The Five Foundations' Pact
How OmaSp's owners shielded the board and withdrew record dividends on the brink of crisis
All financial statements referenced in this article are freely downloadable in PDF format at the end of this article.
Introduction: "The sauna deal"
On 23 May 2024, something extraordinary happened: the five largest owner foundations of Oma Säästöpankki Oyj jointly signed an indemnity commitment of approximately 10 million euros for the bank's board members. The stated purpose was "to extend directors' and officers' liability insurance and to strengthen the commitment of board members."
Exactly 27 days later, on 19 June 2024, Oma Säästöpankki dismissed CEO Pasi Sydänlammi. The bank simultaneously disclosed the results of an internal review, revealing serious problems in its lending practices. In December 2025, three board members — including long-serving vice chair Jyrki Mäkynen — were charged with insider trading offences.
Before any of this, in the spring of 2024, the same board had decided to pay shareholders a record dividend. The five largest owner foundations received a combined total of approximately 20 million euros, up from approximately 9 million euros the previous year.
This article is based on the five foundations' public financial statements and activity reports for the years 2020–2024. The documents reveal systematic and coordinated action in which the same individuals select the bank's board, decide on dividends, collect those dividends themselves, and ultimately commit to financially shielding the board against legal proceedings or damages claims.
Oma Säästöpankki Oyj has already disputed Pasi Sydänlammi's severance payment of 2 million euros, which raises a fair question: will the foundations now also cover Sydänlammi's costs under the terms of the commitment?
1. The indemnity commitment: The formula revealed
What the financial statements show
In the 2024 financial statements of three foundations, the indemnity commitment is reported as an off-balance-sheet liability. The financial statements of Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö state:
"A commitment given by the five largest owner foundations to the board members of Oma Säästöpankki Oyj, the purpose of which is to extend directors' and officers' liability insurance and to strengthen the commitment of board members. The commitment is not joint and several, and the amount presented here represents the maximum liability of Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö sr."
The documented commitments are as follows:
| Foundation | Ownership stake | Indemnity commitment | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö | 25.77% | €4,318,788.72 | Financial statements 2024 |
| Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö | 8.82% | €1,477,561.60 | Financial statements 2024 |
| Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö | 5.78% | €969,099.18 | Financial statements 2024 |
| Documented total | 40.37% | €6,765,449.50 |
The formula revealed
When each foundation's indemnity commitment is divided by its ownership stake, the result is a near-identical multiplier:
| Foundation | Calculation | Multiplier |
|---|---|---|
| Etelä-Karjala | €4,318,788.72 ÷ 25.77% | €167,580/percentage point |
| Töysä | €1,477,561.60 ÷ 8.82% | €167,524/percentage point |
| Kuortane | €969,099.18 ÷ 5.78% | €167,663/percentage point |
The indemnity commitment was thus divided precisely in proportion to ownership stakes. This demonstrates a coordinated decision in which all five foundations agreed on a total shared liability and split it on a pro rata basis.
Estimates for the missing foundations
For two foundations, the indemnity commitment is not documented in the available financial statements. Based on the formula, however, estimates can be calculated:
| Foundation | Ownership stake | Estimated commitment | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö | 9.91% | approx. €1,660,700 | No mention in 2024 financial statements |
| Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö | 9.39% | approx. €1,573,600 | 2024 financial statements not yet available |
A significant discrepancy
The 2024 financial statements of Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö make no mention of the indemnity commitment whatsoever, even though the Etelä-Karjala financial statements specifically refer to "a commitment given by the five largest owner foundations." Parkano is the second-largest owner. Why is the commitment absent from their documents? A deliberate omission?
Total liability
| Foundation | Ownership stake | Commitment | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö | 25.77% | €4,318,789 | Documented |
| Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö | 9.91% | approx. €1,660,700 | Estimate |
| Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö | 9.39% | approx. €1,573,600 | Estimate |
| Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö | 8.82% | €1,477,562 | Documented |
| Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö | 5.78% | €969,099 | Documented |
| Total | 59.67% | approx. €10,000,000 |
Five foundations controlling nearly 60 per cent of the bank's ownership thus committed to shielding the board for a total of approximately 10 million euros. The commitment is valid for three years, from 23 May 2024 to 23 May 2027.
