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movements increase activity within the In understanding other people,
motor system measured using fMRI. we start with what we understand about
Furthermore, it is possible to show that ourselves. As Nick Epley describes in
the same parts of the motor system can his chapter, we take this kind of
be active in talking and in understanding egocentric perspective in understanding
speech. By analyzing which parts of the other people or pets or God or the
brain are active and when they become behavior of inanimate objects. We know
active, it is possible to show that when what we meant when we say something
motor system activity in the frontal lobe or do something and we make the same
of the brain precedes activity in other attribution to others, even nonhuman
regions (e.g., the temporal lobe), others. While this may be a good starting
listeners have a better understanding.6 It point for religions to help people feel
is as if the motor system "recognizes" connected to God, as discussed by Clark
the speech before other parts of the brain Gilpin, it may not be uniformly
when the talking mouth is visible to the informative about human behavior.
listener. Behavior is not transparent for the
intention of that behavior. The fact that
This study shows that more
any particular action is not necessarily
information about the action of
unique to the intent behind it is the basis
producing speech (visible mouth
of a great deal of misunderstanding in
movements) can activate the motor areas
daily interactions. As a result, even if
of the brain during understanding of
mirror neurons help our brains recognize
speech. But it is also the case that
actions and sometimes interpret them,
understanding speech without seeing the
there are real limits to how experience-
speaker depends on the motor system.
producing actions can correctly inform
Hockey players arc experts at hitting
social understanding.
slap shots, blocking passes, and
whacking each other in the head with In spite of this limitation, we
hockey sticks. They have done these may often do just this—assume we
things in the real world just as monkeys understand another's actions because of
in Parma have learned to reach for what we would intend were we to do the
certain objects. When hockey players same thing in the same circumstance.
listen to sentences describing hockey Human social understanding does suffer
action, even without seeing the speaker egocentric limitations often and to the
or the action, motor areas are active extent that it does, something like a
during sentence understanding and these mirror neuron system may play a role.
same motor areas are not active in For example, as discussed by Jean
people without hockey experience! Decety in his chapter, our ability to
Understanding described actions appears understand the pain of others may derive
to be influenced by the motor systems of in part from the neural systems involved
people who have experience with those in our experience of pain, but goes
actions. Understanding action may be beyond this starting point. The social
influenced by the experiences of our brain is on one level perhaps a very
motor systems. egocentric brain. But the fundamental
motivation to connect with others has
Reading minds through action
resulted in systems built on top of these
egocentric foundations. If social
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understanding depended entirely on past biological explanation of
experiences of our own intentions and anthropomorphism, as discussed by
actions, there might be much more Epley and Gilpin. Of course as humans
misunderstanding and cynicism in the we have the ability to go beyond these
world. However, the capacity to reason, strict egocentric limitations and
hypothesize, and model possible futures recognize and respond to our social
may increase social understanding connections more explicitly. This ability
beyond the anchor of purely egocentric to go beyond the more basic grounding
perspective. We can conceive of of the way we understand others may
alternatives to our own goals and subscrve part of the goal of some
motives and relate those alternatives to religions, discussed by Kathryn Tanner,
the actions we observe. To some extent, in fostering a more abstract view of our
this process might also involve the motor connection to others. While a mirror
system by mentally simulating actions neuron system might help form the basis
and anticipated responses. By imagining for some aspects of social understanding,
how we might act in some situation to there may well be other invisible forces
achieve a goal or the alternative ways we at work supported by these and other
may act given some intention, it may be neural systems in our social brain.
possible to go beyond the limits of our
References
own experience. Such constructive
imagery may well depend on the motor I. Hasson, U., Nusbaum, H. C., & Small, S. L.
system, along with other neural systems, (2009). Task-dependent organization of
but currently there is no scientific brain regions active during rest. Proceedings
evidence that such a system might be oft he National Academy ofS ciences of the
linked with the operation of mirror United States ofA merica, 106(26), 10841-
neurons. 10846.
Conclusion 2. Dewey, J. (1903). Democracy in Education.
The Elementary School Teacher, 4(4), 193-
We are equipped to understand
204.
the world around us by relating what we
perceive to our own experiences. With 3. Gallese, V., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L.,
respect to actions in particular, our & Rizzolatti, G. (1996). Action
brains have specialized circuitry to relate recognition in the premotor cortex.
previously executed actions to newly Brain, 119 (Pt 2), 593-609.
perceived ones, possibly by performing
4. lacoboni, M., Woods, R. P., Brass,
an internal (imagined) simulation of
M., Bekkering, H., Mazziotta, J. C.,
them. There is evidence too that we
& Rizzolatti, G. (1999). Conical
might understand the emotional states of
mechanisms of human imitation.
others by a similar kind of process,
Science, 286(5449), 2526-2528.
whereby our brains activate circuits for
5. Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I.,
experiencing the emotion as a way to
Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta,
understand that emotion in others. These
J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005).
brain mechanisms might also apply (to a
Grasping the intentions of others
greater or lesser degree) when we try to
with ones own mirror neuron
understand actions or feelings by non-
human animals or even inanimate system. PLoS Biology, 3, 529-535.
entities. This could be a partial
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6. Skipper, J. I., van Wassenhove, V.,
Nusbaum, H. C., & Small, S. L.
