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Presidential Press Meth 
20 April, 2011 
Article 1. 
Article 2. 
Article 3. 
Article 4. 
The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Now 
William B. Quandt 
Foreign Policy 
The United States' heavy-handed efforts to help 
Israel at the 
Colum Lynch 
The Washington Post 
Time to up the ante on Egypt 
David Ignatius 
The National Interest 
Samantha and Her Subjects 
Jacob Heilbrunn 
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The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Now 
William B. Quandt 
Spring 2011 -- The upheaval that shook the Arab world in early 2011 
should lead to a fundamental recalibration of American policies in the 
Middle East. As this debate gets underway, many, perhaps most, will 
conclude that this is no time for pushing hard for Arab-Israeli peace. 
They will argue that it is time to let the dust from the Arab revolution 
settle, to shore up other fragile regimes, and to hope for the best. 
Certainly the official view from Israel will reinforce such a wait and 
see attitude. But such a posture, at a time like this, will have the 
effect of making the United States look marginal to the central 
developments of the region. 
While it is true that U.S. influence has waned in recent years—and that 
need not be such a bad thing—on the issue of Arab-Israeli peace the 
U.S. still has a major interest and a major responsibility. So, the 
Obama administration should take a hard look, screw up its courage, 
and try for a serious multi-pronged effort to get Arab-Israeli 
peacemaking onto a promising track. If successful—and the odds are 
admittedly not good—this would mean that the U.S. was aligning itself 
with both democracy and peace in a vital part of the world. That 
would go a long way toward securing American interests. But, is it 
doable? 
The president still has time to make mid-course corrections and start 
to move in a more promising direction. But time is short and he will 
have to recognize some of the serious errors he has made if he is to 
get things right. To have a chance of success, Obama must mobilize a 
major internationally supported initiative to lay out the broad 
guidelines, in the form of quite specific principles, for the resolution 
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of both the Israeli—Palestinian conflict and the Israeli—Syrian one as 
well. 
What went wrong? After all, Obama as a presidential candidate in 
2008 seemed to be genuinely committed to trying a new approach to 
peacemaking. And he seemed to understand that Arab—Israeli peace 
would make a big dent in the intense anti-Americanism that could be 
found in much of the Arab and Islamic worlds. 
Obama got off to a good start in January 2009. He supported the idea 
of engagement with adversaries, mentioning Iran and Syria by name, 
and privileging diplomacy over military force. He appointed a 
respected and experienced former senator, George Mitchell, to 
oversee the day-to-day conduct of his Arab—Israeli policy. As the 
national security advisor he named General James Jones, a man with 
considerable experience with the Palestine issue. In a number of 
public statements, Obama made it clear that he wanted to move 
forcefully toward Arab—Israeli peace and he took a particularly firm 
stand on an issue of great importance to the Palestinians, namely the 
need for Israel to stop building settlements in occupied territory. 
Obama's new approach was aptly expressed in his June 4, 2009 
speech at Cairo University, in which he said: "I have come here to 
seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around 
the world, one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect." 
While all of these steps raised hopes in some quarters that American 
policy was moving into a new and active phase, there were also some 
warning signs that events might force the new president to trim his 
ambitions. First there was the obvious fact that the global economic 
crisis, which significantly worsened in the months before his election, 
was bound to occupy much of his time and energy. In addition to 
pushing a stimulus package and bank bailouts to address the 
economic crisis, his domestic political agenda included passing 
legislation on health care. These proved also to be difficult and 
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divisive tasks, quickly drawing down on the president's political 
capital. 
In the Middle East, two elections also made it more difficult for the 
president to proceed with his initial strategy. First, in Israel, elections 
resulted in the return of hard-line Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, 
to the prime minister's office. He had served as prime minister in the 
period 1996-1999 and had strenuously resisted U.S. efforts to move 
forward on Israeli—Palestinian peace talks. To say the least, his 
reputation in Washington was that of a stubborn and unimaginative 
leader who was unwilling to take risks for peace. 