2. Record dividends in the midst of crisis
Dramatic growth
In the same spring of 2024 when the indemnity commitment was signed, OmaSp's board decided to pay shareholders an exceptionally large dividend. The dividend income of the five largest foundations developed as follows:
| Foundation | 2023 | 2024 | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö | €3,595,634 | €8,578,759 | +138.6% |
| Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö | approx. €1,330,000 | approx. €3,337,000 | +150.9% |
| Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö | €1,247,000 | €2,935,000 | +135.4% |
| Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö | approx. €770,000 | €1,925,000 | +150.0% |
| Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö | approx. €2,022,000 | approx. €3,125,000 | +54.5% |
| Total | approx. €9 million | approx. €20 million | +122% |
What was happening at the same time
Record dividends were paid in the same year that:
- CEO Pasi Sydänlammi was dismissed on 19 June 2024.
- The Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanssivalvonta) revealed "fundamental problems" in the bank's lending practices and customer due diligence.
- The National Bureau of Investigation (KRP) was actively investigating the bank, leading to criminal charges in December 2025.
OmaSp's share price collapsed by approximately 50 per cent during 2024.
The bank set aside a 3 million euro provision for potential sanctions from Finanssivalvonta.
Who decided on the dividends?
The dividend proposal is made by the board and approved by the general meeting. In OmaSp's case, the five largest foundations control nearly 60 per cent of the voting power. In practice, the same parties that select the board through the nomination committee also approve the dividends proposed by that board.
Just before the crisis erupted, these same parties raised dividends to record levels and committed to shielding the board with 10 million euros. Coincidence?
3. The nomination committee: Five people who select themselves
The power structure
OmaSp's shareholder nomination committee prepares proposals for board members, board size, and remuneration. In practice, it decides who runs the bank.
Nomination committee composition as of 1 June 2025:
| Member | Role in foundation | Foundation | Ownership stake |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raimo Härmä (chair) | Chair of the board | Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö | 25.77% |
| Ari Lamminmäki | Chair of the board | Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö | 9.91% |
| Jouni Niuro | CEO | Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö | 9.39% |
| Aino Lamminmäki | Chair of the board | Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö | 8.82% |
| Simo Haarajärvi | Chair of the board | Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö | 5.78% |
These five individuals together represent 59.67 per cent of the bank's ownership.
Circular power
The structure forms a closed loop:
These five individuals select the bank's board through the nomination committee. The board decides on dividends, which flow to the foundations. The same individuals lead the foundations that receive the dividends. And now these same individuals have committed to financially shielding the board that they themselves selected.
4. The dismissed executive stays on: The Sydänlammi and Turtio cases
Pasi Sydänlammi and Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö
Pasi Sydänlammi led Oma Säästöpankki for 15 years, from September 2009 to June 2024. He was dismissed on 19 June 2024 when the bank disclosed the results of its internal review. The general meeting did not grant him discharge of liability. The bank contested his severance payment of over 2 million euros in arbitration.
Sydänlammi did not disappear from the OmaSp sphere.
According to Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö's 2024 financial statements, Sydänlammi continues to serve as the foundation's agent. He also sits on the foundation's election committee alongside chair of the board Aino Lamminmäki. In addition, he makes decisions on the SeAMK research fund, which holds one million euros in assets.
Sydänlammi attended the foundation's Christmas dinner on 17 December 2024, six months after his dismissal — all smiles, judging by the photos.
Sydänlammi and FinCap Fund II
Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö has invested in FinCap Fund II, a real estate fund. The investment was valued at €116,977 at the end of 2024.
This is no trivial detail. The partnership between Pasi Sydänlammi and FinCap has been widely reported in the media. FinCap has been one of OmaSp's key partners in real estate financing. The fund itself has been plagued by serious problems: an interest rate crisis, an additional financing need exceeding one million euros between summer 2023 and spring 2024, a cash shortfall, and a change of ownership in July 2025.
When a dismissed CEO's networks extend into both the owner foundations and the bank's financing partners, it is obvious to anyone — even the wilfully blind — just how tightly the bank's management and owners have been operating together.
Pasi Turtio and Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö
An even more striking case is Pasi Turtio. Throughout the entire review period of 2020–2024, he simultaneously held two roles: Deputy CEO of OmaSp and CEO of Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö.
Turtio thus represented both the bank's operational management and one of its largest owners at the same time. In 2023, he took on a third role as the foundation's representative on the bank's advisory board.
The 2024 activity report states: "Matti Uutela from Seinäjoki was appointed as the new agent to replace foundation CEO Pasi Turtio, who had requested to resign."
