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21 
positions. They have included among their supporters a variety of 
liberal and secular professionals. At the FJP's first public rally before 
the elections in the working-class district of Bulac, a leading member 
of the liberal Egyptian Bloc coalition was among the invited 
speakers. It also has women and Copts among its members. Many of 
the hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood women I have encountered at 
its events work, and some hold full-time jobs. During the years 
immediately ahead, there is little reason for the party leaders to 
radically change their tone. 
For Islamist factions, the coming parliamentary term offers an 
opportunity to widen their support and allay fears of Islamic 
domination. The FJP will doubtless take advantage of its plurality to 
show that it does not menace the rights of others. But among the MPs 
of the Salafi Al-Nour, it seems likely that there will be a divide; many 
Salafist members of parliament envision an Egypt on the model of 
Saudi Arabia. 
During the next year the laws regarding codes of dress or matters of 
faith and worship will probably remain unchanged. Transformations 
are more likely to take place in subtle ways. As the social and cultural 
landscape of the country is altered, the visibly orthodox Muslims will 
become freer in their movements. Under the Mubarak regime, the 
Salafis with their bushy beards and ankle-length galabiyas were very 
closely watched; many of them were virtually under house arrest. In 
the months since Mubarak was ousted, and certainly in the center of 
Cairo, there has been a visible rise in the number of bearded men and 
of women who are fully veiled. The men, in particular, say that they 
were persecuted for their beards under Mubarak's regime, often 
keeping them trim if they grew them at all. Or as many told me, they 
simply stayed in their Islamist governorates or city suburbs, where 
the state's informants kept them under watch. Now it is probable that 
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22 
the more liberal Muslims, and the country's Copts, will feel 
increasingly out of place. 
When I went out to vote on the morning of November 28, a topic of 
discussion as we stood in line for six hours waiting to cast our ballots 
was what our futures might hold if the Islamists took power. Many 
women, my mother and her cousins and friends included, shared 
stories of the past—how they used to take public transportation 
wearing short skirts or open V-neck tops. "The good old days," they 
called them. But many women like my mother, and the others who 
stood in line in the well-to-do neighborhood of Zamalek, also 
understand that they are a minority in a country where 40 percent of 
the population is living on two dollars a day. For many, but certainly 
not all, such poor people, a sense of security and basic guarantees of 
survival are paramount. At polling stations in poorer districts of 
Cairo, like Imbaba, Shubra, and Ain Shams, people told me that they 
wanted "stability and a strong economy," and that "ultimately it is in 
God's hands." During the campaign, liberals spoke of a secular state; 
Islamists, trying to speak for the masses, concentrated on the cost of 
food. It is on such promises of better conditions that the Islamists will 
be expected to deliver. 
Some of the election results were not unexpected. The Muslim 
Brotherhood has long been known to be the country's largest and 
most organized movement, with widespread networks and growing 
popular support. As it offered increasing numbers of Egyptians social 
services where the government had failed, it came to be considered 
the greatest threat to the Mubarak regime. The deposed leader had 
often warned that if he left power, the Muslim Brotherhood would 
rise. 
Indeed, in the 2005 parliamentary elections, Muslim Brotherhood 
members—forced as an outlawed political group to run as 
independent candidates—won the largest bloc of seats, eighty-eight, 
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23 
in opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which 
won 311 seats. The ballots, moreover, were significantly rigged in the 
NDP's favor. What is surprising, then, is not that—with a voter 
turnout of 52 percent—the Brotherhood won 47.6 percent of the 
votes in November, and seems likely to win more in the remaining 
elections. What was unexpected was that the ultra-orthodox Islamist 
Salafis, newcomers to electoral politics, won 18.5 percent of the 
votes. (The moderate Islamist Al-Wasat Party took 2.4 percent, and 
the liberal parties and coalitions collectively just 20.5 percent, 7.1 
percent of the vote going to the nationalist liberal Al-Wafd and 10.7 
percent to the Egyptian Bloc.) 
