EFTA00175775

Case 9:08-cv-8' 
0-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered. 
FLSD Docket 10/ 
?008 
Page 4 of 10 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 4 
Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed.2004) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) 
("[T]he pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts 
that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"), on 
the assumption that all the allegation  in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewiczt. Sorem N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 
n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Neitzket. Williams 490 U.S. 319, 
327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (" Rule 12(b)(6) does not 
countenance ... dismissals Ivsed on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's 
factual allegations"); Scheueri. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 
40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 
appears "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely"). 
Pursuant to Rule 12(e), a party may move for more definite statement of a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed where the pleading "is so vague or 
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably frame a response." The motion is required 
to point out the defects and the desired details. Id. 
Count I — "Sexual Assault and Battery" Is sublect to dismissal as Plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be wanted. 
It is well settled that this Court is to apply Florida substantive law in this action. 
Erie R.Co.l. Tompkins 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Pursuant to Florida law, although the term 
"assault and battery" is most commonly referred to as if it were a legal unit, or a single 
concept, "assault and battery are separate and distinct legal concepts, assault being the 
beginning of an act which, if consummated, constitutes battery." 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault 
§1. An assault and battery are intentional acts. See generally, Spivey I. Battaglia, 258 
So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972); and Travelers Indem. 
PCR Inc., 889 So.2d 779 (Fla. 
2004). 
An "assault" is an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, 
or exertion of force directed toward another under such circumstances as to create a 
reasonable fear of imminent peril. See Lay I. Kremer, 411 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1982). It must be premised upon an affirmative act - a threat to use force, or the actual 
exertion of force. See 3A Fla.Jur.2d Assault §1("The essential element of the tort of 
assault is the violence offered, and not actual physical contact."). 
As further explained in Florida Jurisprudence, 2d, Assault §1 - 
EFTA00175795

Case 9:08-cv-8( 
)-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered 
=LSD Docket 1011 
:008 
Page 5 of 10 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 5 
An assault is defined as an intentional unlawful offer of corporal 
injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of 
another, under circumstances as to create a fear of imminent peril, 
coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt. At 
common law, a tortious assault is an act that puts another in reasonable 
apprehension of immediate bodily harm. 
In ¶14 of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does plead the requisite 
"touching" element of "battery," so that aspect of the assault and battery claim is not 
being challenged. With the standard of pleading established in Twomblv supra, in the 
context of assault, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Rule 12(b)(6). As to the elements of assault, here are no factual allegations as to what 
was said or done to Plaintiff such that it constituted an "intentional, unlawful offer of 
corporal injury to another by force, or exertion of force directed toward another under 
such circumstances as to create a reasonable fear of imminent peril." See ¶14 of Am. 
Comp. In fact, ¶14 alleges that JANE DOE NO. 4 "returned on many occasions to the 
Palm Beach mansion to provide Epstein with massages." Allegations as to 
circumstances creating a fear of imminent peril are lacking. 
Under applicable law, Plaintiff is required to give more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Twomblv,
supra. Plaintiff is required to allege the facts of what was done to her; what EPSTEIN 
said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff. 
As noted in the introduction and as this Court is well aware, there is more than 
one action brought against this Defendant attempting to allege similar sounding claims. 
With all due respect, the details as to a particular claim asserted by a particular Plaintiff 
are important to give this Defendant fair notice of Plaintiff's claim so he may properly 
respond. Accordingly, under applicable law, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 
EFTA00175796

