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EFTA00161958
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 81 of 163 terrorist organizations"). 289. As discussed above, the "special deal" that Epstein received from Deutsche Bank in not being required to provide the normally-required Know Your Customer document was extended to other high-net-worth individuals. Deutsche Bank gave this "special deal" because of the amount of business these individuals generated. See Karimi, Dkt. 37 at ¶ 101. 290. As part of a pattern and practice similar to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank routinely onboarded without due diligence individuals reportedly engaged in criminal activities, in reckless disregard of the financial and other crimes they helped to perpetrate. See id. at11103. 291. In a similar pattern to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank onboarded and provided accounts to Eastern European oligarchs reportedly involved in criminality, including Igor Putin and Roman Abramovich. 292. In a similar pattern to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank onboarded and provided accounts to the founders of the Hezbollah terrorist organization. 293. In a similar pattern to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank onboarded and provided accounts to a billionaire who was a relative of one of the founders of Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, an entity long suspected of financing terrorists. 294. In a similar pattern to what it did for Epstein, Deutsche Bank onboarded and provided accounts to German and Jose Efromovich despite their links to a 81 EFTA00162038
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 82 of 163 Mexican drug cartel. 295. Deutsche Bank's pattern and practice has been exposed in multiple ways. For example, in 2015, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay a combined $2.5 billion in fines—a $2.175 billion fine by American regulators and a €227 million penalty by British authorities-for its involvement in the Libor scandal uncovered in June 2012. The company also pleaded guilty to wire fraud, acknowledging that at least 29 employees had engaged in illegal activity. 296. For another example, in November 2015, Deutsche Bank was ordered to pay $258 million in penalties imposed by the New York State Department of Financial Services and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank after the bank was caught doing business with Burma, Libya, Sudan, Iran, and Syria, which were under U.S. sanctions at the time. 297. For another example, in January 2017, Deutsche Bank agreed to a $7.2 billion settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice over its sale and pooling of toxic mortgage securities in the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. As part of the agreement, Deutsche Bank was required to pay a civil monetary penalty of $3.1 billion and provide $4.1 billion in consumer relief, such as loan forgiveness. 298. For another example, in January 2017, the bank was fined $425 million by the New York State Department of Financial Services and £163 million by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority regarding accusations of money laundering $10 82 EFTA00162039
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 83 of 163
billion out of Russia.
299. The common thread running through Deutsche Bank's participation in
the Epstein sex-trafficking venture and its other illegal behavior is that Deutsche
Bank intentionally planned to profit from being the banker for individuals and
organizations that other banks knew they could not lawfully handle. For Deutsche
Bank, this "high risk, high reward" approach ensured—and continues to ensure—
that it will earn greater profits than would come from complying with the law.
E. The Statute of Limitations
300. The statute of limitations under the TVPA is ten years after the cause
of action arose, or ten years after the victim reaches eighteen years of age, if the
victim was a minor at the time of the alleged offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1), (2).
The TVPA causes of actions for Jane Doe 1, and the other Class Members, all arose
within ten years of the filing of this complaint.
301. The New York Adult Survivors Act has opened up a one-year revival
window for the statute of limitations. See New York State, Governor Hochul Signs
Adult
Survivors
Act,
Governor
Kathy
Hochul
(May
24,
2022),
https://www.governor.ny.govinews/governor-hochul-signs-adult-survivors-act
("For many survivors, it may take years to come to terms with the trauma of sexual
assault and feel ready to seek just.").
