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From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹
> 
Subject: September 5 update 
Date: Thu, 06 Sep 2012 20:43:14 +0000 
5 September, 2012 
Article 1. 
NYT 
The Truth About Obama and Israel 
Haim Saban 
Article 2. 
The National Interest 
U.S., Israeli Interests Diverge on Iran 
Robert W. Merry 
Article 3. 
Agence Global 
The Collapse of Turkey's Middle East Policy 
Patrick Seale 
Article 4. 
The American Interest 
Israel and the New Egypt — Is it all bad news? 
Shlomo Brom, Shai Feldman & Shimon Stein 
Article 5. 
The Daily Beast 
Giving Up 
Peter Beinart 
Article 6. 
Project Syndicate 
Asian Nationalism at Sea 
Joseph S. Nye 
Article 7. 
NYT 
It's Mitt's World 
Thomas L. Friedman 
NYT 
The Truth About Obama and Israel 
Haim Saban 
September 4, 2012 -- AS an Israeli-American who cares deeply about the 
survival of Israel and the future of the Jewish people, I will be voting for 
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President Obama in November. Here's why. 
Even though he could have done a better job highlighting his friendship for 
Israel, there's no denying that by every tangible measure, his support for 
Israel's security and well-being has been rock solid. 
Mitt Romney claims Mr. Obama has "thrown allies like Israel under the 
bus," but in fact the president has taken concrete steps to make Israel more 
secure — a commitment he has described as "not negotiable." 
When he visited Israel as a candidate he saw firsthand how vulnerable 
Israeli villagers were to rocket attacks from Gaza. As president, he 
responded by providing full financing and technical assistance for Israel's 
Iron Dome short-range anti-rocket defense system, which is now protecting 
those villagers. In July, he provided an additional $70 million to extend the 
Iron Dome system across southern Israel. That's in addition to the $3 
billion in annual military assistance to Israel that the president requests and 
that Congress routinely approves, assistance for which Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed deep personal appreciation. 
When the first President Bush had disagreements with Israel over its 
settlement policy, he threatened to withhold loan guarantees from Israel. 
Mr. Obama has had his own disagreements with Mr. Netanyahu over the 
settlers but has never taken such a step. To the contrary, he has increased 
aid to Israel and given it access to the most advanced military equipment, 
including the latest fighter aircraft. 
Ask any senior Israeli official involved in national security, and he will tell 
you that the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel has 
never been stronger than under President Obama. "I can hardly remember a 
better period of American support and backing, and Israeli cooperation and 
similar strategic understanding of events around us," the defense minister, 
Ehud Barak, said last  year, "than what we have right now." 
That cooperation has included close coordination by intelligence agencies 
— including the deployment of cyberweapons, as recent news reports have 
revealed — to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
Mr. Romney conveniently neglects to mention that Mr. Obama's 
predecessor, George W. Bush, diverted American attention from Iran — the 
greatest threat to Israel's existence — to Iraq, even helping to put a pro-
Iranian leader in power in Baghdad. In contrast, through painstaking 
diplomacy, Mr. Obama persuaded Russia and China to support harsh 
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sanctions on Iran, including an arms embargo and the cancellation of a 
Russian sale of advanced antiaircraft missiles that would have severely 
complicated any military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. Mr. Obama 
secured European support for what even Iran's president, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, called "the most severe and strictest sanctions ever imposed 
on a country." 
Mr. Romney has never explained how he would prevent Iran from 
acquiring nuclear weapons; Mr. Obama not only has declared that all 
options are on the table, but he has also taken the option of merely 
"containing" a nuclear-armed Iran off the table. He has directed the 
military to prepare options for confronting Iran and has positioned forces in 
the Persian Gulf to demonstrate his resolve. 
Israel necessarily has a thinner margin of security than the United States, 
given differences in size, geography and military capabilities. Iran's leaders 
are not threatening to destroy the United States, but their threats to destroy 
Israel must be taken seriously. As Iran approaches the nuclear weapons 
threshold, Israel's nervousness is understandable. But Mr. Obama has 
assured Mr. Netanyahu that he will "always have Israel's back." Americans 
who support Israel should take the president at his word. 
Finally, Mr. Obama has been steadfast against efforts to delegitimize Israel 
in international forums. He has blocked Palestinian attempts to bypass 
negotiations and achieve United Nations recognition as a member state, a 
move that would have opened the way to efforts by Israel's foes to sanction 
and criminalize its policies. As a sign of its support, the Obama 
administration even vetoed a Security Council resolution on Israeli 
settlements, a resolution that mirrored the president's position and that of 
every American administration since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
So what's the case against Mr. Obama? That he hasn't visited Israel since 
he was a candidate in 2008? Perhaps these critics have forgotten that 
George W. Bush, that great friend of Israel, didn't visit Jerusalem until his 
seventh year in office. 