Case 9:08-cv-8( 
)-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered 
=LSD Docket 101 
008 
Page 6 of 10 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 6 
"sexual assault and battery" has Plaintiff has failed to plead requisite factual allegations 
concerning the assault. 
In the alternative to dismissing Count I, Defendant requests that Plaintiff be 
required to give more definite statement as to what was done to her; what EPSTEIN 
said and did, if anything, to create fear and apprehension in Plaintiff; in pleading the 
elements of assault. Rule 12(e). 
III - "Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 
42422" - Is sublect to dismissal as Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be qr 
Rule 12(b)(6). Count Ill also contains an 
immaterial reference to 28 
. 42255. which is required to be stricken 
and more definitely stated. 
Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint attempts to assert a claim for "Coercion and 
Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 
. §2422." In her prayer for relief in 
Count III, Plaintiff "demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey Epstein for all 
damages available under 28 
. §2255(a), 
." 
Although the reference to "28 
§2255," pertaining to habeas corpus 
proceedings - federal custody and remedies on motion attacking sentence, is probably 
a typographical error by Plaintiff, and the reference to "28" was meant to be "18," 
Defendant requests that Plaintiff correct this error so that Defendant may have fair 
notice of the claim Plaintiff is attempting to assert. 
Whether or not the "28" is 
typographical error, Defendant is still entitled to dismissal of the count. 
The applicable version of these statutory provisions, (pre-2006 Amendments, as 
the Amended Complaint alleges a time period of "in or about 2002-2003," ¶9), provides: 
CHAPTER 117--TRANSPORTATION FOR ILLEGAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY 
AND RELATED CRIMES 
§ 2422. Coercion and enticement 
(a) Whoever knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
EFTA00175797

Case 9:08-cv-8' 
0-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered 
FLSD Docket 10/ 
'.008 
Page 7 of 10 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 7 
individual to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or 
Possession of the United States, to engage in prostitution, or in any sexual 
activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
20 years, or both. 
(b) Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution 
or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned 
not less than 5 years and not more than 30 years. I
CHAPTER 110--SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF 
CHILDREN 
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal Injuries 
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(# 2242 2243, 
2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A 2260, 2421, 2422 or 2423 of this title and who 
suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any 
appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual 
damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding sentence shall be 
deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $50,000 in value. 
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the 
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in 
the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years after 
the disability. 
' The above-quoted version of 18 MB §2422 is the post-2003 amendments which 
amended the statute as follows: 
2003 Amendments. Subsec. (a). Pub.L. 108-21, 4 103(a)(2)(A) struck out "10" 
and inserted "20". 
Subsec. (b). Pub.L. 108-21, § 103(a)(2)(B) struck out "15" and inserted "30". 
Pub.L. 108-21. § 103(b)(2)(A)(i) struck out ", imprisoned" and inserted "and 
imprisoned not less than 5 years and". 
Pub.L. 108-21, 6. 103(b)(2)(A)(ii) struck out ", or both" at end of subsec. (b). 
Defendant is not waiving his right to claim that the pre-2003 amended version of the 
statute is applicable in this action. However, for purposes of this motion, the relevant 
statutory language is the same. 
EFTA00175798

Case 9:08-cv-8( 
0-KAM 
Document 54 
Entered 
=LSD Docket 10K 
008 
Page 8 of 10 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 8 
Relevant to Plaintiffs complaint, 1a. 
2255(a) creates a civil remedy for "a 
minor who is a victim of a violation of section ... 2422 ... of this title and who suffers 
personal injury as a result of such violation ... ." Plaintiff has failed to plead any factual 
allegations whatsoever pertaining to violations of 18a. 
2422. Rather, Plaintiff has 
alleged conclusory allegations simply attempting to track parts of the statutory language 
in the statute without underlying factual allegations pertaining to the Plaintiff and any 
conduct by Defendant. See ¶29 of Am. Comp. Plaintiffs allegations, (or lack of factual 
allegations), are precisely what the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. prohibits — Plaintiffs complaint alleges only "labels and conclusions, and 
a (partial) formulaic recitation of the elements." 
First, the Amended Complaint fails to designate whether Plaintiff is relying on 
§2422(a) or §2422(b). Second, although the complaint does contain a partial tracking of 
the language in 18 MI. 
§2422(b), it contains absolutely no factual allegations 
concerning the requisite "using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign 
commerce" by Plaintiff to state a cause of action based on a violation of 18 a. 
2422(b). As well, there are no underlying factual allegations involving this Plaintiff as to 
the requisite elements that a defendant knowingly persuaded, induced, enticed, or 
coerced any individual (Plaintiff in this case) who has not attained the age of 18 years, 
to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with 
a criminal offense, or attempted to do so. See 18 
2422(b); i.e. with what criminal 
offense could Plaintiff and Defendant have been charged. Again, a Plaintiff cannot 
simply track the language of a statute without some underlying factual allegations to 
EFTA00175799