(2007). Hearing lips and seeing
voices: how cortical areas supporting
speech production mediate
audiovisual speech perception.
Cerebral Cortex, 17, 2387-2399.
7. Bcilock, S. L., Lyons, I. M.,
Mattarella-Micke, A., Nusbaum, H.
C., & Small, S. L. (2008). Sports
experience changes the neural
processing of action language.
Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 105, 13269-
13272.
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and the brain machinery that supports
Connecting and Binding Social Brains
this important capacity by providing a
and Minds
resonant response to the observation of
We evolved as social organisms another person's distress. Although
in the context of face-to-face interaction. sympathy may motivate helping others,
Much of our human biology was empathy may be one of the social glues
established before the technology of that binds us together as a collective
email and cell phones. As a result, our social organism.
biological nature is tuned primarily to
social signals and interaction that occurs
in the presence of another. It takes just
a moment of observation for us to know
a lot about another person as a social
being. We can understand other
speakers easily within tens of
milliseconds of experience. Our brains
have developed to make this kind of
social connection quickly and easily,
whether through language or action. In
order to understand someone else, we
need to be able to understand their goals
and intentions. Moreover we need to
relate their behavior to our own
individual and personal experience.
Steve Small discusses some of the brain
machinery that may allow us to translate
our perception of language and
observation of behavior into a form that
can be related to our own use of
language and action. This kind of
resonance with experience, rather than
elaborate inferences, may allow us to
connect quickly with others, satisfying
our drive for sociality.
But understanding behavior and
communication is not all there is to
forming social connections. It is one
thing to read intentions and another to
feel someone's pain. If we only could
understand action and communication,
an important element of human
connection would be missing. In
forming a collective mind, as Gun Semin
discusses it, we need to have collective
emotional responses. Jean Decety
discusses the foundations of empathy
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daycare is being ignored by the other
faifefecrtlnaillp ah,paza children with the exception of one little
boy who takes her hand and includes her
1.1 111wpilomii eeSr.air l in all his activities. These modest
ane twibmJzga:c&tes i al beginnings signal the important and
LOS"` "'•
ongoing role of empathy for surviving
Iir'24-t—ite
and flourishing in our social world.
Empathy has been suggested to be
Chapter 99 essential to navigating the social world;
it enhances our understanding of others,
Empathy and Interpersonal
improves the effectiveness of our social
Sensitivity
communication, and fosters mutually
A young girl, after watching a satisfying social relationships.
televised documentary account of child Conversely, lack of empathy or its
hunger and suffering in Bangladesh, maladaptive use causes social
pleads with her parents to "do relationships to falter and fail.
something" to help them. A new child in
Empathy refers to our natural
capacity to quickly and automatically
9 The lead author is Jean Decety. Ph.D., the relate to the emotional states of another
Irving B. Harris Professor in the Departments of person. Rudimentary forms of empathy
Psychology and Psychiatry, and co-director of appear early in the life course, and with
the Brain Research Imaging Center at the
maturation, empathy can be experienced
University of Chicago Medical Center. He is the
by simply reading about or imagining
editor of the journal Social Neuroscience. His
interests include the investigation of the someone else's emotion. Empathy
neurobiological mechanisms underpinning comes so naturally that physicians must
interpersonal sensitivity, particularly empathy learn to dampen their empathic pain
and sympathy. His recent work focuses on
responses when inserting a needle into a
developmental neuroscience with both typically
patient (1). Just because empathy comes
developing children and adolescents as well as in
children with deficits in empathic responding naturally does not mean, however, that it
such as antisocial behavior problems. Decety has is instantiated in a discrete brain module
published more than 115 scientific papers, and that is automatically activated when one
recently edited the Social Neuroscience of
witnesses another's distress or suffering.
Empathy (2009, MIT press), and Interpersonal
Rather, the experience of empathy is
Sensitivity: Entering Others' World (2007,
Psychology Press). underpinned by the combined activity of
Empathy and sympathy play crucial several dissociable psychobiological
roles in much of human social interaction and are systems. Further, empathy can be
necessary components for healthy co-existence.
modulated by various contextual,
Sympathy is thought to have a key role in
dispositional, and interpersonal factors.
motivating prosocial behavior, guides our
preferences and behavioral responses, and The study of empathy, using
provides the affective and motivational base for sophisticated methods from psychology,
moral development. Although the study of these neurology, neuroimaging, and
abilities has traditionally been examined using
neuropsychology, provide a unique
behavioral and clinical methods, recent work in
opportunity to understand the invisible
social neuroscience has begun to provide
compelling and novel insights on the neural power of empathy in shaping our
mechanisms involved in interpersonal obligatorily gregarious social nature.
sensitivity. These developments are explored in
Defining empathy and its functions
this essay.
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Empathy can be defined as our intermediate forms of empathy exist
natural capacity to share, appreciate, and between the extremes of mere agitation
respond to the affective states of others. at the distress of another and full
This capacity is essential for the understanding of their predicaments (3).
regulation of social interactions. For Many comparative psychologists view
instance, empathy is believed to empathy as a kind of induction process
motivate prosocial behavior and inhibit by which emotions, both positive and
aggressive behavior (2). In addition, our negative, are shared, and which increase
ability to share the emotions of those we the probability that the protagonists will
observe binds us to each other and subsequently engage in similar behavior.
fosters a collective social identity.
