EFTA00099941

Q. I will ask that question if you want, but I was focusing on people 
other than Mr. Epstein right now. 
A. I don't give massages. 
Q. Let's just tie that down. It is your testimony that you've never 
given anybody a massage? 
A. I have not given anyone a massage. 
Q. You never gave Mr. Epstein a massage, is that your testimony? 
A. That is my testimony. 
Q. You never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage is your testimony? 
A. I never gave [Minor Victim-21a massage. 
(Ex. 11 at 112:17-113:12). 
The defendant argues that these questions were fundamentally ambiguous because the 
deposition elsewhere discussed both sexual and professional massages. It was unclear, she 
explains, what kind of massage the questioner meant. (Def. Mot. 4 at 17.) The defendant's 
argument is, yet again, misguided. This line of questioning used broad language, and at no point 
during this set of questions 
did 
counsel suggest that the questions were limited to sexual 
= 
or professional massages. Cf. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 376 (concluding that the word "you" was 
ambiguous when the prior two questions asked about the defendant "as an individual" and then 
switched "without indication" to the defendant "as trustee"). The defendant's answers were 
unequivocal, with no expressions of confusion or internal contradictions. Cf. Markiewicz, 978 
F.2d at 809 (explaining that a question was ambiguous as to whether it asked about the deponent's 
personal or professional capacities, in light of the deponent's confusion in the next questions). A 
properly instructed jury could conclude that the defendant meant what she said: she never gave 
anyone a massage, including Epstein and Minor Victim-2. 
134 
EFTA00100101

The defendant is, of course, free to testify on her own behalf to her professed confusion or 
otherwise argue to the jury that the questions were ambiguous or the answers truthful. The issue 
before the Court is whether the questions were so fundamentally ambiguous that a jury, after 
hearing the trial evidence, could not conclude that the "response given was false as the defendant 
understood the question." Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
defendant has failed to establish such a fundamental defect." 
3. 
Materiality 
Finally, the defendant argues that none of these answers was material to the defamation 
action. As a threshold issue, however, materiality is also not appropriate for resolution on a motion 
to dismiss the indictment. As noted above, materiality is a jury question "except in the most 
extraordinary circumstances." Forde, 740 F.Supp.2d at 412 (citing Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 522-23). 
As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), "there is no 
doubt that materiality is an element of perjury under § 1623," and its precedent "therefore dictates 
that materiality be decided by the jury, not the court." Id. at 465. 
The Second Circuit has explained that it is inappropriate for courts to resolve questions 
relating to the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion to dismiss the indictment. The Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure contain no "analogue for summary judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56" for several reasons. United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 280 (2d Cir. 
2018). First, "[p]ermitting civil `summary judgment'-like motions .. . would enable an end-tun 
around the calibrated framework for discovery in criminal cases," and thereby "upset the policy 
49 Even if the Court concludes that any of the individual statements charged in the Indictment 
cannot sustain a perjury conviction, the count survives so long as some statement can properly be 
presented to the jury. See Bonacorsa, 528 F.2d at 1221 ("It is customary, and ordinarily not 
improper, to include more than one allegedly false statement in a single count. .. . Where there 
are several such specifications of falsity in a single count, proof of any of the specifications is 
sufficient to support a verdict of guilty." (citations omitted)). 
135 
EFTA00100102

choices reflected in the criminal discovery rules." Id. Second, doing so "risks invading `the 
inviolable function of the jury' in our criminal justice system.'" Id. at 281 (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, if the "defense raises a factual dispute that is inextricably intertwined with a 
defendant's potential culpability, a judge cannot resolve that dispute on a Rule 12(b) motion." Id. 
The exception to this rule is "extraordinarily narrow" because, in the normal course, the 
"government must make a detailed presentation of the entirety of the evidence before a district 
court can dismiss an indictment on sufficiency grounds," which the Government is not required to 
do at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id. at 282 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That 
point is underscored by United States v. Nitsche, 843 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2011), on which the 
defendant relies. There, the district court dismissed an indictment in a child enticement case for 
insufficiency of the evidence. First, however, the court explained that the question was ripe 
because "(1) Defendant has stipulated to the entire record that is relevant to Count I; (2) the 
Government has had several opportunities to make a proffer of any additional facts, to conduct 
any subsequent investigation, and to ask the Court for further delay to seek more evidence; and (3) 
because the record is limited to the chat." Id. at 9. Accordingly, "[tjhe transcripts themselves 
provide the Court with all of the relevant undisputed facts to decide the motion." Id. Here, of 
course, that is simply not the case and, in particular, there is no stipulation as to the entire relevant 
record. 
Under the relevant legal standard, the defendant's statements were material if they could 
have led to the discovery of other evidence or could influence the factfinder in the defendant's 
civil case. Evaluating that standard necessarily implicates facts beyond the deposition testimony 
itself and Judge Preska's unsealing order,50 such as identification of the allegedly defamatory 
5° The defendant observes that Judge Preska redacted some of the statements that form the basis 
of Count Six, stating that the "testimony is .. . far afield from the sex trafficking and sexual abuse 
136 
EFTA00100103