Case 9:08-cv-81 
0-KAM 
Document 54 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 9 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Count III is required to be 
Entered 
=LSD Docket 10K 
'008 
Page 9 of 10 
dismissed, and the reference to 28 USC 2455 be stricken. 
In the alternative, Plaintiff should be required to more definitely state the 
underlying factual allegations to support her claim as set forth in the statute, 18 
§2422(b) and §2455. 
Conclusion 
As discussed above herein, under the pleading standard established in Twombly,
supra, and law concerning the elements of Count I and III, Plaintiff has failed to state 
claims upon which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs complaint lack 
underlying factual allegations and, thus, Plaintiff is required to more definitely state the 
requisite factual allegations. Finally, Plaintiff should correct any improper statutory 
references. 
Certificate of Service 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed with 
the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being 
served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in the 
manner specified by CM/ECF on this sth day of  October 2008: 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Jeffrey Marc Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
18205 Biscayne Boulevard 
Suite 2218 
Miami. L 
60 
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq. 
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South 
Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012 
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
EFTA00175800

Case 9:08-cv-80 
LRAM 
Document 54 
Entered ( 
-LSD Docket 10/0, 
)08 
Page 10 of 10 
Case No. CV-80380-Marra-Johnson 
Page No. 10 
Michael R. Tein, Esq. 
Lewis Tein, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove, FL 33133 
rax: 
Counse or e endant Jeffrey Epstein 
Respectfully submitt 
By: 
ROBERT D CRITTON, JR., ESQ. 
Florida Ba No. 224162 
, ESQ. 
Florida Bar #617296 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTTIER & COLEMAN 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West 
ach, FL 33401 
Phone 
Fax 
for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein) 
EFTA00175801

Case 9:08-cv-1 
30-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterer 
FLSD Docket 02 
2009 
Page 1 of 8 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA/JOI INSON 
JANE DOE NO. 4, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Defendant. 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, Jane Doe No. 4 ("Jane" or "Jane Doc"), brings this Amended Complaint against 
Jeffrey Epstein, as follows: 
Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue 
1. 
Jane Doc No. 4 is a citizen and resident of the State of Florida, and is sui juris. 
2. 
This Complaint is brought under a fictitious name to protect the identity of the 
Plaintiff because this Complaint makes sensitive allegations of sexual assault and abuse upon a 
minor. 
3. 
Defendant Jeffrey Epstein is a citizen and resident of the State of New York. 
4. 
This is an action for damages in excess of $50 million. 
5. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this action and the claims set forth herein pursuant to 28 
§I 332(a), as the matter in controversy (i) exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs; 
and (ii) is between citizens of different states. 
6. 
Additionally, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
§I 33 I because 
Plaintiff alleges a claim under the laws of the United States. This Court has supplemental 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
. §I 367(a) over all other claims set forth herein, which form part of 
- I - 
EFTA00175802

Case 9:08-cv-f 
30-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterer 
FLSD Docket 02 
2009 
Page 2 of 8 
the same case or controversy. 
7. 
This Court has venue of this action pursuant to 28 
§§1391(a) and 1391(b) as a 
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. 
Factual Allegations 
8. 
At all relevant times, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein") was an adult male, 52 
years old. Epstein is a financier and money manager with a secret clientele limited exclusively to 
billionaires. He is himself a man of tremendous wealth, power and influence. He maintains his 
principal home in New York and also owns residences in New Mexico, St. Thomas and Palm Beach, 
FL. The allegations herein concern Epstein's conduct while at his lavish estate in Palm Beach. 
9. 
Upon information and belief, Epstein has a sexual preference and obsession for 
underage minor girls. He engaged in a plan and scheme in which he gained access to primarily 
economically disadvantaged minor girls in his home, sexually assaulted these girls, and then gave 
them money. In or about 2002-2003, Jane Doc, then approximately 15 years old, fell into Epstein's 
trap and became one of his victims. 
10. 
Upon information and belief, Jeffrey Epstein carried out his scheme and assaulted 
girls in Florida, New York and on his private island, known as Little St. James, in St. Thomas. 
II. 
Epstein's scheme involved the use of young girls to recruit underage girls. 
a Palm Beach Community College student from Loxahatchee, Florida recruited girls 
ostensibly to give a wealthy man a massage for monetary compensation in his Palm Beach mansion. 
The young girls would be contacted when Epstein was planning to be at his Palm Beach residence 
or soon after he had arrived there. Ms. 
upon information and belief, generally sought out 
economically disadvantaged underage girls from western Palm Beach County who would be enticed 
by the money being offered - generally $200 to $300 per "massage" session - and who were 
perceived as less likely to complain to authorities or have credibility if allegations of improper 
- 2 - 
EFTA00175803