Though certain non-human
Empathy's invisible power is that it
primates may share feelings between
moves us to cooperate, coordinate our
individuals, humans seem to have the
behaviors, and provide the needed care
unique ability to intentionally "feel for'
for one another. Notably, however,
and act on behalf of other individuals
empathic concern does not necessarily
whose experiences may differ greatly
lead to empathic behavior. First,
from their own. Such a capacity may
empathy poses a paradox, as sharing of
help explain why empathic concern is
feelings does not necessarily imply that
often associated with prosocial behaviors
one will act or even feel impelled to act
such as helping kin, and why it has been
in a supportive or sympathetic way.
considered the foundation for altruism,
Second, the complexity of the social and
the expression of empathy and caring for
emotional situations eliciting empathic
those who are not kin. Evolutionary
concern influences the probability and
biologists have suggested that empathic
nature of the help provided. Whether and
helping behavior evolved because of its
how empathic actions are expressed
contribution to genetic fitness (kin
depends on the feelings we perceive in
selection). In humans and other
the other, our relationship with that
mammals, an impulse to care for
individual, and the context in which we
offspring is almost certainly genetically
share an emotional state.
hard-wired. Less clear, however, is
Empathy is critical for complex whether an impulse to care for siblings,
human interactions, but this does not more remote kin, and similar non-kin is
mean that empathy and prosocial genetically hard-wired. The emergence
behavior have suddenly appeared with of altruism is not easily explained within
Homo sapiens. If empathy is a potent the framework of neo-Darwinian
invisible force generated by the social theories of natural selection (but see
brain, some form of emotion-sharing Cacioppo's chapter on this point). Social
should also be evident in other social learning explanations of kinship patterns
species such as non-human primates. in human helping behavior are thus
Indeed, field observations conducted by highly plausible. Indeed, one of the most
comparative psychologists and striking aspects of human empathy is
ethologists suggest that behaviors that it can be felt for virtually any
homologous to empathy can be found in "target," even targets of a different
non-human primates (2). Some have species (animals included). We can see
argued that empathy is not an all-or- a deer hurt by a passing car or the dogs
nothing phenomenon, and that many locked in crates at a shelter and feel
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strongly for their pain or confinement distressed shortly after another infant
and future. In part, this kind of empathic begins to cry. Facial mimicry of basic
extension may be motivated by the kind emotional expressions also contributes to
of anthropomorphic attitudes we have affective sharing, and this phenomenon
about non-human entities as discussed starts very early in life, by
by Nick Epley in his chapter. The fact approximately 10 weeks of age. This
that we are adept at "feeling for" very primitive mimicry mechanism, which
different others whom we can observe may be based on mirror neurons, which
but not truly understand suggests that we are sensorimotor neurons found in the
possess a capacity to cognitively re- premotor, motor, and posterior parietal
represent others in our mind in a way we cortex of the brain that become active
can understand. Indeed, second-order when observing as well as when
representation is a key component of enacting a behavior as discussed in
empathy in humans, and may be a useful Steven Small's chapter. This kind of
adaptation for human survival because it mechanism may contribute to the
maximizes the range of individuals with development of empathy in the early
whom we can form a social bond. preverbal period, and continues to
operate past childhood. There is
The Components of Empathy
evidence that when we perceive
The psychological components emotions and actions of others, we use
that make up full-blown empathy are the same neural circuits as when we
supported by distinct and separable produce the same emotions and actions
psychobiological systems. Empathy can ourselves (e.g., watching another
be decomposed into an affective individual being disgusted and
component that includes the perception experiencing disgust in oneself activate
and sharing of an emotional state similar neural circuits). For instance,
observed in another individual, and a viewing facial expressions triggers
cognitive component that includes the expressions on one's own face, even
motivation and intention to respond. without explicit identification of what
Closely related is a regulatory we're seeing (4).
component that involves adjustment of
The cognitive component of
one's emotional and behavioral
empathy is closely related to processes
response. The affective, cognitive, and
involved in "theory of mind" (i.e., the
regulatory aspects of empathy involve
ability to attribute mental states to others
interacting, yet partially non-overlapping
and to understand that others' mental
neural circuits. The initial component in
states can differ from one's own) and
the overall process leading to empathy
self-regulation. The capacity for two
draws on somatic mimicry, also known
people to resonate with each other
as "emotion contagion." This affective
emotionally, prior to any cognitive
component of empathy develops earlier
understanding, is the basis for
than the cognitive component. Affective
developing shared emotional meanings,
responsiveness is present at an early age,
but it is not enough for mature empathic
is involuntary, and relies on mimicry and
understanding and concern. Such an
linking of actions perceived in others
understanding requires the observer to
with actions in oneself (i.e., perception-
form an explicit representation of the
action coupling). For instance,
feelings of another person, a process that
newborns and infants become vigorously
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involves additional mechanisms beyond account for our ability to perceive and
the sharing of emotion and includes self- understand the pain of others. In the case
regulatory mechanisms to modulate the of pain, individuals are predisposed to
observer's experience of negative find distress of others aversive and learn
arousal. Specifically, in order to to avoid actions associated with this
understand the emotions and feelings of distress. This is even the case in many
others in relation to oneself, second- mammalian species, including rodents.