The success of the Salafis—mainly represented by the Al-Nour Party, 
which was formed after the revolution—seems partly owing to recent 
miscalculations of the Brotherhood, which has repeatedly been absent 
from Friday protests and demonstrations that had the support of most 
other political groups, even the Salafis. The Brotherhood boycotted 
the May 27 "Day of Rage," or "Second Revolution," angering many 
of the million people who took part. Over the months, the 
Brotherhood leaders also changed and changed again their positions 
on a variety of issues—including the status of Copts and the end goal 
of an Islamic state—earning them the reputation, as I often heard 
said, of "never speaking the entire truth." In conversations with 
voters in poor neighborhoods during the November 28-29 vote, I 
frequently heard: "The Brotherhood can't fully be trusted; they don't 
stick to their words. The Salafis are pure." 
Perhaps their biggest mistake came on November 18, when tens of 
thousands of Egyptians—responding to a call by the Brotherhood—
returned to Tahrir Square to protest a government draft document that 
seemed, among other things, to give the ruling SCAF control over the 
writing of the new constitution. The demonstration went off 
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24 
peacefully, and when darkness eventually fell, the Brotherhood 
packed up and left, satisfied with the show of force. 
In the early hours of the following morning, riot police stormed the 
square, forcefully clearing it of the remaining protesters, mainly 
activists and revolutionary coalitions. In the days that followed, 
clashes between the police and protesters escalated, with the state's 
various security forces unleashing a kind of violence that had rarely 
been seen since the revolution. Tear gas was fired in toxic amounts, 
poisoning many and killing some; specially trained forces seemed to 
be targeting protesters' eyes. In the course of a single day, five young 
men lost sight in one eye, and one man—Ahmed Harara—was 
blinded (he had lost his first eye on January 28). 
Egyptians were outraged at the level of violence—forty-two people 
were killed—and at the SCAF's refusal to take responsibility, 
withdraw the state's security forces, and issue an apology. Many 
liberal parties suspended their campaigns, and some called for the 
elections to be postponed. The interim cabinet resigned in response to 
the violent attacks, and the presidential candidate Mohamed 
Elbaradei offered to forgo his presidential ambitions and instead 
serve as temporary prime minister to deal with the crisis. The 
country's highest Islamic authority, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar 
University, succeeded in brokering a truce on the streets so that 
elections could go forward. 
Throughout it all, the Muslim Brotherhood was conspicuously absent, 
cau- tious about taking sides. On TV programs and talk shows, the 
liberal candidates went to great lengths to explain why it was not 
moral to continue their election campaigns while people were dying 
in Tahrir. The Brotherhood leaders, for their part, insisted that 
elections take place soon; they knew they were far ahead of the other 
parties and coalitions. They had been waiting for this moment for 
eighty years; they weren't prepared to let it slip away. 
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25 
On the night of November 24, members of the Brotherhood 
reappeared in the square with the intention of clearing it—along with 
the embattled Mohamed Mahmoud Street—of the remaining 
protesters. "They did everything they could to get people to go 
home," a friend told me. "They would assess the type of person you 
are, and speak to you in a way that they thought would persuade you. 
They were willing to go to any lengths to make sure that people left 
that night." 
It is widely believed that the Brotherhood leaders had made a deal 
with the SCAF. They would clear the main demonstration site and 
calm the protesters, and the SCAF in return would hold the elections 
on time. Many blamed the Brotherhood for how long the clashes 
lasted and how many lives were lost. In Tahrir on November 25 the 
Islamist researcher and political analyst Ibrahim El Houdaiby told a 
group of us: "It would have taken a completely different direction 
had the Brotherhood come out last weekend and put their weight 
behind the people." Even Islamists and some preachers and veiled 
women spoke of their disappointment with the Brotherhood; they 
hoped that it wouldn't win the polls of the following week. 
Still, the liberal parties were not able to find much support from the 
underclass, whether in poor urban districts or rural Egypt. They could 
not penetrate the decades-old informal networks that have long been 
dominated by family and tribal alliances, religious affiliations, or 
agents of the former regime. Even if they had succeeded, the most 
prominent of the liberal coalitions, the Egyptian Bloc, was headed by 
the Free Egyptians Party, founded by the telecom tycoon Naguib 
Sawiris, whose popularity plummeted in June when he tweeted a 
cartoon of Mickey and Minnie Mouse wearing Muslim gowns and 
headdresses—Mickey with a bushy beard, and Minnie in a face veil. 
"Mickey and Minnie after...," he wrote. 