Case 9:08-cv-f 
30-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterer 
FLSD Docket 02 
2009 
Page 3 of 8 
conduct were made. This was an important element of Epstein's plan. 
12. 
Epstein's plan and scheme reflected a particular pattern and method. The underage 
victim would be brought to the kitchen entrance of Epstein's mansion, where she would be 
introduced to 
Epstein's assistant. Ms. 
would then bring the girl up a flight of 
stairs to a bedroom that contained a massage table in addition to other furnishings. There were 
photographs of nude women lining the stairway hall and in the bedroom. The girl would then find 
herself alone in the room with Epstein, who would be wearing only a towel. He would then remove 
his towel and lie naked on the massage table, and direct the girl to remove her clothes. Epstein 
would then perform one or more lewd, lascivious and sexual acts, including 
and 
13. 
Consistent with the foregoing plan and scheme, when Jane Doc was approximately 15 
years old, she was recruited by 
to give Epstein a massage for monetary compensation. 
Jane was brought to Epstein's mansion in Palm Beach, to the kitchen entrance. Once there, Jane 
was introduced to 
who led her up the flight of stairs to the room with the massage 
table. In this room, Jane was directed by Epstein to remove her clothes and give him a massage. 
Jane initially kept her panties and bra on, and complied with Epstein's instructions. Jane was paid 
by Epstein for this massage. 
14. 
Jane returned on many occasions to the Palm Beach mansion to provide Epstein with 
massages. On those occasions, Epstein engaged in sexual contact and activity with the minor Jane, 
which included, among other things, directing Jane to remove all her clothes, 
during 
the massage, and digitally MI= 
Jane's 
Jeffrey Epstein oftener 
on the 
minor Jane during the massage. This sexual abuse continued for approximately three years. 
IS. 
As a result of these encounters with Epstein, Jane experienced confusion, shame, 
humiliation and embarrassment, and has suffered severe psychological and emotional injuries. 
- 3 - 
EFTA00175804

Case 9:08-cv-£ 
10-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterec' 
FLSD Docket 02/ 
?009 
Page 4 of 8 
COUNT I 
Sexual Assault and Battery 
16. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 15 above. 
17. 
Epstein acted with intent to cause an offensive contact with Jane Doe, or an imminent 
apprehension of such a contact, and Jane Doe was thereby put in such imminent apprehension. 
18. 
Epstein made an intentional, unlawful offer of offensive sexual contact toward Jane 
Doe, creating a reasonable fear of imminent peril. 
19. 
Epstein intentionally inflicted harmful or offensive contact on the person of Jane Doe, 
with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is imminent. 
20. 
Epstein tortiously committed a sexual assault and battery on Jane Doe. Epstein's acts 
were intentional, unlawful, offensive and harmful. 
21. 
Epstein's plan and scheme in which he committed such acts upon Jane Doe were 
done willfully and maliciously. 
22. 
As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's assault on Jane, she has suffered and 
will continue to suffer severe and permanent traumatic injuries, including mental, psychological and 
emotional damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein for compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and such other and further relief as this 
Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT II 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
23. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs I through 15 above. 
24. 
Epstein's conduct was intentional or reckless. 
25. 
Epstein's conduct with a minor was extreme and outrageous, going beyond all bounds 
of decency. 
- 4 - 
EFTA00175805