order representations of the other must For instance, rats that had learned to
be consciously available and must not press a lever to obtain food would stop
confuse the other with the self. The doing so if their response was paired
medial and ventromedial prefrontal with the delivery of an electric shock to
cortices are known to play crucial roles a visible neighboring rat (6).
in decoupling first-person and third-
Recently, a handful of functional
person information and maintaining
neuroimaging studies performed with
representations of the other as distinct
healthy human volunteers revealed that
from the self (5).
the same neural circuits implicated in
The regulatory component of processing the affective and motivational
empathy, especially regulation of aspects of pain in oneself account for the
internal emotional states and processes, perception of pain in others (7). In one
is particularly relevant to the modulation study, participants in a magnetic
of vicarious emotion and the experience resonance imaging (MRI) scanner either
of empathy as well as sympathy. received a painful stimulus or, in other
Empathy is unlikely to lead to helping trials, observed a signal that their
behavior if the observer is incapacitated partner, who was present in the same
by strong empathically evoked emotions, mom, would receive the same stimulus.
which is why emotional regulation is an First-hand experience of pain resulted in
important component in empathy. activation of the somatosensory cortex,
Indeed, children high in effortful control which encodes the way we feel aspects
show greater empathic concern, and the of a noxious stimulus such as its bodily
tendency to experience empathy and location and intensity. Furthermore, the
sympathy versus personal distress varies anterior medial cingulate cortex (ACC),
as a function of their ability to regulate and the anterior insula were activated
their emotions more generally. during both first-hand pain and the
anticipated experience of pain in
How We Perceive Other People in
someone else. These regions are
Pain
responsible for the affective and
When witnessing another person motivational processing of noxious
experiencing pain, the scope of an stimuli such as those aspects of pain that
observer's reaction can range from pertain to desires, urges, or impulses to
concern for personal safety, including avoid or terminate a painful experience.
feelings of alarm, fear, and avoidance, to A number of other neuroimaging studies
concern for the other person, including of empathy for pain in adults as well as
compassion, sympathy, and care-giving. in children have demonstrated that the
The existence of the perception-action somatosensory cortex is not activated
coupling mechanism apparent in only during first-hand pain but is also
emotional contagion also seems to activated with the perception of other
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people in pain. Altogether, there is and resistance to interference), functions
strong evidence to suggest that that are predominantly centered in the
perceiving the pain of others triggers an prefrontal cortex which continues to
automatic somatic sensory-motor mature from birth to adolescence.
mirroring mechanism between other and Theoretically, imagining the other is
self, which activates almost the entire distinct from imagining the self the
neural pain matrix including the former may evoke empathic concern
periaqueductal gray, a major site in pain (defined as an other-oriented response
transmission and for processing of fear congruent with the perceived distress of
and anxiety, and the supplementary the person in need) while the latter
motor area that programs defensive induces both empathic concern and
movements in response to anticipated personal distress (i.e., a self-oriented
pain. Such a neural resonance aversive emotional response such as
mechanism provides a functional bridge anxiety or discomfort). This distinction
between first-person and third-person has been supported empirically. When
information. It is grounded in the individuals are asked to imagine how
equivalence of self and other, which they would feel in reaction to emotion-
allows for analogical reasoning, and laden familiar situations and to imagine
offers a possible, yet partial, route to how a known person would feel if she
understanding others. was experiencing the same situations,
common neural circuits are activated
Of course, human empathic
both for the self and the other. However,
abilities arc more sophisticated than
relative to imagining the self, imagining
simply yoking perceptions of the self
the other results in specific activation of
and other. In the eighteenth century,
parts of the frontal cortex that are
Scottish philosopher and economist
implicated in executive control—the use
Adam Smith proposed that through
of attention and working memory and
imagination, "we place ourselves in his
decisions—and an area of the brain at
situation... enter as it were into his body,
the interface of the temporal and parietal
and become in some measure the same
lobes of the brain that is a key
person with" (8). By means of
component of a larger network of neural
imagination we come to experience
circuits involved in attention (sometimes
sensations which are generally similar
called the temporoparietal junction).
to, although typically weaker than, those
of the other person. This capacity to Some researchers have
engage in role-taking has been hypothesized that the role of the frontal
theoretically linked to the development lobes and the temporoparietal junction is
of empathy, moral reasoning, and more to hold separate perspectives or to resist
generally, prosocial behavior. Unlike the interference against attention to one's
motor mimicry and emotional contagion own perspective. In a recent functional
aspect of empathy, perspective-taking brain imaging study (9), participants
develops later, possibly because it draws were shown pictures of people with their
heavily on the maturation of executive hands or feet in painful or non-painful
functions (i.e., processes that serve to situations with the instruction to imagine
monitor and control thought and actions, themselves or to imagine another
including self-regulation, planning, individual experiencing these situations.