Yes, Mr. Obama should have gone there, especially after his 2009 speech 
in Cairo, addressed to the Arab world. He should have showered Israelis 
with more love and affection. He could have done more to allay Israel's 
worries that there might one day be an American president who would take 
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a different approach to the Middle East in general, and Israel in particular; 
Mr. Obama should have made it clear he isn't that president. 
But as John Adams said, facts are stubborn things. The facts back up the 
president's staunch support of Israel — facts that even $100 million from a 
casino magnate can't refute. (Full disclosure: I have contributed to 
Democratic campaigns this political cycle, though not nearly to that 
extent.) 
When I enter the voting booth, 
going to ask myself, what do I prefer 
for Israel and its relationship with the United States: meaningful action or 
empty rhetoric? To me the answer is clear: I'll take another four years of 
Mr. Obama's steadfast support over Mr. Romney's sweet nothings. 
Haim Saban is a private equity investor, the chairman of the Spanish-
language media company Univision and a founder of the Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. 
The National Interest 
U.S., Israeli Interests Diverge on Iran 
Robert W. Merry 
September 5, 2012 -- A Reuters dispatch says that Israel's most widely read 
newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, reported on Monday that the Obama 
administration had approached Iran through two European intermediary 
countries with a remarkable proposal. The Israeli newspaper said the 
United States promised to refrain from any involvement in an Israel-Iran 
war triggered by an Israeli attack on Iran. In exchange, said the report, the 
United States wanted assurances that Iran would not go after U.S. military 
positions in the region following an Israeli attack. 
It's difficult to fathom what to make of such a report, and there are ample 
reasons to question the veracity of an item suggesting the United States is 
prepared to embrace a diplomacy that separates itself so starkly from 
Israel. But, whatever its veracity, the report suggests a new reality has 
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emerged in U.S.-Israel relations. The interests of the two countries have 
diverged on the question of war with Iran. This new reality is reflected also 
in a Time [3]_[3]report [3] over the weekend that the United States in 
February postponed a massive joint U.S.-Israel military exercise that had 
been scheduled for a time when U.S. concerns were growing over a 
unilateral Israeli military strike against Iran. The exercise, according to the 
report, was rescheduled for October, but Washington has severely reduced 
its participation, with perhaps 1,500 or even just 1,200 U.S. military 
personnel now scheduled to take part instead of the originally planned 
5,000. 
Time quotes one senior Israeli military official as suggesting the United 
States downsized its role to distance itself from Israel's constant drumbeat 
for war with Iran. "Basically," the official told the magazine, "what the 
Americans are saying is, `We don't trust you.'" This raises a question: If 
President Obama truly believes the two countries' interests have in fact 
diverged in serious ways, what can he do about it? What should he do 
about it? 
Consider first the likely consequences of a unilateral Israeli attack on Iran 
—the Syrian civil war exploding into a region-wide sectarian conflict; 
destabilization of such nations as Bahrain, Jordan and Lebanon; 
obliteration of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement; a new Intifada in the 
occupied Palestinian lands; expanded terrorist activity against the West; a 
doubling or tripling of oil prices; a likely economic meltdown in Europe 
and China, with huge subsidiary damage to the U.S. economy. All of these 
things easily could be triggered simply by an Israeli attack on Iran; all of 
them likely would be worse if America got dragged into the resulting 
Israeli-Iranian conflict. 
Second, what kind of country would America be if it ceded its sovereignty 
in matters of war and peace to a tiny ally that seems bent on manipulating 
American decision making by manipulating American domestic politics? 
It's one thing to have Israel thwart America's efforts to foster a peaceful 
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on Israel's perception of 
its own interests; it's quite another to allow Israel to pull the United States 
into a war that the American people are not prepared for and that likely 
would severely harm America's economic and geopolitical interests. 
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In political terms, the geopolitical and economic chaos that would be 
unleashed by such a war probably would upend any president who lacked 
the fortitude to prevent it. If a global recession and all of its resulting 
anguish could be attributed, in retrospect, to the president's pusillanimous 
inability to stand up to an errant ally, new opposition forces would emerge 
to deal a blow to the incumbent party that could last a decade or more. A 
good object lesson would be Woodrow Wilson, whose war decisions 
unleashed such devastation upon the American polity that voters in 1920 
repudiated the incumbent party with a magnitude seldom seen in American 
history. 