The other election that damaged the chances for Obama to pursue his 
plans to engage constructively with adversaries took place in Iran in 
June 2009 and was widely viewed in the West as a deeply flawed 
affair that cheated the reformist movement of a possible victory. 
Instead of dealing with Iranian moderates, Obama would have to deal 
with a reinstated President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Many Americans were highly 
skeptical about the wisdom of trying to pursue a policy of 
engagement with this Iranian regime, especially as it continued to 
follow a policy of producing nuclear energy that led many to believe 
Iran was on its way to becoming a nuclear weapons state in violation 
of its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The Netanyahu Problem 
Obama and Netanyahu did not get off to a very good start. With some 
effort, Obama did help persuade Netanyahu to express guarded 
support for the so-called `two-state solution' to the Israeli—Palestinian 
conflict, but he had a much harder time persuading the Israeli prime 
minister to stop building settlements in the West Bank and east 
Jerusalem. This latter point became a test of wills between the two 
leaders, and finally in late 2009 Netanyahu gave a partial 
concession—a moratorium on new settlement construction in the 
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West Bank (but not east Jerusalem) for a period of ten months. By the 
time this offer was made, Obama and his political advisors were 
showing signs of being worried about the prolonged strain in U.S.-
Israeli relations. Many seemed to feel that it was time for the 
president to mend fences and to accept what Netanyahu had offered 
as a positive first step. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, long 
attuned to the domestic politics surrounding the management of the 
relationship with Israel from her time as senator from New York 
state, was quick to label Netanyahu's offer of a ten-month 
moratorium as "unprecedented"—which was not true—and to turn to 
the Palestinians with demands that they agree to enter negotiations. 
"If there is indeed still a window of opportunity for a comprehensive 
Arab—Israeli peace, it may not remain open for long. And if Obama 
does not try to break the impasse, it is unlikely that his eventual 
successor will do so." 
During the first part of 2010, there was very little real movement in 
Arab—Israeli peace diplomacy. Mitchell travelled diligently to the 
region, but his style was so low-key that whatever gains he made 
were barely noticed. In mid year, Obama and Netanyahu met in 
Washington for a carefully staged reconciliation meeting. With 
Congressional elections on the horizon, Obama presumably did not 
want to burden Democratic candidates with the charge that the 
Obama administration was excessively tough in its dealings with 
Israel. Exactly what happened during the meeting between the two 
leaders is not clear. It seems that Netanyahu made a strong case for 
U.S. support in confronting Iran; and in return for U.S. assurances on 
this score, he agreed to enter "direct negotiations without 
preconditions" with the Palestinians. 
White House Middle East advisors began to talk about a "new 
Netanyahu," a strong leader who would be prepared to make 
concessions for peace. The "old Netanyahu," a man whose 
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ideological roots are found deep in the revisionist Zionist tradition 
which sees all of Palestine as rightfully belonging to Israel, had 
strongly opposed previous peace agreements that his predecessors 
had negotiated, and had been a very reluctant participant in any talks 
with the Palestine Liberation Organizaton during his previous tenure 
as prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Whether this more optimistic 
view of Netanyahu was based on some serious understandings with 
him or was more in the nature of wishful thinking could not be 
determined, but it did mean that U.S. efforts turned to convincing the 
Palestinians to enter into direct negotiations. 
By this time, efforts to engage with Syria had just about dropped off 
the radar screen. Sound strategy suggests that the U.S. should have 
done much more to open serious negotiations on the Syrian front—
and here negotiation is the right paradigm—and there is a substantial 
record to build upon. If Syria were also on track to achieving a peace 
agreement with Israel—the terms of which are much easier to define 
than they are on the Palestinian front—then Syria would have every 
incentive to use its influence in support of the peace process. But it 
was only the Palestinian—Israeli front that received sustained 
attention, at least in public. As the expiration of the Israeli semi-
moratorium on settlement building in the West Bank approached, the 
American side pressed hard to get negotiations started between 
Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Several 
meetings did take place, but there was no meeting of minds, and 
when the settlement moratorium expired the Palestinians suspended 
their participation in the negotiations. By late 2010, the `peace 
process' seemed to have reached a stalemate. In fact, it had never 
gained much momentum at all. 