cognitive flexibility, response inhibition, During perception of painful situations,
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both the self-perspective and the other- level of empathic response, therefore,
perspective were associated with seems to be influenced by motivational
activation in the neural network involved factors as well as the interpersonal
in pain processing. These results reveal relationship between the target and the
the similarities in neural networks observer.
representing first- and third-person
Altogether, these findings
information. In addition, however, the
demonstrate that the similarities between
self-perspective yielded higher pain
affective representations of the self and
ratings and involved more extensive
the other stem from shared neural
activation of some circuits in the pain
circuits that can be emulated either
matrix than did the other-perspective,
automatically or intentionally by the act
thus highlighting important differences
of perspective-taking. Importantly, these
between self- and other-perspectives.
findings also point to some distinctions
Neuroanatomical regions and between these two representations,
circuits form the foundation for the distinctions that contribute to our
experience of pain in others, but they are capacity to detach ourselves from others
not sufficient to explain variability in sufficiently to make considered
interpersonal sensitivity. Although responses to their pain.
empathetic brain circuits are activated by
Conclusion
the mere perception of pain in others,
activity in these circuits can be Empathy, the natural capacity to
modulated by social, motivational, and share, appreciate, and respond to the
cognitive factors. For example, affective states of others, plays a crucial
observing pain in likable others (i.e., role in much of human social interaction
those who played a game fairly) resulted from birth to the end of life. As would be
in an enhancement of empathic brain expected if empathy functions to
responses, whereas pain in dislikable enhance social cohesion, social non-
others who played unfairly did not. human primate species also exhibit
Another functional MRI study (10) rudimentary versions of empathy. What
found that participants showed humans have in abundance are higher-
significantly greater responses in neural level cognitive and social abilities
regions that are involved in pain (language, theory of mind, executive
perception when observing the pain of functions) that can be deployed to
people who were not responsible for modulate empathic responses, and that
their stigmatized condition (i.e., are amenable to modulation by lower-
individuals who contracted AIDS as the level processes such as emotional
result of a blood transfusion) than either contagion and mimicry. These levels of
controls (healthy individuals) or people processing enable empathy to have an
who were held responsible for their impact on a wide variety of human
condition (i.e., those who contracted behaviors. From motivating prosocial
AIDS through illegal drug use). In behavior to providing the affective and
addition, participants expressed more motivational bases for moral
empathy and personal distress in development, empathy is an invisible
response to the pain of people who were force to reckon with when considering
not responsible for their stigmatized how humans behave toward each other.
condition as compared to controls. The
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consequences for the way we feel and
Seeing into My Mind and Other
think about and behave toward others.
Minds
Empathy is defined by Jean
Decety as "the natural capacity to share,
appreciate, and respond to the affective
states of others." Empathy rests on our
ability to see into the mind of another
while distinguishing it from one's own
to be in a position to cooperate,
coordinate, and provide the needed care
for others. The possession of empathic
capacity is not sufficient to determine
the precise nature of the response toward
others, however. As Decety points out,
whether an individual attends to and
responds empathically upon observing
emotion in another individual depends
on, among other things, dispositional
tendencies, the relationship between the
individuals, and contextual constraints.
Motivation to help another is also
influenced by the amount of cognitive
effort we are willing and able to exert to
take the perspective of the other.
Perspective-taking is essentially
an attempt to see into the invisible mind
of another. What we can't see, we model
based on our own mind and like-minded
individuals. Nick Epley shows that
seeing into and connecting with other
minds is such a frequent operation of the
social brain that the absence of others
inclines people to see human minds in
nonhuman entities. Whether it's a tree, a
pet, or God, ascribing mind to others
endows them with the capacity to
experience the same affective states we
experience. This shared capacity evokes
in us a tendency to feel and express
empathic concern for their well-being.
Unfortunately, humans do not grant all
individuals, much less non-human
entities, an equivalent degree of mind.
Epley articulates how differences in the
capacity to see mind in others have
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passengers were rescued, cold, wet, and
almost completely unharmed. Explained
— d 4.,capasi one passenger, "God was certainly
looking out for us." New Orleans Mayor
stfatatilthr s"°--QI El ikely—
Ray Nagin offered a very different
i-awkvoid e
experience. lone'Ss nt-.t se- r SW i = assessment of God's mind following the
d-t1' p~ sttattilindp eosptle devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina
1 when he explained that, "Surely God is
mad at America. Surely he's not
approving of us being in Iraq under false
Chapter 1010
pretense. But surely he's upset at Black
Seeing Invisible Minds America, too."
Shortly after taking off from Depending on your own beliefs,
LaGuardia airport in the dead of winter, such statements will seem somewhere
the engines of US Airways flight 1549 between insane and insightful. To
failed after inhaling several large geese. psychologists, they seem impressive.