All of this argues for the American president—either Obama or his 
successor—to separate his government starkly from the Israeli government 
on the matter of an attack on Iran. But what about the political backlash? It 
would be fierce, as anti-Iran hawks and friends of Israel throughout 
America go on the attack. The pro-Israel lobby would mobilize, and 
evangelical Christians would swarm into political action like angry 
hornets. Journalists would speculate widely that the president had 
destroyed his political standing with Jewish voters. But all this would miss 
the big picture. On fundamental issues, the politics of national interest 
often trump the politics of parochial interest. The president would have to 
explain his action to the American people, but he would move the polls 
dramatically if he could explain effectively the national stakes involved—a 
merely restive Middle East vs. absolute chaos; at least a chance for an 
ongoing, if slow, economic recovery vs. the certainty of a global recession; 
a proud America protecting its sovereign command over decisions of war 
and peace vs. a country that cedes those decisions to others; presidential 
leadership that protects the interests of the American people vs. leadership 
that loses sight of such things. 
The essence of the argument would have to be that it isn't in America's 
interest to go to war with Iran while the president is pursuing his regimen 
of economic sanctions and seeking a negotiated solution through the 
ongoing talks involving Iran and the so-called P5+1 (the United States, 
Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany). And he isn't willing to cede 
to other nations U.S. decisions that could result in perhaps thousands of 
combat deaths for young Americans in an already stretched U.S. military. 
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The president would win that argument, but first he would have to 
demonstrate the fortitude to take it forcefully and deftly to the American 
people. 
Such a political victory in turn wouldtransform U.S. relations with 
Israel.The conventional wisdom in Washington is that interest-group 
politics, and particularly ethnic-group politics, drive events. That's often 
true, but not when a national consensus emerges that runs counter to the 
parochial interests of particular groups. As Woodrow Wilson once wrote, 
"If [the president] rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist 
upon it, he is irresistible." 
We have seen in recent years an Israeli prime minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, who sought to outmaneuver the U.S. president by mustering 
political sentiment against him through speeches to the U.S. Congress and 
to the AIPAC lobbying group. But that's possible only if pro-Israel 
Americans can make the case that America's interests and Israel's are 
always identical, and thus any president who isn't in sync with Israel's 
national leadership is perforce on the wrong side of domestic politics. Of 
course the interests of any two nations are never always identical. And if 
the president successfully can convince the American people that the two 
nations' interests not only can diverge but have, then the balance of 
influence in the relationship will change in America's favor. And 
Netanyahu would have to ponder carefully whether he wants another shot 
at taking on the U.S. president on his own turf. That's assuming that the 
diplomatic chastisement represented by the new U.S. diplomacy hasn't led 
to the collapse of his government in the meantime. 
So let's assume Obama believes U.S. and Israeli interests have diverged 
over Iran and strongly believes his job requires him to protect his country 
from the consequences of an Israeli strike. What can he do about it? One 
possibility would be actions akin to what was reported by Yedioth 
Ahronoth—an understanding with Iran that America would not involve 
itself in any Israeli attack and would remain neutral in any subsequent 
Israel-Iran war. This would have the virtue of protecting American interests 
without impinging upon Israel's own range of options in protecting itself 
from perceived threats. But it seems unrealistic to think the Iranians would 
believe America would in fact remain aloof from Israel in such 
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circumstances or that it could not bring to bear sufficient pressure to 
forestall such an Israeli attack. This seems like a nonstarter. 
That leaves what might be called the Brzezinski option, named after former 
White House national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has 
argued for a U.S. stance that declares firmly and clearly that America will 
not accept an Israeli attack on Iran because the consequences would be 
"disastrous" for America and the world—and for Israel too. As Brzezinski 
points out, polls in Israel show a large majority there opposes a unilateral 
Israeli strike, particularly if it would harm Israel's relations with America, 
and hence a firm American stance would generate serious political 
pressures on Netanyahu within his own country. 
Of course, it isn't clear that Obama or any future president actually will see 
events with sufficient clarity to conclude that the United States and Israel 
are on divergent paths on the matter of Iran. But they are. And, when it 
comes to America's vital national interests—particularly when the 
expenditure of American blood is on the line—the president's job is to see 
events with crystal clarity. 
Robert W. Merry is editor of The National Interest and the author of books 
on American history and foreign policy. His most recent book is Where 
They Stand: The American Presidents in the Eyes of Voters and Historians 
[5] (Simon & Schuster, 2012). 
Article 3. 
Agence Global 
The Collapse of Turkey's Middle East Policy 
Patrick Seale 
04 Sep 2012 -- The `Arab Spring' will undoubtedly go down in history as 
an important moment in the liberation of the Arab peoples from tyranny. 
But, like most major political upheavals, it has had a number of 
unfortunate and largely unforeseen consequences. 
The economies of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen have suffered serious 
damage; Syria's on-going civil war has resulted in heavy -- and mounting -
- civilian casualties and material destruction; in the Sahel, violence and 
chaos have followed the overthrow of Libya's Muammar al-Qadhafi, 
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especially in Mali where Touareg rebels backed by Islamist groups have 
seized a great chunk of the country; sectarian tensions have sharpened 
across the region causing all minorities to feel less secure; the Palestine 
cause has been consigned to the margins of international attention, while 
Israel, fully backed by the United States, proceeds undisturbed with its land 
grab. 