302. RICO does not establish a precise statute of limitations. In this case,
83
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 84 of 163 the RICO enterprise, as well as the conspiracy to violate RICO, continued and caused injury through around July 2020, as explained in further detail below, within any possible statute of limitations. 303. Deutsche Bank fraudulently concealed its role in facilitating the Epstein sex trafficking venture through around July 20, 2020, when Deutsche Bank and the New York banking regulators publicly announced a civil settlement for Deutsche Bank's violation of its obligations in connection with Jeffrey Epstein's sex trafficking. As a result, the conspiracy continued until that time and also any applicable statute of limitations was equitably tolled until July 20, 2020. 304. Deutsche Bank joined a conspiracy to violate the TVPA and a conspiracy to violate RICO in and around 2013. Thereafter, it ratified the acts and crimes already committed by the Epstein sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy in furtherance of the venture and conspiracy. 305. Jane Doe 1, and other members of the Class, did not have the means and resources to uncover Deutsche Bank's role in facilitating their sexual abuse and sex trafficking until New York banking regulators announced their findings on July 20, 2020. VII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 306. Jane Doe 1 brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and 23(c)(4) on behalf of herself and the following Class: 84 EFTA00162041
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 85 of 163 All women who were sexually abused or trafficked by Jeffrey Epstein during the time when Deutsche Bank began maintaining bank accounts for Epstein and/or Epstein related-entities, which was in or about August 19, 2013, through Epstein's death on about August 10, 2019, both dates inclusive, as well as all women who were sexually abused or trafficked by Jeffrey Epstein during earlier times, between January 1, 2005 and August 19, 2013, when the sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy was operating—i.e., from January 1, 2005 through August 10, 2019 (the "Class Period"). Jane Doe 1 reserves the right to seek leave to modify this definition, including the addition of one or more subclasses, after having the opportunity to conduct discovery. 307. Numerosity: The Class consists of dozens of women, making joinder impracticable, in satisfaction of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The exact size of the Class and the identities of the individual Class Members are ascertainable through records maintained by the Epstein estate executors and the Defendants, including but not limited to Deutsche Bank's records for Epstein-related accounts (e.g., account ledgers reflecting payments from Epstein to Class Members). 308. Typicality: Jane Doe 1's claims are typical of the claims of the other Class Members she seeks to represent. The claims of Jane Doe land the other Class Members are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful pattern and practice of Deutsche Banks' participation in and funding of Epstein's sex abuse and Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. 309. Commonality: There are many questions of law and fact common to 85 EFTA00162042
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 86 of 163 the claims of Jane Doe 1 and the other Class Members, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect only individual Class Members, within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3). Class treatment of common issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) will materially advance the litigation. 310. Common questions of fact and law affecting Class Members include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the Epstein sex-trafficking venture caused its victims to engage in commercial sex acts in violation of Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1); b. Whether the Epstein sex-trafficking venture recruited, enticed, solicited, harbored, provided, obtained, and transported victims in ways that were in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce; c. Whether Epstein and his co-conspirators used means of force, fraud, coercion, and abuse of legal process, or a combination of such means, to sexually abuse the victims and to cause victims to engage in commercial sex acts; d. Whether Deutsche Bank knowingly assisted, facilitated, and supported the Epstein sex-trafficking venture's pattern and practice of coercively forcing victims to engage in commercial sex acts; e. Whether Deutsche Bank benefited financially or by receiving things of 86 EFTA00162043
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 87 of 163 value from its participation in a venture which has engaged in sex trafficking in violation of TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1); f. Whether Deutsche Bank knew or should have known that the Epstein sex-trafficking venture had engaged in violations of the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); g. Whether Deutsche Bank was part of a conspiracy violate the TVPA and RICO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c) & 18 U.S.C. § 1961(d); and h. Whether Deutsche Bank committed aided and abetted, or was negligent in facilitating, Epstein's sexual abuse which would constitute and include sexual offenses as defined in Article 130 of New York penal law committed against persons who were eighteen years of age or older. 311. Absent a class action, most of the Class Members would find the cost of litigating their claims to be cost-prohibitive and will have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation, in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 312. Adequacy: Jane Doe 1 will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other Class Members she seeks to represent. Jane Doe 1 has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Jane Doe 1 and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting 87 EFTA00162044