Case 9:08-cv-f 
30-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterer 
FLSD Docket 02. 
2009 
Page 5 of 8 
26. 
Epstein committed willful acts of child sexual abuse on Jane Doe. These acts resulted 
in mental or sexual injury to Jane Doe, that caused or were likely to cause Jane Doe's mental or 
emotional health to be significantly impaired. 
27. 
Epstein's conduct caused severe emotional distress to Jane Doe. Epstein knew or had 
reason to know that his intentional and outrageous conduct would cause emotional distress and 
damage to Jane Doe, or Epstein acted with reckless disregard of the high probability of causing 
severe emotional distress to Jane Doe. 
28. 
As a direct and proximate result of Epstein's intentional or reckless conduct, Jane 
Doe, has suffered and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and pain. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein for compensatory damages, costs, punitive damages, and such other and further relief as this 
Court deems just and proper. 
COUNT III 
Coercion and Enticement to Sexual Activity in Violation of 18 
42422 
29. 
Plaintiff Jane Doe repeats and realleges paragraphs I through 15 above. 
30. 
Epstein used a facility or means of interstate commerce to knowingly persuade, 
induce or entice Jane Doe, when she was under the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or 
sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. 
31. 
On June 30, 2008, Epstein entered a plea of guilty to violations of Florida §§ 796.07 
and 796.03, in the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County (Case nos. 2008-cf-
009381AXXXMB and 2006-cf-009454AXXXMB), for conduct involving the same plan and 
scheme as alleged herein. 
32. 
As to PlaintiffJane Doe, Epstein could have been charged with criminal violations of 
Florida Statute §796.07(2) (including subsections (I), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) thereof), and other 
- 5 - 
EFTA00175806

Case 9:08-cv-£ 
30-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterer: 
FLSD Docket 02/ 
2009 
Page 6 of 8 
criminal offenses including violations of Florida Statutes §§ 798.02 and 800.04 (including 
subsections (5), (6) and (7) thereof). 
33. 
Epstein's acts and conduct arc in violation of 18 
§2422. 
34. 
As a result of Epstein's violation of 18 
§2422, Plaintiff has suffered personal 
injury, including mental, psychological and emotional damages. 
35. 
Plaintiff hired Herman & Mermelstein, P.A., in this matter and agreed to pay them a 
reasonable attorneys' fee. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 4 demands judgment against Defendant Jeffrey 
Epstein for all damages available under 18 
. §2255(a), including without limitation, actual 
and compensatory damages, costs of suit, and attorneys' fees, and such other and further relief as 
this Court deems just and proper. 
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiff demands a jury trial in this action on all claims so triable. 
Dated: February 27, 2009 
Respectfully submitted, 
By: 
s/ Adam D. 1 lorowitz 
Stuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245) 
Adam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980) 
MERMELSTEIN & HOROWITZ, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
Tel: 
Fax: 
- 6 - 
EFTA00175807

Case 9:08-cv-£ 
30-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterec 
FLSD Docket 024 
?009 
Page 7 of 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on February 27, 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with 
the Clerk of the Court using CWECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this 
day to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of 
Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CWECF or in some other authorized manner for those 
parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing. 
/s/ Adam D. Horowitz 
- 7 - 
EFTA00175808

Case 9:08-cv-£ 
10-KAM 
Document 62 
Enterec 
FLSD Docket 02A 
2009 
Page 8 of 8 
SERVICE LIST 
DOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida 
Jack Alan Goldber er Esq. 
Robert D. Critton Es . 
/s/ Adam D. Horowitz 
- 8 - 
EFTA00175809

Case 9:08-cv-8 
'0-KAM 
Document 76 
Entered 
FLSD Docket 041 
309 
Page 1 of 7 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-CV-80380-MARRA-JOHNSON 
JANE DOE NO. 4 
1. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S ANSWER & AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, (hereinafter "EPSTEIN"), by and through his 
undersigned attorneys, files his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint and states: 
1. Without knowledge and deny. 
2. As to the allegations in paragraphs 2, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi I. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 
1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Malloy'. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth 
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - "Mt would be incongruous to have different 
standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared 
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5 
Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination ("...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a 
specific denial."). See also 24 FIa.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. — 
"... a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting 
EFTA00175810