Turkey is yet another victim of the unforeseen consequence of the Arab 
Spring: Its ambitious Middle East policy has collapsed. Two years ago, 
Turkey could claim to be the most successful country in the region. Its 
economy was booming. Its charismatic Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, in power since 2002, enjoyed popularity at home and respect 
abroad. The Turkish combination of democracy and Islam was hailed as a 
model for the region. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, an academic 
turned statesman, was credited with devising a peaceful regional order, 
based on the principle of "zero problems with neighbours." A key pivot of 
Davutoglu's new regional order was a Turkish-Syrian partnership, both 
commercial and political, which soon expanded into a free-trade zone 
embracing Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Visas with these countries 
were abolished. Meanwhile, Turkish construction companies were active in 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as well as in Qadhafi's Libya (where 
contracts were estimated at some $18bn for roads, bridges, pipelines, ports, 
airports and much else besides.) Buoyed by these successes, Turkey set 
about seeking to solve some of the region's most obdurate conflicts. It tried 
hard to bring Syria and Israel to the negotiating table. Together with Brazil, 
it made what seemed a promising advance towards solving the problem of 
Iran's nuclear programme. In Afghanistan, Turkish troops were the only 
foreign forces welcome, which seemed to presage a role for Ankara in 
negotiating a settlement with the Taleban. In addition, Prime Minister 
Erdogan had hopes of reaching an entente with Turkey's old rival, Greece, 
and of making peace at last with Armenia (a country still smarting from the 
harsh treatment of Armenians by the Ottoman Turks.) Above all, the 
Turkish Prime Minister seemed ready to make major political concessions 
to the Kurds of eastern Anatolia in a bid to end, once and for all, the long 
and violent struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has 
claimed tens of thousands of lives. 
Then the whole thing fell apart. 
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The deal which Turkey and Brazil negotiated with Iran over its nuclear 
facilities was rejected by Washington. Turkey's overtures to Armenia got 
nowhere: The border remains closed. Turkey quarrelled violently with 
Israel when Israeli commandos boarded a Turkish ship, the Mavi Marmara, 
in international waters, and killed nine activists, most of them Turks, who 
were trying to break Israel's cruel siege of Gaza. Israel has refused to 
apologise for its brutal behaviour. Turkey's hopes of better relations with 
Greece were dashed by Greece's economic collapse. Moreover, having 
quarrelled with Turkey, Israel hurried to embrace Greece, as well as the 
Greek-speaking Republic of Cyprus, joining with it in the exploitation of 
gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean, to the anger of Turkish-speaking 
northern Cyprus and of Turkey itself. On the commercial front, Qadhafi's 
overthrow put an end to several big Turkish contracts in Libya, while 
Turkey's expanding business with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states 
was dealt a harsh blow by the disruption of road traffic across Syria due to 
the uprising there. Turkey's once friendly relations with Iran suffered 
because they now found themselves on opposite sides of the Syrian 
conflict, while Turkish relations with Iraq suffered because of Turkey's 
close ties with the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government in northern 
Iraq (including providing the KRG with facilities to export oil direct to 
Turkey, to the fury of Baghdad.) Instead of "no problems with 
neighbours," Turkey is now beset with grave problems on almost every 
front. Inevitably, Ahmet Davutoglu's star has waned. No longer the master 
strategist, he is seen as an amateur politician struggling to survive. 
The real turning point was Turkey's impetuous decision to back the Syrian 
rebels against President Bashar al-Asad's regime. At a stroke, Turkey's 
partnership with Syria collapsed, bringing down the whole of Turkey's 
Arab policy. Instead of attempting to resolve the Syrian conflict by 
mediation -- which it was well placed to do -- Turkey took sides. It 
provided house room in Istanbul for the civilian Syrian opposition and 
camps for the Free Syrian Army and other fighting groups. Under Turkish 
protection, the Syrian rebels now control a narrow strip of territory of some 
70 kilometres along the Syrian-Turkish border. Turkey and Syria are 
virtually at war. In retaliation for Turkey's role in channelling funds, 
weapons and intelligence to the rebels, Syria seems to be encouraging the 
PKK -- and its Syrian affiliate, the PYD -- to turn up the heat on Turkey. 
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The PYD has occupied five largely Kurdish towns in northern Syria, from 
which Syrian government forces were deliberately withdrawn. If Syria's 
Kurds gain anything like the autonomy already enjoyed by Iraq's Kurds, 
then Turkey's own Kurds are bound to press their claims for political rights 
and freedoms. In eastern Turkey, the PKK's 28-year insurgency seems to 
be springing back to life with deadly ambushes against military targets, 
such as last Sunday's attack which killed a dozen Turkish soldiers. The 
struggle to put a lid on Kurdish militancy could once again become 
Turkey's most painful and disruptive domestic problem. 