Turtio thus requested his own resignation from the foundation CEO position in the very same year the crisis broke. The same year the indemnity commitment was signed. The same year Sydänlammi was dismissed.
Presumably, Turtio's resignation from the foundation came at the same time as his departure from Oma Säästöpankki.
A summary of Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö's many other peculiarities can be found at the end of this article.
5. The KPMG training session of 2021: Preparing for trouble?
A seminar in Turku
The activity report of Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö for 2021 describes a significant event. On 27 September 2021, the foundation's board attended a training session organised by KPMG in Turku. The instructor was Johanna Fagervik, a lawyer and senior manager.
The training covered the following topics: the Foundations Act, key principles of foundation governance, good governance practices, liability for damages, related-party issues, foundation oversight, and public benefit status.
Reflecting on the owner's role
After the training, a seminar was held in which the board reflected specifically on Oma Säästöpankki's ownership. The activity report states:
"In the seminar, the foundation's board considered, among other things, the ownership of Oma Säästöpankki. Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö's ownership stake in Oma Säästöpankki is 10.9%. It is the second-largest owner of the listed Oma Säästöpankki Oyj. The board considered what its ownership strategy is and what the foundation seeks to achieve through its ownership. Does the foundation act merely as a passive holder of Oma Säästöpankki shares, or does the foundation take a more active role as an owner."
Significance in the broader picture
The training thus dealt specifically with liability for damages and related-party issues. The seminar explored the role of an active owner.
Three years later, these same foundations issued a 10 million euro indemnity commitment to the board.
Was the KPMG training part of broader preparations? Did the foundations already know about coming problems in 2021? Or was it simply routine governance development?
We do not know what was truly decided at the seminar, but the timeline raises questions.
6. The collapse in ownership value
A 212 million euro loss
At the same time as the foundations withdrew record dividends and committed to shielding the board, the value of their OmaSp holdings collapsed:
| Foundation | Value 31.12.2023 | Value 31.12.2024 | Loss |
|---|---|---|---|
| Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö | €182,298,629 | €90,934,845 | -€91,363,784 |
| Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö | €70,800,000 | €35,000,000 | -€35,800,000 |
| Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö | €66,406,041 | approx. €33,125,000 | -€33,281,041 |
| Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö | €62,368,750 | €31,111,000 | -€31,257,750 |
| Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö | €40,906,250 | €20,405,000 | -€20,501,250 |
| Total | €422,779,670 | €210,575,845 | -€212,203,825 |
The combined value of the five foundations' OmaSp holdings was cut in half. They lost a total of over 212 million euros.
Dividends vs. losses
At the same time, they received approximately 20 million euros in dividends — roughly 11 million euros more than the previous year.
If the foundation decision-makers knew about the coming crisis and the share price collapse, paying record dividends was a way to transfer money out of the bank and into the owners' hands before the value evaporated. If they did not know, the decision was still significant: in the midst of crisis, money was distributed outward rather than retained to strengthen the bank's balance sheet.
7. Legal and ethical dimensions
The Foundations Act perspective
The Foundations Act requires that a foundation's assets be used in accordance with its stated purpose. The typical purpose of savings bank foundations is to promote thrift and financial well-being.
Are indemnity commitments worth millions of euros to shield the bank's board consistent with the foundations' bylaws? Do they promote thrift and financial well-being — or the personal interests of the bank's management?
To whom are the foundations' delegations and boards accountable for this decision?
The Limited Liability Companies Act perspective
Chapter 1, Section 7 of the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act provides that all shares carry equal rights in the company unless the articles of association provide otherwise. This is the principle of equal treatment.
In this case, five foundations controlling 59.67 per cent of ownership have created a special relationship with the board. They have committed to financially shielding board members. The remaining owners, who control 40.33 per cent of ownership, are not party to this arrangement.
When certain owners grant the board special benefits not available to other owners, an asymmetric power relationship is created.
Board independence
A listed company's board should act in the interest of all shareholders. When board members are personally indebted to certain owners, independence is compromised.
The stated purpose of the indemnity commitment was "strengthening the commitment of board members" — but commitment to whom? To all shareholders, or only to those offering the shield?
This is particularly problematic in a crisis, where the interests of different shareholders may conflict.
