EFTA00222482

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 1 of 12 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO. 08-80119-CIV-MARRA 
Jane Doe No. 2, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Jeffrey Epstein ("Defendant")'s 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement, Directed to Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint (DE 46), filed October 6, 2008. Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 2 ("Plaintiff") filed a response 
to the motion (DE 49) and Defendant filed a Reply (DE 50). The Court has carefully reviewed 
the motion, response, and reply, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. 
Background 
On February 6, 2008, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendant (DE 1), which was 
replaced on September 22, 2008 by an Amended Complaint (DE 42). Plaintiff brings suit 
alleging Count I - Sexual Assault and Battery; Count II - Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress; and Count III - Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2422. 
The facts, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, are as follows: At all relevant times, 
Defendant was an adult male. Am. Compl. 1 8. Defendant engaged in a plan and scheme in 
1 
EFTA00222482

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 2 of 12 
which he gained access to primarily economically disadvantaged minor girls in his home, 
sexually assaulted these girls, and then gave them money. Am. Compl. ¶ 8. In or about 2004-
2005, Plaintiff, then approximately 16 years old, became one of Defendant's victims. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 9. Defendant carried out his scheme and assaulted girls in Florida, New York, and his 
private island in St. Thomas. Am. Compl.  9. 
Defendant's scheme involved the use of young girls to recruit underage girls. Am. Compl. 
¶ 10. Under Defendant's plan, underage girls were recruited ostensibly to give a wealthy man a 
massage for monetary compensation in his Palm Beach mansion. Id. The recruiter would be 
contacted when Defendant was planning to be at his Palm Beach residence or soon after he 
arrived. Id. Defendant or someone on his behalf directed the recruiter to bring one or more 
underage girls to the residence. Id. The recruiter generally sought out economically 
disadvantaged underage girls from western Palm Beach County who would be enticed by the 
money being offered — generally $200 to $300 per "massage" session — and who were perceived 
as less likely to complain to authorities or have credibility if allegations of improper conduct 
were made. Id. This was an important element of Epstein's plan. Id. 
Defendant's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. Am. Compl. ¶ 11. 
Upon arrival at Defendant's mansion, the underage victim would be introduced to Sarah Kellen, 
Defendant's assistant, who gathered the girl's personal information, including her name and 
telephone number. Id. Kellen would then bring the girl up a flight of stairs to a bedroom that 
contained a massage table in addition to other furnishings. Id. There were photographs of nude 
women lining the stairway hall and in the bedroom. Id. Kellen would then leave the girl alone in 
the room, whereupon Defendant would enter wearing only a towel. Id. Defendant would then 
2 
EFTA00222483

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 3 of 12 
remove his towel, lay down naked on the massage table, and direct the girl to remove her clothes. 
Id. Defendant would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious and sexual acts, including 
masturbation and touching the girl's vagina. Id. 
Consistent with the foregoing plan, Plaintiff was recruited to give Defendant a massage 
for monetary compensation. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff was brought to Defendant's mansion in 
Palm Beach. Id. Plaintiff was introduced to Kellen, who led her up the stairs to the room with 
the massage table. Id. In this room, Defendant told Plaintiff to remove her clothes and to give 
him a massage. Id. Plaintiff kept her panties and bra on and complied with Defendant's 
instructions. Id. Defendant wore only a towel around his waist. Id. After a short period of time, 
Defendant removed the towel and rolled over, exposing his penis. Id. Defendant began to 
masturbate and he sexually assaulted Plaintiff. Id. 
After Defendant had completed the assault, Plaintiff was then able to get dressed, leave 
the room and go back downstairs. Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Defendant paid Plaintiff $200. Id. 
Defendant paid the recruiter $100 for bringing Plaintiff to him. Id. As a result of this encounter, 
Plaintiff experienced confusion, shame, humiliation, and embarrassment, and has suffered severe 
psychological and emotional injuries. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. 
Under Count I - Sexual Assault and Battery, the Amended Complaint alleges as follows: 
Defendant acted with intent to cause an offensive contact with Plaintiff, or an imminent 
apprehension of such a contact, and Plaintiff was thereby put in such imminent apprehension. 
Am. Compl.  16. Defendant made an intentional, unlawful offer of offensive sexual contact 
toward Plaintiff, creating a reasonable fear of imminent peril. Am. Compl.  17. Defendant 
intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact on the person of Plaintiff, with the intent to 
3 
EFTA00222484