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 88 of 163 this action on behalf of the other Class Members and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Jane Doe 1 nor her counsel have any interests adverse to those of the other Class Members. 313. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Deutsche Bank pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed Class is readily and easily ascertainable from Defendants' records. 314. Superiority: A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because: a. Joinder of all Class Members is impracticable; b. The prosecution of individual remedies by Members of the Class will tend to establish inconsistent standards of conduct for Defendants and result in the impairment of Class Members' rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties; c. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly-situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender; d. Absent a class action, Class Members will continue to suffer losses and be aggrieved and Defendants will continue to violate New York and 88 EFTA00162045
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 89 of 163 federal law without remedy; e. Class treatment of this action will cause an orderly and expeditious administration of class claims, economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions will be ensured; f. Jane Doe 1 and her counsel are unaware of any class action brought against any Defendant for the violations alleged in this action; g. The forum is desirable because Defendants conducted the subject business with Jeffrey Epstein in this District and Class Members were consequently trafficked in this District; and, h. This action presents no difficulty that would impede its management by the Court as a class action. VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION COUNT I KNOWING BENEFICIARY IN A SEX-TRAFFICKING VENTURE IN VIOLATION OF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(aX2), 1595 315. PlaintiffJane Doe 1 realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 — 314, as if fully set forth in this Count. 316. Jane Doe I brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other Class Members she respectively seeks to represent. 317. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally participated in, assisted, supported, and facilitated a sex-trafficking venture that was in and affecting 89 EFTA00162046
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 90 of 163 interstate and foreign commerce, together and with others, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2). 318. Deutsche Bank took many concrete steps to aid Epstein's sex- trafficking venture, as outlined above. Among the concrete steps that Deutsche Bank took to aid Epstein was providing hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash, which made the sex-trafficking venture possible. Providing Epstein hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash caused Deutsche Bank to receive financial benefits. Deutsche Bank's willingness to provide large amounts of cash to Epstein was the quid pro quo for it receiving financial benefits from Epstein. 319. The cash that Deutsche Bank provided was necessary for Epstein to coerce Jane Doe I as well as other Class Members to engage in commercial sex acts. The cash directly formed part of the commercial nature of the sex acts. The cash was also a necessary and required part of Epstein's recruitment of Jane Doe 1 and other victims of his sex-trafficking venture. By providing cash that Deutsche Bank knew would be used to fund the sex trafficking venture, Deutsche Bank actively participated in the recruitment of victims of the venture. 320. The cash that Deutsche Bank provided went far beyond providing routine banking facilities to a client. It was far from routine for Deutsche Bank to provide $200,000 per year in cash to someone like Epstein, who did not have an apparent need for such extravagant sums. Moreover, the circumstances in which 90 EFTA00162047
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 91 of 163 Epstein was requesting such large amounts were far from routine and raised numerous "red flags"—taking it well outside routine circumstances. 321. Deutsche Bank providing $200,000 per year in cash to Epstein, under the circumstances of this case, was entirely inconsistent with the ordinary duties of a bank or its employees. 322. The reason that Deutsche Bank ignored the numerous red flags about Epstein was to receive financial benefits from Epstein, estimated to be in the range of (at least) "$24 million annually." Deutsche Bank knew that it would gain far- from-routine financial benefits by ignoring the red flags associated with Epstein and by participating in his sex-trafficking venture. 323. Among the concrete steps that Deutsche Bank took to aid and participate in the Epstein sex-trafficking venture were opening up more than 40 accounts at Deutsche Bank for Epstein, his related entities, and associates. By opening these accounts, Deutsche Bank receive many benefits from participating in Epstein's venture. The opening of these accounts was affirmative conduct that caused Deutsche Bank to receive those benefits. 324. Among the concrete steps that Deutsche Bank took to aid the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, between on or about August 19, 2013, and through about July 2020, Deutsche Bank concealed its delivery of hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash to Epstein and his associates. In order to benefit from the Epstein sex- 91 EFTA00162048
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 92 of 163 trafficking venture, Deutsche Bank willfully failed to file required Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with the federal government, because doing so would imperil its ability to profit from the sex-trafficking venture. Deutsche Bank's concealment of the cash transactions caused it to receive financial benefits through continuation of the Epstein sex-trafficking venture. 325. Among the concrete steps that Deutsche Bank took to aid the Epstein sex-trafficking venture were its failure to implement oversight requirements imposed by the ARRC. This failure was not just passive facilitation, but a deliberate omission by Deutsche Bank. This omission was specific act of concealment, which allowed Epstein to continue funding his sex-trafficking venture through suspicious transactions that would have otherwise been prevented. 326. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally benefited financially from, and received value for, its participation in the sex-trafficking venture, in which Epstein, with Deutsche Bank's knowledge, or its reckless disregard of the fact, that Epstein would use means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, and a combination of such means to cause Jane Doe 1, as well as other Class Members, some of whom were under the age of eighteen, to engage in commercial sex acts. 327. Deutsche Bank actually knew that it was participating in a particular sex-trafficking venture—i.e., the Epstein sex-trafficking venture outlined above. Deutsche Bank's knowledge went far beyond having an abstract awareness of sex 92 EFTA00162049