Structural conflict of interest
The leaders of the foundations that issued the indemnity commitment simultaneously sit on OmaSp's nomination committee, which selects the bank's board:
| Person | Role in foundation | Role at OmaSp |
|---|---|---|
| Raimo Härmä | Chair, Etelä-Karjala foundation | Chair of nomination committee |
| Ari Lamminmäki | Chair, Parkano foundation | Nomination committee member |
| Aino Lamminmäki | Chair, Töysä foundation | Nomination committee member |
| Simo Haarajärvi | Chair, Kuortane foundation | Nomination committee member |
| Jouni Niuro | CEO, Lieto foundation | Nomination committee member |
The same individuals thus select the bank's board, decide on issuing the indemnity commitment, and benefit from it indirectly — because the board's continuity safeguards their own position of power.
8. Open questions
This article is based on public financial statements, activity reports, and news sources. The documents raise numerous questions that demand answers:
Regarding the indemnity commitment:
- Who decided on the timing of the commitment? Did the decision-makers know on 23 May 2024 that the CEO would be dismissed 27 days later?
- Why is there no mention of the commitment in Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö's financial statements, even though the Etelä-Karjala document refers to "the five largest" foundations' commitment?
- Who are the beneficiaries of the indemnity commitment? Current board members only, or also former ones, such as those named in the insider trading charges?
- What happens if the commitment is called upon? Who decides on the payment of damages?
Regarding oversight:
- Has the indemnity commitment been reported to Finanssivalvonta as part of the bank's governance arrangements?
- Has the Finnish Patent and Registration Office's foundation oversight assessed the legality of these commitments?
Regarding individuals:
- Why is Pasi Sydänlammi allowed to continue as Töysä foundation's agent and election committee member after his dismissal? Who made this decision?
- Did Turtio recommend the FinCap Fund II investment as well as the property purchase from the bank?
More broadly:
- What was truly decided at the KPMG training session in September 2021?
- Did the foundations know about the bank's problems before they became public?
- Is the entire Finnish savings bank sector structurally vulnerable to similar problems?
In closing
This article reveals systematic corrup... that is, coordinated action among the five largest owner foundations of Oma Säästöpankki.
The indemnity commitment was issued exactly 27 days before the CEO's dismissal. The foundations knew something — and that something led them to take on a 10 million euro liability.
Record dividends were paid that same spring, in the same year the crisis erupted, the share price collapsed, and board members were charged. Money was transferred from the bank to its owners at record pace.
The nomination committee forms a closed circle in which the same five individuals select the board, lead the owner foundations, and decide on the indemnity commitment. One of them leads the bank's largest owner while simultaneously chairing the nomination committee.
The dismissed CEO continues as agent for one owner foundation and participates in its decision-making. Another bank executive served for years simultaneously as both the bank's Deputy CEO and the CEO of an owner foundation — until he requested his own resignation in the year of the crisis.
The KPMG training in 2021 dealt with liability for damages and the active role of an owner. Three years later, the foundations did exactly that: they took an active role and committed to bearing the liability.
One thing is clear: when the same individuals select the board, decide on dividends, collect those dividends themselves, and commit to financially shielding the board, this is no longer normal listed company governance.
This is power that selects itself and shields itself.
18.12.2025
Highlights, Sources and documents
Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö: Peculiarities and downloadable documents
The king and his castle: Raimo Härmä is the central figure of the entire system. He simultaneously serves as chair of Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö's board and chair of OmaSp's nomination committee. He thus leads the bank's largest owner (25.77 per cent) while also selecting the bank's board. When the indemnity commitment was signed, Härmä in effect decided to shield the board that he himself had in effect chosen. The foundation's share of the commitment is 4.32 million euros — by far the largest of all five.
Dividends nearly tripled: In 2023, the foundation received dividends of 3.6 million euros from OmaSp. In 2024, the figure was 8.6 million euros — a 139 per cent increase. In the same year, the foundation's OmaSp holdings plummeted in value from 182 million to 91 million euros. In other words: the foundation lost 91 million euros in ownership value but managed to withdraw record dividends before the collapse.
Auditor changed mid-crisis: In 2022 and 2023, the auditor was Heikki Tuomi of KPMG. In 2024, in the middle of the banking crisis, the auditor was replaced by Sanna Miettinen. Both are from KPMG, but the timing of the switch raises questions. Was it routine rotation, or was a fresh pair of eyes preferred in a situation where the previous auditor had seen too much?