Avoidable Errors 
Several things seemed to be wrong with Obama's strategy. First, 
whatever the wisdom of deciding to make a freeze on settlements his 
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top priority, Obama should have realized that Netanyahu would 
resist, and that much would depend on who was seen to win this 
initial test of wills. If Obama were seen to back down on this first 
issue of contestation, that would damage his reputation for being a 
strong leader. And back down he did. 
Second, Obama did not seem to fully appreciate the importance of 
having a strong alter ego to serve as his primary diplomat on Arab—
Israeli affairs. All prior U.S. successes in Arab—Israeli diplomacy had 
involved a strong president working closely with an empowered 
secretary of state, both backed by an experienced team of advisors. 
This was the model that worked for Nixon—Kissinger, Carter—Vance, 
and Bush I-Baker. But Obama chose to work with George Mitchell, a 
low-key technocrat—a man of undoubted ability, but not someone 
known to be especially close to the president. Hillary Clinton, who 
might have also played a significant role, seemed stand-offish toward 
Arab—Israeli issues, at least during her first year as secretary of state. 
Recent presidents have allowed a certain amount of chaos to reign 
among their Arab—Israeli policy group. This was definitely the case 
for Clinton and Bush II, and it also has been true of Obama. While 
Mitchell was supposed to be his primary advisor, others were also in 
the game, often sending rather different signals. There was his first 
chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, with close personal ties to Israel; there 
was his outspoken vice president, Joe Biden, a former chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; there was his national 
security advisor, James Jones; and, on at least one occasion, there 
was General David Petraeus, then head of the U.S. Central 
Command, on the importance of Arab—Israeli peace to the U.S.'s 
strategic interests in the Middle East. 
And then there was Dennis. In Middle East circles, if you mention the 
name Dennis it is immediately clear that you are referring to Dennis 
Ross. No one has logged more hours working on Arab—Israeli 
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issues—starting back in the Reagan administration and then 
throughout all of Bush I and Clinton. Ross had made an appearance 
during the campaign as an advisor to Obama on Middle East affairs, 
but in the initial round of appointments he had been given 
responsibility at the State Department for a vaguely defined "central 
region" of the Middle East that seemed to mean Iran and the Gulf 
region. In any event, with his strongly pro-Israel views, and his 
reputation for endlessly promoting the "process" part of the peace 
process, he was not widely seen as the right person to help steer 
Obama in the new direction that the president seemed to be pursuing. 
One of his former colleagues described him as a "down in the weeds 
kind of guy," good for managing the day-to-day diplomacy, but not 
for charting a new course. 
But as U.S.—Israeli relations deteriorated, Ross was called upon to 
help patch things up with Netanyahu. And by late 2010 he was back 
in an undefined role at the White House with responsibility for some 
aspects of Arab—Israeli diplomacy. In short, apart from the president 
himself, who would have the final word, it was not clear which of his 
many advisors was key to his plans for getting Arabs and Israelis to 
make peace. 
A third misstep by Obama was to define the Israeli—Palestinian 
conflict in terms of a dispute that could best be resolved by direct 
negotiations between the parties. Previous administrations—Clinton 
and Bush II in particular—had been in the habit of saying that "we 
cannot want peace more than the parties to the conflict," and that the 
U.S. would never impose a solution. The U.S. would facilitate, urge, 
nudge, and persuade, but that was about it. Only in his last month in 
office did Clinton finally put forward specific proposals. And Bush 
II, even when he learned that Israelis and Palestinians had made 
surprising progress in secret talks late in his second term, was 
unwilling to step in to help clinch the deal. 