A real headache for Turkey is the massive influx of Syrian refugees. To 
stem the flood, Turkey has closed its frontier with Syria for the time being. 
Syrian refugees in Turkey are said to number over 80,000, lodged in nine 
tented camps. Five more camps are under construction, which could house 
another 30,000 refugees. Turkey says it cannot realistically take in more 
than about 100,000, without help from other countries and international 
organisations. Hosting the refugees has already cost Turkey an estimated 
135 million euros -- and no doubt will cost a great deal more. 
Should Turkey revise its Syria policy? Instead of joining in Washington's 
(and Israel's) war against Tehran and Damascus, Ankara might be well 
advised to revert back, step by step, to a more neutral stance. Lakhdar 
Brahimi, the new UN peace envoy, needs Turkey's help in his difficult task 
of mediating a peaceful resolution of the Syrian conflict. That would be the 
way to restore Turkey's Middle East policy to its former glory. Turkey 
needs urgently to rethink its relations with all its neighbours -- Syria first 
among them. 
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East. His latest 
book is The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers 
of the Modern Middle East (Cambridge University Press). 
The American Interest 
Israel and the New Egypt — Is it all bad 
news? 
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Shlomo Brom, Shai Feldman & Shimon Stein 
September 4, 2012 Not surprisingly, Israelis are alarmed at the prospect 
that their southern neighbor will now be led by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Israel lost "the devils it knew": not only Mubarak, but also his top 
lieutenants, such as General Omar Suleiman, head of Egypt's General 
Intelligence Directorate, with whom Israelis have been dealing for years. 
They fear that in the new Egypt it may no longer be possible to "close 
deals" with a very small number of individuals located in the Office of the 
President and in the security services. They also worry that public opinion 
will now matter more, and that Egyptian policy toward Israel will be 
affected to a far greater extent by the sentiments in the Egyptian street, 
whose hostility toward Israel was given expression by the ransacking of the 
Israeli Embassy in Cairo in September 2011. Finally, there is fear that 
Egyptian-Israeli relations will experience a sharp and rapid deterioration. 
This fear is understandable, given the Brotherhood's history of rejecting 
Israel's right to exist, as well as its formal and vocal opposition to the 1978 
Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. 
President Morsi's August 12 sacking of the top commanders of the 
Egyptian Military and intelligence services only exacerbates these Israeli 
concerns. The sacking signaled a further tilt in the internal balance of 
power in favor of Egypt's new Brotherhood-dominated civilian leadership 
at the expense of security chiefs with whom Israel has had decades-long 
relations. 
While these fears and concerns remain valid, the picture emerging some 
months after the Muslim Brotherhood's ascent is more complex, presenting 
risks but also opportunities. Israel and the new Egypt share some important 
interests that may help preserve the two countries' relations. These interests 
are important because Egypt's new leaders are likely to follow not only 
their ideological inclinations but also the geostrategic interests of the 
Egyptian state. (One such key interest is preserving Egypt's close ties with 
the United States.) Whether these opportunities will be utilized to preserve 
if not improve Egyptian-Israeli ties depends not only on the complexities 
of post-revolutionary Egypt but also on the manner in which Israel will 
conduct itself—in its relations with Egypt, as well as in other realms that 
affect Egyptian-Israeli bilateral relations. 
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The following are a number of key areas where an Egyptian-Israeli shared 
agenda may emerge. 
Hamas in Gaza 
Since Hamas was born as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
underestimating the importance of the ideological affinity between the two 
movements would be a grave mistake. However, the new leadership in 
Cairo shares with Israel a common interest in avoiding another violent 
explosion between Israel and Gaza. Israel's interest is clear: It wishes to 
avoid developments that endanger its citizens in the south and disrupt their 
daily lives. But Egypt also fears such explosions, because it seeks to avoid 
developments that might push the problems of Gaza and its population into 
its own lap. Egypt's concern is that such responsibility would pull it into an 
unwanted confrontation with Israel instigated by some Hamas action. 
One important way to avoid such explosions is for Israel and Hamas to 
reach a tacit understanding on "rules of the game." This would minimize 
the danger that, by initiating terror and other attacks, small extremist 
groups would succeed in embroiling Hamas and Israel in an escalating 
conflict. Egypt's new leaders have an opportunity to play a positive role 
here. Whereas until now Egypt's mediation between Israel and Hamas has 
been limited to negotiating ceasefires and the Shalit prisoner-exchange 
deal, the new environment offers an opportunity for Egypt to help Israel 
and Hamas reach such broader understandings. 
The understandings suggested here would need to include the creation of 
mechanisms that would allow Israel and Hamas to explain to one another 
the steps they may take in an evolving crisis, so as to avoid 
misunderstandings that lead to inadvertent escalation. Such escalation has 
occurred in recent past, when Israel reacted to attacks launched by small 
extremist groups in the Sinai by punishing elements of Hamas in Gaza. 