LUT University in debt of gratitude: Over three years, Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology LUT received approximately 1.43 million euros from the foundation for various projects. In 2023, the foundation funded a €500,000 professorship in "Systems Engineering of Renewable Electricity Generation." Other major recipients included the Saimaa Nature Conservation Association (€514,000), the South Karelia Recreation Area Foundation (€514,000), and Yrityskylä projects (€480,000). When the same organisations receive hundreds of thousands of euros year after year, a network forms in which raising critical questions about the funder is in no one's interest.
The board stayed while the world burned: Essentially the same board composition sat in place for all three years 2022–2024. Raimo Härmä as chair, Antti Rämä as vice chair, the same members year after year. Only in August 2024, when OmaSp's crisis was already in full swing, did Rämä step down and a new member join.
Grants grew in the midst of crisis: In 2024, the foundation made grant decisions totalling 2.39 million euros — more than in any previous year during the review period. At the same time, the value of the foundation's largest investment was cut in half. Is this good foundation governance, or the distribution of funds to one's own network before the situation deteriorates further?
A 91 million euro loss, zero accountability: The value of the foundation's OmaSp holdings fell by 91 million euros in one year. Yet the same Raimo Härmä who led both the foundation and influenced the bank's board selection still sits in both roles. Under the Foundations Act, a foundation has no owners in the legal sense. No one is therefore personally accountable for the fact that the foundation's wealth was halved. This is the essence of "ownerless money": power without accountability.
Downloads
- Financial statements and activity report 2022 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2023 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2024 (PDF)
Parkanon Säästöpankkisäätiö: Peculiarities and documents
The indemnity commitment vanished along the way: The financial statements of Etelä-Karjalan Säästöpankkisäätiö clearly refer to "a commitment given by the five largest owner foundations." Parkano is the second-largest owner with a 9.91 per cent stake. Yet Parkano's own 2024 financial statements make no mention of the indemnity commitment whatsoever. According to the formula, Parkano's share would be approximately 1.66 million euros. Where did this information go? A deliberate omission, a different accounting practice, or something else?
KPMG trained them, the foundation learned: In September 2021, Parkano's board travelled to Turku for KPMG training. The topics covered included liability for damages, related-party issues, and the active role of an owner. The seminar directly explored the question: "Does the foundation act merely as a passive owner, or does it take a more active role?" Three years later, the foundations took a very active role indeed: a 10 million euro indemnity commitment for the board. The training appears to have paid off.
Sydänlammi celebrated, then got the boot: At the foundation's 10th anniversary celebrations in Tampere on 28 September 2023, CEO Pasi Sydänlammi "brought greetings" to the guests. Less than nine months later, he was dismissed. The celebratory speeches apparently made no reference to forthcoming lending problems or internal reviews.
10th anniversary celebrations: Thrift on a flexible budget: In 2023, the foundation organised an impressive series of celebrations across six locations. Meat soup in Kurikka, Restaurant Ponsi in Tampere plus a Tappara-Ilves hockey match at Nokia Arena, rapper Elastinen and Suurimaa at the Käenkoski festivities in Parkano, and Arja Koriseva in Kankaanpää. The estimated total cost was approximately €115,000. In the same year, an individual youth sports team typically received a €1,000 grant. Promoting thrift appears to be a more flexible concept when it comes to one's own celebrations.
The Lamminmäki dynasty: Ari Lamminmäki has served as chair of the board for all four review years 2021–2024. At the same time, he sits on OmaSp's nomination committee alongside his spouse Aino Lamminmäki, who leads the Töysä foundation. Together, this couple controls two major owner foundations — approximately 19 per cent of the bank's ownership and 40 per cent of the nomination committee's voting power. Their relationship has never been reported in OmaSp's official documents.
The largest donations reveal the networks: Over three years, the most significant grants went to the Tampere University Hospital (Tays) paediatric haematology and oncology unit (€150,000), Mieli ry for children's and young people's mental health work (€150,000), and 4H organisations for the IkiOmaKesätyö summer employment programme (approximately €111,000). These are worthy causes in themselves, but at the same time board member Martti Kangasniemi repeatedly recused himself from grant decisions concerning Jalasjärven Jalas ry, which received approximately €58,000 over four years. The inner circle gets its share.
Downloads
- Financial statements and activity report 2021 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2022 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2023 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2024 (PDF)
Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö: Peculiarities and documents
New arrival, old tricks: Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö is the youngest of the five. It was established only on 28 February 2023, when Liedon Säästöpankki sold its banking operations to OmaSp and departed the Savings Bank Group. As the purchase price, the foundation received 3.1 million OmaSp shares. Less than a year and a half later, the foundation was already co-signing the indemnity commitment for the board whose selection its CEO participates in. It learned the house rules fast.