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26 
In the weeks following, a full-scale campaign was launched against 
him by Islamists, urging people to boycott his businesses. In a matter 
of weeks, 304,000 subscribers left his telecom provider, Mobinil, for 
local competitors; his company suffered losses of 96 percent for the 
third quarter of 2011. Even among some liberal Egyptians, Sawiris's 
tweet was seen as going too far: "We are a largely Muslim country, 
Sawiris has to remember and respect that." In response to the cartoon, 
a Coptic friend posted on Facebook a message that "the revolution 
was about unity, not such attacks." 
Amid all this, the Salafi Al-Nour Party has preached in favor of its 
puritan form of Islam, and a state governed by its principles—one 
with the same religious restrictions as Saudi Arabia—as the answer to 
the country's social and economic woes. The Salafists swiftly 
followed the lead of the Muslim Brotherhood, providing free and 
subsidized goods and services to the poor, and focusing their 
campaign messages on the price of food and cost of living. We don't 
know how much the party's appeal was hurt or enhanced by the fact 
that its campaign posters didn't feature pictures of its female 
candidates, and instead had an image of a rose above their printed 
names. At a political rally in a public square in Alexandria, it covered 
a statue of a mermaid with a cloth. But it appealed to Egyptians who 
spoke the language of the street and believed, among other things, 
that ultimately, the future of Egypt is in "the hands of Allah." 
In the days since the initial election results were released, the liberals 
have been discussing how to regroup and prepare for the weeks and 
voting rounds ahead. Many liberal Muslims and Copts are talking 
about what the future might hold, including immigration. The 
Islamist parties, for their part, are anxious not to be grouped together. 
The FJP has firmly stated that it will not enter an alliance with the 
Salafis, who themselves have said they will not walk in the shadow 
of the Brotherhood. (Before the elections, the two groups had agreed 
EFTA01148619

27 
on a code of proper behavior during them, but they have not entered 
into a political alliance.) 
In months to come, Egypt's first freely elected parliament will 
probably be as fragmented as the political landscape that preceded it. 
During what will be a period of immense pressure, the Muslim 
Brotherhood will most likely emerge as a mediator and perhaps the 
ally of the parliament's liberal coalition. The military, for its part, 
will undoubtedly continue to have a hand in the country's affairs, 
whether overtly through a provision of the constitution, or through 
tactical pacts with factions in parliament. Having waited since 1928 
for this moment, the Brotherhood can be expected to wait another 
few years before attempting to make any drastic or fundamental 
changes in the social and cultural life of the Egyptian state. 
Yasmine El Rashidi, a former Middle East correspondent for The 
Wall Street Journal, has written for The Washington Post, Newsday, 
Ms, Bidoun, The Chronicle of Higher Education, and Monocle, 
among other publications. A collection of her writings on the 
Egyptian uprising, The Battle for Egypt, was published in May. She 
lives in Cairo. 
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28 
AnICIC 6. 
INEGMA 
Syrian Uprising: Its Impact on Iran and 
Possibility of Civil War 
Riad Kahwaji 
December 20, 2011 -- Over ten months have passed and the Syrian 
uprising has maintained its strong momentum without a near end in 
sight. The Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad has signed an 
Arab-League plan aimed at quelling the violence in the country that 
has claimed the lives of over 5,000 people and injured thousands 
others. However, most observers and analysts in the Middle East 
have cast doubt on the sincerity and seriousness of the Syrian Baath 
Party regime to implement the Arab League plan. The suppression of 
the Syrian public uprising has all but increased since the signing of 
the Arab plan on December 19. Expectations by most regional 
experts and officials are that sooner or later the Syrian file will be 
referred to the United Nations Security Council, and a Turkish-led 
international military intervention would be inevitable. However, the 
resilience of the Syrian regime has surprised many, but so did the 
determination of the Syrian people who seems to have reached th 
point of no-return in its uprising to topple the Assad regime and end 
the half century old Baath Party rule. 