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 93 of 163 trafficking in general. Indeed, Deutsche Bank discussed internally Epstein's sex trafficking and the large amounts of cash that Deutsche Bank was giving him. Thus, Deutsche Bank did not simply fail to adequately detect signs of Epstein's sex trafficking; it did detect multiple signs of Epstein's sex-trafficking venture and continued to participate in the venture. Deutsche Bank knew that the venture was on-going, which was why Epstein required vast sums of cash. 328. Deutsche Bank's actions extend well beyond a situation of failing to train its staff about recognizing the warning signs of sex trafficking. Deutsche Bank's employees did recognize the signs of Epstein's sex trafficking. Indeed, Deutsche Bank's employees knew about Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. But Deutsche Bank decided to continue facilitating the Epstein sex-trafficking venture rather than ending its participation in the venture. 329. Among the signs that Deutsche Bank was facilitating Epstein's sex trafficking venture were those facts that came to the attention of Deutsche Bank's Anti-Financial Crime Department at the end of 2014 and into 2015, which caused the Department to escalate issues regarding Epstein's sex-trafficking venture to more senior levels. 330. Among the signs that Deutsche Bank was facilitating Epstein's sex trafficking venture were those facts that came to the attention of Deutsche Bank were those facts that came to its attention that led to an in-person meeting by Deutsche 93 EFTA00162050
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 94 of 163 Bank officials with Epstein in the bar in the basement of his New York home. While Epstein appears to have denied sex trafficking at that meeting, in light of all the circumstances, his denial was not credible—and Deutsche Bank knew that they were not credible. 331. Deutsche Bank's actual knowledge extended to the fact that specific individual women and girls were being coercively sex trafficked by Epstein between the time of his on-boarding and the termination of its relationship with Epstein. Even if Deutsche Bank did not know all the names of Epstein's victims, it knew that specific victims (e.g., Jane Doe 1) of a specific trafficker (Epstein) at a specific time period (various dates between 2013-19) existed and were being forced to engage in commercial sex acts. It also knew that some of the victims had eastern European surnames. Deutsche Bank was on notice, and knew, that such victims were being coercively trafficked by Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. 332. Deutsche Bank helped to conceal the names of Epstein's victims from the public and from law enforcement and prosecuting agencies by helping to conceal the existence of the sex-trafficking venture. Among the ways in which Deutsche Bank helped to conceal the venture's existence was by providing the cash necessary for the venture to avoid leaving a visible "paper trail." 333. Deutsche Bank's concealment included failing to follow through on enhanced monitoring of Epstein's accounts recommended by the ARRC. Deutsche 94 EFTA00162051
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 95 of 163 Bank failed to implement that enhanced monitoring specifically to help conceal Epstein's ongoing sex-trafficking. Deutsche Bank knew that if it implemented that enhanced monitoring, it would have to stop providing Epstein with the cash needed to run his sex-trafficking venture. 334. Deutsche Bank's concealment included failing to file required SARs for Epstein's suspicious cash transactions. 335. In addition to having actual knowledge that it was participating in Epstein's sex trafficking venture, Deutsche Bank had constructive knowledge that it was participating in Epstein's sex trafficking venture. Deutsche Bank also had constructive knowledge that Jane Doe 1, as well as other Members of the Class, were being coercively sex trafficked by Epstein. Its constructive knowledge extended to the names of Epstein's victims, because Epstein and his associates knew the names of the victims. 336. Deutsche Bank had constructive knowledge of Epstein's sex- trafficking venture because of specific acts by Epstein that put it on notice of a particular and ongoing sex trafficking venture. Among the specific acts were Epstein's use of $200,000 per year in cash in circumstances that prompted Deutsche Bank to specifically ask Epstein about sex-trafficking. 337. Also among the specific acts giving rise to constructive knowledge were the facts that an associate of Epstein (his attorney) made a total of 97 95 EFTA00162052
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 96 of 163 withdrawals from the Bank's Park Avenue branch, all in the amount of $7,500, Deutsche Bank's limit for third-party withdrawals. The circumstances of these withdrawals gave the bank notice that "structuring" was occurring to avoid alerting federal authorities. 338. Also among the specific acts giving rise to constructive knowledge were the facts that came to the attention of Deutsche Bank's Anti-Financial Crime Department at the end of 2014 and into 2015, which caused the Department to escalate issues concerning Epstein's sex-trafficking venture to more senior management. 339. Among the financial benefits that the Deutsche Bank received for participating in and facilitating Epstein's sex-trafficking venture were the deposit of funds that Epstein and Epstein-controlled entities made to Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank profited from the use of these deposits. Epstein and Epstein-controlled entities deposited these funds in exchange for Deutsche Bank's facilitation and participation in the sex trafficking venture, including its willingness to provide large amounts of cash in suspicious circumstances and to allow "structuring" of withdrawals to avoid triggering reporting requirements. 340. Among the financial benefits that Deutsche Bank received for participating in Epstein's sex-trafficking venture was referral of business opportunities from Epstein and his co-conspirators. Deutsche Bank profited from 96 EFTA00162053