The CEO who selects the board: Jouni Niuro simultaneously serves as CEO of Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö and as a member of OmaSp's nomination committee. In the other foundations, the nomination committee seat is held by the chair of the board, but in Lieto it is held by a salaried CEO. Niuro thus draws his salary from a foundation whose largest investment is OmaSp, while simultaneously selecting the bank's board, which decides on dividends, which fund his salary. The circle closes neatly.
The wealthiest of all: By balance sheet total, Liedon Säästöpankkisäätiö is the second-largest owner foundation at a full 148 million euros. Its equity stands at 147.7 million euros — more than Parkano, Töysä, and Kuortane foundations combined. The former local bank brought a substantial nest egg with it.
Why did Lieto leave the Savings Bank Group? The 2023 activity report is candid about the reasons: dissatisfaction with "the cost-efficiency of the Savings Bank consortium's operations and the slowness of decision-making." Also cited were "differing views within the group regarding future plans." Lieto thus saw OmaSp as a more dynamic and efficient partner. Ironic, given what emerged at OmaSp barely a year and a half later.
2.75 million up in smoke straight away: In its first year of operations, the foundation recorded losses of 2.75 million euros from real estate funds — disposal losses of 2.37 million euros and write-downs of €386,000. What funds had the former bank invested in? Were some of the same problematic vehicles found among other foundations? The documents do not specify.
Ernst & Young as the exception: Lieto's auditor is Ernst & Young, whereas the other foundations use either KPMG or small local firms. Perhaps the former bank wanted to keep its own auditors. Or perhaps it wanted an auditor not too familiar with the OmaSp foundation inner circle.
Indemnity commitment in the dark: Since the 2024 financial statements were not available, we cannot confirm with certainty whether Lieto participated in the indemnity commitment. However, the Etelä-Karjala document refers to "the five largest" foundations' commitment, and Lieto is the third-largest owner. According to the formula, Lieto's share would be approximately 1.57 million euros. This will become clear when the financial statements are published.
Remuneration in order from year one: Although the foundation operated for only 10 months in 2023 (March to December), delegation and board members as well as the CEO were paid salaries and remuneration totalling €309,344. CEO Niuro also has a group pension agreement that pays a pension from age 63. Not bad for the first year of operations.
A 33 million euro loss on the horizon: At the end of 2023, Lieto's OmaSp holdings were valued at 66.4 million euros. If the share price stood at €10.60 at the end of 2024, the holdings would be worth approximately 33 million euros — a loss of approximately 33 million euros in a single year. This will become clear when the 2024 financial statements are published.
Downloads
- Financial statements and activity report 2023 (PDF)
Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö: Peculiarities and downloads
Financial statements signed in Paris: The "official" purpose of Töysän Säästöpankkisäätiö is to promote thrift and financial well-being among the residents of Töysä, Alavus, and the surrounding area. The 2023 financial statements, however, were signed in Paris on 19 April 2024. Not in Töysä, not in Alavus, not even in Finland — but in the French capital. While the foundation hands out grants of a few thousand euros to local youth teams, its leadership handles official signatures on trips abroad. Promoting thrift appears to apply mainly to the grant recipients.
A dismissed CEO as a decision-maker: Pasi Sydänlammi was dismissed as OmaSp's CEO on 19 June 2024 and was not granted discharge of liability. Yet he continues to serve as Töysä foundation's agent, sits on its election committee, and decides jointly with Aino Lamminmäki on the allocation of the one million euro SeAMK research fund. Sydänlammi attended the foundation's Christmas dinner on 17 December 2024, six months after his dismissal. Who decided that a dismissed CEO denied discharge of liability should continue in these roles?
Half a million to Denmark: The Saxo Bank account balance grew in one year from €944 to €501,342. The explanation is technical — OmaSp discontinued its book-entry account system maintenance — but the timing raises questions: why was half a million euros transferred to a Danish bank in the very same year OmaSp's crisis erupted and the foundation's largest investment collapsed in value?
A quarter of a million to India, up in smoke: In September 2022, the foundation invested over one million euros in the Elite India Solar Fund. By the end of 2024, the investment was worth just €4,940. The loss amounts to approximately €252,643. Who recommended this investment? The documents do not say. A local youth team gets a thousand euros from the foundation, but a quarter of a million vanishes into an Indian solar energy fund with no public accounting.