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 4 of 12 
cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is imminent. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. 
Defendant tortiously committed a sexual assault and battery on Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 19. 
Defendant's acts were intentional, unlawful, offensive and harmful. Id. Defendant's plan and 
scheme in which he committed such acts upon Plaintiff were done willfully and maliciously. Am. 
Compl. ¶ 20. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's assault on Plaintiff, she has 
suffered and will continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, 
psychological and emotional damages. Am. Compl. 1 21. 
Under Count II, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the Amended Complaint 
alleges as follows: 
Defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless. Am. Compl. ¶ 23. Defendant's conduct 
with a minor was extreme and outrageous, going beyond all bounds of decency. Am. Compl.
24. Defendant committed willful acts of child sexual abuse on Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. 
These acts resulted in mental or sexual injury to Plaintiff, that caused or were likely to cause 
Plaintiff's mental or emotional health to be significantly impaired. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. 
Defendant's conduct caused severe emotional distress to Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Defendant 
knew or had reason to know that his intentional and outrageous conduct would cause emotional 
distress and damage to Plaintiff, or Defendant acted with reckless disregard of the high 
probability of causing severe emotional distress to Plaintiff. Id. As a direct and proximate result 
of Defendant's intentional or reckless conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer 
severe mental anguish and pain. Am. Compl. ¶ 27. 
Under Count III, Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2422, the Amended Complaint alleges as follows: 
4 
EFTA00222485

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 5 of 12 
Defendant used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, induce 
or entice Plaintiff, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. Am. Compl. ¶ 29. As a 
result of Defendant's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, Plaintiff has suffered personal injury, 
including mental, psychological and emotional damages. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. 
Defendant argues in his motion that Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint must be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Alternatively, Defendant seeks a more definite statement of Counts I and III. Lastly, Defendant 
argues that the reference in Count III to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 should be stricken as immaterial. 
Plaintiff responds that the Court should deny the motion because the pleadings at issue 
contain a short and plain statement of the claims showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief in 
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff contends that the specific facts sought by 
Defendant may properly be the subject of discovery, but are not necessary for purposes of 
pleading. 
Standard of Review 
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a 
court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson 
Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). To satisfy the 
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a short and 
plain statement showing an entitlement to relief, and the statement must "give the defendant fair 
notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8)• see also Bell Atlantic Corp. I. 
5 
EFTA00222486

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 6 of 12 
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. • Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). 
This is a liberal pleading requirement, one that does not require a plaintiff to plead with 
particularity every element of a cause of action. Roe I. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 
F.3d 678, 683 (I I th Cir. 2001). Instead, the complaint need only "contain either direct or 
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under 
some viable legal theory." Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). "A complaint need not 
specify in detail the precise theory giving rise to recovery. All that is required is that the 
defendant be on notice as to the claim being asserted against him and the grounds on which it 
rests." Sams I. United Food and Cornml Workers Intl Union, 866 F.2d 1380, 1384 (I I th Cir. 
1989). 
"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed 
factual allegations, [ ] a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief 
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 
of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp.. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citations omitted). 
"Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the 
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Id. at 1965. Plaintiff must plead 
enough facts to state a plausible basis for the claim. Id. 
Discussion 
Counts I alleges a claim for sexual assault and battery. Under Florida law, It is customary 
to refer to the term "assault and battery" as if it were a legal unit, or a single concept; however, 
assault and battery are separate and distinct legal concepts, assault being the beginning of an act 
which, if consummated, constitutes battery. 3A Fla. Jur 2d Assault §1. "'The essential element 
6 
EFTA00222487