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Obama seemed torn between two paradigms. One saw the Arab—
Israeli conflict in strategic terms—its continuation had adverse 
consequences for U.S. national interests, it weakened moderate forces 
in the region, gave voice to radicals who whipped up anti-American 
sentiment, and ultimately made it harder to deal with emerging 
challenges from countries like Iran or issues like jihadi extremism. 
Obama himself had expressed this view as candidate in 2008 and 
again in 2009 after his election. From this standpoint, the U.S. could 
and should place a high priority on solving the conflict, and to do so 
should use tough-minded diplomacy, including pressures and 
inducements, to get the parties to move toward compromises. This 
could be done in cooperation with other powers, the United Nations 
and regional players, but U.S. power had to be on display for it to 
work. 
There was some reason to believe at the outset of the Obama 
administration that the president was setting the stage for this type of 
forceful American-led diplomacy. But somewhere in his second year, 
Obama seemed to buy into a different paradigm. Like his 
predecessors, he said frankly that the U.S. could not want Arab—
Israeli peace more than the parties themselves. Obama's ambivalence 
was perfectly captured on April 13, 2010, when he stated that Arab—
Israeli peace was a "vital national security interest of the United 
States," and then also said: "And the truth is, in some of these 
conflicts the United States can't impose solutions unless the 
participants in these conflicts are willing to break out of old patterns 
of antagonism. I think it was former Secretary of State Jim Baker 
[sic] who said, in the context of Middle East peace, we can't want it 
more than they do." While this latter point sounds reasonable on the 
surface, it is in fact a vapid shibboleth. Taken literally, it means that 
if one party is reticent, that party will set the pace for diplomacy. 
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But the Arab—Israeli conflict has never been about which party wants 
peace most. Each community is internally divided over these issues, 
which are, after all, existential, and many individuals are divided in 
their own beliefs. They want peace, but they fear the price that they 
may have to pay to get it. They often seem to want peace in the 
abstract, but only on their own terms or not at all. This is not the 
frame for successful face-to-face negotiations. Instead, it suggests the 
need for a powerful third-party mediator to help structure the 
negotiations and shift the calculus of gains and losses. 
Even with two strong leaders such as Menachem Begin and Anwar 
Sadat, both of whom doubtless wanted peace on certain terms, it 
would have been counterproductive for the U. S. to sit back until the 
two parties had narrowed their differences to the point where the U. 
S. could step in and help them cross the finish line with a few gentle 
nudges and reassurances. Had Carter and Vance accepted this model, 
there would have been no Camp David Summit and no Egyptian—
Israeli peace (at least not in 1979). 
Perhaps Obama began to focus on getting the parties into direct 
negotiations as part of a strategy of building American domestic 
support for a more forceful American role further down the road. But 
by fall 2010, it sounded very much as if direct negotiations were an 
end in and of themselves. Many analysts who have studied the 
Israeli—Palestinian conflict carefully are dubious about the possibility 
of resolving the conflict through direct negotiations alone. Such a 
model assumes a degree of parity that does not exist. Israel is in a far 
stronger position, while the Palestinians are weak, divided, and 
occupied. The big "concession" made by the Palestinian leadership 
has been to give up their claim to some 78 percent of historic 
Palestine and to agree to build their state in the remaining 22 percent. 
Having come to this point, most Palestinians do not feel there is 
much more room for concessions on their side. And they continue to 
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insist that their capital must be in east Jerusalem and that some 
satisfaction must be given, if largely symbolic, to the Palestinian 
refugees who lost their homes in the 1948 war. 
Just as the matter of recovering all of Sinai was never an issue for 
negotiations in the mind of Anwar Sadat, so also the Palestinians 
consider these points as fundamental to the question of whether or 
not a peace agreement is at all possible. Any significant deviation 
from them will mean peace is an illusion. Where they are prepared to 
show more flexibility is in the timeline for implementing an 
agreement; the precise delineation of boundaries, provided that land 
swaps result in fair compensation for any parts of the west bank that 
Israel keeps; and on security issues, where the Palestinians are 
prepared to accept that their future state will never be heavily 
militarized. 