Iran appears to be the most anxious party over the course of events in 
Syria. Syria has been the other strong side of the Iranian axis in the 
region that has been engaged in a Cold War against a U.S.-led 
alliance that includes several Western and Arab states. Iran has 
worked on building this axis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, and in addition to Syria includes two strong non-state actors: 
Hamas and Hizbullah. Syria has been the bridge for Iran in the Arab 
EFTA01148621

29 
world and losing the Assad regime would break this bridge and 
disconnect Iran from its strongest regional player: Hizbullah in 
Lebanon. So the collapse of the Syrian regime will destroy Iran's 
current strategic position in the region that is the fruit of two decades 
of hard work and billions of dollars. Burhan Galyoun, the head of the 
Syrian National Council that groups all main opposition forces has 
already stated that the first order of business for the nex government 
of a Syria after Assad will be to end the strategic relations that 
Damascus has with both Iran and Hizbullah. 
Tehran seems to continue to bet on the Syrian regime for one main 
reason and that is it does not have any other options. "Iran will back 
Assad regime to the very end," asserted an Iranian expert who also 
advices the presidency in Tehran. He pointed out that Iran believes 
Assad could still survive the current crisis, providing that the United 
Nations or the West do not intervene militarily. "The Assad regime 
has learned a valuable lesson from (the late deposed Libya leader) 
Moammar Ghaddafi, and that is so long as it has a monopoly on the 
absolute use of violence it will not fall no matter how many people 
protest and march," the Iranian expert said. "Ghaddafi could have 
won and remained in power if it wasn't for the NATO intervention," 
he added. So the Syrian regime's strategy to quell the uprising is to 
use full military force against the opposition, and to use all its cards 
and connections to prevent an international intervention. Even though 
Assad is playing for time the time factor is playing against the regime 
as a result of the strong determination shown by the people despite 
the ferocity of the Syrian military and security forces in dealing with 
protestors and opposition figures. 
The Syrian opposition in turn is becoming more organized internally 
and externally. Faced with hesitation by some international powers to 
back an intervention in Syria, the Syrian opposition leaders have 
decided to become more self-sufficient. Efforts to raise money to 
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30 
self-sustain their activities outside and inside Syria have proven 
successful so far. Donations by a large base of wealthy Syrian 
businessmen and supporters have brought in millions of dollars that 
will enable the opposition to better organize itself and gain 
international recognition and support. However, the danger of 
delaying international intervention would compel the Syrian 
opposition to become more self-dependent in their internal efforts to 
fight back the Syrian military onslaught. Thousands of Syrian troops 
appear to have defected and are now organizing in small groups 
around the country, engaging the regime's forces in guerrilla warfare. 
But the fighting is taking more on the form of sectaria clashes 
between the predominantly Alawite forces of the regime and the 
largely Sunni opposition forces. If unchecked by a swift international 
intervention to end the conflict, Syria will most likely slide into a 
sectarian war between the Alawite minority and Sunni majority. 
Expectations now are that the Syrian regime will probably fail to 
implement the Arab plan, and subsequently will miss its last chance 
to prevent the internationalization of the conflict. As of January 2012, 
the Arab seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will go 
to Morocco after it was held by Lebanon for 2 years. Due to the 
strong Syrian-Iranian influence in the current Lebanese government, 
the Lebanese envoy to the UN opposed any resolutions against Syria. 
But with Morocco, the situation will be much different and the Arab 
League would be able to present a strong resolution against the 
Syrian regime. Many diplomats and analysts believe a resolution 
proposed by the Arabs at the UNSC will not face much resistance 
from China and Russia and will most likely be passed. Whenever the 
UNSC refers the UN Human Rights report on Syria to the War 
Crimes Court and issues a resolution calling for the creation of safe-
corridors or implementation of a no-fly zone ove northern Syria, then 
Turkey would have the needed international political cover to lead a 
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31 
military alliance that will establish a safe-zone for the defected Syrian 
forces to organize and will also prompt many Syrian military and 
government figures to turn against the Assad regime. 
Fear of international players, including Israel, that an international 
intervention could create another Libya scenario inside Syria is not 
fully true. Hesitant Syrian officials who still support the regime will 
likely reconsider their position whenever they see the regime's 
strategy that is based on preventing intervention, fails. This could 
bring a quick end to the crisis. Since most armed opposition groups 
are defected Syrian soldiers working under a military leadership, 
there will not be any chaos as was the case in the period that followed 
the collapse of the Libyan regime. There will likely be an orderly 
transition of both political and military powers in Syria. However, 
delaying the intervention could lead to the rise of armed Sunni 
militias to work separately from the organized Free Syrian Army, and 
this would lead to the spread of chaos before and after the collapse of 
the Assad regime. Reports out of Syria indicate that the current 
sanctions by many countrie and the civil-disobedience action by the 
opposition have started to take its toll on the regime. All what is 
needed is a little push from the international community to bring an 
end to a regime that was rightly described recently by a U.S. official 
as a "dead man walking." 