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 7 of 12 
of an assault is the violence offered, and not actual physical contact,' and 'a battery is defined as 
an unlawful touching or striking or the use of force against the person of another with the 
intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or apprehension thereof.' McDonald 
I. Ford, 223 So.2d 553, 555 (Fla. 2n° DCA 1969), quoting 3 Fla.Jur., Assault and Battery, § 3. 
Assault is defined as an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force 
unlawfully directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a fear of imminent 
peril, coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt. Lay I. Kremer, 411 
So.2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). A battery consists of the infliction of a harmful or 
offensive contact upon another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that 
such contact is imminent. Paul I. Holbrook, 696 So.2d 1311, 1312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); 
Sullivan I. Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 454 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review 
denied, 461 So.2d 116 (Fla.1985). 
Defendant does not contend that Plaintiff failed to allege the above-listed elements of the 
torts of assault and battery in Count I. Instead, Defendant argues that, under the standard of 
pleading established in Twombly, Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to 
support the pleading. Defendant's argument, in essence, is that in a post-Twombly pleading, a 
heightened fact pleading of specifics is required. However, Twombly did not alter the standard 
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) in the typical case. As the Court explained in CBT Flint 
Partners, LLC I. Goodmail Systems, Inc: 
In my view, Twombly did not radically alter the elementary rules of civil 
procedure that have governed litigation in the federal courts for the past seventy 
years. The Court's forced retirement of Conley I. Gibson's "no set of facts" 
language does not change the fundamental command of Rule 8 as to what a valid 
complaint must look like. Indeed, the Court made clear that it was not imposing a 
7 
EFTA00222488

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 8 of 12 
heightened pleading standard. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974 ("[W]e do not require 
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face."). As a general matter, I am loath to assume that 
the Supreme Court circumvented the normal channels for amending the Federal 
Rules. Swierkiewicz I Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) ("A requirement of 
greater specificity for particular claims is a result that must be obtained by the 
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.") 
(quotations omitted). Second, to the extent that Twombly might be plausibly read 
to alter the requirements for the sufficiency of a complaint, there should be a 
strong presumption in favor of narrowly confining the decision to its facts. Cohens 
I. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) ( "It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general 
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which 
those expressions are used."). The Court's "new standard" was merely a specific 
way to articulate a solution to what it perceived to be a specific pleading problem, 
in a specific area of law that inflicted a high cost upon antitrust defendants. It was 
not a broad based new license for federal courts to ramp up pleading 
requirements. 
CBT Flint Partners, LLC I. Goodmail Systems, Inc., 529 F.Supp.2d 1376, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
In this case, Defendant contends that the pleadings fail to allege the specific facts of 
"what was said or done to Plaintiff," "what Epstein said and did, if anything, to create fear and 
apprehension in Plaintiff'; and "what was the intentional or harmful contact?" (Mot. 5). As to 
these issues, the Amended Complaint alleges as follows: Alone with Plaintiff in an upstairs room 
of Defendant's mansion, Defendant told Plaintiff to remove her clothes and to give him a 
massage. Am. Compl.  12. Defendant wore only a towel around his waist. Id. After a short 
period of time, Defendant removed the towel and rolled over, exposing his penis. Id. Defendant 
acted with intent to cause an offensive contact with Plaintiff, or an imminent apprehension of 
such a contact, and Plaintiff was thereby put in such imminent apprehension. Am. Compl.  16. 
Defendant made an intentional, unlawful offer of offensive sexual contact toward Plaintiff, 
creating a reasonable fear of imminent peril. Am. Compl. ¶ 17. Defendant began to masturbate 
and he sexually assaulted Plaintiff. Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Defendant intentionally inflicted harmful 
8 
EFTA00222489