Not surprisingly, Israel sees things very differently. For over forty 
years, Israel has been in control of east Jerusalem and the West Bank. 
It sees any relinquishment of these territories as a concession, and no 
Israeli politician to date has ever publicly accepted the principle of 
withdrawing to the 1967 lines, including in east Jerusalem. Indeed, 
many Israeli politicians, including most of the current government, 
believe in expanding Jewish settlement on the West Bank—a policy 
interpreted by the Palestinians as intended ultimately to squeeze them 
out of their homeland. Even the most moderate Israeli leader 
imagines that some of the West Bank and east Jerusalem will remain 
under Israeli control indefinitely. And no Israeli leader has said much 
in public about how Palestinian refugee claims could be addressed. 
There is very little reason to believe that the parties, given the power 
imbalance, could bridge the gaps in their positions through direct 
negotiations. And yet such negotiations have been, as during previous 
administrations, the centerpiece of American diplomacy. 
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A fourth mistake, if reports from fall 2010 are true, was that Obama 
apparently offered some very big inducements to Netanyahu in order 
to get a mere three-month extension of the settlement moratorium. 
And even then, Netanyahu refused to comply. This was a sign of 
Obama's weakness. By prematurely putting some very big chips on 
the table for very minor purposes, he insured that the price for much 
bigger moves would soar. This was simply bad bargaining technique. 
Fortunately, the president seemed to realize his error and was 
unwilling to put the offer in writing. It was then dropped altogether, 
along with the demand that Israel cease settlement activity. This left 
American policy in early 2011 as consisting primarily of the effort to 
get the parties back to the negotiating table. But this cannot be the 
sum total of a strategy meant to succeed, especially in the aftermath 
of the upheaval in Egypt and its regional spillover. 
While Obama has little to show for his first two years of Arab—Israeli 
diplomacy, it is not axiomatic that he cannot make mid-course 
corrections and start to move in a more promising direction. Surely 
the popular uprisings in the Middle East have raised understandable 
questions about whether this is possible right now, yet those 
upheavals make it all the more important that the U.S. aligns itself 
with both democracy and peace in a vital part of the world. 
Plans for the Third Year 
Some have argued that the significant Republican gains in the mid-
term elections in November 2010 will make it harder for Obama to 
govern. On the domestic front this is doubtless so. But Congress is 
less a factor in setting the broad lines of foreign policy, although 
there will certainly be some very strong and uncritical pro-Israeli 
voices elevated to senior positions in Congress. Still, most of what 
Obama needs to do to improve the odds of success in the Arab—Israeli 
arena does not depend primarily on Congress. 
The President needs to take the following steps: 
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1. He would need to start making the case immediately that Arab—
Israeli peace is in the national interests of the United States. The 
American public needs to hear a convincing rationale for devoting 
time and resources to the seemingly hopeless task of breaking the 
Arab—Israeli impasse. 
2. He needs to decide who is going to be his principal spokesman on 
Arab—Israeli issues. For better or worse, in the current line up of 
policy advisors, Hillary Clinton is the only person who has the clout 
to play this role. Mitchell, while genuinely liked and admired, is not 
viewed as having much real clout by the parties to the dispute. 
3. This way of thinking may not be part of the mainstream 
Washington consensus, but it is frequently expressed behind closed 
doors, even in the capital. It leads to the conclusion that if there is to 
be peace, there may be only one last chance and one last policy 
option: Obama must develop a new American initiative that proposes 
the outlines of an Israeli—Palestinian accord, as well as a 
comprehensive Arab—Israeli peace agreement, and mobilize 
international support behind it. Arab countries moving towards 
democracy will seek greater purposefulness and fairness in the U.S. 
diplomatic role in their region, and Obama's failure to anticipate and 
understand their reasonable expectations will dangerously erode 
American credibility further at this critical juncture. 