Mr. Kahwaji is CEO and founder of the Institute for Near East and 
Gulf Military Analyses (INEGMA), a think tank in Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates, that is active in media and conference activities 
within the region. He is also the Middle East Bureau Chief for 
Defense News, an international defense weekly based in Springfield, 
VA. 
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32 
Foreign Policy 
Bashar al-Assad Is Every Bit His Father's 
Son 
Jerrold M. Post, Ruthie Pertsis 
December 20, 2011 -- Incredibly, the Syrian uprising has now entered 
its 10th month. More than 5,000 people have been killed, according 
to the United Nations, with thousands more imprisoned and tortured 
or driven from the country. Many Syrian activists fear the toll may be 
far higher. A newly released Human Rights Watch report details that 
army units have been given "shoot to kill" orders in dealing with 
unarmed protesters. In the last two days alone, at least 150 people 
have been killed, a worrying sign that the violence is accelerating. 
Yet, in a remarkable interview this month with ABC's Barbara 
Walters, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 1) denied the extent of 
violence in his beleaguered country; 2) disputed the evidence in a 
U.N. report charging him and his government with crimes against 
humanity, asking, "Who said that the United Nations is a credible 
institution?"; 3) claimed that the forces charged with cracking down 
too hard on protesters did not belong to him, but instead to the 
government; and 4) indicated that the Syrian people supported him --
otherwise he would not be in his position. 
Does this suggest that Bashar is out of touch with political reality? Or 
-- as he has watched with dismay the fate of his fellow Arab dictators 
in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, who yielded too quickly to protests; 
and the violent end of Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, who fought 
until the bitter end -- has he resolved to follow neither path? To 
understand Assad's political behavior from a psychological 
perspective and try to anticipate how he will behave, we must 
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33 
understand him in the context of the Assad family's dominance of the 
Syrian political scene. Bashar's father, Hafez al-Assad, ruled Syria 
with an iron fist for three decades, including enforcing draconian 
emergency laws in 1963 that helped him eliminate political 
opponents and pave the way for the family to secure long-term 
political control, despite being part of the minority Alawite sect. 
Emblematic of his brutal rule was the crushing of the uprising in the 
city of Hama in 1982, in which tens of thousands of Syrians were 
killed. 
Hafez had originally designated his eldest and favorite son, Bassel, as 
his successor, and Bassel, the chief of presidential security, was 
perfect for the job. He was forceful, macho, an aficionado of fast cars 
who was popular with women. He stood in stark contrast to Bashar, 
Hafez's second son, who grew up in Bassel's shadow, weak and in his 
own world, calm with a soft voice. Bashar went on to become a 
doctor, specializing in ophthalmology. In fact, it was Hafez's 
childhood dream to become a doctor, but his family did not have the 
financial resources to support him, so he entered the military and then 
politics instead. Thus, it can be argued that Bashar, in becoming a 
doctor, was fulfilling his father's thwarted dreams. 
So it was not surprising that when duty called, six years after Bassel 
was killed in a car accident in 1994, the dutiful son would abandon 
his medical career to be at his father's side. He was summoned back 
from London, where he was in postdoctoral training in 
ophthalmology. It was not taken for granted that Bashar, who seemed 
to lack the forceful character necessary to succeed his father, would 
replace him. Indeed, some family members looked to Bashar's 
younger brother, Maher, who more closely resembled his father and 
eldest brother in his aggressive personality. In the end, though, Hafez 
chose Bashar as his successor, giving him the role of the dignified 
leader, and named Maher as the head of the Republican Guard, the 
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34 
enforcer. (This would not have been a new arrangement for the Assad 
family, for Hafez himself had an aggressive younger brother, Rifaat, 
who was the head of the security forces and personally oversaw the 
Hama massacre.) 