statements at the heart of that case and the evidence that might have been uncovered had the 
defendant answered the questions truthfully. A jury should be allowed to hear the questions in 
context to evaluate their materiality, which cannot be done at this stage.51 The Court therefore 
should deny the motion. 
In any event, the perjurious statements were material in both senses of the definition. First, 
the questions were aimed at developing a record in the civil suit that Epstein and the defendant 
recruitede 
Epstein's Palm Beach property in the guise of hiring her as a masseuse, and 
then sexualized that massage. Honest answers to those questions-for instance that Epstein in fact 
had a scheme to recruit underaged girls for sexual massages—would have been corroborative of 
some of Mclaims. 
Second, had the defendant honestly answered the deposition questions, 
ould have located other victims or witnesses who may have corroborated her testimony. 
But in any event, the question of materiality should be put to the jury and is inappropriate for the 
Court to resolve on a motion to dismiss without the benefit of the full factual record. The motion 
should be denied. 
allegations that were central to the dispute in 
v. Maxwell." (Def. Mot. 4, Ex. I at 7:3-6.) 
(The last colloquy has been unsealed except for Minor Victim-2's name. (See 15 Civ. 7433 (LAP), 
Dkt. No. 1212-1).) Yet Judge Preska's opinion as to the propriety of certain redactions in a civil 
case is not controlling as to whether the Government can meet the elements of a criminal perjury 
charge here. First, before Judge Preska were the defendant's denials of various sexual activities, 
not honest answers that would have been quite different. In part for that reason, Judge Sweet 
authorized the deposition at the outset. Second, the Government was not a party to the civil 
unsealing litigation and did not have an opportunity to be heard on this issue before Judge Preska. 
51 While the Government is open to crafting a stipulation on the background of the 
lawsuit 
to streamline presentation of these issues to the jury, it notes that the defendant's summary of that 
suit as set forth in her motion is incorrect. (E.g., Def. Mot. 4 at 20 (erroneously asserting that the 
defamation claims at issue turned on 
.bility to prove salacious allegations about public 
officials)). 
137 
EFTA00100104

In sum, the defendant asks this Court to dismiss Counts Five and Six by stretching to read 
ambiguity into clear questions and encouraging the Court to resolve questions committed to the 
jury. The Court should reject those arguments and permit the jury to resolve these issues of fact. 
VI. 
Counts Five and Six Are Properly Joined and Should Not Be Severed 
The Indictment charges the defendant with participating in a scheme to sexually abuse 
minors, and with committing perjury to conceal her crimes. All six counts of the Indictment am 
properly joined: they are logically connected, subject to overlapping proof, and connected by a 
common scheme or plan. To sever the counts and justify holding a second trial at which a second 
jury will be convened and the same witnesses—including victims of sexual abuse—will testify a 
second time, the defendant must carry a heavy burden by showing substantial prejudice from the 
joinder. She has not done so, and the severance motion should be denied. 
A. 
Applicable Law 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) permits the joinder of offenses that "are of the 
same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or 
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan." Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). This rule establishes three 
tests for joinder, each "reflect[ing] a policy determination that gains in trial efficiency outweigh 
the recognized prejudice that accrues to the accused." United States v. Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037, 
1042 (2d Cir. 1988). 
Charges are "similar" if they are "somewhat alike" or "hav[e] a general likeness to each 
other." United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245,253 (2d Cir. 2008)(quoting United States v. Werner, 
620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 8(a) does not requite 
`too precise an identity between the character of the offenses!" United States v. Pizarro, No. 17 
Cr. 151, 2018 WL 1737236, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2018) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Werner, 620 
138 
EFTA00100105