Another important possible task for Egypt would be to play a more 
effective role in fostering internal Palestinian reconciliation. Playing such a 
role in a manner that does not clash with Israel's interests would require 
that both Israel and Hamas reframe their approaches to this issue. Israel 
would need to acknowledge that it has an interest in such reconciliation 
producing a single Palestinian address with which Israel can reach 
understandings, even if limited to practical matters falling short of full 
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resolution of the conflict. Within this context, Israel should further 
liberalize the arrangements guiding movements of goods to and from Gaza. 
In turn, Hamas would need to allow the creation of a new Palestinian 
government that would not be committed to implementing Hamas' 
ideology and would not include acknowledged members of the movement. 
In the latter case, Israel would need to reciprocate by accepting that the 
Quartet's three preconditions for engagement would apply to the post-
reconciliation new Palestinian government, not to the Hamas movement. 
The Sinai Peninsula 
The chaos in the Sinai Peninsula challenges both Israel and Egypt. As has 
already been demonstrated, extremist groups exploiting the chaos in the 
Sinai to launch terror attacks against Israel can exact a heavy toll on the 
Jewish state. In addition, chaos in the Sinai invites human trafficking, thus 
exacerbating Israel's problem of rising illegal immigration. Yet such chaos 
also challenges Egypt directly, as was made clear by the August 5 attack on 
an Egyptian army outpost, which claimed 16 Egyptian lives. More broadly, 
Egypt's sovereignty over Sinai—the restoration of which cost the 
Egyptians tens of thousands of lives during the 1970 War of Attrition and 
the 1973 War—has now been compromised, surrendered to an odd 
amalgamation of Bedouin tribes, Palestinian extremist groups, and al-
Qaeda affiliated cells. 
Thus Egypt and Israel share an interest in preventing the Sinai Peninsula 
from becoming a base for, and a magnet attracting, radical groups. For this 
reason, Israel has a national security interest in Egypt's taking measures to 
restore and reassert its sovereignty over the Sinai. At the same time, Israel 
fears that an Egyptian deployment of forces in the Sinai that significantly 
exceeds the limitations stipulated in the 1979 Peace Treaty would be a 
slippery slope. Forces ostensibly deployed against radical groups in the 
Peninsula may "forget" to leave. 
Muslim Brotherhood spokesmen have argued that, at a minimum, the 
security protocol of the 1979 treaty needs to be revised. This represents a 
turn to pragmatism, as the Brotherhood's leaders no longer call for 
abrogating the treaty. Yet Israelis understandably fear that opening up the 
treaty for revisions may prove to be just as slippery a slope. 
A different Israeli approach might transform this risk to an opportunity. 
This could be the case if such a discussion would result in the new 
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affirmation of the treaty, this time by an Egypt led by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Indeed, the added legitimacy bestowed by the Brotherhood's 
tacit acceptance of the treaty may even be worth some Israeli acceptance of 
changes in its security protocol. 
Syria and Iran 
On matters related to Iran and Syria, the geostrategic interests of Israel and 
Egypt do not collide. In his inaugural address, and more recently in his 
August 30 speech at the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran, President 
Morsi placed Egypt squarely with the opponents of Bashar Assad's regime 
and thus in opposition to Iran's efforts to save it. Indeed, with regard to the 
challenges that the civil war in Syria present, Israel and Egypt seem to 
share two important objectives: defeating Iran's efforts to expand its 
influence in the region, and avoiding Syria's becoming even more chaotic 
than the Sinai and thus an even more dangerous magnet for the most 
extreme Islamist groups and cells, al-Qaeda-affiliated or not. 
Egypt under Muslim Brotherhood leadership seems to view the Syria issue 
from two perspectives. As a leader of the Sunni Arab world, Egypt was 
clearly unhappy with the inroads that Shi`a Iran has made in the region, 
especially after the balance of power in the Gulf was destroyed by the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Iran's support of Hezbollah was particularly troubling, 
culminating in the April 2010 discovery of a Hezbollah cell in Egypt. And 
Assad's Syria was seen as an indispensible transport route for Iran's 
support of Hezbollah. 
Equally challenging are the prospects that post-revolutionary Syria would 
become a focal point for the region's Sunni Arab extremists in much the 
same way Iraq has experienced in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. The 
reemergence of such groups, this time in Syria, will challenge the 
Brotherhood as the leading authority in the world of Sunni political Islam. 
While Ennahada in Tunisia and the Brotherhood in Egypt have now come 
to represent one way to replace the old autocratic regimes of the Arab 
world, al-Qaeda represents the opposite approach. 