Initially, Syrians and Syria-watchers hoped that Bashar would be an 
open-minded, liberal, and reforming leader. But these hopes rested on 
a fragile foundation. The thrust of the argument was based on 
Bashar's supposed "Westernization" during his time living and 
studying ophthalmology in London. Contributing to the Westernized 
image was his elegant British-born wife, Asma, whose parents had 
emigrated from Syria to Britain, and who worked as an investment 
banker with J.P. Morgan. 
The Westernized facade proved to be all too thin, however. Bashar 
was 27 when he lived in London, a fully formed adult, and had spent 
his life absorbing his father's political ideas and observing his 
leadership style, in particular how to deal with conflict. What's more, 
Bashar only spent about 18 months in London and was almost 
certainly significantly insulated by personal security forces during 
that time, so his actual exposure to "Western" ways of life was likely 
quite limited. And, of course, mere exposure to Western culture, even 
if it is direct, is by no means a guarantee that an individual will adopt 
and internalize its values and ideals. 
In any event, the stormy waves of political reality were to overcome 
whatever hopes he might initially have had to bring Syria into the 
modern world. As the pressure for political reform grew, Bashar 
found his minority Alawite leadership increasingly threatened, and 
his inner circle pressed him to put a lid on the restive Sunni-majority 
population, as his father would have done. As the second-choice son, 
and not the obvious choice at that, Bashar had to prove himself a 
worthy occupant of his father's throne. Unlike his father, the lion of 
Damascus, whose powerful authority was unquestioned, Bashar was 
EFTA01148627

35 
acutely aware of the concerns of the inner circle about whether he 
could successfully lead Syria. 
In a revealing moment during the Barbara Walters interview, when 
asked whether he thought that his forces cracked down too hard on 
protesters, Bashar replied: "They are not my forces; they are military 
forces belong[ing] to the government.... I don't own them. I am 
president. I don't own the country." In fact, he may have been 
speaking the truth, reflecting that he does not have the full authority 
his father had and was not the author of the extent of the violent 
crackdown. Rather, it seems to be the handiwork of his aggressive 
younger brother, Maher, who was initially the lightning rod for 
criticism of the regime's brutality and who, according to a former 
Syrian diplomat, because of his control of Syria's security forces, is 
"first in command, not second." 
Bashar's comment that he doesn't own the country is reminiscent of 
Qaddafi's denial that he had any position of authority in Libya at the 
beginning of the unrest there. Likewise reminiscent of Qaddafi, who 
repeatedly claimed, "My people, they all love me," when asked 
whether he thought that he had the support of the Syrian people, 
Bashar responded that he wouldn't be in the position of president if he 
didn't. But, in an apparent reference to the late Libyan leader, Bashar 
disavowed killing his own people: "We don't kill our people; nobody 
kill[s]. No government in the world kill[s] its people, unless it's led 
by crazy [a] person." Never mind that the claim is demonstrably false 
-- his calm demeanor during the interview underscored this 
distinction between him and the emotionally unstable Qaddafi. 
Perhaps a better comparison for Bashar is to Qaddafi's own 
designated successor, his son Saif al-Islam, who was also seen as a 
potential force of modernization for his country. Saif was famously 
exposed to the Western world during his graduate training in political 
philosophy at the London School of Economics, and it is believed 
EFTA01148628

36 
that he took the lead in ending Libya's economic isolation. But 
fatefully for Saif, raised by his father's side, as the protests mounted, 
he fully supported his father and helped carry out the violent 
suppression of the protest movement to the degree that the 
International Criminal Court indicted him along with the elder 
Qaddafi. As his father had vowed to "fight to the last drop of my 
blood," Saif, giving up any pretense of reformer, vowed that he 
would "fight to the last bullet." 
Like Saif, and for all his veneer of Westernization, Bashar never 
learned from a powerful father how to respond to protest without 
resorting to violence, and totalistic violence at that. After all, the 
Hama massacre kept Hafez al-Assad in power for nearly two more 
decades. It seems likely that Bashar, like Saif, will persist with the 
present destructive course charted by his father until the end, for in 
the end "blood will out." 
Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology, and 
international affairs and director of the Political Psychology rogram 
at George Washington University's Elliott School of International 
Affairs. A graduate of the Political Psychology Program, Ruthie 
Pertsis serves as Post's research director. 
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