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 9 of 12 
or offensive contact on the person of Plaintiff, with the intent to cause such contact or the 
apprehension that such contact is imminent. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Defendant tortiously committed a 
sexual assault and battery on Plaintiff. Am. Compl.  19. Defendant's acts were intentional, 
unlawful, offensive and harmful. Id. 
Plaintiff need not set forth more specific facts to support its allegations to satisfy the 
notice pleading standard under Rule 8, which requires only that a complaint must set forth a short 
and plain statement of the facts upon which the claim is based that is sufficient to give the 
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. The 
parties will be afforded a liberal opportunity for discovery "to disclose more precisely the basis 
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues." Conley I. 
Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). Defendant's motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement 
is DENIED as to Count I. 
Counts III' alleges a claim for coercion and enticement to sexual activity in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2422. That statute states, in pertinent part, 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has 
not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, 
shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 
'Plaintiff mistakenly cites 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the wherefore clause of Count III, 
regarding damages sought. Plaintiff acknowledges that this was a typographical error and the 
correct cite is to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant's motion to strike the citation to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
in the Amended Complaint is GRANTED. That citation is hereby STRICKEN and substituted 
with 18 U.S.C. § 2255. 
9 
EFTA00222490

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02112/2009 
Page 10 of 12 
18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).2
The Amended Complaint alleges: "Epstein used a facility or means of interstate 
commerce to knowingly persuade, induce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 
years, to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense." Am. Compl. ¶ 29. 
First, the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the element of using a facility or means 
of interstate commerce. See ¶ 29. More specifics are properly the subject of discovery. 
Second, Defendant argues that the Amended Complaint fails to set forth underlying 
factual allegations as to the requisite elements that Defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, 
enticed, or coerced Plaintiff, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or 
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. Specifically, 
Defendant claims that Plaintiff fails to allege with what criminal offense Defendant could have 
been charged. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The Amended Complaint states a cause of action for 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. However, Defendant's position that Plaintiff must state what part 
of "to engage in prostitution or sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense" upon which is relying Plaintiff is well-taken. 
Rule 12(e) permits a party to move for a "more definite statement of a pleading to which 
a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot 
reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). As explained by another court, "[t]he 
claim of the plaintiff in his complaint is sufficiently definite to enable the defendant to know with 
2 The allegations in the Amended Complaint closely track the language of § 2422(b), 
making it clear that this is the subsection upon which Plaintiff is relying. 
10 
EFTA00222491

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 11 of 12 
what it is charged, and it is reasonably able therefrom to respond whether it did the thing 
charged." Dennis I. Begley Drug Co. of Tennessee, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 608, 609 (E.D. Tenn. 1971). 
As it is written, ¶ 29 is ambiguous as to whether Plaintiff claims prostitution or another criminal 
offense (and if so, what offense) with which Defendant could have been charged.' The Court 
finds that Defendant is entitled to a more definite statement as to ¶ 29 in order to provide 
Defendant with sufficient notice to frame a responsive pleading. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More 
Definite Statement, Directed to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (DE 46) is GRANTED IN 
PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows: 
I. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement as to Count I is DENIED. 
2. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss or for a more definite statement as to Count III is 
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant's motion to dismiss is 
denied; however, Plaintiff must file another complaint, which includes a more definite 
statement as to Count III - Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2422, as explained in this Order. 
3. 
Defendant's motion to strike the citation to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Amended Complaint 
3 In its opposition, Plaintiff improperly seeks to rely upon a July 10, 2008 letter from A. 
Marie Villafana, Assistant U.S. Attorney to Plaintiff's counsel. This letter was not referenced in 
nor attached to the Amended Complaint. It is axiomatic that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the 
Court must consider well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and must limit its examination 
to the four corners of the complaint. Grossman I. Nationsbank, N.A. 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th 
Cir. 2000). Thus, the Court will not consider the letter in ruling on the instant motion. 
11 
EFTA00222492

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered on FLSD Docket 02/12/2009 
Page 12 of 12 
is GRANTED and that citation is hereby STRICKEN. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, 
Florida, this 12th day of February, 2009. 
KENNETH A. MARRA 
United States District Judge 
copies to: 
All counsel of record 
12 
EFTA00222493