F.2d at 929). Offenses may be joined "where the same evidence may be used to prove each count 
or if the counts have a sufficient logical connection." United States v. Page, 657 F.3d 126, 129 
(2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "For purposes of analysis under 
Rule 8(a)," however, "no one characteristic is always sufficient to establish 'similarity' of offenses, 
and each case depends largely on its own facts." United States v. Blakney, 941 F.2d 114, 116 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For instance, in United States v. Werner, 
620 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1980), the "Second Circuit found sufficient similarity between two carp 
thefts that occurred two years apart and only one of which was violent in nature," because "'both 
offenses arose out of [defendant's] scheme to use his position as an insider ... to obtain money or 
property carried by it."' United States v. Smith, No. 05 Cr. 922 (DLC), 2007 WL 98043 I, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2007), aff'd, 348 F. App'x 636, 638 (2d Cir. 2009) (first alteration in original) 
(quoting Werner, 620 F2d at 927). 
Joinder is also proper for "distinct criminal acts where they originated from a common 
scheme." United States v. Ying Lin, No. 15 Cr. 601 (DLI), 2018 WL 5113139, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 19, 2018) (citing Werner, 620 F.2d at 927). Specifically in the context of perjury, "[t]he law 
in this circuit clearly supports the joinder of underlying substantive crimes with perjury counts 
where, as here, the false declarationsconcem the substantive offenses." United States v. Potamitis, 
739 F.2d 784, 791 (2d Cir. 1984); see United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1971). 
False statements can "concern" or be connected with substantive offenses even if they were not 
made as part of an investigation into the specific substantive conduct. See United States v. Ruiz, 
894 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1990) (joining false statements on loan applications with perjury about 
"attempts to secure Senate Ethics Committee approval" of "consulting fees'); United States v. 
Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. 1185, 1190-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (joining fraud counts with a false statement 
139 
EFTA00100106

in a bankruptcy proceeding). Similarly, "[c]ourts have repeatedly recognized the appropriateness 
of trying perjury or obstruction charges together with the underlying crimes to which the perjury 
relates, where proof of the alleged perjury requires proof of knowledge of the underlying crime." 
United States v. Butler, No. 04 Cr. 340, 2004 WL 2274751, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2004) (Lynch, 
J.) (permitting joinder of defendants under Rule 8(b)). 
In the event that properly joined counts "appear[] to prejudice a defendant or the 
government," Rule 14(a) permits a court to "order separate trials of counts ... orprovide any other 
relief that justice requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). "[I]n order to prevail" on a Rule 14 motion, 
"the defendant must show not simply some prejudice but substantial prejudice." United States v. 
Sampson, 385 F.3d 183, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Werner, 620 F.2d at 928). The defendant 
carries this "heavy burden" because Rule 8(a) already strikes a "balance' between "considerations 
of economy and speed" and "possible unfairness" to the defendant. United States v. Amato, 15 
F.3d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, "the principles that guide the district court's 
consideration of a motion for severance usually counsel denial," Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at 
*5 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), and severance should be granted 
"only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the 
defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence," Zap.° 
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993).52 But "Rule 14 does not require severance even if 
prejudice is shown; rather, it leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district 
court's sound discretion." Id. at 538-39. "[L]ess drastic measures ... such as limiting instructions, 
52 While Zafiro involved a motion to sever defendants, rather than counts, the Supreme Court's 
construction of Rule 14(a) applies in either case. See Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (relying on Zafiro); 
United States v. Gracesqui, No. 10 Cr. 74 (PKC), 2015 WL 5231168, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 8, 
2015), afd, 730 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Page for the proposition that Zafiro applies 
both to motions to sever counts and motions to sever defendants). 
140 
EFTA00100107