The pilots glided their plane onto the They seem impressive not because they
Hudson River, where all of the reveal a keen sense of causal inference,
but rather because they reveal what may
be the most impressive capacities of the
1° The lead author is Nicholas Epley, Ph.D., a social brain—the ability to reason about,
Professor of Behavioral Science at the University
or "to see," what other minds see.
of Chicago Booth School of Business. His
Introspection enables you to know your
research investigates people's ability to reason
about others' minds, from knowing how one is own intentions, report on your own
being judged by others to predicting others' thoughts, feel your own pain, and
attitudes, beliefs, and underlying motivations, recognize when you are feeling shame
and the implications of systematic mistakes in
rather than guilt. Other minds, however,
mind reading for everyday social interactions.
are inherently invisible. You cannot
His research has appeared in more than two
dozen journals, has been featured by the Wall know what it is like to be another person
Street Journal, CNN, Wired, and National Public on the inside because your skull gets in
Radio, among many others, and has been funded the way.
by the National Science Foundation and the
Templeton Foundation. Epley has written for the The inherent invisibility of other
New York Times, produced lectures for the minds poses a major problem for hard-
Financial Times, been elected as a Fellow of the
nosed philosophers, who skeptically note
Association for Psychological Science, and is the
that people cannot infer that other minds
winner of the 2008 Theoretical Innovation Prize
exist at all. Although it is surprisingly
from the Society for Personality and Social
Psychology. difficult for philosophers to reject the
Other minds are inherently invisible. skeptical conclusion from the "other
You cannot see an attitude, smell a belief, or
minds problem," almost everyone else
touch an intention, and yet you can nevertheless
casts it aside altogether some time
"see" these mental states in other people with
around the age of five. At this point
great case. You can even see them in agents
ranging from pets to gadgets to gods. How you people have developed such a strong
are able to see other minds, and how they capacity to think about other minds that
become visible, matters because it marks the
they not only see minds in other people,
difference between treating others as human
but they seem to see other minds almost
beings worthy of moral care and concern versus
everywherel. Gods can be caring or
treating others as objects or animals.
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callous. Pets can be thoughtful or involves the capacity for
devious. And every now and then, metacognition—the capacity to think
computers can have a mind of their own. about one's own thoughts or emotions—
exemplified in experiences such as
Having the capacity to reason
confidence and doubt, or in secondary
about other minds enables people to
emotions such as shame, guilt, joy, or
form deep social connections with
hope. People seem to represent these
others, to empathize with others' pain
two capacities in others quite
and share in their joy, and to anticipate
independently. A sociopath, for
others' actions. But having a capacity
instance, can appear to act with a high
and actually using it are two different
degree of mindful agency but no mindful
things. People are not naturally inclined
experience, whereas a baby might appear
to see invisible things in the
full of mindful experience with
environment. People do not
relatively little mindful agency. Seeing
automatically see into other minds,
other agents as mindful essentially
either, but instead do so only under
means seeing them as able to
certain circumstances and with some
consciously think and/or to feel.
psychological effort. This chapter will
Because you arc aware of both your own
describe how people come to see other
thoughts and feelings, you likely
minds, how other minds can become
consider yourself—like most people
more or less visible, and why the
do—to be very mindful.
visibility of other minds matters for
everyday life. Making Other Minds Visible
Kinds of Minds Introspection provides a kind of
flashlight that seems to provide direct
Studying how people understand
access to one's own agency as well as
other minds first requires understanding
experience. Although research
how people intuitively define another
demonstrates that introspection is
mind. Research suggests that people
actually a process of indirect inference,
think of minds as having two distinct
it appears to us that introspection
dimensions, the ability to act (agency)
provides direct access to the workings of
and the ability to feel (experience)2.
our own brain. It seems that we can look
Mindful agency involves the cognitive
on the inside andf eel when we arc
activities that enable action, such as the
suffering, know when we are
capacity to plan, to have intentions, to
experiencing regret, or be aware of our
engage in deliberate self-control, and to
intentions to lose weight. We can use
pursue one's own goals. Conscious
our introspective abilities to make
preferences, attitudes, and beliefs follow
inferences about what others are likely
from these capacities. Mindful
thinking or feeling (and we very often
experience, in contrast, involves the
do), but such inferences are likely to
cognitive activities involved in reacting
seem inherently less direct, less
to the external world, such as the
immediate, and less illuminating. We
capacity for self-awareness, and the
cannot see into other minds as clearly as
experience of basic psychological states
we seem able to see our own.
(like hunger, thirst, or pain), and other-
oriented emotions (such as empathy or When something is difficult to
sympathy). Mindful experience also see, people may doubt whether it
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actually exists, or may not see it at all. therefore share his or her attentional
This is true of the relative difficulty that focus, and recognize that other people
people have seeing other minds may have preferences that differ from
compared to one's own, in ways that are one's own. By age two, children's
sometimes very subtle and surprising. social ability to read other minds seems
For instance, we tend to evaluate to have already surpassed that of our
ourselves by consulting our mindful nearest primate relatives, and over the
intentions, but we evaluate others (and next two years they pick up what appear
their intentions) by observing their to be uniquely human mind-reading
actions. We may consider ourselves to capacities. By age five, children
be conscientious if we planned to buy demonstrate the most sophisticated of
our spouse a birthday gift, but need to mind-reading abilities—the capacity to
see an actual gift to infer that our spouse recognize that others' beliefs may differ
is equally conscientious. 3 We tend to from one's own and to use those
believe that we are more likely to differing (sometimes mistaken) beliefs to
experience complicated mental emotions predict the other agent's behavior.
like shame, guilt, or embarrassment than Variability from age five onward comes
are others. ° We tend to believe that our from learning more specific details about
own behavior will therefore be guided how other minds actually work, largely
by moral sentiments like empathy, guilt, gathered from personal experience,
or compassion whereas others' behavior religious practice, or broader cultural
is more likely driven by the relatively norms.
mindless motives of self-interest.6 Other
Many psychologists and
minds are more opaque than our own,
neuroscientists speculate that learning to
and some learning, attending, seeking,
read other minds comes from the deeply
and projecting is required for our brains
social tendency, present at birth, to
to become fully social and see into them.
mimic others' actions. For example,
Here's howl.