These two critically important Egyptian interests are not incongruent with 
the manner in which Israel's view of the Syrian scene has evolved in recent 
months. In turn, this provides an opportunity for Israel and Egypt's new 
leaders to share their assessments, directly or through their respective 
professional bodies. While these shared interests would not necessarily 
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translate into practical modes of cooperation, they at least point to the 
possibility that Israel and new Egypt may have common regional 
perspectives. 
Palestinian-Israeli Peace? 
Possibly the most intriguing question is whether Egypt can play a positive 
role in resuscitating the efforts to achieve Palestinian-Israeli Peace. The 
individuals handling the Palestinian file in Mubarak's Egypt were sensitive 
to Israel's concerns but not uncritical of Israeli policies. As noted earlier, 
the political leaders of post-Mubarak Egypt have very different sentiments. 
While clearly problematic from Israel's standpoint, the Brotherhood's 
track-record also gives it an opportunity to play a positive role in an effort 
to rekindle the stalemated peace process. Enjoying a level of credibility 
and influence with Hamas that the Mubarak regime lacked, Egypt's new 
leaders can help renew the peace efforts by impressing upon Hamas the 
utility of joining such efforts instead of opposing them. 
Yet for this more positive potential role for Egypt to materialize, Israel 
would need to adopt a more nuanced and creative approach. While not 
blind to the risks involved in trying to bridge or at least tactically bypass its 
ideological differences with Hamas and the broader Brotherhood 
movement, a new Israeli approach would need to recognize the enormous 
benefits of any agreement with the Palestinians that would win the 
acceptance, if not endorsement, of the leading forces of political Islam. 
The suggestions here point to the possibility that, despite the ideological 
gap dividing Israel and the new Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt, they may 
have interests that coincide. This in turn opens new opportunities for 
preserving the two counties' relations, if not necessarily improving them. 
Due to the sensitivities involved, exploiting these opportunities would 
require that Israel approach this task with a great deal of finesse and a 
willingness to act quietly. 
Artick 5. 
The Daily Beast 
Giving_Up
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Peter Beinart 
September 4, 2012 -- When it comes to Israel, the American Jewish right 
won't take yes for an answer. Today the Democrats released their party 
platform, and almost instantly, neoconservatives became apoplectic, with 
the Washington Post's Jennifer Rubin dubbing it the "most radically 
unsupportive statement of policy on Israel by a major U.S. party since the 
founding of the state of Israel." 
The reason? In 2008, the Democratic platform said America and its allies 
would "continue to isolate Hamas until it renounces terrorism, recognizes 
Israel's right to exist and abides by past agreements." This time, the 
platform merely said that "we will insist that any Palestinian partner must 
recognize Israel's right to exist, reject violence, and adhere to existing 
agreements" but didn't mention Hamas by name. In 2008, the platform said 
that "Jerusalem is and will remain the capital of Israel" and that the city's 
status "is a matter for final status negotiations." This year, the platform 
didn't mention Jerusalem at all. 
But in their desperation to paint Obama as Norman Finklestein in a better 
suit, Rubin and co. are missing the reality under their nose: The main 
difference between the 2008 and the 2012 platforms is that the latter 
deemphasizes the Palestinian issue altogether. The real message of the 
Democrats' 2012 platform is exactly the one Republicans have been 
longing to hear: We give up. 
Compare the 2008 and 2012 platforms side by side. In 2008, the 
Democrats began their Israel section with the peace process: "For more 
than three decades, Israelis, Palestinians, Arab leaders, and the rest of the 
world have looked to America to lead the effort to build the road to a 
secure and lasting peace." Then it went on to say how much America loves 
Israel. The 2012 platform, by contrast, starts with Israel love and spends an 
entire paragraph elaborating on it without ever mentioning the Palestinians. 
In 2008, in other words, America's support for Israel was defined as a 
means towards the larger goal of Israel-Palestinian peace. In 2012, support 
for Israel is an end in itself. 
And even when the 2012 platform does mention the peace process, it 
doesn't convey nearly the same urgency. In 2008, the Democrats pledged 
to "take an active role to help secure a lasting settlement of the Israel-
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Palestinian conflict." In 2012, the word "active" is gone, replaced with the 
weaker formulation: "President Obama and the Democratic Party seek 
peace between Israelis and Palestinians." In 2008, the platform insisted that 
"sustained American leadership for peace and security will require patient 
efforts and the personal commitment of the President of the United States." 
This year, there is no such pledge of "personal" presidential 
"commitment," just a formulaic promise to "continue to encourage all 
parties to be resolute in the pursuit of peace." 
In fact, the Israel-Palestine section of this year's platform is about 70 
words shorter than it was in 2008. That's the reason it doesn't specifically 
mention Jerusalem and Hamas. It's not that Obama and company are 
hatching a bold plan to force Israel into concessions more dramatic than 
the ones they wanted in 2008. They're not hatching anything at all, which 
is why this Democratic platform—unlike the last one—doesn't go into 
detail about the terms of a two state deal. 