The building blocks are all there—the Clinton parameters of 
December 2000, the outline of an agreement discussed by the then 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Abbas in fall 2008, the terms of an 
Israeli—Syrian agreement discussed in detail during 1998-2000. In 
short, the U.S., with support from others in the international 
community, would state its support for an agreement that would 
establish a Palestinian state on the territories of the West Bank and 
Gaza, with east Jerusalem as its capital. The borders of the state 
would be based on the 1967 lines, with small agreed adjustments and 
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equitable land swaps. The Palestinian state would recognize Israel 
and would agree to far-reaching security arrangements, including 
perhaps international peacekeeping forces at key locations. The hard 
tradeoff for the Palestinians would be that in exchange for 
recognition of their state, they would forego the literal "right of 
return" of refugees to Israel proper, accepting instead some token 
repatriation and generous compensation for the rest. On the Syrian 
front, Israel would be expected to withdraw to the June 4, 1967 line, 
but the Golan would be demilitarized, agreements on water would be 
worked out, and Syria would be expected to use its influence to help 
promote a comprehensive Arab—Israeli peace. With these principles 
clearly spelled out, Arab states would be asked to endorse them and 
to promise to recognize Israel and establish relations with it as peace 
with the Palestinians and Syrians goes into effect. 
Now, this type of initiative will of course be controversial, 
particularly among partisans of Israel, who have long maintained that 
the U. S. should not try to impose its views on the parties. But these 
points do not really go much beyond what previous American 
administrations have supported. One could imagine that a fairly 
impressive bipartisan array of former U.S. officials would support the 
main outlines of this approach, as would European allies, the so-
called Quartet partners (European Union, Russia, and the UN) and 
the Arab League. One would expect many Palestinians to be 
generally receptive, although Hamas and other factions will be 
opposed or skeptical. One should not minimize the difficulty of 
getting Palestinians to accept the watered-down principle on refugee 
rights. 
The Netanyahu government, and perhaps others in Israel as well, 
would react negatively at the outset and would try to mobilize 
opposition to this approach. This is where the test for Obama would 
begin. Could he convince significant numbers of Israelis that this 
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outline was the best path to a secure, predominantly Jewish 
democratic state at peace with its neighbors? Could most Israelis be 
convinced that by accepting this framework, and then negotiating 
hard on the details and side payments—this is when Obama should 
be prepared for some major positive inducements—that Israel would 
be better able to face whatever threat might be posed by Iran? 
If Obama is unwilling to see this diplomatic initiative through, he 
would be better off not launching it. But if he genuinely believes that 
American national interests are at stake, something along these lines 
needs to be part of his strategy. We will learn a lot about the 
president and about American politics by how Obama sets his 
priorities in the coming months. If there is indeed still a window of 
opportunity for a comprehensive Arab—Israeli peace, it may not 
remain open for long. And if Obama does not try to break the 
impasse, it is unlikely that his eventual successor will do so. The odds 
of success are not good, based on his efforts of the first two years, but 
diplomacy is not about playing games with good odds. Occasionally, 
as now, it would mean tackling a strategically important, difficult 
issue where both the payoff and risk are high. It is for tackling and 
successfully resolving such issues that we should bestow the title of 
statesman. Obama may have won his Nobel peace prize, but if he is 
to really earn it he should use the undeniable power of the United 
States to promote the kind of peace agreement outlined here. 
William B. Quandt is Edward R. Stettinius Professor of Politics at the 
University of Virginia. During the Nixon and Carter administrations, 
he served on the National Security Council; he played an active role 
in the negotiations that led to the Camp David accords and the 
Egyptian—Israeli peace treaty. 
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AniCIC 2. 
Foreign Policy 
The United States' heavy-handed efforts 
to help Israel at the M. 