Steve Small examines a neurological
Learning. Children do not enter underpinning for mimicry, and Jean
the world able to think about other Decety argues in his essay that an inborn
minds, but they learn to do so fairly capacity for mimicry underlies the
quickly. At around three months of age, human capacity for empathy. Looking
children start preferentially attending to where others look and copying their
animate objects compared to inanimate actions is a reasonable way to copy their
objects, and at around six months of age likely mental states as well. This
start to distinguish between intentional egocentric method of using one's own
(goal-directed) and unintentional mental experience as a guide to other
(accidental) action. At this age, for minds continues to be employed
instance, children will look reliably throughout adulthood, and can give
longer at a person who is reaching for a insight into others' mental states but can
cup than to a person who is making the also lead people to overestimate the
same reaching motion in the absence of extent to which others' minds are similar
a cup. Over the next 18 months, to one's own. These biases tend to be
children become more likely to mimic called egocentric when reasoning about
intentional than unintentional actions, to other people, and they tend to be called
follow the gaze of another person and anthropomorphic when reasoning about
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nonpeople such as a god or a gadget or a partner's thoughts before making their
pet. choice, only 27% chose to cooperate. If
people had already been thinking about
Attending. People rarely notice
others' thoughts, as it seems like they
things in their environment unless they
would naturally be doing in this
arc specifically attending to them. Other
situation, then a simple instruction to
minds likewise tend to be relatively
consider others' thoughts would have no
invisible unless attention is specifically
effect on people's own behavior. That is
drawn to them. For instance, take a
not the case. This simple experiment
moment to think about how happy you
shows that people may not naturally
are compared to the average American...
consider other minds even when it
No really, please take a moment.. if you
appears that they should. Thinking
just spent some time thinking about how
about other minds requires attentional
happy you are and no time thinking
effort. It does not necessarily come
about how happy the average American
automatically. Indeed, as Tanya
is, then you are no different from the
Luhrmann describes in her chapter,
majority of people in psychology
people may have to work very hard to
experiments who do likewise/3. People
discern other minds, such as the mind of
can consider others' thoughts, feelings,
God, even when they are actively
beliefs, or emotions, but doing so
looking for them.
requires mental effort that is in short and
limited supply. Consider, for instance, a Seeking. If seeing other minds
simple experiment in which you are requires attention, then other minds are
playing a game with another person9. especially likely to become visible when
Both you and the other player in this people are motivated to think about
game must first choose privately to them. There arc many reasons why
cooperate or compete with each other. If people might try to get into the mind of
you both choose to cooperate, you both another agent, from a spouse to a pet to a
earn $5. But if the other player chooses god, but two arc reasonably well-
to cooperate and you choose to compete, supported by existing research. First,
then you win $10 and your partner gets people tend to think about other minds
nothing. If you, however, choose to when they are trying to form a social
cooperate and the other player chooses connection with others. 1° Making
to compete, you win nothing and your people feel lonely or isolated, for
partner wins $10. If you both choose to instance, increases the tendency to
compete, you both win a measly $2. It describe one's pet as thoughtful,
seems obvious in this situation that you considerate, or sympathetic (all mindful
should consider both what you would traits). And those who arc made to feel
like to do, but also consider what the lonely are also likely to report believing
other player is likely to be thinking. in mindful supernatural agents, such as
Experimental evidence suggests that God. Second, people tend to think about
people do indeed think about the former other minds when they are trying to
but spend little time thinking of the achieve some understanding and control
latter. In a basic version of this over their environment or over another
experiment, 60% of people chose to agent's behavior.' Concepts of mind,
cooperate. However, when people were including attitudes, beliefs, goals, or
simply asked to think about their desires, can provide compelling cause-
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and-effect explanations of behavior that mind of it's own, that a mayor believes
give a sense of predictability and that God punished his city by sending a
control. A meteorologist may know that hurricane, or that you truly believe that
a hurricane may strike here or there your pet poodle is thoughtful and
depending on environmental conditions. considerate. Some of these attributions
Lacking such knowledge, a hurricane of mind seem purely metaphorical and
that strikes here rather than there may therefore unimportant, as ways of
lead people to invoke a mindful agent— speaking rather than ways of believing,
such as a God—to explain that action. whereas others seem to represent
genuine beliefs about the real presence
Projecting. If introspection
or absence of another social mind. But
makes your own mind visible, then you
metaphors have a way of influencing
might assume that those who look
behavior in ways that are consistent with
similar to you on the outside might look
believing the metaphor to be literally
similar to you on the inside as well.