At root, the 2012 platform is an admission of defeat. In 2008, the Israel 
section began with a rousing declaration of American leadership: "For 
more than three decades, Israelis, Palestinians, Arab leaders, and the rest of 
the world have looked to America to lead the effort to build the road to a 
secure and lasting peace." Now there's no such statement. And for good 
reason: Today the world no longer looks to America to lead a peace 
process. From Europe to Turkey to Egypt, America's current and former 
allies have largely given up on the U.S.-led peace process, and the 2012 
platform is yet more evidence that the Obama administration has 
essentially given up on it too. 
So don't fret, Jennifer Rubin. Rejoice! Team Obama is all but 
acknowledging that in a second term, the two state solution will be an 
afterthought. Which should make Hamas very happy indeed. 
Artick 6. 
Project Syndicate 
Asian Nationalism at Sea 
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Joseph S. Nye 
3 September 2012 -- Will war break out in the seas of East Asia? After 
Chinese and Japanese nationalists staged competing occupations of the 
barren landmasses that China refers to as the Diaoyu Islands and Japan 
calls the Senkaku Islands, angry demonstrators in the southwestern 
Chinese city of Chengdu chanted, "We must kill all Japanese." 
Likewise, a standoff between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the 
Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea led to protests in Manila. And a 
long planned step forward in cooperation between South Korea and Japan 
was torpedoed when the South Korean president visited the barren island 
that Korea calls Dokdo, Japan calls Takeshima, and the United States calls 
the Liancourt Rocks. 
One should not be too alarmist. The US has declared that the Senkaku 
Islands (administered by the Okinawa Prefecture when it was returned to 
Japan in 1972) are covered by the US-Japan security treaty. Meanwhile, the 
standoff over the Scarborough Shoal has calmed down, and, while Japan 
recalled its ambassador from South Korea over the Dokdo incident, it is 
unlikely the two countries would come to blows. 
But it is worth recalling that China used lethal force to expel Vietnamese 
from the Paracel Islands in 1974 and 1988. And China prevailed upon the 
Cambodian host of this year's ASEAN summit to block a final 
communiqué that would have called for a code of conduct in the South 
China Sea — the first time in the ten-member association's four-decade 
history that it failed to issue a communiqué. 
The revival of extreme nationalism in East Asia is both worrisome and 
understandable. In Europe, while Greeks may grumble about the terms of 
German backing for emergency financing, the period since World War II 
has seen enormous progress in knitting countries together. Nothing similar 
has happened in Asia, and issues dating back to the 1930's and 1940's 
remain raw, a problem exacerbated by biased textbooks and government 
policies. 
The Chinese Communist Party is not very communist any more. Instead, it 
bases its legitimacy on rapid economic growth and ethnic Han nationalism. 
Memories of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and Japanese aggression 
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in the 1930's are politically useful and fit within a larger theme of Chinese 
victimization by imperialist forces. 
Some American defense analysts view China's maritime strategy as being 
clearly aggressive. They point to increasing defense expenditures and the 
development of missile and submarine technology designed to cordon off 
the seas extending from China's coast to "the first island chain" of Taiwan 
and Japan. 
Others, however, see a Chinese strategy that is confused, contradictory, and 
paralyzed by competing bureaucratic interests. They point to the negative 
results of China's more assertive policies since the economic crisis of 
2008. Indeed, China's policies have damaged its relations with nearly all of 
its neighbors. 
Consider the Senkaku incident in 2010, when, after Japan arrested the crew 
of a Chinese trawler that had rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel, China 
escalated its economic reprisals. The result, as one Japanese analyst put it, 
was that "China scored an own goal," immediately reversing what had 
been a favorable trend in bilateral relations under the ruling Democratic 
Party of Japan. More generally, while China spends billions of renminbi in 
efforts to increase its soft power in Asia, its behavior in the South China 
Sea contradicts its own message. 
I have asked Chinese friends and officials why China follows such a 
counterproductive strategy. The first and formal answer is that China 
inherited historical territorial claims, including a map from the Nationalist 
period that sketches a "nine-dotted line" encompassing virtually the entire 
South China Sea. Today, with technology making underwater as well as 
fisheries resources more exploitable in the area, it is impossible to abandon 
this patrimony. In 2009-2010, some mid-ranking officials and 
commentators even referred to the South China Sea as a sovereign "core 
interest" like Taiwan or Tibet. 
But China's leaders have never been clear about the exact location of the 
"nine-dotted line," or about whether their claims refer only to certain land 
features, or also to more extensive continental shelves and seas. When 
asked why they do not clarify their claims, my Chinese interlocutors 
sometimes say that to do so would require difficult political and 
bureaucratic compromises that would provoke domestic nationalists. 
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