Colum Lynch 
APRIL 18, 2011 -- In the aftermath of Israel's 2008-2009 intervention 
into the Gaza Strip, Susan E. Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the United 
Nations, led a vigorous campaign to stymie an independent M. 
investigation into possible war crimes, while using the prospect of 
such a probe as leverage to pressure Israel to participate in a U.S.-
backed Middle East peace process, according to previously 
undisclosed diplomatic cables provided by the anti-secrecy website 
WikiLeaks. The documents provide a rare glimpse behind the 
scenes at the M. as American diplomats sought to shield Israel's 
military from outside scrutiny of its conduct during Operation Cast 
Lead. Their release comes as the issue is back on the front pages of 
Israel's newspapers, following the surprise recent announcement by 
Richard Goldstone -- an eminent South African jurist who led an 
investigation commissioned by the M.'s Human Rights Council --
in a Washington Post op-ed that his team had unfairly accused Israel 
of deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians. The new documents, 
though consistent with public U.S. statements at the time opposing a 
M. investigation into Israeli military operations, reveal in 
extraordinary detail how America wields its power behind closed 
doors at the United Nations. They also demonstrate how the United 
States and Israel were granted privileged access to highly sensitive 
internal M. deliberations on an "independent" M. board of inquiry 
into the Gaza war, raising questions about the independence of the 
process. In one pointed cable, Rice repeatedly prodded M. 
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Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to block a recommendation of the 
board of inquiry to carry out a sweeping inquiry into alleged war 
crimes by Israeli soldiers and Palestinian militants. In another cable, 
Rice issued a veiled warning to the president of the International 
Criminal Court, Sang-Hyun Song, that an investigation into alleged 
Israeli crimes could damage its standing with the United States at a 
time when the new administration was moving closer to the tribunal. 
"How the ICC handles issues concerning the Goldstone Report will 
be perceived by many in the US as a test for the ICC, as this is a very 
sensitive matter," she told him, according to a Nov. 3, 2009, cable 
from the U.S. mission to the United Nations. 
Rice, meanwhile, assured Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor 
Lieberman during an Oct. 21, 2009, meeting in Tel Aviv that the 
United States had done its utmost to "blunt the effects of the 
Goldstone report" and that she was confident she could "build a 
blocking coalition" to prevent any push for a probe by the Security 
Council, according to an Oct. 27, 2009 cable. 
Israel launched a three-week-long offensive into Gaza in late 2008 in 
an effort to prevent Hamas and other Palestinian militants from firing 
rockets at Israeli towns. The Israel Defense Forces killed as many as 
1,400 Palestinians. Thirteen Israel soldiers were also killed during 
Operation Cast Lead, and a number of •. 
facilities faced repeated 
attacks. The military campaign raised calls at the •. 
for an 
investigation into reports of war crimes. In response, Ban 
commissioned a top •. 
troubleshooter, Ian Martin, to set up an 
independent •. 
board of inquiry into nine incidents in which the 
Israeli Defense Forces had allegedly fired on •. 
personnel or 
facilities. The •. 
probe -- which established Israeli wrongdoing in 
seven of the nine cases -- was the first outside investigation into the 
war, with a mandate to probe deaths, injuries, and damage caused at 
M. locations. The board's 184-page report has never been made 
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public, but a 28-page summary released on May 5 concluded that 
Israel had shown "reckless disregard for the lives and safety" of 
civilians in the operation, citing one particularly troubling incident in 
which it struck a M. -run elementary school, killing three young 
men seeking shelter from the fighting. Israel denounced the findings 
as "tendentious, patently biased," saying that an Israeli military 
inquiry had proved beyond a doubt that Israel had not intentionally 
attacked civilians. But the most controversial part of the probe 
involved recommendations by Martin that the •. 
conduct a far-
reaching investigation into violations of international humanitarian 
law by Israeli forces, Hamas, and other Palestinian militants. On May 
4, 2009, the day before Martin's findings were presented to the media, 
Rice caught wind of the recommendations and phoned Ban to 
complain that the inquiry had gone beyond the scope of its mandate 
by recommending a sweeping investigation. 