Töysä downloadable documents:
- Financial statements and activity report 2020 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2021 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2022 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2023 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2024 (PDF)
Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö: Peculiarities
A Deputy CEO serving as the owner's agent: The Kuortane case is a textbook example of structural conflict of interest. For five years, Pasi Turtio simultaneously held two roles: Deputy CEO of OmaSp and CEO of Kuortaneen Säästöpankkisäätiö. He thus represented both the bank's operational management and one of its largest owners at the same time. In 2023, he took on a third role: the foundation's representative on the bank's advisory board. The same man was effectively sitting on both sides of the table.
Turtio fled the sinking ship: The 2024 activity report states dryly: "Matti Uutela from Seinäjoki was appointed as the new agent to replace foundation CEO Pasi Turtio, who had requested to resign." Turtio thus requested his own resignation. In the very same year the indemnity commitment was signed. The same year Sydänlammi was dismissed. The same year the crisis erupted. Rats know when the ship is sinking.
A property deal with oneself: In 2021, the foundation purchased a property called Pankkila in Kuortane. The seller was Oma Säästöpankki Oyj. The purchase price was €100,000. The purchase decision was made by a foundation whose CEO was the bank's Deputy CEO. In effect, Turtio sold to himself. Was the price at market value? Who assessed it — or was a property seized from some struggling entrepreneur who had fallen behind on loan repayments bought at a bargain price on Turtio's instructions?
FinCap Fund II and the Sydänlammi connection: The foundation has invested in FinCap Fund II, a real estate fund valued at €116,977 at the end of 2024. This is no random investment. The partnership between Pasi Sydänlammi and FinCap has been widely reported. The entire FinCap group has been one of OmaSp's largest black holes in real estate, not to mention SJK. The fund and FinCap have been plagued by serious problems: equity wiped out in three companies, an interest rate crisis, additional financing needs, a cash shortfall, and a change of fund ownership — though to former FinCap insiders, so the wheel keeps turning. When a dismissed CEO's favoured partners' fund turns up in the foundation's investments, the density of the networks begins to take shape.
Same auditor as Töysä: Kuortane and Töysä foundations are audited by the same person: Mikko Sillanpää from Seinäjoki. He has served as auditor for both foundations throughout the entire five-year review period. When two foundations whose leadership is tightly connected to OmaSp's management use the same auditor, independence may remain a theoretical statement at the end of the audit report.
A million-euro express transfer to SeAMK: In 2024, the foundation made its single largest grant decision ever: one million euros to Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences for new study places. This is clearly more than any other grant in the entire five-year review period. In the same year, the foundation's OmaSp holdings halved in value. Why was a historically large donation necessary right now?
Dividends multiplied 2.5 times: In 2023, the foundation received dividends of approximately €770,000. In 2024, the figure was €1,925,000. At the same time, the foundation's OmaSp holdings collapsed from 41 million to 20 million euros. Record dividends were thus withdrawn in the same year the ownership value was halved. A familiar pattern.
Haarajärvi at the centre of it all: Simo Haarajärvi has served as chair of the foundation's board for all five years 2020–2024. At the same time, he sits on OmaSp's nomination committee and serves as the foundation's representative on the bank's advisory board. He signed the indemnity commitment that shields the board whose selection he himself participated in. Haarajärvi is not as prominent a figure as Raimo Härmä, but he is part of the same five-person inner circle that controls the entire system.
The delegation shrinks: In 2020, the foundation's delegation had 33 members. By 2024, only 27. A reduction of six members in five years. Fewer overseers means easier oversight. Or rather: the absence of oversight becomes easier.
Downloads
- Financial statements and activity report 2020 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2021 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2022 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2023 (PDF)
- Financial statements and activity report 2024 (PDF)
Other sources
Oma Säästöpankki Oyj: Annual reports 2018–2024, stock exchange releases, Corporate Governance reports, nomination committee rules of procedure, media.
Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanssivalvonta): Inspection reports 2022–2025, stock exchange announcements.
National Bureau of Investigation (KRP): Pre-trial investigation bulletins 2024–2025.
Ilkka-Pohjalainen: Roles of Sydänlammi and the Lamminmäki family.
The foundations' financial statements are public documents available from the Finnish Patent and Registration Office's foundation register. The authors of this article have compiled the documents and written this article based on them.