often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice and permit joinder." Page, 657 F.3d at 129 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
B. 
Discussion 
The perjury counts should be tried jointly with Counts One through Four. The offenses are 
of similar character, are logically connected and will be proved through muchof the same evidence 
because the perjury counts concern at least some of the same conduct relevant to the crimes 
charged in Counts One through Four and, as such, are properly joined. See generally Potamitis, 
739 F.2d at 791. Severing the counts would waste judicial resources by requiring a second trial at 
which the Government would offer similar proof, including by calling the same victims of sexual 
abuse to testify again at a second trial. The defendant has identified no prejudice sufficient to 
justify imposing that burden on the victims, the Court, and the Government. 
First, the Government expects to prove the offenses charged in Counts One through Four 
and those charged in Counts Five and Six with much of the same evidence. See United States v. 
Hester, No. 19 Cr. 324 (NSR), 2020 WL 3483702, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020) ("Notably, the 
fact that evidence of the crime charged in one count may be admissible in the Government's direct 
case in the trial of the other will typically defeat the need to severe the counts."). At trial, some of 
the most critical evidence that the defendant committed the offenses charged in Counts One 
through Four will also form the crux of the Government's proof of the falsity of the defendant's 
deposition testimony. In particular, victim testimony and related evidence offered to prove the 
existence of Epstein's scheme to abuse underage girls, and Maxwell's participation therein, will 
also provide much of the evidence demonstrating the falsity of the statements charged in Count 
Five. Compare, e.g., Indictment ¶ 4(c), (e) (discussing massages resulting in sexual abuse), with 
id. ¶ 21 (denying interacting with underage girls and a denying a "scheme to recruit underage girls 
for sexual massages"). Similarly, aspects of that proof, such as testimony regarding the sexualized 
141 
EFTA00100108

massages that were part of the scheme, will also prove the falsity of the statements charged in 
Count Six. Indeed, were severance to be granted, the facts involving Counts One through Four 
"would be central to a separate trial" on Counts Five and Six. Butler, 2004 WL 2274751, at *4; 
see Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19 ("Virtually every overt act alleged in the conspiracy count formed 
the subject matter of one of the eight perjury counts, and would therefore be admissible in a perjury 
trial to show the falsity of Sweig's denial before the grand jury."). 
Critically, the Government expects that proof to include testimony from victims of sexual 
abuse. For instance, the Government anticipates that Minor Victim-2 will testify that the defendant 
gave her an unsolicited massage during which Minor Victim-2 was topless. Indictment117(b). 
That is an overt act charged in Counts One and Three. Id.11111(c),17(c). It is also strong evidence 
that the defendant's statement "I never gave [Minor Victim-2] a massage" was false, as charged 
in Count Six. Id.  23. If the Court severs the Indictment into two trials, it will require Minor 
Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cl Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) 
(recognizing that joint trials of multiple defendants avoid "requiring victims and witnesses to 
repeat the inconvenience (and sometimes trauma) of testifying"). 
Similarly, the defendant's efforts to conceal her crimes by lying in a deposition is itself 
compelling evidence of her consciousness of guilt as to the offenses charged in Counts One 
through Four and indeed would almost certainly be relevant and admissible at a trial as to those 
counts even if severance were granted. In particular, and among other examples, the defendant's 
false denial of the existence of a scheme to recruit underage girls for sexual massages, and her 
specific (and equally false) denials as to Minor Victim-2, would be admissible as evidence of the 
defendant's consciousness o f guilt, even at a trial focusedexclusively on Counts One through Four. 
See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 747 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[A]cts that exhibit a 
142 
EFTA00100109

consciousness of guilt, such as false exculpatory statements, may also tend to prove knowledge 
and intent of a conspiracy's purpose ...." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
Second, the offenses are logically connected and are part of the same common plan or 
scheme. It is settled law in this Circuit that joinder o f "underlying substantive crimes with perjury 
counts" is appropriate "where, as here, the false declarations concern the substantive offenses." 
Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791; see also United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1992) (same). In 
Ruiz, the defendant was a New York state senator who founded a nonprofit that was developing a 
mall in the Bronx, and for which he provided consulting services. In 1984 and 1985, he made two 
loan applications for funds to invest in the project, on which he made false statements. Id. at 503-
04. In 1986, the defendant also lied about his possession of a letter from the Senate Ethics 
Committee to a grand jury that was investigating his consulting activities for the nonprofit. Id. at 
503. He was charged with two counts of false statements on the loan applications and one count 
of perjury, and he moved to sever the perjury charge. The district court denied the motion, 
explaining that, although the "alleged perjury did not occur during a specific investigation by the 
grand jury into the alleged bank fraud," the statements nonetheless "'concerned the defendant's 
scheme to maximize his personal gain from the [project], as well to cover any improprieties that 
scheme might involve." Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 702 F. 
Supp. 1066, 1076-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)) (emphasis omitted). And the Second Circuit affinned, 
explaining that the counts had "sufficient logical connection" because they all "relate to [the 
defendant's] extra-senatorial activities through the [nonprofit]," and therefore were "part of a 
common scheme or plan." Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505. So too here: the defendant's perjury did not 
occur in the context of a grand jury investigation into the same sexual offenses charged in the 
Indictment, but the statements concerned those offenses and sought to conceal the defendant's role 
143 
EFTA00100110

