issues concerning Mr. Epstein's plea negotiations are significant. As both sides 
expressed to the Court during the hearing on August 12, 2011, there are no reported cases that 
address these precise facts. As far as we know, in our combined decades of experience as criminal 
defense attorneys, there has been no case where third parties in a civil case have sought to discover, 
much less use, plea negotiations as evidence to vacate the product of the client's plea bargain years 
after the client has served a prison sentence, served a year of community control, completed his 
entire sentence, and paid enormous sums of money to the attorney representing persons bringing 
or threatening to bring lawsuits against himfor money damages. To adjudicate these issues without 
Mr. Epstein's intervention would bring him irreparable harm, especially because if his plea 
negotiations are disclosed, Mr. Epstein will forever lose the benefit of their confidentiality and 
' The government has two weeks to respond to the supplemental brief to be filed by 
attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Leflcowitz, and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 then have two weeks 
after that to file their response. [DE 91 & 92]. 
7 
EFTA00177884

'Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 8 of 9 
privilege. 
4. The existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the 
application is timely: 
At least two unusual circumstances militate for a determination that the motion to intervene 
is timely and should be granted. First, the plaintiffs ignored this case for a year and a half, waiting 
until this Court dismissed it for lack of prosecution to pay it any attention. Their main concern 
during all that time was their claims for money against Mr. Epstein. They can now hardly complain 
that Mr. Epstein's motion to intervene is untimely. 
Second, the Court's ruling on the issues concerning Mr. Epstein's plea negotiations will reach 
far beyond the parties in this case and will impact every criminal investigation and prosecution in 
this and other Districts. Releasing the plea negotiation letters and cmails and using them as evidence 
to invalidate the bargain itself, as Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 request, will chill the ability of lawyers 
and clients to engage in candid plea discussions with the government. This will ultimately crowd 
the dockets of the district courts, where judges rely on plea negotiations to dispose of 96.1% of all 
criminal cases? The ruling urged by Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 will also shift the ethical and 
constitutional obligations of all criminal defense attorneys, because few criminal defense lawyers 
would consider entering into plea discussions and making candid written statements during plea 
negotiations if those statements are later discoverable and could be used against the client in a yet-
unfiled lawsuit by yet-unknown plaintiffs at some unknown time in the future. No lawyer would 
agree to have open discussions with a prosecutor about resolving a criminal matter or to make 
2 The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice reports that as of 2005, 
only 3.9% of all federal criminal cases proceed to trial. These statistics are reported at 
www.oip.usdoi.gov/bis/pub/html/fisst/2005/fis05st.him.
8 
EFTA00177885

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 9 of 9 
written submissions of their positions and views of the evidence and law, if plea negotiations could 
be used to damage a client in a future civil case. With these additional serious interests at stake, the 
motion to intervene should not be denied as untimely. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Epstein's motion for a limited intervention is timely and should be granted as of right 
under Rule 24(a) or, alternatively, as a matter within the Court's discretion under Rule 24(b). 
If allowed to intervene, Mr. Epstein would file the attached motion for a protective order in 
response to the motion of Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 for disclosure of the defense plea negotiation 
letters and emails [DE 50 at 5], their motion to use these letters and emails as substantive evidence 
in their quest to invalidate the Non-Prosecution Agreement [DE 51], and their motion to disseminate 
the letters and emails to the media [DE 51 at 7]. 
We certify that on September 2,2011, the foregoing document was filed electronically with 
the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BLACK, SREBNICIC, KORNSPAN 
& STUMPF, P.A. 
201 South Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 1300 
Miami, Florida 33131 
Office: (305) 371-6421 
Fax: (305) 358-2006 
By  
/S/
ROY BLACK, ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 126088 
JACKIE PERCZEK, ESQ. 
Florida Bar No. 0042201 
On Behalf of Jeffrey Epstein 
9 
EFTA00177886