Case 9:08-cv-8( 
0-KAM 
Document 76 
Entered .. . FLSD Docket 04/01 
)09 
Page 2 of 7 
Jane Doe No. 4'. Epstein 
Page 2 
the privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute 
the kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief" which would prevent a plaintiff 
bringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege. 
3. As to the allegations In paragraph 3, deny. 
4. As to the allegations in paragraph 4, deny. 
5. As to the allegations in paragraph 5, without knowledge and deny. 
6. As to the allegations in paragraphs 6, Defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. See DeLisi I. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 
1099 (Fla. zim DCA 1983); Malloy'. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth 
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - "[i]t would be incongruous to have different 
standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared 
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court."); 5 
Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination ("...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a 
specific denial."). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. — 
"... a civil defendant who raises an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting 
the privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute 
the kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff 
bringing a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege. 
7. As to the allegations in paragraphs 7 through 15 of Plaintiffs Second Amended 
Complaint, Defendant exercises his Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-
EFTA00175811

ease 9:08-cv-8 
1.0-KAM 
Document 76 
Entered 
FLSD Docket 04/C 
009 
Page 3 of 7 
Jane Doe No. 4 
Epstein 
Page 3 
Incrimination. See DeLisl 
Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Ha. 4th DCA 
1983); Malloy 1 Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment - "[i]t would be incongruous to have different standards 
determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, 
depending on whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court.")• 5 Fed.Prac. & 
Proc. Civ. 3d §1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
("...court must treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific 
denial."). See also 24 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. - "... a civil 
defendant who raises an affirmative defense Is not precluded from asserting the 
privilege [against self-incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the 
kind of voluntary application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff bringing 
a claim seeking affirmative relief from asserting the privilege. 
8. In response to the allegations of paragraph 16, Defendant realleges and adopts 
his responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Second Amended Complaint set forth 
in paragraphs 1 through 7 above herein. 
9. Defendant asserts the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination to 
the allegations set forth in paragraphs 17 through 22 of the Second Amended 
Complaint. See DeLisi I. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 4m DCA 1983); 
Malloy'. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination 
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment - "[fit would be incongruous to have different standards determine the 
EFTA00175812

Case 9:08-cv-8( 
9-KAM 
Document 76 
Entered, FLSD Docket 04/0; 
)09 
Page 4 of 7 
Jane Doe No. 4 
Epstein 
Page 4 
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on 
whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court"); 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d 
§1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ("...court must 
treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific denial."). See also 24 
Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants In civil actions. —"... a civil defendant who raises 
an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the privilege [against self-
incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the kind of voluntary 
application for affirmative relief' which would prevent a plaintiff bringing a claim seeking 
affirmative relief from asserting the privilege. 
10. In response to the allegations of paragraph 23, Defendant realleges and adopts 
his responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Second Amended Complaint set forth 
in paragraphs 1 through 7 above herein. 
11. Defendant asserts the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination to 
the allegations set forth in paragraphs 24 through 28 of the Second Amended 
Complaint. See DeLisi 
Bankers Ins. Company 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 41  DCA 1983); 
Malloy I Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination 
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment - "[l]t would be Incongruous to have different standards determine the 
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on 
whether the claim was asserted In state or federal court."); 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d 
§1280 Effect of Failure to Deny - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ("...court must 
treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific denial."). See also 24 
EFTA00175813

Case 9:08-cv-f 
30-KAM 
Document 76 
Entere6 
FLSD Docket 041( 
:009 
Page 5 of 7 
Jane Doe No. 4'. Epstein 
Page 5 
FIa.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants in civil actions. —"... a civil defendant who raises 
an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the privilege [against self-
incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the kind of voluntary 
application for affirmative relief which would prevent a plaintiff bringing a claim seeking 
affirmative relief from asserting the privilege. 
12. In response to the allegations of paragraph 29, Defendant realleges and adopts 
his responses to paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Second Amended Complaint set forth 
in paragraphs 1 through 7 above herein. 
13. Defendant asserts the Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination to 
the allegations set forth In paragraphs 30 through 35 of the Second Amended 
Complaint. See DeLisi I. Bankers Ins. Company, 436 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 41h DCA 1983); 
Malloy'. Hogan, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 (1964)(the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination 
Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment - "lilt would be incongruous to have different standards determine the 
validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared prosecution, depending on 
whether the claim was asserted in state or federal court"); 5 Fed.Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d 
§1280 Effect of Failure to Deny — Privilege Against Self-Incrimination ("...court must 
treat the defendant's claim of privilege as equivalent to a specific denial."). See also 24 
Fla.Jur.2d Evidence §592. Defendants In civil actions. — "... a civil defendant who raises 
an affirmative defense is not precluded from asserting the privilege [against self-
incrimination], because affirmative defenses do not constitute the kind of voluntary 
EFTA00175814