therein. See Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190-91 (joining counts involving use of businesses to 
commit fraud with a count of falsely swearing in bankruptcy court that the defendant "had not 
engaged in any business activity during the preceding six years").53 Accordingly, and consistent 
with the holdings in Ruiz and Broccolo, this Court should deny the severance motion. 
The defendant argues that the offenses are not connected because they involve different 
time periods. To be sure, Counts One through Four charge conduct involving certain victims from 
1994 to 1997, while the perjury counts charge statements made in 2016 in a case concerning 
.buse from 1999 to 2002. However, the specific statements charged in Count Five and 
Count Six directly relate to the conduct charged in Counts One through Four, including, in one 
instance, a specific victim identified as relevant to those counts. And those statements were not 
time-bound or restricted ta. 
For instance, the defendant denied the existence of any scheme 
to recruit underage girls for sexual massages, not the existence of such a scheme between 1999 
and 2002, or a scheme specifically focused on 
The defendant also denied ever giving 
anyone a massage, specifically including Epstein and Minor Victim-2. She did not limit her denial 
toMor 
to a particular time period. There is, accordingly, a strong connection between the 
truth or falsity of the defendant's broad denials and her acts in the period at issue in the substantive 
counts. The cases on which the defendant relies are factually inapposite and do not support her 
argument, because they involve wholly unrelated events. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 590 
F.2d 422, 431 (2d Cir. 1978) (severing a Medicaid fraud indictment from a tax evasion indictment 
where the only similarly was the defendant's manipulation of people he had employed—different 
53 While the defendant may argue that the fact that her deposition, unlike Ruiz, did not involve 
criminal authorities counsels in favor of a different outcome, as discussed further below, the 
prospect of a criminal prosecution was nonetheless plainly on her mind at the time of the 
depositions, as evidenced by the myriad arguments she herself makes in support of her motions to 
suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena to 
(See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4, Def. 
Mot. 11 at 2). 
144 
EFTA00100111

in each indictment—to his personal profit); United States v. Brown, No. 07-0296, 2008 WL 
161146, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2008) (severing an "isolated" firearms possession charge on a 
certain day from other narcotics and firearms charges); United States v. Martinez, No. 92 Cr. 839 
(SWK), 1993 WL 322768, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1993) (similar). 
The defendant also content that her false statements were not connected to the substantive 
offenses because they were made in a civil deposition, rather than "to the grand jury or the FBI to 
derail its investigation." (Def. Mot. 5 at 8). As an initial matter, and as evidenced by the 
defendant's own motions to suppress the fruits of the grand jury subpoena issued to 
the defendant herself professes to have been concerned about the prospect of a criminal 
investigation at the time of her depositions, which strongly suggests that, on these facts, the 
distinction is of little moment. (See, e.g., Def. Mot. 3 at 3-4 (explaining that the defendant "flatly 
rejected" a law enforcement exception to the civil protective order); Def. Mot. 11 at 2 (arguing 
that the defendant "declined to invoke" her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
at the deposition after negotiating the protective order)). More important, and whatever moment 
that distinction may have in other contexts, it has little bearing on the severance analysis which 
turns instead on whether the substance of the false statement relates to the substantive offense, and 
is thereby provable through overlapping evidence and part of the speaker's effort to conceal the 
offense. See Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 505; Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791 (citing United States v. Carson, 
464 F.2d 424, 436 (2d Cir. 1972); Sweig, 441 F.2d at 118-19) (affirming denial of a severance 
motion where the false statements "concern the substantive offenses" and citing cases where the 
perjury count's proof overlapped with the evidence on the substantive counts). With respect to 
that analysis, the defendant cites no case for the proposition that the setting in which the statement 
is made is significant, much less determinative. Cf. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. at 1190 (false statement 
145 
EFTA00100112