"Given that those recommendations were outside the scope of the 
Board's terms of reference, she asked that those two 
recommendations not be included in the summary of the report that 
would be transmitted to the membership," according to an account 
contained in the May 4 cable. Ban initially resisted. "The Secretary-
General said he was constrained in what he could do since the Board 
of Inquiry is independent; it was their report and recommendations 
and he could not alter them, he said," according to the cable. 
But Rice persisted, insisting in a subsequent call that Ban should at 
least "make clear in his cover letter when he transmits the summary 
to the Security Council that those recommendations exceeded the 
scope of the terms of reference and no further action is needed." Ban 
offered no initial promise. She subsequently drove the point home 
again, underlining the "importance of having a strong cover letter that 
made clear that no further action was needed and would close out this 
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issue." Ban began to relent, assuring Rice that "his staff was working 
with an Israeli delegation on the text of the cover letter." 
After completing the cover letter, Ban phoned back Rice to report 
that he believed "they had arrived at a satisfactory cover letter. Rice 
thanked the Secretary-General for his exceptional efforts on such a 
sensitive issue." 
At the following day's news conference, Ban flat-out rejected 
Martin's recommendation for an investigation. While underscoring 
the board's independent nature, he made it clear that "it is not my 
intention to establish any further inquiry." Although he 
acknowledged publicly that he had consulted with Israel on the 
findings, he did not say it had been involved in the preparation of the 
cover letter killing off the call for an investi ation. Instead, he only 
made a request to the Israelis to pay the M. more than $11 million 
in financial compensation for the damage done to •. 
facilities. 
When contacted about the cable by Turtle Bay, a •. 
spokesman, 
Farhan Haq, declined to comment on its contents, noting only that the 
original investigation was designed only to resolve a dispute with 
Israel over the damage done to its facilities and seek restitution. 
But the issue was far from over. The •. 
Human Rights Council, 
which the United States has long criticized for singling out Israel for 
censure, had already established its own commission headed by 
Goldstone. Goldstone agreed to take on the assignment after he 
revised the terms of reference to allow for investigation into both 
Israel and Hamas. The Goldstone investigation coincided with U.S. 
efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process. Israel was livid 
over the development, warning that it could undermine peace 
prospects. In a Sept. 16 meeting with Rice, Danny Ayalon, Israel's 
deputy foreign minister, called the Goldstone Report, which had been 
released the day before, "outrageous," according to a diplomatic 
cable, adding that it would give Hamas a "free pass" to smuggle 
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weapons into Gaza. Rice agreed, calling the report deeply flawed and 
biased. But she also saw its release as an opportunity to convince 
Israel to pursue a U.S.-backed peace process. She asked Ayalon to 
"help me help you" by embracing the peace process and highlighting 
Israel's capacity to hold its own troops accountable for possible 
misconduct. She underscored that the Goldstone Report could be 
more easily managed if there was positive progress on the peace 
process, according to the cable. She also advised Israel that it "would 
be helpful" if it would emphasize its own judicial process and 
investigations" into the matter. 
Rice reinforced that position a month later in a meeting with 
Lieberman, but the foreign minister was skeptical about the prospects 
for peace in the Middle East. "Israel and the United States had a 
responsibility not to foster illusions. A comprehensive peace was 
impossible," said Lieberman, who "cited Cyprus as an example that 
Israel might emulate, claiming that no comprehensive solution was 
possible, but security, stability and prosperity were." 
The release of the cables comes as Rice is very publicly sticking with 
her position taking on the Goldstone Report. "The United States was 
very, very plain at the time and every day since that the Goldstone 
report was deeply flawed, and we objected to its findings and 
conclusions," Rice told the House Foreign Affairs Committee last 
week. "We didn't see any evidence at the time that the Israeli 
government had intentionally targeted civilians or intentionally 
committed war crimes." 
Colum Lynch has been been reporting on foreign policy and national 
security for the Washington Post since June 1999. 
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