true. People metaphorically refer to
Indeed, animals that move at a
feeling dirty after behaving unethically,
humanlike speed (such as a horse) seem
and yet washing one's hands actually
more mindful to people than do animals
reduces the guilt that people report
that move either much slower (such as a
feeling from engaging in unethical
sloth) or much faster (such as a
actions." People are surely just
hummingbird)." And an agent that look
speaking metaphorically when they refer
humanlike, such as a computerized
to rejection as being given the cold
avatar with human face, seems more
shoulder, and yet research demonstrates
mindful than avatars that do not look
that people do indeed report feeling that
humanlike. Any parent knows how well
a room is colder after someone has just
toy makers love to capitalize on this
rejected them than after someone has
tendency. But it is the converse of this
just accepted them.14 And surely people
effect that is even more interesting—
are only speaking metaphorically when
other minds become less visible as the
they refer to the stock market as anxious
agent becomes less similar to the self.
or jittery, and yet describing the market
Others that differ from you in their
as mindful leads stock traders to believe
interests, nationality, or social status are
that trends are likely to continue whereas
likely to be seen as less mindful—less
describing the market as mindless leads
thoughtful, less likely to experience
traders to predict more random
complicated emotions, less able to
variability." Whether metaphorical or
experience pain or suffering—than those
literal, seeing other agents as mindful
that are similar to you. It is little
matters because people tend to treat the
wonder, then, that the history of human
agent as if it has a mind. That matters
conflict is filled with instances of people
for at least three major reasons.
dehumanizing radically different others,
treating them like mindless animals or First, mindful agents have both
objects.12 intentions and the capacity for self-
control. Mindful agents can therefore be
Why Minds Matter
held responsible for their actions.
It may not be obvious to you why Possessing a guilty mind Omens real is
it matters that your neighbor, every now necessary for being held criminally
and then, thinks that her computer has a responsible for a crime in the US, a
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precedent found in courts around the than when in the presence of their
world dating back to the Middle Ages. relatively more mindful spouse22.
In times past and cultures in which
Finally, other minds matter
people did not so naturally restrict
because mindful agents become moral
intentional capacities to other humans,
agents worthy of care and compassion7.
animals (such as rats) and objects (such
The principle of autonomy captures this
as "possessed" statues) were common
most basic of human rights—that
targets of criminal prosecution16'17.
because all people have the same
Increasing the extent to which other
minimal capacity to suffer, deliberate,
agents seem mindful also increases the
and choose, no person can compromise
praise or blame that they receive for
the body, life, or freedom of another
their actions. And even diminishing the
person. Agents with mindful
extent to which people feel in mindful
experience, the capacity to suffer,
control of their own behavior (e.g., by
deliberate, and choose, become those
undermining people's belief in free will),
that evoke empathy and concern for well
leads people to behave in ways that are
being, whereas agents without mindful
consistent with diminished self-control
experience can be treated simply as
(such as by cheating on an exam when
mindless objects. From debates about
tempted to do so).1
abortion to animal rights to euthanasia,
Second, other minds arc capable the mindful experience of the agents in
of thinking, and may therefore be question is often either the explicit or
thinking about you. Being under implicit focus of debate. Making
scrutiny by mindful agents has two basic invisible minds visible, and hence more
effects on human behavior. One is that like one's own, enables people to more
mindful agents become sources of social readily follow the most famous of all
influence, increasing the extent to which ethical dictates—to treat others as you
people behave in socially desirable would have others treat you.
ways2 0. Imagine, for instance, how you
Conclusion
might behave if you found a magic ring
that made you invisible... and you'll get It is impossible for scientists to
the point. This ability for mindful examine whether God was looking out
surveillance to control behavior has been for the passengers of flight 1549 or
proposed as one of the reasons, if not the punishing the residents of New Orleans
primary reason, why religious systems with Hurricane Katrina, but it is very
that posit an omnipresent deity are able possible to examine why people might
to maintain such large-scale cooperative make such inferences. These
societies. The other effect of mindful examinations have revealed a
surveillance is that it is mentally taxing remarkable capacity to look beyond the
to monitor others' thoughts. This visible behavior that the environment
effortful monitoring can diminish a provides to reason about a completely
person's performance on other invisible world of intentions and goals,
cognitively demanding tasks21. And of motives and beliefs, of attitudes and
while waiting for a stressful event, such preferences—an invisible world of other
as giving a speech, people show less minds. Understanding when people are
stress-related responses when in the likely to recognize other minds (and see
presence of their relatively mindless pet into them) and when they are not is the
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key to understanding when people may 7. Epley, N., & Waytz, A. (in press).
be likely to invoke natural versus Mind Perception. In S.T. Fiske, D.T.
supernatural explanations, when gadgets Gilbert, & G. Lindsay, (Eds.), The
can seem to have minds of their own, Handbook of Social Psychology (5th
and when people are likely to treat their ed.). New York: Wiley.
pets as people and their enemies as
8. Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be
animals. A mind like our own, with the
gone! The "below-average effect"
capacity to see into other minds, is
and the egocentric nature of
essential for an agent to be, as we are,
comparative ability judgments.
fundamentally social.
Journal of Personality and Social
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