in bankruptcyproceeding). And the cases the defendant cites in which a perjury or false statements 
count was severed only underscore this point. In both cases, the statement itself concerned an 
entirely different subject matter, provable through largely if not entirely different evidence. See 
United States v. Boni, No. 08 Cr. 230 (CSH), 2009 WL 3157582, at *1, *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 
2009) (severing a structuring conspiracy and false statements related to that conspiracy from a 
"separate" corruption conspiracy); United States v. Mitan, No. 08-760, 2009 WL 2328870, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009) (severing counts charging a fraud scheme from perjury count for an 
affidavit submitted as part of a bail motion, which "was not as an attempt to cover up the scheme 
to defraud, but rather an attempt to show that Court had erred" in its bail decision). 
Finally, the defendant argues that the counts are unrelated because the defendant's 
testimony was given in response to questions "tangential to the defamation action," and her 
answers "concealed" no crimes because they were "true and reflective of the poor questioning by 
the plaintiff's lawyers." (Def. Mot. 5 at 8-9). The defendant is free to make at least some of these 
arguments to the jury, but these assertions are not a lawful basis for severing Counts Five and Six. 
This is merely an attempt to refashion the defendant's claim that she gave truthful, immaterial 
answers to ambiguous questions. But, as discussed in detail in Section V, those arguments have 
no merit. 
Third, the defendant has failed to carry her heavy burden under Rule 14(a) to show 
prejudice. At the outset, "[t]he contention that there is some inherent prejudice in joining perjury 
and related counts with substantive charges has been widely rejected." Potamitis, 739 F.2d at 791. 
And courts routinely hold that there is no prejudice where the evidence in support of the two counts 
is "interconnected." Blakney, 941 F.2d at 116; see Carson,464 F.2d at 436 ("[T]he commonality 
146 
EFTA00100113

of proof of the conspiracy and perjury crimes permitted joinder of the offenses . .. and denial of 
appellant's Rule 14 pretrial motion for severance."); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *6-*7. 
The defendant argues that the trial on the perjury counts will require a "full-blown re-
litigation of the defamation action." (Def. Mot. 5 at 9). That is a significant exaggeration. To 
litigate the perjury counts, the parties will need to present evidence about the basic substance of 
the civil suit—in particularMllegations and the defendant's denials-such that the jury 
will be able to assess materiality and the statements' context. This can be done briefly—as stated 
in Section V, the Government is amenable to presenting that information through a stipulation—
and, in any event, through minimal additional evidence. The stipulation or other evidence could 
be crafted to minimize the risk of spillover prejudice, for instance by referring to 
'y a 
pseudonym to avoid any connection she might have to testimony on the substantive counts. And 
any remaining prejudice could be vitiated by a limiting instruction that the jury should not consider 
allegations as evidence of the substantive counts. See Page, 657 F.3d at 130-31 
(approving of similar precautions when introducing evidence of a defendant's prior felony 
conviction); Pizarro, 2018 WL 1737236, at *7; see also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540 ("[J]uries are 
presumed to follow their instructions." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). There is 
every reason to think a jury could and would follow such an instruction. See, e.g., Rivera, 546 
F.3d at 254 (using a limiting instruction to prevent spillover prejudice for counts involving the 
sexual exploitation of different children, especially in light of admissibility across counts); United 
States v. Pena, 932 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (using a limiting instruction to address 
spillover prejudice from two murder for hire conspiracies). Indeed, even if the counts were 
severed, as noted above, the Government would still seek to offer evidence o f the defendant's false 
denials of conduct relevant to Counts One through Four as evidence of her consciousness of guilt 
147 
EFTA00100114