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 97 of 163 these referred business opportunities. Epstein referred business entities and business opportunities to Deutsche Bank in exchange for its facilitation and participation in the sex trafficking venture. These referrals were a quid pro quo for Deutsche Bank's participation in the sex-trafficking venture. 341. Deutsche Bank financially profited from the deposits made by Epstein and Epstein-controlled entities and from the business opportunities referred to Deutsche Bank by Epstein in exchange for its facilitation and participation in Epstein's sex trafficking venture. 342. Deutsche Bank knowingly received financial benefits in return for its assistance, support, and facilitation of Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. Deutsche Bank knew that if it stopped providing assistance, support, and facilitation of Epstein's sex-trafficking venture, it would no longer receive those benefits. 343. Deutsche Bank knew, and was in reckless disregard of the fact, that it was Epstein's pattern and practice to use the channels and instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, to entice, recruit, solicit, harbor, provide, obtain, and transport young women and underage girls for purposes of causing commercial sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). 344. Deutsche Bank and its employees had actual knowledge that they were facilitating Epstein's sexual abuse and sex trafficking conspiracy to recruit, solicit, entice, coerce, harbor, transport, obtain and provide Jane Doe 1 as well as other 97 EFTA00162054
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 98 of 163 Members of the Class, into commercial sex acts, through the means of force, threats of force, fraud, abuse of process, and coercion. 345. Deutsche Bank's affirmative conduct was committed knowing, and in reckless disregard of the fact, that Epstein would use cash and financial supported provided by Deutsche Bank as a means of defrauding, forcing, and coercing sex acts from Jane Doe 1 as well as other Members of the Class. Deutsche Bank's conduct was outrageous and intentional. 346. In addition to actual knowledge that it was participating in and facilitating the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, Deutsche Bank also should have known that (and was willfully blind to the fact that) it was participating in and facilitating a venture that had engaged in coercive sex trafficking, as covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). 347. In exchange for facilitating and covering up Epstein's commercial sex trafficking, Deutsche Bank's officers and employees advanced in their careers at Deutsche Bank and received financial benefits therefrom by securing the Deutsche Bank-Epstein relationship. 348. Facilitating and covering up Epstein's sexual trafficking and misconduct was a means of obtaining economic success and promotion within the Deutsche Bank hierarchy. 349. Deutsche Bank's actions were in and affecting interstate and foreign 98 EFTA00162055
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 99 of 163 commerce, including its banking activities which were in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce. 350. Deutsche Bank's knowing and intentional conduct has caused Jane Doe 1 and the other Members of the Class serious harm including, without limitation, physical, psychological, emotional, financial, and reputational harm. 351. Deutsche Bank's knowing and intentional conduct has caused Jane Doe 1 and the other Members of the Class harm that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity, in order to avoid incurring that harm. 352. This case does not involve mere fraud. Instead, Deutsche Bank's criminal conduct in violating the TVPA was outrageous and intentional, because it was in deliberate furtherance of a widespread and dangerous criminal sex trafficking organization. Deutsche Bank's criminal conduct also evinced a high degree of moral turpitude and demonstrated such wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil obligations. Deutsche Bank's criminal conduct was directed specifically at Jane Doe I and other members of the Class, who were the victims of Epstein's sexual abuse and sex trafficking organization. 353. Deutsche Bank's outrageous and intentional conduct in this case is part of a pattern and practice of Deutsche Bank profiting by undertaking illegal "high 99 EFTA00162056
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Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 100 of 163 risk, high reward" clients. 354. By virtue of these knowing and intentional violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(2), 1595, Deutsche Bank is liable to Jane Doe 1 and the other Members of the Class for the damages they sustained and reasonable attorneys' fees. 355. By virtue of these intentional and outrageous violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(2), 1595, Deutsche Bank is liable to Jane Doe 1 and other members of the Class for punitive damages. COUNT II PARTICIPATING IN A SEX-TRAFFICKING VENTURE IN VIOLATION OF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), 1595 356. Plain t i ffJane Doe 1 realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs I — 314, as if fully set forth in this Count. 357. Jane Doe I brings this Count individually and on behalf of the other Class Members she respectively seeks to represent. 358. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally participated in, perpetrated, assisted, supported, facilitated a sex-trafficking venture that was in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, together and with others, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). 359. Among other things, Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally recruited, enticed, provided, obtained, advertised, and solicited by various means Jane Doe 1, as well as other Class Members, knowing that Epstein would use means 100 EFTA00162057