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not entitled to the inference that all absent evidence would have been both favorable and material 
to her case. United States v. Berry, No. 20-CR-84 (AJN), 2021 WL 2665585, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 29, 2021). 
Third, the Defendant must show that the prejudicial loss of evidence was caused by the 
pre-indictment delay. That is, the Defendant must show that the evidence was at one point 
available but that at trial "the lost testimony or information was not available through other 
means." Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *4 (quoting United States v. Sprouts, 282 F.3d 
1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2002)). Here, the Defendant has made only a "bare allegation that [certain] 
records have been lost or destroyed," but without explaining when or why they were lost. United 
States v. Dornau, 356 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Further, the Defendant does not 
explain whether any attempt was made to acquire these records either directly or by other means. 
It is unexplained, for example, why the Defendant believes that government property records that 
at one point existed are no longer available. Or why the Defendant could not have proven 
Epstein's residency by any alternative means. Similarly, the Defendant does not explain why the 
flight manifests that pilot Larry Visoski delivered to Epstein's office in New York have been 
lost. See Trial Tr. at 172. In short, the Defendant fails to show that the absence of documentary 
evidence was causally related to any decision by the Government to delay the Indictment. 
For similar reasons, the Defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice by reference to the 
deceased potential witnesses. First, "[c]ourts have generally found that vague assertions that a 
deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an 
indictment for delay." Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 317; see, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 
U.S. 783, 785-86, 788-90 (1977) (reversing dismissal for pit-indictment delay where a material 
defense witness had died); United States v. Snyder, 668 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1982) (two 
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defense witnesses died three years or more prior to indictment); United States v. King, 560 F.2d 
122, 130 (2d Cir. 1977) (defense witness died a year prior to the indictment). Here, the 
Defendant largely speculates about the contents of these deceased witnesses' absent testimony. 
She states, for example, that the two architect witnesses "could have established" the timeline for 
Epstein's residences and renovations at each but does not say what that timeline is. Maxwell Br. 
at 29. Similarly, the Defendant states that Epstein's live-in housekeeper could have testified that 
the Defendant spent only limited time with Epstein at his townhouse in New York but provides 
little basis or detail for that anticipated testimony. As with the documentary evidence above, 
such speculation, with the apparent presumption that absent evidence would necessarily favor the 
Defendant, is insufficient to establish actual prejudice. See United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 
651, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no prejudice where there is "no way of knowing what [an absent 
witness's] testimony would have been"). 
Second, the Defendant fails to establish that the content of these witnesses' testimony 
could not have been introduced into trial by other means. At trial, witnesses testified that Epstein 
employed a significant number of individuals to work at his residences, renovate those 
residences, or fly his private airplane. Some, like Juan Alessi, Lany Visoski, and David 
Rodgers, testified at trial. Still others were listed on the parties' witness lists. The Defendant 
does not explain why these witnesses' testimony, or the testimony of those listed witnesses who 
were not called, could not have supplied the same information that she seeks from individuals 
who were unavailable to testify. Her assertion that only individuals that have since died could 
provide adequate testimony is entirely unsubstantiated. Similarly, the Defendant does not 
explain why evidence of construction or renovations at Epstein's residences could not be proven 
by other witness testimony or by documentary evidence. 
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And third, the Defendant does not demonstrate that such witnesses, even if available to 
testify as the Defendant speculates they may have, would have meaningfully altered her defense 
such that she was substantially prejudiced by their absence. Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at 
*4. No witness listed could testify directly to whether or not the Defendant and Epstein sexually 
abused the victims. Rather, each would at best provide additional corroboration of the 
Defendant's arguments at trial to impeach the witnesses' credibility as to particular aspects of 
their testimony. This falls short of substantial prejudice. United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 
694 (2d Cir. 1982) (no prejudice where absent witness's testimony was "at best corroborative on 
minor points"). 
Specifically, the housekeeper's anticipated testimony that the Defendant rarely spent the 
night at Epstein's townhouse and that she and Epstein were not "always" together contradicts 
little, if any, of the Government's case at trial. Maxwell Br. at 30. The Defendant does not 
claim that the housekeeper was always aware of the Defendant's or Epstein's actions, and so is 
unlikely to have rebutted testimony that at other times and other locations, the Defendant and 
Epstein committed crimes. See Pierre-Louis, 2018 WL 4043140, at *4 (absence of a witness not 
prejudicial because unless the witness was with the defendant "every moment," it would have 
been "impossible for him to testify that defendant did not commit the charged crimes"). 
The speculated testimony of 
—that an individual known only as "the 
Countess," not the Defendant, wrote the household manual—is similarly unhelpful to the 
Defendant's claim. In considering whether testimony would have been beneficial to the 
Defendant, the Court must consider whether the witness would have been credible and withstood 
cross-examination. See Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 317 (citing United States v. Spears, 159 
F.3d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999)). The Defendant provides no basis to conclude that the jury 
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would have credited this vague testimony about an unnamed individual over the evidence 
presented at trial, including the testimony of Juan Alessi and an email chain between the 
Defendant and Markham that indicates that the Defendant worked closely with Markham to 
create the manual and provided specific content, such as the checklists, to be included. See GX-
424. 
Finally, the Defendant refers to her prior briefing in which she alleged substantial 
prejudice because of the absence of other deceased potential witnesses, including Epstein, 
Epstein's mother,- talent agent Michael Casey, and Palm Beach Police Department 
Detective Joseph Recarey. See Dkt. No. 138 at 8-11. The Court has previously considered and 
rejected the Defendant's claim of prejudice based on these absent witnesses. Maxwell, 534 F. 
Supp. 3d at 317. The Defendant points to no development at trial that she believes should alter 
the Court's conclusion, nor is the Court aware of any such reason for reconsideration. 
The Defendant's reply brief devotes just a single sentence to her claim of pre-indictment 
delay and does not address any of the defects identified by the Government. She has not 
satisfied either element required for a claim of pre-indictment delay, as she has not demonstrated 
that the Government improperly delayed prosecution nor that she suffered actual and substantial 
prejudice from such delay. The Court therefore denies her motion to vacate her convictions on 
this basis. 
V. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the Defendant's Rule 29 motion because the 
jury's guilty verdicts were supported by the witness testimony and documentary evidence 
presented at trial. The Court denies the Defendant's motion based on constructive amendment or 
variance because the jury instructions, the Government's evidence at trial, and summation all 
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captured the core of criminality charged in the Indictment, and the Defendant was not prejudiced 
by any alleged variance. Further, because the Government neither intentionally delayed its 
prosecution nor was the Defendant prejudiced by any delay, the Court also denies the 
Defendant's motion based on pit-indictment delay. Finally, the Court grants the Defendant's 
motion as to multiplicity. The Government concedes that Count One is multiplicitous with 
Count Three, and the Court further concludes that Count Five is multiplicitous with Count Three. 
Count Five, like Counts One and Three, charged the Defendant's participation in the same 
decade-long unlawful agreement with the Defendant's continuous coconspirator, Jeffrey Epstein, 
to groom and sexually abuse underage girls. 
Accordingly, the Court will enter judgment of conviction on Counts Three, Four, and Six. 
The Defendant's sentencing date remains scheduled for June 28, 2022. The Court previously set 
a schedule for sentencing submissions that remains in effect. Dkt. No. 656. 
This resolves Dkt. No. 599. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: April 29, 2022 
New York, New York 
ALISON J. NATHAN 
United States Circuit Judge 
Sitting by Designation 
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