as to those counts, and would consent to a similar limiting instruction, which a jury would be 
presumed to follow. And, of course, in a severed trial exclusively on the perjury counts, the 
defendant would surely argue that a limiting instruction is necessary to prevent the jury from 
concluding that the defendant's statements were false based in part on the substance of 
unproven allegations. Just as a jury would set aside the substance ofSallegations for that 
purpose, so can the jury set aside the substance ofelegations 
for Counts One through 
Four. 
The defendant contends instead that the perjury counts require a "collateral trial" on the 
truth of statements 
and resolution of "more than 50 substantive motions . . . pending 
before the District Court." (Def. Mot. 5 at 9-10). As described in Section V, a false statement in 
a civil deposition is material (1) if a "truthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the 
discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit," United States v. Kross, 14 
F.3d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1994), or (2) if it has "a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of 
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed," United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Neither of these standards requires the jury to determine whether the defendant's statements would 
have tipped the scales in the defamation suit or would likely have led to the discovery of evidence. 
See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988) ("It has never been the test of materiality 
that the misrepresentation or concealment would more likely than not have produced an erroneous 
decision, or even that it would snore likely than not have triggered an investigation."); United States 
v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 135-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing the "natural 
tendency test" from a but-for test); Kross, 14 F.3d at 754 (rejecting, in a civil forfeiture case, the 
argument that the defendant's true testimony would not itself have justified a forfeiture because 
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"such evidence might lead to evidence . . . which would justify forfeiture"). The jury need not 
decide the outcome of the defamation case in order to evaluate whether truthful answers were 
capable of influencing the decisionmaker or could reasonably have led to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.54
Finally, the defendant argues that severance is appropriate because including the perjury 
counts "will necessarily introduce into the trial the issue of Ms. Maxwell's credibility." (Def. Mot. 
5 at 13). That is true anytime perjury or false statements counts are joined with other offenses, yet 
joining perjury or false statements counts to the substantive crimes they concern is the rule, not 
the exception. And more generally, the "adverse effect of being tried for two crimes rather than 
one" is not prejudice. Werner, 620 F.2d at 929. 
Trying the perjury counts with the Mann Act counts they concern makes eminent sense. 
Doing so greatly advances judicial efficiency by avoiding the need for two trials at which the same 
evidence would be presented, including testimony from the same victims. Just as the counts am 
similar in character, the trial would not be unwieldy. Against these efficiencies, endorsed by the 
liberal joinderprinciples behind Rule 8, the defendant identifies at most only "generalized claim[s] 
of prejudice," Rivera, 546 F.3d at 254, that can be cured by an appropriate limiting instruction. 
She thus falls far short of meeting her heavy burden, and her motion should be denied. 
54 The defendant relatedly suggests that her counsel from the defamation suit may have to testify 
regarding the perjury counts, denying her counsel o f her choice. She has not identified what factual 
issue they might testify to and why it must come from one of the lawyers who represented her on 
both that case and this one. The Government notes, in this respect, that three of the defendant's 
attorneys in this case had no involvement in the civil suit. Even if such testimony were necessary 
by one of the defendant's lawyers, it would only disqualify the firm if that lawyer is called "on a 
significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be 
prejudicial to the client." N.Y. R.P.C. 3.7(b); see generally Murray v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 
173, 177-80 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the advocate-witness rule). 
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VII. 
The Indictment Contains the Elements of Each Offense and Provides the Defendant 
More Than Adequate Notice of the Charges Against Her 
The defendant also moves to dismiss Counts One through Four on the grounds that the 
Indictment lacks specificity because it does not name minor victims, does not include specific 
dates, and uses language that the defendant claims not to understand. (Def. Mot. 12). The motion 
is meritless and should be denied. The plain language of the Indictment clearly and sufficiently 
sets forth every element of each crime charged, and the extensive details contained in the 
Indictment as further amplified through the voluminous discovery and the Government's various 
pre-trial filing describing the case and its anticipated proof at trial provide the defendant with more 
than sufficient notice of the charges against her. 
A. 
Applicable Law 
It is well-established that "[a]n indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the 
offense(s) charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge(s) against which he must 
defend." United States v. Rahimi, No. 16 Cr. 760 (RMB), 2017 WL 2984169, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 22, 2017) (citing United States v. Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). As a result, "'an indictment need do little 
more than to track the language of the statute charged and state the time and place (in approximate 
terms) of the alleged crime" in order to be sufficient. United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 
693 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1113 (2d Cir. 1975)). As 
such, "[a] defendant faces a high standard in seeking to dismiss an indictment." United States v. 
Nejad,No. 18 Cr. 224 (AJN), 2019 WL 6702361, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Post, 950 F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
Additionally, "when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations in the 
indictment as true." Chalmers, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 559. "A court should not look beyond the face 
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of the indictment and draw inferences as to proof to be adduced at trial, for `the sufficiency of the 
evidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment.' Id. 
(quoting United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776-77 (2d. Cir. 1998)). 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 states in part that an indictment "must be a plain, 
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged ...." 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). There are two constitutional requirements an indictment must satisfy in 
order to be sufficient: first, it must "contain[] the elements of the offense charged and fairly 
inform[] a defendant of the charge against which [s]he must defend," and second, it must 
"enable[)" a defendant "to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the 
same offense." United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (internal quotation 
mark omitted) (quotingHamling, 418 U.S. at 117). "[A]n indictment parroting the language of a 
federal criminal statute is often sufficient ...." Id. at 109. As a general matter, "[a]n indictment 
does not . . . `have to specify evidence or details of how the offence was committed.' United 
States v. Wey, No. 15 Cr. 611 (AJN), 2017 WL 237651, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan, 18, 2017)(emphasis 
in original) (quoting United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102, Ill (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). "When 
the charges in an indictment have stated the elements of the offense and provided even minimal 
protection against double jeopardy," the Second Circuit "has repeatedly refused, in the absence of 
any showing of prejudice, to dismiss .. . charges for lack of specificity." United States v. Stringer, 
730 F.3d 120,124 (2d Cir. 2013) (ellipses in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d. 37, 45 (2dCir. 1999)). 
Although courts have identified certain crimes for which an indictment may require greater 
specificity beyond tracking the language of the statute, such cases are "very rare." Stringer, 730 
F.3d at 125. Forexample, the Second Circuit has clarified that within this "less-common category" 
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is the "specification of what statements are alleged to be false, and in what respect they are false, 
in charges of criminal falsity," as well as "the subject matter of the congressional inquiry" for 
charges of "refusal to answer questions in a congressional inquiry." Id. at 125-26 (citing, inter 
alia, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962)). Similarly, "where an indictment charges a 
crime that depends in turn on violation of another statute, the indictment must identify the 
underlying offense." United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2000). When delineating the 
contours of this narrow category of crimes requiring additional specificity in an indictment, the 
Second Circuit has previously found that the failure to name a specific victim of fraud does not 
renderan indictment inadequate underthis standard. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 127. In other words, 
absent some affirmative indication that additional specificity is required when charging a particular 
statute, there is no basis to conclude that an indictment need contain more than the elements of the 
offense and the approximate time and place of the alleged violation. See Wey, 2017 WL 237651 
at *5 (declining to "depart from the usual sufficiency framework" where defendant "cites no 
authority" suggesting that the statutes at issue fall into the narrow exception to the general rule 
when considering motion to dismiss for lack of specificity). 
B. 
Discussion 
Because each of the four counts at issue—Counts One, Two, Three, and Four—clearly lays 
out each element of the charged offense and adequately informs the defendant of the accusations 
against her, the Indictment easily satisfies the standard for sufficiency. Tellingly, the defendant 
does not claim that any of these counts fails to allege an essential element or to track the language 
of the relevant statute. Nor could she, as the face of the Indictment not only contains each and 
every essential element of the crimes charged, but also goes beyond the basic requirements for 
pleading each charge by providing additional factual background. Instead, the defendant baldly 
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asserts that the crimes charged in Counts One through Four require additional specificity without 
citing any authority in support of such a broad claim. (See Def. Mot. 12 at 2). In particular, the 
defendant suggests that the failure to identify each minor victim by name, the presence of a date 
range rather than specific dates, and the use of certain language that the defendant claims not to 
understand render Counts One through Four so deficient that they must be dismissed. Because the 
defendant cites no authority indicating that violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2422, or 2423 fall into 
the rare exception to "the rule that 'an indictment need do little more than to track the language of 
the statute charged,'" her motion should be denied. United States v. Mingio,209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 
716 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Nathan, J.) (quoting Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124). 
First, the use of pseudonyms to refer to minor victims of the charged conduct does not 
warrant dismissal of the Indictment. See Stringer, 730 F.3d at 124 (affirming sufficiency of fiaud 
indictment "[n]otwithstanding its failure to specify the names of persons whose identifying 
documents were used" in scheme where prosecution provided victims' names in advance of trial). 
The identity of a victim is not required to be included on the face of a charging instrument, and the 
"lack of any identity or date of birth information of the alleged victims does not warrant dismissal" 
of charges alleging sexual abuse. United States v. Kidd, 386 F. Supp.3d 364, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
The defendant cites no law to the contrary and has not identified a single indictment in this District 
that includes the full names of minor victims of sexual abuse. Indeed, it makes good sense that a 
charging instrument alleging sexual abuse of minors would not include the full names of minor 
victims, whose privacy Congress has emphasized should be protected. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d) 
(delineating privacy protections for child victims and witnesses). 
Judge Marrero's decision in Kidd, which denied a motion to dismiss a sex trafficking 
charges in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 where the indictment referred to victims by pseudonyms, 
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